Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "تأليه شكوكي" in Arabic language version.
Sceptical theists are ... sceptical of our abilities to discern whether the evils in our world constitute good evidence against the existence of God.For a state of the art discussion of its merits and drawbacks, see Benton، Matthew A.؛ Hawthorne، John؛ Isaacs، Yoaav (2016). "Evil and Evidence" (PDF). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. ج. 7: 1–31. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0001. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2022-08-11..
Contemporary philosophers have further refined sceptical theism into a family of related views, each with a different defence. These defences include appeals to analogies (for example the parent/child relationship), appeals to the limitations of our grasp of the moral realm and appeals to epistemic requirements (for example sensitivity requirements or contextual requirements).
According to sceptical theists, the human mind is limited in such a way that it would not at all be surprising that God would have reasons that are beyond our understanding for allowing the evils of our world.
Sceptical theists are ... sceptical of our abilities to discern whether the evils in our world constitute good evidence against the existence of God.For a state of the art discussion of its merits and drawbacks, see Benton، Matthew A.؛ Hawthorne، John؛ Isaacs، Yoaav (2016). "Evil and Evidence" (PDF). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. ج. 7: 1–31. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0001. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2022-08-11..
Paul Draper... is an agnostic philosopher here in the Department at Purdue
Sceptical theists are ... sceptical of our abilities to discern whether the evils in our world constitute good evidence against the existence of God.For a state of the art discussion of its merits and drawbacks, see Benton، Matthew A.؛ Hawthorne، John؛ Isaacs، Yoaav (2016). "Evil and Evidence" (PDF). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. ج. 7: 1–31. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0001. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2022-08-11..
Contemporary philosophers have further refined sceptical theism into a family of related views, each with a different defence. These defences include appeals to analogies (for example the parent/child relationship), appeals to the limitations of our grasp of the moral realm and appeals to epistemic requirements (for example sensitivity requirements or contextual requirements).
The sceptical element of sceptical theism can be used to undermine various arguments for atheism including both the argument from evil and the argument from divine hiddenness.
According to sceptical theists, the human mind is limited in such a way that it would not at all be surprising that God would have reasons that are beyond our understanding for allowing the evils of our world.
Alston is not quite as explicit, but seems to agree. He calls the position he defends "agnosticism" (1996, 98). He says that our cognitive resources are "radically insufficient to provide sufficient warrant to accepting [the main premise of the evidential argument]," so much so that "the inductive argument collapses"
In particular, says the skeptical theist, we should not grant that our inability to think of a good reason for doing or allowing something is indicative of whether or not God might have a good reason for doing or allowing something.
It is important to get clear on the scope of the skepticism endorsed by skeptical theists. First, it is not a global skepticism—skeptical theists are not committed to the view that we cannot know anything at all. Instead, the skepticism is (putatively) limited to a narrow range of propositions, namely those having to do with God's reasons for action. For example, a skeptical theist could admit that humans have ceteris paribus knowledge of God's reasons for actions. An example of such knowledge might be the following: other-things-being-equal, God will eliminate suffering when he is able to do so. However, knowing this latter claim is consistent with denying that we know the following: God will eliminate this particular instance of suffering. Holding the combination of these two views is possible for the following reason: while we might know that other-things-being-equal, God will eliminate suffering when he is able to do so, we might not know whether or not other things are equal in any particular instance of suffering.
Not all theists are skeptical theists, and not all of the philosophers who endorse the skeptical component of skeptical theism are theists.
If skeptical theism is true, it appears to undercut the primary argument for atheism, namely the argument from evil. This is because skeptical theism provides a reason to be skeptical of a crucial premise in the argument from evil, namely the premise that asserts that at least some of the evils in our world are gratuitous.
Evidential arguments from evil attempt to show that, once we put aside any evidence there might be in support of the existence of God, it becomes unlikely, if not highly unlikely, that the world was created and is governed by an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being.
Sceptical theists are ... sceptical of our abilities to discern whether the evils in our world constitute good evidence against the existence of God.For a state of the art discussion of its merits and drawbacks, see Benton، Matthew A.؛ Hawthorne، John؛ Isaacs، Yoaav (2016). "Evil and Evidence" (PDF). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. ج. 7: 1–31. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0001. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2022-08-11..
In particular, says the skeptical theist, we should not grant that our inability to think of a good reason for doing or allowing something is indicative of whether or not God might have a good reason for doing or allowing something.
Alston is not quite as explicit, but seems to agree. He calls the position he defends "agnosticism" (1996, 98). He says that our cognitive resources are "radically insufficient to provide sufficient warrant to accepting [the main premise of the evidential argument]," so much so that "the inductive argument collapses"
Paul Draper... is an agnostic philosopher here in the Department at Purdue
Contemporary philosophers have further refined sceptical theism into a family of related views, each with a different defence. These defences include appeals to analogies (for example the parent/child relationship), appeals to the limitations of our grasp of the moral realm and appeals to epistemic requirements (for example sensitivity requirements or contextual requirements).
It is important to get clear on the scope of the skepticism endorsed by skeptical theists. First, it is not a global skepticism—skeptical theists are not committed to the view that we cannot know anything at all. Instead, the skepticism is (putatively) limited to a narrow range of propositions, namely those having to do with God's reasons for action. For example, a skeptical theist could admit that humans have ceteris paribus knowledge of God's reasons for actions. An example of such knowledge might be the following: other-things-being-equal, God will eliminate suffering when he is able to do so. However, knowing this latter claim is consistent with denying that we know the following: God will eliminate this particular instance of suffering. Holding the combination of these two views is possible for the following reason: while we might know that other-things-being-equal, God will eliminate suffering when he is able to do so, we might not know whether or not other things are equal in any particular instance of suffering.
Not all theists are skeptical theists, and not all of the philosophers who endorse the skeptical component of skeptical theism are theists.
If skeptical theism is true, it appears to undercut the primary argument for atheism, namely the argument from evil. This is because skeptical theism provides a reason to be skeptical of a crucial premise in the argument from evil, namely the premise that asserts that at least some of the evils in our world are gratuitous.
The sceptical element of sceptical theism can be used to undermine various arguments for atheism including both the argument from evil and the argument from divine hiddenness.
Evidential arguments from evil attempt to show that, once we put aside any evidence there might be in support of the existence of God, it becomes unlikely, if not highly unlikely, that the world was created and is governed by an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being.
According to sceptical theists, the human mind is limited in such a way that it would not at all be surprising that God would have reasons that are beyond our understanding for allowing the evils of our world.
