Dan Gusfield: The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms. The MIT Press, 1989, ISBN 0-262-07118-5, 1.1.1, S.3–4.
Description of market based on A. E. Roth: The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory. In: Journal of Political Economy. 92. Jahrgang, 1984, S.991–1016, doi:10.1086/261272.
Gusfield „Stable Marriage“ 64 references A.E. Roth: The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory. In: Journal of Political Economy. 92. Jahrgang, 1984, S.991–1016, doi:10.1086/261272. as proving that the pre-1995 algorithm is essentially the hospital-optimal algorithm described in Gusfield 39. Gusfield 41 demonstrates that the hospital-optimal algorithm is also applicant-pessimal.
Alvin Roth, Elliott Peranson: The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. In: The American Economic Review. 89. Jahrgang, Nr.4, September 1999, S.756–757, doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748 (stanford.edu [PDF; abgerufen am 31. Januar 2018]).
Gusfield „Stable Marriage“ 54 gives an example of a situation with no stable solution and states that proof of NP completeness comes from Eytan Ronn: NP-complete stable matching problems. In: Journal of Algorithms. 11. Jahrgang, Nr.2, Juni 1990, ISSN0196-6774, S.285–304, doi:10.1016/0196-6774(90)90007-2.
Alvin E. Roth, Elliott Peranson: The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. In: The American Economic Review. 89. Jahrgang, Nr.4, September 1999, S.756–757, doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748 (bepress.com (Memento des Originals vom 11. Juni 2011 im Internet Archive) [abgerufen am 31. Januar 2018]).
Sara Robinson: Are Medical Students Meeting Their (Best Possible) Match? In: SIAM News. Nr.3, April 2003, S.36 (siam.org (Memento des Originals vom 18. November 2016 im Internet Archive) [abgerufen am 31. Januar 2018]).
Alvin E. Roth, Elliott Peranson: The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. In: The American Economic Review. 89. Jahrgang, Nr.4, September 1999, S.756–757, doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748 (bepress.com (Memento des Originals vom 11. Juni 2011 im Internet Archive) [abgerufen am 31. Januar 2018]).
Alvin Roth, Elliott Peranson: The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. In: The American Economic Review. 89. Jahrgang, Nr.4, September 1999, S.756–757, doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748 (stanford.edu [PDF; abgerufen am 31. Januar 2018]).
Sara Robinson: Are Medical Students Meeting Their (Best Possible) Match? In: SIAM News. Nr.3, April 2003, S.36 (siam.org (Memento des Originals vom 18. November 2016 im Internet Archive) [abgerufen am 31. Januar 2018]).
Alvin E. Roth, Elliott Peranson: The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. In: The American Economic Review. 89. Jahrgang, Nr.4, September 1999, S.756–757, doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748 (bepress.com (Memento des Originals vom 11. Juni 2011 im Internet Archive) [abgerufen am 31. Januar 2018]).
Gusfield „Stable Marriage“ 54 gives an example of a situation with no stable solution and states that proof of NP completeness comes from Eytan Ronn: NP-complete stable matching problems. In: Journal of Algorithms. 11. Jahrgang, Nr.2, Juni 1990, ISSN0196-6774, S.285–304, doi:10.1016/0196-6774(90)90007-2.