Hoffmann (1990), p. 19: "In the absence of Chinese acquiescence, and with the onset of World War I, acceptance of the McMahon line by the British themselves (and especially by the British home government in London) became lukewarm and even unsupportive. British policy toward the line thereafter varied according to changing international circumstances (among them the problematical Russian attitude toward the Simla agreement in 1914) and the vagaries of bureaucratic politics in London, India, and Assam itself." Hoffmann, Steven A. (1990). India and the China Crisis. University of California Press. ISBN978-0-520-06537-6.
Hoffmann (1990), p. 20: "As of 1936 the India Office [of the British government] was prepared to concur with the suggestions about Aitchison's Treaties and the Survey of India change, but it set forth certain conditions. Of these the most important was that unnecessary publicity should be avoided; the press should not even be notified of the Aitchison changes. Hoffmann, Steven A. (1990). India and the China Crisis. University of California Press. ISBN978-0-520-06537-6.
Banerji, Arun Kumar (2007), "Borders", in Jayanta Kumar Ray (ed.), Aspects of India's International Relations, 1700 to 2000: South Asia and the World, Pearson Education India, pp. 173–256, ISBN978-81-317-0834-7: "Accordingly, a new edition of the vol. 14 of the Aitchison's Treaties was published in 1937, but to make the changes unobtrusive, it was passed off as the 1929 edition. This amounted to a virtual falsification of official documents.[61] Copies of the original 1929 edition of the Aitchison's Treaties were withdrawn and destroyed, with the possible exception of one, kept in the Harvard Library."
Brobst, Kashmir 1947 1998, p. 93. Brobst, Peter John (March 1998), "Kashmir 1947: Sir Olaf Caroe and the question of British 'Grand Design'", Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 36 (1): 92–123, doi:10.1080/14662049808447762
Mehra (1972), p. 305: "... what is patent is that for nearly two decades after 1914, the dubious risk of attracting Russian, and later Chinese, attention continued to be the principal reason for the non-publication of the Simla Convention and its adjuncts, the Trade Regulations and the India Tibet boundary agreement." Mehra, Parshotam (February 1972), "A Forgotten Chapter in the History of the Northeast Frontier: 1914-36", The Journal of Asian Studies, 31 (2): 299–308, doi:10.2307/2052598, JSTOR2052598, S2CID163657025
jstor.org
Mehra (1972), p. 305: "... what is patent is that for nearly two decades after 1914, the dubious risk of attracting Russian, and later Chinese, attention continued to be the principal reason for the non-publication of the Simla Convention and its adjuncts, the Trade Regulations and the India Tibet boundary agreement." Mehra, Parshotam (February 1972), "A Forgotten Chapter in the History of the Northeast Frontier: 1914-36", The Journal of Asian Studies, 31 (2): 299–308, doi:10.2307/2052598, JSTOR2052598, S2CID163657025
Gupta, Karunakar (July–September 1971), "The McMahon Line 1911-45: The British Legacy", The China Quarterly (47): 526, JSTOR652324
Mehra (1972), p. 305: "... what is patent is that for nearly two decades after 1914, the dubious risk of attracting Russian, and later Chinese, attention continued to be the principal reason for the non-publication of the Simla Convention and its adjuncts, the Trade Regulations and the India Tibet boundary agreement." Mehra, Parshotam (February 1972), "A Forgotten Chapter in the History of the Northeast Frontier: 1914-36", The Journal of Asian Studies, 31 (2): 299–308, doi:10.2307/2052598, JSTOR2052598, S2CID163657025
