This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, էջ. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, էջ 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, էջ. 947) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC231867665Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN978-0-7139-9037-9Searle, John (1980), «Minds, Brains and Programs»(PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից(PDF) 2015 թ․ սեպտեմբերի 23-ին
This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, էջ. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, էջ 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, էջ. 947) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC231867665Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN978-0-7139-9037-9Searle, John (1980), «Minds, Brains and Programs»(PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից(PDF) 2015 թ․ սեպտեմբերի 23-ին
Hubert Dreyfus writes: "In general, by accepting the fundamental assumptions that the nervous system is part of the physical world and that all physical processes can be described in a mathematical formalism which can, in turn, be manipulated by a digital computer, one can arrive at the strong claim that the behavior which results from human 'information processing,' whether directly formalizable or not, can always be indirectly reproduced on a digital machine." (Dreyfus 1972, էջեր 194–5). John Searle writes: "Could a man made machine think? Assuming it possible produce artificially a machine with a nervous system, ... the answer to the question seems to be obviously, yes ... Could a digital computer think? If by 'digital computer' you mean anything at all that has a level of description where it can be correctly described as the instantiation of a computer program, then again the answer is, of course, yes, since we are the instantiations of any number of computer programs, and we can think." (Searle 1980, էջ 11) Dreyfus, Hubert (1972), What Computers Can't Do, New York: MIT Press, ISBN978-0-06-011082-6Searle, John (1980), «Minds, Brains and Programs»(PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից(PDF) 2015 թ․ սեպտեմբերի 23-ին
Bringsjord, Selmer; Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar (2018), «Artificial Intelligence», in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից 2019 թ․ նոյեմբերի 9-ին, Վերցված է 2018 թ․ սեպտեմբերի 18-ին
This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, էջ. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, էջ 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, էջ. 947) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC231867665Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN978-0-7139-9037-9Searle, John (1980), «Minds, Brains and Programs»(PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից(PDF) 2015 թ․ սեպտեմբերի 23-ին
Hubert Dreyfus writes: "In general, by accepting the fundamental assumptions that the nervous system is part of the physical world and that all physical processes can be described in a mathematical formalism which can, in turn, be manipulated by a digital computer, one can arrive at the strong claim that the behavior which results from human 'information processing,' whether directly formalizable or not, can always be indirectly reproduced on a digital machine." (Dreyfus 1972, էջեր 194–5). John Searle writes: "Could a man made machine think? Assuming it possible produce artificially a machine with a nervous system, ... the answer to the question seems to be obviously, yes ... Could a digital computer think? If by 'digital computer' you mean anything at all that has a level of description where it can be correctly described as the instantiation of a computer program, then again the answer is, of course, yes, since we are the instantiations of any number of computer programs, and we can think." (Searle 1980, էջ 11) Dreyfus, Hubert (1972), What Computers Can't Do, New York: MIT Press, ISBN978-0-06-011082-6Searle, John (1980), «Minds, Brains and Programs»(PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից(PDF) 2015 թ․ սեպտեմբերի 23-ին
Bringsjord, Selmer; Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar (2018), «Artificial Intelligence», in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից 2019 թ․ նոյեմբերի 9-ին, Վերցված է 2018 թ․ սեպտեմբերի 18-ին
This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, էջ. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, էջ 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, էջ. 947) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC231867665Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN978-0-7139-9037-9Searle, John (1980), «Minds, Brains and Programs»(PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից(PDF) 2015 թ․ սեպտեմբերի 23-ին
Hubert Dreyfus writes: "In general, by accepting the fundamental assumptions that the nervous system is part of the physical world and that all physical processes can be described in a mathematical formalism which can, in turn, be manipulated by a digital computer, one can arrive at the strong claim that the behavior which results from human 'information processing,' whether directly formalizable or not, can always be indirectly reproduced on a digital machine." (Dreyfus 1972, էջեր 194–5). John Searle writes: "Could a man made machine think? Assuming it possible produce artificially a machine with a nervous system, ... the answer to the question seems to be obviously, yes ... Could a digital computer think? If by 'digital computer' you mean anything at all that has a level of description where it can be correctly described as the instantiation of a computer program, then again the answer is, of course, yes, since we are the instantiations of any number of computer programs, and we can think." (Searle 1980, էջ 11) Dreyfus, Hubert (1972), What Computers Can't Do, New York: MIT Press, ISBN978-0-06-011082-6Searle, John (1980), «Minds, Brains and Programs»(PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից(PDF) 2015 թ․ սեպտեմբերի 23-ին
This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, էջ. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, էջ 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, էջ. 947) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC231867665Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN978-0-7139-9037-9Searle, John (1980), «Minds, Brains and Programs»(PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, Արխիվացված է օրիգինալից(PDF) 2015 թ․ սեպտեմբերի 23-ին
