Liquid Courage, The American, by Charlie Szrom and Thomas Brugato. «Arkivert kopi». Arkivert fra originalen 26. oktober 2010. Besøkt 2. august 2010., 22 February 2008. See also Brugato, Thomas. (2008). Drunk On Oil: Russian Foreign Policy 2000–2007. Berkeley Undergraduate Journal, 21(2). Retrieved from: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/26d7t54f
Hill, Clifford G. Gaddy and Fiona (-001-11-30T00:00:00+00:00). «Putin Personality Disorder». Brookings(engelsk). Besøkt 21. mars 2022.Sjekk datoverdier i |dato= (hjelp)
The Russian World in Moscow’s Grand Strategy www.csis.org Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). av Igor Zevelev. August 2016.
sitat:The concepts of “compatriots abroad” and the “Russian World” have evolved within two different yet overlapping discourses. Each of these concepts has its own intellectual history. However, these ideas have something in common. Basically they both reflect the tension between actual Russian Federation state borders and the mental maps of “Russianness” that exist in the minds of many Russians.
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Of the Russian communities abroad, none faces a greater challenge than that in Ukraine. Today, Ukraine is effectively a lost cause within the context of the Russian World. For much of the Ukrainian population and for the entire political class, the idea of the Russian World has become synonymous with war.
«Menneskerettigheter og Den russisk-ortodokse kirke: opportunisme, autoritarianisme eller ortodoks nasjonalisme?» Hans Morten Haugen (2017) Nordisk Østforum 31, 45–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/noros.v31.726
sitat:Uavhengig av hvilke endringer som faktisk har funnet sted, er det sterke felles interesser mellom den russiske stat og ROK i å bevare tradisjonelle verdier og fremme patriotisme og en anti-vestlig agenda. Gjennom å gjensidig legitimere hverandre bidrar ROK og dagens russiske regime til hverandres opprettholdelse.
Mens Stoeckl og March peker på en endring der dialogorienterte tradisjonalister nå preger ROK fremfor sterkt intolerante fundamentalister, er andre skeptiske til at vi faktisk ser slike endringer, og hevder at vi snarere ser en tilbakevending til ortodokse verdier (Agadjanian 2010: 100). Forklaringer på en slik tilbakevending finner vi i et felles ønske mellom regimet og ROK om en forent anti-vestlig front. I tillegg, som vi kommer tilbake til under, har vi sett en revitalisering av teologiske begreper om sakralisering av nasjoner og guddommeliggjøring av mennesker, og en utvidelse av fellesskapsbegreper til å omfatte fellesskapet skapt gjennom ROK.
Liquid Courage, The American, by Charlie Szrom and Thomas Brugato. «Arkivert kopi». Arkivert fra originalen 26. oktober 2010. Besøkt 2. august 2010., 22 February 2008. See also Brugato, Thomas. (2008). Drunk On Oil: Russian Foreign Policy 2000–2007. Berkeley Undergraduate Journal, 21(2). Retrieved from: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/26d7t54f
Gaddy, Fiona Hill, Clifford G. (15. februar 2022). «Putin Personality Disorder». Foreign Policy(engelsk). Besøkt 21. mars 2022.
Putin Has a Grimly Absolute Vision of the ‘Russian World’. The Ukraine war is fueled by a delusion of civilizational necessity. Foreignpolicy.com kommentar av Benjamin R. Young. sitat:Putin believes an invasion of Ukraine is a righteous cause and necessary for the dignity of the Russian civilization, which he sees as being genetically and historically superior to other Eastern European identities. The idea of protecting Russian-speakers in Eurasia has been a key part of Putin's "Russkiy Mir" worldview and 21st-century Russian identity. Under the rubric of Russkiy Mir (Russian World), Putin's government promotes the idea that Russia is not a mere nation-state but a civilization-state that has an important role to play in world history.
While the Kremlin refers to the Ukrainian government as "Nazis," the actual neo-fascist ideologues in this conflict are those in the Russian leadership. Beginning as far back as 1994, Russian political elites started talking about a uniquely Eurasianist Russian civilization. In 1997, Russian post-liberal, neo-fascist philosopher Alexander Dugin, later an advisor to Putin, published his foundational book, Foundations of Geopolitics. Referred to as Putin's Rasputin, Dugin argues that the world order is shaped by competition between Sea Powers (Atlanticists), such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU countries, and Land Powers (Eurasianists), such as Russia.
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Beginning in 2012, Putin began to refer to a distinct Russian civilizational identity and explained that "the self-definition of the Russian people is that of a multiethnic civilization." Included within this civilizational framework are ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in former Soviet republics that extend beyond Russia's national borders. In 2020, Putin appeared on state television and said that Russia's unique civilizational identity needed to be protected via genetics and technological sophistication. This ideology positions contemporary Russia as a global bastion of traditional values and national conservatism. Most of all, it argues that the Kremlin has a duty and right to defend the interests and culture of Russian-speakers all over the world. Putin rejects the Westphalian state system for an irredentist vision of an expansionist Russian civilization.
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While security concerns regarding NATO expansion are certainly important to the Kremlin, the politico-cultural role that Ukraine plays in contemporary Russian ideology is of greater value to Putin's long-term vision of a rejuvenated Russian World. In February 2021, Putin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov named Ukraine as a part of Russkiy Mir.
Simply put, Putin and his circle genuinely do not believe Ukraine is a real country. To them, Ukraine has become too linguistically, culturally, and spiritually separated from Russian civilization. In the paranoid and Manichaean worldview of the Kremlin, the renegade region known in the West as "Ukraine" needs to be reconnected with its motherland, Russia. Russian history and civilization demand it.
Putin’s Thousand-Year War foreignpolicy.com (betalingsmur) av Michael Hirsh. 12.03.2022 sitat:Indeed, Putin may have been preparing for this moment longer than people realize: After the Russian leader annexed Crimea in 2014, the Kremlin’s longtime ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, wrote that it would mark "the end of Russia’s epic journey to the West, the cessation of repeated and fruitless attempts to become a part of Western civilization." Surkov predicted that Russia would exist in geopolitical solitude for at least the next hundred years.
Ensomhet hos en halvrase (14+) globalaffairs.ru
Vladislav Surkov. 04.09.2018 (via google translate) sitat:Det 14. året av vårt århundre huskes for viktige og svært viktige prestasjoner, som alle vet og alt er sagt. Men det viktigste av datidens hendelser blir først nå åpenbart for oss, og de langsomme, dype nyhetene om det når nå bare våre ører. Denne begivenheten er slutten på Russlands episke reise til Vesten, opphøret av gjentatte og fruktløse forsøk på å bli en del av den vestlige sivilisasjonen, for å gifte seg med den "gode familien" til europeiske folk. Fra det 14. året og utover strekker det seg en uendelig lang ny tid, epoken 14+, der vi vil ha hundre (to hundre? Tre hundre?) år med geopolitisk ensomhet. (orig:Одиночество полукровки (14+) (…) 14-й год нашего века памятен важными и очень важными свершениями, о которых всем известно и все сказано. Но важнейшее из тогдашних событий только теперь открывается нам, и медленная, глубинная новость о нем теперь только достигает наших ушей. Событие это – завершение эпического путешествия России на Запад, прекращение многократных и бесплодных попыток стать частью Западной цивилизации, породниться с «хорошей семьей» европейских народов.
С 14-го года и далее простирается неопределенно долгое новое время, эпоха 14+, в которую нам предстоит сто ( двести? триста?) лет геополитического одиночества.
Putins lange tilstand. Om hva som skjer her ng.ru Vladislav Surkov 02.11.2019 (via google translate)sitat: Det er nødvendig å forstå, forstå og beskrive Putins maktsystem og generelt hele komplekset av ideer og dimensjoner ved Putinismen som fremtidens ideologi. Det er fremtiden, siden den virkelige Putin neppe er en Putinist, akkurat som for eksempel Marx ikke er en marxist og det er ikke et faktum at han ville gått med på å være det hvis han visste hva det var. Men dette må gjøres for alle som ikke er Putin, men som gjerne vil være som ham. For å kunne kringkaste hans metoder og tilnærminger i tiden som kommer.
Beskrivelsen skal ikke utføres i stil med to propagandaer, vår og ikke vår, men på et språk som både russisk embetsverk og anti-russisk embetsverk vil oppfatte som moderat kjettersk. Et slikt språk kan bli akseptabelt for et ganske bredt publikum, noe som kreves, siden det politiske systemet laget i Russland er egnet ikke bare for en innenlandsk fremtid, det har tydeligvis et betydelig eksportpotensial, etterspørselen etter det eller for dets individuelle komponenter allerede eksisterer, blir dens erfaring studert og delvis adoptert, imitert av både regjerende og opposisjonelle grupper i mange land.
(Original:Владислав Сурков: Долгое государство Путина. О том, что здесь вообще происходит
Необходимо осознание, осмысление и описание путинской системы властвования и вообще всего комплекса идей и измерений путинизма как идеологии будущего. Именно будущего, поскольку настоящий Путин едва ли является путинистом, так же, как, например, Маркс не марксист и не факт, что согласился бы им быть, если бы узнал, что это такое. Но это нужно сделать для всех, кто не Путин, а хотел бы быть, как он. Для возможности трансляции его методов и подходов в предстоящие времена.
Описание должно быть исполнено не в стиле двух пропаганд, нашей и не нашей, а на языке, который и российский официоз, и антироссийский официоз воспринимали бы как умеренно еретический. Такой язык может стать приемлемым для достаточно широкой аудитории, что и требуется, поскольку сделанная в России политическая система пригодна не только для домашнего будущего, она явно имеет значительный экспортный потенциал, спрос на нее или на отдельные ее компоненты уже существует, ее опыт изучают и частично перенимают, ей подражают как правящие, так и оппозиционные группы во многих странах.)
Skeie, Kari (12. mars 2022). «Creme de la Kreml». NRK. Besøkt 12. mars 2022. «Som 23-åring vervet Putin seg til den russiske etterretningstjenesten. Han tilbrakte blant annet fem år i Dresden i det daværende Øst-Tyskland. Putin sluttet i KGB i 1991, men flere av hans venner fra denne perioden er fremdeles blant hans nærmeste rådgivere.»
Assessment of the Future of 'Russkiy Mir' in Russia’s Grand Strategy realcleardefense.com av Gabriela Rosa-Hernández. Artikkel. sitat:Summary: In October 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at the 7th World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad and approved a migration policy. In 2014, Russia utilized its "Russian World" rhetoric to justify its illegal annexation of Crimea and its support of secessionist groups in the Donbass. Following Russia’s demographic decline, and its economic issues; it is likely that the "Russian World" narrative will continue and focus on compatriot resettlement.
In First Interview Since Departure, Russia's Former 'Gray Cardinal' Questions Existence Of Ukraine rferl.org interview gjort av Mike Eckel. 26.02.2020 sitat:And he suggested that Ukrainians historically were upstarts who needed to be restrained by force. "Relations with Ukraine were never simple, even when Ukraine was part of Russia. Ukraine has always been troublesome for the imperial and Soviet bureaucracy," he was quoted as saying. "Forceful coercion for brotherly relations, this is the only method that has historically proven effective when it comes to Ukraine. I do not think that any other will be invented."
«About Russkiy Mir Foundation». Russkiy Mir Foundation. Arkivert fra originalen 21. september 2013. Besøkt 1. september 2013.«Arkivert kopi». Archived from the original on 21. september 2013. Besøkt 9. april 2022.CS1-vedlikehold: Uheldig URL (link)
«War brought Vladimir Putin to power in 1999. Now, it must bring him down | Jonathan Littell». the Guardian(engelsk). 3. mars 2022. Besøkt 3. mars 2022. «“You want to know who Vladimir Putin is, young man? Vladimir Putin is a lieutenant colonel of the KGB. And do you know what a lieutenant colonel of the KGB is? Absolutely nothing.” What Kovalev meant was that a man who had never even made full colonel was simply a small-minded operative, incapable of thinking ahead more than a move or two.»
Russia Is a ‘Distinct Civilization,’ Putin Saysthemoscowtimes.com sitat :"Russia is not just a country, it’s really a separate civilization. If we want to preserve this civilization, we should focus on high-level technology and its future development," Putin said.
"Russkiy Mir" as the Kremlin’s Quasi-ideology uacrisis.org sitat:The Kremlin defines anyone who, according to Vladimir Putin, "speaks and thinks in Russian", as a part of "Russkiy Mir". On such grounds Dmitriy Peskov, the spokesperson of the Russian President, has named Ukraine as a part of "Russkiy Mir" in February 2021. It yet again underlines the expansionist nature of the concept and refusal to agree with the national self-determination of other states.
uio.no
hf.uio.no
The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian Diplomacy uio.no Universitetet i Oslo, Senter for slaviske og østeuropeiske studier, invitasjon til Arrangement 2020, Alicja Curanović (Universitetet i Warszawa) skal holde foredrag om den russisk-ortodokse kirkens stadig mer fremtredende rolle i russisk statsdiplomati.
Sitat:The Church and the state in Russia
The Russian Federation's use of religion in foreign policy is exercised with a growing efficiency. This is, to a certain degree, a consequence of processes taking place in Russia: For many Russians, including the political elite, religion is a crucial component of tradition and as such the foundation of values for spiritual recovery of Russian society and Russia regaining its power status. The religious diplomacy is therefore a part of a wider phenomenon of rapprochement between Church and state in Russia.
The Church as a valuable diplomatic asset
Religion appears frequently in Russia’s official concepts of state policy: The country is depicted as a “civilisational pole” with its own cultural space (russkiy mir) and mission (i.e. promoting interfaith dialogue). Both russkiy mir and interfaith dialogue are connected with state security and soft power. Loyal religious organisations, capable of conducting transnational activity, are a valuable asset of state diplomacy. This is the case of the Russian Orthodox Church.
unit.no
uia.brage.unit.no
Religiøs og nasjonal symbolikk som virkemidler i sosiale medier Nicolaysen, Vegard, masteroppgave religion 2019. Universitetet i Agder
sitat: Den russisk-ortodokse kirkeog Russland forholder seg til landegrenser på ulike måter. Den russiske føderasjonen forholder seg i stor grad til en politisk landegrense, mens kirken har medlemmer over hele verden.
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Ifølge Patriark Kirill gjelder begrepet alle som helt eller delvis baserer sin nasjonale identitet på «Russian spiritual and cultural foundations …».42 Med Russkiy Mir Foundation kan statsmakten bidra til å danne et grunnlag for nasjonal bevissthet utover statens grenser, som igjen kan bli til nasjonalisme når ens eget samfunn tilsynelatende blir truet.
Liquid Courage, The American, by Charlie Szrom and Thomas Brugato. «Arkivert kopi». Arkivert fra originalen 26. oktober 2010. Besøkt 2. august 2010., 22 February 2008. See also Brugato, Thomas. (2008). Drunk On Oil: Russian Foreign Policy 2000–2007. Berkeley Undergraduate Journal, 21(2). Retrieved from: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/26d7t54f
«About Russkiy Mir Foundation». Russkiy Mir Foundation. Arkivert fra originalen 21. september 2013. Besøkt 1. september 2013.«Arkivert kopi». Archived from the original on 21. september 2013. Besøkt 9. april 2022.CS1-vedlikehold: Uheldig URL (link)
