Estado mental (Portuguese Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Estado mental" in Portuguese language version.

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34philpapers.org

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20stanford.edu

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8worldcat.org

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3springer.com

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3utm.edu

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1oxfordbibliographies.com

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apa.org

Kazdin, Alan E., ed. (2000). «thinking». Encyclopedia of Psychology. [S.l.]: American Psychological Association. ISBN 978-1-55798-187-5

britannica.com

«Mind». Encyclopædia Britannica (em inglês). Consultado em 31 de maio de 2021
«Philosophy of mind». Encyclopædia Britannica (em inglês). Consultado em 3 de junho de 2021
«Mind». Encyclopædia Britannica (em inglês). Consultado em 3 de junho de 2021

cambridge.org

Dresher, B. Elan; Hornstein, Norbert (1990). «Language and the deep unconscious mind: Aspectualities of the theory of syntax». Behavioral and Brain Sciences (em inglês). 13 (4): 602–603. ISSN 1469-1825. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00080377
McAlister, Linda L. (2004). «Brentano's epistemology». The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. [S.l.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 149–167. ISBN 978-0-521-00765-8

degruyter.com

Richard, Sébastien (2018). «Marty against Meinong on Assumptions». Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty. [S.l.]: De Gruyter. pp. 219–240. ISBN 9783110531480. doi:10.1515/9783110531480-010

doi.org

dx.doi.org

Tartaglia, James (2008). «Intentionality, Consciousness, and the Mark of the Mental: Rorty's Challenge». The Monist. 91 (2): 324–346. doi:10.5840/monist20089127
Pernu, Tuomas K. (2017). «The Five Marks of the Mental». Frontiers in Psychology (em English). 8: 1084. ISSN 1664-1078. PMC 5500963. PMID 28736537. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084
Goldstein, Irwin (2000). «Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States». Philosophy. 75 (291): 89–104. doi:10.1017/S0031819100000073
Johnson, Joshua (2013). «The Private Language Argument and a Second-Person Approach to Mindreading». European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 5 (4): 75–86. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v5i4.206
Searle, John R. (1991). «Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality». Philosophical Issues. 1: 45–66. ISSN 1533-6077. JSTOR 1522923. doi:10.2307/1522923
Smith, David Livingstone (1999). «John Searle: The Dispositional Unconscious». Freud's Philosophy of the Unconscious. Col: Studies in Cognitive Systems (em inglês). 23. [S.l.]: Springer Netherlands. pp. 137–150. ISBN 978-94-017-1611-6. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1611-6_14
Dresher, B. Elan; Hornstein, Norbert (1990). «Language and the deep unconscious mind: Aspectualities of the theory of syntax». Behavioral and Brain Sciences (em inglês). 13 (4): 602–603. ISSN 1469-1825. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00080377
Gillett, Eric (1996). «Searle and the "Deep Unconscious"». Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. 3 (3): 191–200. doi:10.1353/ppp.1996.0027
Crane, Tim (1998). «Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental». Cambridge University Press. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 43: 229–251. doi:10.1017/S1358246100004380
Haugeland, John (1990). «The Intentionality All-Stars». Philosophical Perspectives. 4: 383–427. ISSN 1520-8583. JSTOR 2214199. doi:10.2307/2214199
Bain, David (2003). «Intentionalism and Pain» (PDF). Philosophical Quarterly. 53 (213): 502–523. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00328
Gozzano, Simone (2019). «Locating and Representing Pain». Philosophical Investigations. 42 (4): 313–332. doi:10.1111/phin.12238
Lazzeri, Filipe (16 de agosto de 2019). «O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente?». Principia. 23 (2): 249–277. ISSN 1808-1711. doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p249
Gulick, Robert Van (15 de janeiro de 2009). Beckermann, Ansgar; McLaughlin, Brian P; Walter, Sven, eds. «Functionalism». The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (em inglês). ISBN 978-0-19-926261-8. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001
Bratman, Michael (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (em inglês). [S.l.: s.n.] JSTOR 2185304. doi:10.2307/2185304
Pallies, Daniel (2021). «An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure». Philosophical Studies. 178 (3): 887–907. doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01464-5
Bäuerle, Rainer; Cresswell, M. J. (2003). «Propositional Attitudes». Handbook of Philosophical Logic (em inglês). [S.l.]: Springer Netherlands. pp. 121–141. ISBN 978-94-017-4524-6. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-4524-6_4
Orpwood, Roger (2017). «Information and the Origin of Qualia». Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience (em English). 11: 22. PMC 5399078. PMID 28484376. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2017.00022
Crane, Tim (2009). «Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?». Philosophical Quarterly. 59 (236): 452–469. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.608.x
Jacquette, Dale (1985). «Sensation and Intentionality». Philosophical Studies. 47 (3): 429–440. ISSN 0031-8116. JSTOR 4319760. doi:10.1007/BF00355213
Grzankowski, Alex (2012). «Not All Attitudes Are Propositional». European Journal of Philosophy. 23 (3): 374–391. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00534.x
Searle, John R. (2018). «Are there Non-Propositional Intentional States?». Non-Propositional Intentionality. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-179680-7. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0011
Stephens, Lynn (1988). «Unconscious Sensations». Topoi. 7 (1): 5–10. doi:10.1007/BF00776204
Gligorov, Nada (2008). «Unconscious Pain». American Journal of Bioethics. 8 (9): 27–28. PMID 18853379. doi:10.1080/15265160802318246
Overgaard, Morten (19 de setembro de 2018). «Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access». Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 373 (1755). 20170353 páginas. PMC 6074085. PMID 30061466. doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0353
Bartlett, Gary (2018). «Occurrent States». Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 48 (1): 1–17. doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531. Consultado em 3 de abril de 2021. Cópia arquivada em 4 de maio de 2021
Nolfi, Kate (2015). «Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?». Philosophical Issues. 25 (1): 41–63. doi:10.1111/phis.12051
Nida-Rümelin, Julian (2000). «Rationality: Coherence and Structure». Rationality, Rules, and Structure (em inglês). [S.l.]: Springer Netherlands. pp. 1–16. ISBN 978-94-015-9616-9. doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9616-9_1
Zynda, Lyle (1996). «Coherence as an Ideal of Rationality». Synthese. 109 (2): 175–216. ISSN 0039-7857. JSTOR 20117566. doi:10.1007/BF00413767
Lord, Errol (1 de outubro de 2017). «What You're Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!)». Mind. 126 (504): 1109–1154. ISSN 0026-4423. doi:10.1093/mind/fzw023
Lillehammer, Hallvard (2010). «Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons». The Journal of Ethics. 14 (1): 17–26. doi:10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3
Richard, Sébastien (2018). «Marty against Meinong on Assumptions». Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty. [S.l.]: De Gruyter. pp. 219–240. ISBN 9783110531480. doi:10.1515/9783110531480-010

jstor.org

Searle, John R. (1991). «Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality». Philosophical Issues. 1: 45–66. ISSN 1533-6077. JSTOR 1522923. doi:10.2307/1522923
Haugeland, John (1990). «The Intentionality All-Stars». Philosophical Perspectives. 4: 383–427. ISSN 1520-8583. JSTOR 2214199. doi:10.2307/2214199
Bratman, Michael (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (em inglês). [S.l.: s.n.] JSTOR 2185304. doi:10.2307/2185304
Jacquette, Dale (1985). «Sensation and Intentionality». Philosophical Studies. 47 (3): 429–440. ISSN 0031-8116. JSTOR 4319760. doi:10.1007/BF00355213
Zynda, Lyle (1996). «Coherence as an Ideal of Rationality». Synthese. 109 (2): 175–216. ISSN 0039-7857. JSTOR 20117566. doi:10.1007/BF00413767

nih.gov

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

Martin, David C. (1990). «207 The Mental Status Examination». Clinical Methods: The History, Physical, and Laboratory Examinations 3rd ed. [S.l.]: Butterworths. ISBN 978-0-409-90077-4
Pernu, Tuomas K. (2017). «The Five Marks of the Mental». Frontiers in Psychology (em English). 8: 1084. ISSN 1664-1078. PMC 5500963. PMID 28736537. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084
Orpwood, Roger (2017). «Information and the Origin of Qualia». Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience (em English). 11: 22. PMC 5399078. PMID 28484376. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2017.00022
Gligorov, Nada (2008). «Unconscious Pain». American Journal of Bioethics. 8 (9): 27–28. PMID 18853379. doi:10.1080/15265160802318246
Overgaard, Morten (19 de setembro de 2018). «Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access». Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 373 (1755). 20170353 páginas. PMC 6074085. PMID 30061466. doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0353

oup.com

academic.oup.com

Lord, Errol (1 de outubro de 2017). «What You're Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!)». Mind. 126 (504): 1109–1154. ISSN 0026-4423. doi:10.1093/mind/fzw023

oxfordbibliographies.com

Rysiew, Patrick. «Rationality». Oxford Bibliographies (em inglês). Consultado em 4 de junho de 2021

oxfordhandbooks.com

Gulick, Robert Van (15 de janeiro de 2009). Beckermann, Ansgar; McLaughlin, Brian P; Walter, Sven, eds. «Functionalism». The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (em inglês). ISBN 978-0-19-926261-8. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001

philpapers.org

Tartaglia, James (2008). «Intentionality, Consciousness, and the Mark of the Mental: Rorty's Challenge». The Monist. 91 (2): 324–346. doi:10.5840/monist20089127
Kim, Jaegwon (2006). «1. Introduction». Philosophy of Mind Second ed. [S.l.]: Boulder: Westview Press
Honderich, Ted (2005). «Mind». The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press
Honderich, Ted (2005). «mind, problems of the philosophy of». The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press
Goldstein, Irwin (2000). «Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States». Philosophy. 75 (291): 89–104. doi:10.1017/S0031819100000073
Johnson, Joshua (2013). «The Private Language Argument and a Second-Person Approach to Mindreading». European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 5 (4): 75–86. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v5i4.206
Gillett, Eric (1996). «Searle and the "Deep Unconscious"». Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. 3 (3): 191–200. doi:10.1353/ppp.1996.0027
Crane, Tim (1998). «Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental». Cambridge University Press. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 43: 229–251. doi:10.1017/S1358246100004380
Heil, John (2004). «Introduction». Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction (Second Edition). [S.l.]: New York: Routledge
Bain, David (2003). «Intentionalism and Pain» (PDF). Philosophical Quarterly. 53 (213): 502–523. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00328
Gozzano, Simone (2019). «Locating and Representing Pain». Philosophical Investigations. 42 (4): 313–332. doi:10.1111/phin.12238
Craig, Edward (1996). «perception». Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [S.l.]: Routledge
Borchert, Donald (2006). «perception». Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition. [S.l.]: Macmillan
Borchert, Donald (2006). «Belief». Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition. [S.l.]: Macmillan. Consultado em 2 de abril de 2021. Cópia arquivada em 12 de janeiro de 2021
Bratman, Michael (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (em inglês). [S.l.: s.n.] JSTOR 2185304. doi:10.2307/2185304
Pallies, Daniel (2021). «An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure». Philosophical Studies. 178 (3): 887–907. doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01464-5
Lopez, Shane J. (2009). «Pleasure». The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology. [S.l.]: Wiley-Blackwell
Mangan, Bruce (2001). «Sensation's Ghost: The Nonsensory Fringe of Consciousness». Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness. 7. Consultado em 3 de junho de 2021
Crane, Tim (2009). «Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?». Philosophical Quarterly. 59 (236): 452–469. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.608.x
Kalpokas, Daniel E. (2020). «Perception as a Propositional Attitude». Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia. 35 (2): 155–174
Crane, Tim (2003). «The Intentional Structure of Consciousness». Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives: 33–56
Grzankowski, Alex (2012). «Not All Attitudes Are Propositional». European Journal of Philosophy. 23 (3): 374–391. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00534.x
Stephens, Lynn (1988). «Unconscious Sensations». Topoi. 7 (1): 5–10. doi:10.1007/BF00776204
Gligorov, Nada (2008). «Unconscious Pain». American Journal of Bioethics. 8 (9): 27–28. PMID 18853379. doi:10.1080/15265160802318246
Strandberg, Caj (2012). «Expressivism and Dispositional Desires: 2. a distinction in mind». American Philosophical Quarterly. 49 (1): 81–91
Bartlett, Gary (2018). «Occurrent States». Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 48 (1): 1–17. doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531. Consultado em 3 de abril de 2021. Cópia arquivada em 4 de maio de 2021
Frise, Matthew (2018). «Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs». American Philosophical Quarterly. 55 (1): 63–79. Consultado em 3 de abril de 2021. Cópia arquivada em 1 de junho de 2021
Nolfi, Kate (2015). «Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?». Philosophical Issues. 25 (1): 41–63. doi:10.1111/phis.12051
Mele, Alfred R.; Rawling, Piers (2004). «Introduction: Aspects of Rationality». The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press
Audi, Robert (2001). The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press. pp. 19, 34
Kiesewetter, Benjamin. «Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness». Australasian Philosophical Review
Lillehammer, Hallvard (2010). «Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons». The Journal of Ethics. 14 (1): 17–26. doi:10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3
Kriegel, Uriah (2018). «3. The Modes of Conscious Intentionality». Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value. [S.l.]: Oxford: Oxford University Press
Kriegel, Uriah (2015). «Conclusion: The Structure of the Phenomenal Realm». The Varieties of Consciousness. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press

routledge.com

rep.routledge.com

Pettit, Philip. «Desire - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy». www.rep.routledge.com (em inglês). Consultado em 4 de maio de 2021
Oppy, Graham. «Propositional attitudes». Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (em inglês). Consultado em 3 de junho de 2021
Rey, Georges. «Unconscious mental states». Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (em inglês). [S.l.: s.n.] Consultado em 3 de junho de 2021

springer.com

link.springer.com

Smith, David Livingstone (1999). «John Searle: The Dispositional Unconscious». Freud's Philosophy of the Unconscious. Col: Studies in Cognitive Systems (em inglês). 23. [S.l.]: Springer Netherlands. pp. 137–150. ISBN 978-94-017-1611-6. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1611-6_14
Bäuerle, Rainer; Cresswell, M. J. (2003). «Propositional Attitudes». Handbook of Philosophical Logic (em inglês). [S.l.]: Springer Netherlands. pp. 121–141. ISBN 978-94-017-4524-6. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-4524-6_4
Nida-Rümelin, Julian (2000). «Rationality: Coherence and Structure». Rationality, Rules, and Structure (em inglês). [S.l.]: Springer Netherlands. pp. 1–16. ISBN 978-94-015-9616-9. doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9616-9_1

stanford.edu

plato.stanford.edu

Bourget, David; Mendelovici, Angela (2019). «Phenomenal Intentionality». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 31 de maio de 2021
Huemer, Wolfgang (2019). «Franz Brentano: 3.2 Intentionality». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 28 de maio de 2021
Siewert, Charles (2017). «Consciousness and Intentionality». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 31 de maio de 2021
Jacob, Pierre (2019). «Intentionality». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 31 de maio de 2021
Levin, Janet (2018). «Functionalism». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 31 de maio de 2021
Graham, George (2019). «Behaviorism». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 31 de maio de 2021
de Vignemont, Frédérique (2020). «Bodily Awareness». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 23 de junho de 2021
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2019). «Belief». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 22 de junho de 2020. Cópia arquivada em 15 de novembro de 2019
Schroeder, Tim (2020). «Desire». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 3 de maio de 2021
Setiya, Kieran (2018). «Intention». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 23 de junho de 2021
Scarantino, Andrea; de Sousa, Ronald (2021). «Emotion». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 23 de junho de 2021
Liao, Shen-yi; Gendler, Tamar (2020). «Imagination». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 23 de junho de 2021
Michaelian, Kourken; Sutton, John (2017). «Memory». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 23 de junho de 2021
Senor, Thomas D. (2019). «Epistemological Problems of Memory». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 23 de junho de 2021
Tye, Michael (2018). «Qualia: 2. Which Mental States Possess Qualia?». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 3 de junho de 2021
Wu, Wayne (2018). «The Neuroscience of Consciousness: 1.3 Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 3 de junho de 2021
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2019). «Belief». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 4 de junho de 2021
Schroeder, Tim (2020). «Desire». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 4 de junho de 2021
Huemer, Wolfgang (2019). «Franz Brentano». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 24 de junho de 2021
Marek, Johann (2021). «Alexius Meinong». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 24 de junho de 2021

ufsc.br

periodicos.ufsc.br

Lazzeri, Filipe (16 de agosto de 2019). «O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente?». Principia. 23 (2): 249–277. ISSN 1808-1711. doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p249

universitypressscholarship.com

oxford.universitypressscholarship.com

Searle, John R. (2018). «Are there Non-Propositional Intentional States?». Non-Propositional Intentionality. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-179680-7. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0011

utm.edu

iep.utm.edu

Polger, Thomas W. «Functionalism». Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado em 31 de maio de 2021
Johnson, Gregory. «Emotion, Theories of». Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado em 23 de junho de 2021
Murphy, Peter. «Coherentism in Epistemology». Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado em 5 de junho de 2021

web.archive.org

Schwitzgebel, Eric (2019). «Belief». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 22 de junho de 2020. Cópia arquivada em 15 de novembro de 2019
Borchert, Donald (2006). «Belief». Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition. [S.l.]: Macmillan. Consultado em 2 de abril de 2021. Cópia arquivada em 12 de janeiro de 2021
Bartlett, Gary (2018). «Occurrent States». Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 48 (1): 1–17. doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531. Consultado em 3 de abril de 2021. Cópia arquivada em 4 de maio de 2021
Frise, Matthew (2018). «Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs». American Philosophical Quarterly. 55 (1): 63–79. Consultado em 3 de abril de 2021. Cópia arquivada em 1 de junho de 2021

worldcat.org

Pernu, Tuomas K. (2017). «The Five Marks of the Mental». Frontiers in Psychology (em English). 8: 1084. ISSN 1664-1078. PMC 5500963. PMID 28736537. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084
Searle, John R. (1991). «Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality». Philosophical Issues. 1: 45–66. ISSN 1533-6077. JSTOR 1522923. doi:10.2307/1522923
Dresher, B. Elan; Hornstein, Norbert (1990). «Language and the deep unconscious mind: Aspectualities of the theory of syntax». Behavioral and Brain Sciences (em inglês). 13 (4): 602–603. ISSN 1469-1825. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00080377
Haugeland, John (1990). «The Intentionality All-Stars». Philosophical Perspectives. 4: 383–427. ISSN 1520-8583. JSTOR 2214199. doi:10.2307/2214199
Lazzeri, Filipe (16 de agosto de 2019). «O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente?». Principia. 23 (2): 249–277. ISSN 1808-1711. doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p249
Jacquette, Dale (1985). «Sensation and Intentionality». Philosophical Studies. 47 (3): 429–440. ISSN 0031-8116. JSTOR 4319760. doi:10.1007/BF00355213
Zynda, Lyle (1996). «Coherence as an Ideal of Rationality». Synthese. 109 (2): 175–216. ISSN 0039-7857. JSTOR 20117566. doi:10.1007/BF00413767
Lord, Errol (1 de outubro de 2017). «What You're Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!)». Mind. 126 (504): 1109–1154. ISSN 0026-4423. doi:10.1093/mind/fzw023