Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "برنامج إيران النووي" in Arabic language version.
{{استشهاد ويب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ الوصول= و|تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد بخبر}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |سنة= لا يطابق |تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: |الأول4= باسم عام (help) and الوسيط |مؤلف3= يحوي أسماء رقمية (help)صيانة الاستشهاد: أسماء عددية: قائمة المؤلفين (link)This concern led Western governments to withdraw support for Iran's nuclear program. Pressure on France, which in 1973 signed a deal to build two reactors at Darkhovin, and Germany, whose Kraftwerk Union began building a pair of reactors at Bushehr in 1975, led to the cancellation of both projects.
Since 2003, the IAEA Secretariat has reported specific cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements by Iran, Libya, South Korea and Egypt to the board (Step 2). The actions taken by the board in each case were inconsistent and, if they go uncorrected, will create unfortunate precedents.
South Korea publicly disclosed its past secret nuclear research activities, revealing that it had conducted chemical uranium enrichment from 1979 to 1981, separated small quantities of plutonium in 1982, experimented with uranium enrichment in 2000, and manufactured depleted uranium munitions from 1983 to 1987. The South Korean government had violated its international agreements by not declaring any of these activities to the IAEA in Vienna.
{{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: صيانة الاستشهاد: أسماء متعددة: قائمة المؤلفين (link){{استشهاد بخبر}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |سنة= لا يطابق |تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ الوصول= و|تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة){{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة)In official consultations with the Agency and member-states throughout the 1990s, Iran underlined its plan to acquire, for exclusively peaceful purposes, various aspects of nuclear technology, including fuel enrichment.
In accordance with Article IV of the NPT, States Parties undertook to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Indeed, the inalienable right of all States Parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination constitutes the very foundation of the Treaty.
{{استشهاد ويب}}: الوسيط غير المعروف |unused_data= تم تجاهله (مساعدة){{استشهاد بخبر}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |سنة= لا يطابق |تاريخ= (مساعدة)Since 2003, the IAEA Secretariat has reported specific cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements by Iran, Libya, South Korea and Egypt to the board (Step 2). The actions taken by the board in each case were inconsistent and, if they go uncorrected, will create unfortunate precedents.
{{استشهاد ويب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: تحقق من قيمة |مسار أرشيف= (مساعدة)Iran argues that this experience indicates that joint ownership of foreign facilities does not solve the problem of assuring fuel supply ... The recent experience in which Russian fuel supply to Bushehr was delayed for an extended period as disputes over Iran's nuclear program continued also contributed to Iran's perception that foreign fuel supply is unreliable.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |سنة= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: صيانة الاستشهاد: BOT: original URL status unknown (link){{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: صيانة الاستشهاد: BOT: original URL status unknown (link)The agency's Director General and Board of Governors recognized Iran had breached its NPT safeguards obligations, but argued that it actually had a right under the treaty to make nuclear fuel ... U.S. officials and the IAEA board of governors chose in 2004 and 2005 to use this same line of reasoning to decide not to forward reports of safeguards infractions by South Korea and Egypt to the UN Security Council.
{{استشهاد ويب}}: الوسيط |title= غير موجود أو فارغ (مساعدة){{استشهاد بخبر}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |سنة= لا يطابق |تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: صيانة الاستشهاد: BOT: original URL status unknown (link){{استشهاد ويب}}: الوسيط |title= غير موجود أو فارغ (مساعدة)Any nuclear activity may entail proliferation concerns. But there are internationally-agreed mechanisms to address such concerns, ... Iran has been the only country, with comparable technology, that has been prepared to implement these proposals.
{{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة)The agency's Director General and Board of Governors recognized Iran had breached its NPT safeguards obligations, but argued that it actually had a right under the treaty to make nuclear fuel ... U.S. officials and the IAEA board of governors chose in 2004 and 2005 to use this same line of reasoning to decide not to forward reports of safeguards infractions by South Korea and Egypt to the UN Security Council.
Since 2003, the IAEA Secretariat has reported specific cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements by Iran, Libya, South Korea and Egypt to the board (Step 2). The actions taken by the board in each case were inconsistent and, if they go uncorrected, will create unfortunate precedents.
South Korea publicly disclosed its past secret nuclear research activities, revealing that it had conducted chemical uranium enrichment from 1979 to 1981, separated small quantities of plutonium in 1982, experimented with uranium enrichment in 2000, and manufactured depleted uranium munitions from 1983 to 1987. The South Korean government had violated its international agreements by not declaring any of these activities to the IAEA in Vienna.
{{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: صيانة الاستشهاد: أسماء متعددة: قائمة المؤلفين (link){{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة)Iran argues that this experience indicates that joint ownership of foreign facilities does not solve the problem of assuring fuel supply ... The recent experience in which Russian fuel supply to Bushehr was delayed for an extended period as disputes over Iran's nuclear program continued also contributed to Iran's perception that foreign fuel supply is unreliable.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |سنة= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: replacement character في |عنوان= في مكان 36 (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: تحقق من قيمة |مسار أرشيف= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: صيانة الاستشهاد: BOT: original URL status unknown (link){{استشهاد ويب}}: الوسيط غير المعروف |unused_data= تم تجاهله (مساعدة)In official consultations with the Agency and member-states throughout the 1990s, Iran underlined its plan to acquire, for exclusively peaceful purposes, various aspects of nuclear technology, including fuel enrichment.
This concern led Western governments to withdraw support for Iran's nuclear program. Pressure on France, which in 1973 signed a deal to build two reactors at Darkhovin, and Germany, whose Kraftwerk Union began building a pair of reactors at Bushehr in 1975, led to the cancellation of both projects.
{{استشهاد بخبر}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |سنة= لا يطابق |تاريخ= (مساعدة)In 2006, it embarked on a uranium enrichment programme, defining it as part of its civilian nuclear energy programme, which is permitted under Article IV of the NPT.
In accordance with Article IV of the NPT, States Parties undertook to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Indeed, the inalienable right of all States Parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination constitutes the very foundation of the Treaty.
{{استشهاد بخبر}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |سنة= لا يطابق |تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد بخبر}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |سنة= لا يطابق |تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد بخبر}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |سنة= لا يطابق |تاريخ= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ= (مساعدة)In 2006, it embarked on a uranium enrichment programme, defining it as part of its civilian nuclear energy programme, which is permitted under Article IV of the NPT.
Any nuclear activity may entail proliferation concerns. But there are internationally-agreed mechanisms to address such concerns, ... Iran has been the only country, with comparable technology, that has been prepared to implement these proposals.