Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "حرية الإرادة" in Arabic language version.
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: |صحيفة= تُجوهل (مساعدة) Full text on line at us.archive.org....Aristotle and Epictetus: In the latter authors it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them. In Alexander's account, the terms are understood differently: what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them.
...Aristotle and Epictetus: In the latter authors it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them. In Alexander's account, the terms are understood differently: what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them.
Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been proposed.
The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress.
One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free flowing..
Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences, etc.), or are those higher mental processes determined by those states?Also found in John A Bargh (2008). "Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural". Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. ص. 128 ff. ISBN:0195189639. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-03-07.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: الوسيط غير المعروف |المحررين= تم تجاهله (مساعدة)...the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it.... Whether we affirm or deny necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of moral freedom and responsibility.
Instead of postulating a universal law of causality and then having to deny the possibility of choice, we start with the premise that freedom of choice exists, and then we seek to explain causality as a property of brains.
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: |صحيفة= تُجوهل (مساعدة) Full text on line at us.archive.org.{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: الوسيط غير المعروف |المحررين= تم تجاهله (مساعدة)The body-mind relationship...includes the problem of man's position in the physical world...'World 1'. The world of conscious human processes I shall call 'World 2', and the world of the objective creations of the human mind I shall call 'World 3'.
The nonconscious forms of self-regulation may follow different causal principles and do not rely on the same resources as the conscious and effortful ones.
Yet perhaps not all conscious volition is an illusion. Our findings suggest that the traditional folk notions of willpower and character strength have some legitimate basis in genuine phenomena.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: الوسيط غير المعروف |المحررين= تم تجاهله (مساعدة){{استشهاد بكتاب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ الوصول= (مساعدة)Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by DC Dennett (2003). "The self as a responding and responsible artifact" (PDF). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. ج. 1001 ع. 1: 39–50. Bibcode:2003NYASA1001...39D. DOI:10.1196/annals.1279.003. PMID:14625354. S2CID:46156580. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2021-04-15.
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: |صحيفة= تُجوهل (مساعدة) Full text on line at us.archive.org.Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by DC Dennett (2003). "The self as a responding and responsible artifact" (PDF). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. ج. 1001 ع. 1: 39–50. Bibcode:2003NYASA1001...39D. DOI:10.1196/annals.1279.003. PMID:14625354. S2CID:46156580. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2021-04-15.
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: |صحيفة= تُجوهل (مساعدة) Full text on line at us.archive.org.... any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description.
Feelings or intuitions per se never count as self-evident proof of anything.Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will For full text on line see this نسخة محفوظة 2013-05-05 على موقع واي باك مشين..
Feelings or intuitions per se never count as self-evident proof of anything.Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will For full text on line see this نسخة محفوظة 2013-05-05 على موقع واي باك مشين..
Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by DC Dennett (2003). "The self as a responding and responsible artifact" (PDF). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. ج. 1001 ع. 1: 39–50. Bibcode:2003NYASA1001...39D. DOI:10.1196/annals.1279.003. PMID:14625354. S2CID:46156580. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2021-04-15.
{{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ الوصول= (help)Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by DC Dennett (2003). "The self as a responding and responsible artifact" (PDF). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. ج. 1001 ع. 1: 39–50. Bibcode:2003NYASA1001...39D. DOI:10.1196/annals.1279.003. PMID:14625354. S2CID:46156580. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2021-04-15.
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: |صحيفة= تُجوهل (مساعدة) Full text on line at us.archive.org.Philosophers who distinguish freedom of action and freedom of will do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually) our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or "willings".
Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by DC Dennett (2003). "The self as a responding and responsible artifact" (PDF). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. ج. 1001 ع. 1: 39–50. Bibcode:2003NYASA1001...39D. DOI:10.1196/annals.1279.003. PMID:14625354. S2CID:46156580. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2021-04-15.
{{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة)...Aristotle and Epictetus: In the latter authors it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them. In Alexander's account, the terms are understood differently: what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them.
...Aristotle and Epictetus: In the latter authors it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them. In Alexander's account, the terms are understood differently: what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them.
{{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة)Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been proposed.
The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress.
Feelings or intuitions per se never count as self-evident proof of anything.Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will For full text on line see this نسخة محفوظة 2013-05-05 على موقع واي باك مشين..
One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free flowing..
Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences, etc.), or are those higher mental processes determined by those states?Also found in John A Bargh (2008). "Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural". Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. ص. 128 ff. ISBN:0195189639. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-03-07.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: الوسيط غير المعروف |المحررين= تم تجاهله (مساعدة)...the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it.... Whether we affirm or deny necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of moral freedom and responsibility.
Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by DC Dennett (2003). "The self as a responding and responsible artifact" (PDF). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. ج. 1001 ع. 1: 39–50. Bibcode:2003NYASA1001...39D. DOI:10.1196/annals.1279.003. PMID:14625354. S2CID:46156580. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2021-04-15.
Instead of postulating a universal law of causality and then having to deny the possibility of choice, we start with the premise that freedom of choice exists, and then we seek to explain causality as a property of brains.
... any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description.
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: |صحيفة= تُجوهل (مساعدة) Full text on line at us.archive.org.{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: الوسيط غير المعروف |المحررين= تم تجاهله (مساعدة)The body-mind relationship...includes the problem of man's position in the physical world...'World 1'. The world of conscious human processes I shall call 'World 2', and the world of the objective creations of the human mind I shall call 'World 3'.
The nonconscious forms of self-regulation may follow different causal principles and do not rely on the same resources as the conscious and effortful ones.
Yet perhaps not all conscious volition is an illusion. Our findings suggest that the traditional folk notions of willpower and character strength have some legitimate basis in genuine phenomena.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: الوسيط غير المعروف |المحررين= تم تجاهله (مساعدة){{استشهاد بكتاب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ الوصول= (مساعدة){{استشهاد ويب}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ الوصول= (help){{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة)Philosophers who distinguish freedom of action and freedom of will do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually) our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or "willings".
Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences, etc.), or are those higher mental processes determined by those states?Also found in John A Bargh (2008). "Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural". Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. ص. 128 ff. ISBN:0195189639. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-03-07.
{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: الوسيط غير المعروف |المحررين= تم تجاهله (مساعدة)