معاداة السنة (Arabic Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "معاداة السنة" in Arabic language version.

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  • Commins، David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. ص. 192. In Russia and Central Asia, public figures and the media see Wahhabism as the inspiration for religious revival and Islamic political movements. During the Soviet era, official apprehensions emerged about an 'Islamic threat' posed by Sufi orders as nests of secret conspiracies against the communist system. In the post-Soviet era, Sufism has assumed a positive connotation as a moderate form of Islam opposed to Wahhabism, which has become a sort of bogeyman in public discourse. Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for 'importing' Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region's heritage. Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront 'a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan.' The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles
  • Commins، David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU: I.B TAURIS. ص. 192. Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for 'importing' Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region's heritage.Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront 'a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan. The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles.{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: صيانة الاستشهاد: مكان (link)

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brookings.edu

ca-c.org

  • Atkin، Muriel. "THE RHETORIC OF ISLAMOPHOBIA". CA&C Press AB. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2012-01-25. In political, as well as religious matters, any Muslim who challenges the status quo is at risk of being labeled a Wahhabi. This is how the KGB and its post-Soviet successors have used the term. In fact, the KGB may have played a large role in promoting its use

carnegieendowment.org

  • Ostovar، Afshon (30 نوفمبر 2016). "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2018-04-25. However, by equating takfirism and Wahhabism, Iran further muddies the water of identity politics. It is a way of confusing the sectarian dynamic in Iraq and Syria, by asserting that the other side is not actually Sunni, but rather an extreme ideological movement (takfirism) that is beyond the pale of Islam and, therefore, not even Islamic. Like the case of the Saudi grand mufti, such rhetoric allows Iranian officials to indulge in their own game of takfir—articulating who is and who is not a Muslim and justifying actions accordingly. To neutral observers of Wahhabism, such accusations might touch on truth, but as a foreign policy tool, they only beget further acrimony from Iran's Sunni neighbors.
  • OSTOVAR، AFSHON PAPER Source: Getty Summary (30 نوفمبر 2016). "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-08-09. In September, the New York Times published an op-ed by Iran's foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, entitled "Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism."Zarif contends that Wahhabist Islam has become a plague, unleashing terrorism and murderous tumult across the Middle East and throughout the world. He calls Wahhabism a "theological perversion" that has "wrought havoc" and had a "devastating" impact in Islamic communities. The violence committed by jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda is a direct result of "Riyadh's persistent sponsorship of extremism," he argues, and this violence is at the root of the current conflicts in the Middle East. He accuses Saudi Arabia of "playing the 'Iran card'" to induce its allies to take part in the Syrian and Yemeni wars, and he concludes that "concrete action against extremism is needed." Even though Riyadh caused the mess, Zarif "invite[s]" Saudi Arabia to be part of the solution. That gesture rings hollow given the accusatory tone of the piece. It is clearly a polemic against Iran's neighbor and archrival, another salvo in their ongoing cold war.

cnn.com

edition.cnn.com

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dailysabah.com

  • Sebnem Oruc، Merve (25 فبراير 2020). "How did the world buy Assad's 'war on terror' narrative?". Daily Sabah. ص. While the Assad regime and its most loyal backer Iran provided an opportunity for the rise of al-Qaida and Daesh in Syria, Damascus also allowed the radicals to travel abroad freely to confuse the Westerners. The extremists went abroad and recruited sympathizers, brought them to Syria for training and then sent them back. Assad’s clerics had already threatened the West; they kept their promise and made Daesh bombings happen in the Western countries. It was a “shock and awe” tactic that actually worked. The Western leaders who were against Assad’s rule became the targets of far-right and leftist political groups in Europe. And finally, Islamophobia – Sunniphobia is the right word actually – started to rise in the West as every Sunni was seen as a threat by the white supremacists and their circles of influence. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2021-01-30.

doi.org

  • Stephens، Julia (يناير 2013). "The Phantom Wahhabi: Liberalism and the Muslim fanatic in mid-Victorian India". Modern Asian Studies. ج. 47 ع. 1: 22–52. DOI:10.1017/S0026749X12000649. JSTOR:23359778. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2021-02-07 – عبر JSTOR. ABSTRACT In the late 1860s and early 1870s the British colonial government in India suppressed an imagined Wahhabi conspiracy, which it portrayed as a profound threat to imperial security.
  • Carrington، Kerry؛ Ball، Matthew؛ O'Brien، Erin؛ Tall، Juan (2013). Crime, Justice and Social Democracy: International Perspectives. UK: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. ص. 133–144. DOI:10.1057/9781137008695_9. ISBN:978-1-137-00868-8. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-03-27. When, in September 2001, the right-wing Republican president of the US proclaimed the 'war on terrorism', which he also dubbed a 'crusade', George W. Bush was soon joined in such battle by his staunch British ally Tony Blair, a Labour prime minister. A populist prime minister of the conservative coalition in Australia, John Howard faithfully entered the fray on behalf of this nation, which likewise imagines itself to have a special relationship with the USA. All these allies participated in the unlawful invasion of Afghanistan the following month, in the name of this war on terrorism, and of Iraq eighteen months later. The forces of all three countries are still in Afghanistan, with very little difference to this fact having been made by the now Democratic presidency in the US, the now Tory-led coalition in the UK, or the now Labor government in Australia. Really, existing labour parties - when in government, that is - have taken a very similar stance in relation to securing militarily the US-led global empire to that of their conservative opponents. All have participated similarly in state crime in the 'war on terror'; indeed all have been comparably complicit in what I call 'empire crime'

e-ir.info

  • Zammit، Wael (30 أغسطس 2015). "US–Iran "Special" Relations Between 2001 and 2003: Friends or Foes? "The "war on terror" created a rare opportunity for Iran and U.S. to come together". E-International Relations. ص. 14. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2017-04-20. In one of their meetings, the member of the Iranian delegation had a message for the American government: "Iran was prepared to work unconditionally with the United States in the "war on terror" and if they could work with [the Americans] on this issue, it had the potential to fundamentally transform U.S.-Iranian relations." Commenting on this, reporter John Richardson said that such a statement had "seismic diplomatic implications"... " In Tehran, the Iranians opted for rapprochement as they wanted to ensure that the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan could succeed, and they had their own reasons. Infact, the American decision to destroy the infrastructure of al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban served major political,economic and strategic goals for Tehran".. "To eliminate the Taliban regime would also mean to put an end to the support the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) received from Iran's enemies and neighbors: Afghanistan and Sadam's Iraq. Last but not least, Iran wanted to play an active role in the "war on terror;" reduce tension and improve relations with Western countries including the United States and assure Tehran's full integration in the international community." Pg.15 "The "war on terror" created a rare opportunity for Iran and U.S. to come together. Hilary Mann,who had just joined the National Security Council staff as its resident Iran expert and Ryan Crocker, a senior State Department official, sit with Iranian officials who expressed their will to cooperate with the Americans and re-establish diplomatic relations." Pg.16 "I an interview with Barbara Slavin in 2005, former Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps' chief commander, Mohsen Rezaie, stated that the Islamic Republic played an "important role" in capturing Kabul as members of IRGC "fought alongside and advised the Afghan rebels who helped U.S. forces topple Afghanistan's Taliban regime" in the months after the September 11 terrorist attacks.Such a stance is further emphasized by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who discussed the war on Afghanistan on CBS in November 11, 2001, two days before the fall of Kabul and asserted that "there [were] some Iranian liaison people, as well as some American liaison people working with the same Afghan forces."Besides, Slavin confirms the Iranian role and argues that members of the IRG Qods Brigade were on the field when the Alliance, with U.S. air support, took control of Kabul."... "The American-Iranian cooperation did not end after the successful overthrow of the Taliban regime. The rapprochement between the two arch-foes was further illustrated in their collaboration to create an interim post-Taliban government in Afghanistan. Whereas, Iran's role in the "war on terror" was largely secret, its role in forming a "broad-based, multiethnic, politically balanced, freely chosen" government was rather direct as the American and Iranian diplomats met and collaborated via the Six plus Two group.

eeradicalization.com

firstpost.com

hindustantimes.com

interfax-religion.ru

iranintl.com

jpost.com

m.jpost.com

jstor.org

martinkramer.org

  • Kramer، Martin. "Khomeini's Messengers in Mecca". MartinKramer.org. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2021-05-07. Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back," and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics."32 Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, called "Wahhabi hooligans." Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi'ites) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi'ites), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi'ite works). The Wahhabis "will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history."33 This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds."

mepc.org

middlebury.edu

middleeasteye.net

muslimmatters.org

nytimes.com

nyulawreview.org

  • A. Beydoun، Khalid (2020). "Exporting Islamophobia in the Global "War On Terror"" (PDF). NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2020-04-26.
  • A Beydoun، Khaled (2020). "EXPORTING ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE GLOBAL "WAR ON TERROR"". New York University Law Review Online. 95:81: 84. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2021-01-17. Beyond genuine national security threats, countries across the world capitalized on the conflation of Islam with terrorism to serve discrete national interests. This American War on Terror furnished nations with license, and more importantly, a policing template and language to profile and persecute their Muslim minority populations. American Islamophobia, buoyed by swift state action including the War in Afghanistan and the USA PATRIOT Act, manifested in a surge of vigilante violence against Muslims and "Muslim-looking" groups and had global impact

oxfordislamicstudies.com

presstv.ir

scribd.com

springer.com

link.springer.com

  • Carrington، Kerry؛ Ball، Matthew؛ O'Brien، Erin؛ Tall، Juan (2013). Crime, Justice and Social Democracy: International Perspectives. UK: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. ص. 133–144. DOI:10.1057/9781137008695_9. ISBN:978-1-137-00868-8. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-03-27. When, in September 2001, the right-wing Republican president of the US proclaimed the 'war on terrorism', which he also dubbed a 'crusade', George W. Bush was soon joined in such battle by his staunch British ally Tony Blair, a Labour prime minister. A populist prime minister of the conservative coalition in Australia, John Howard faithfully entered the fray on behalf of this nation, which likewise imagines itself to have a special relationship with the USA. All these allies participated in the unlawful invasion of Afghanistan the following month, in the name of this war on terrorism, and of Iraq eighteen months later. The forces of all three countries are still in Afghanistan, with very little difference to this fact having been made by the now Democratic presidency in the US, the now Tory-led coalition in the UK, or the now Labor government in Australia. Really, existing labour parties - when in government, that is - have taken a very similar stance in relation to securing militarily the US-led global empire to that of their conservative opponents. All have participated similarly in state crime in the 'war on terror'; indeed all have been comparably complicit in what I call 'empire crime'

stetson.edu

www2.stetson.edu

time.com

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vox.com

  • Williams، Jennifer (27 سبتمبر 2016). "The head of Hezbollah has found someone he hates even more than Israelis". Vox. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-04-26. "Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of a group that has been fighting Israel for decades, declared on Tuesday that "Wahhabism is more evil than Israel," Lebanon's Al Akhbar newspaper reported."... "In other words, things have gotten so bad that Hezbollah, Israel's mortal enemy, now considers Wahhabis — that is, fellow Muslims — to be worse than Israel. Bear in mind, this is coming from the same man who has described Israel as "a cancerous entity and the root of all the crises and wars" and pledged that Israel's destiny "is manifested in our motto: 'Death to Israel.'"

washingtonpost.com

web.archive.org

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