Süni intellekt fəlsəfəsi (Azerbaijani Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Süni intellekt fəlsəfəsi" in Azerbaijani language version.

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7web.archive.org

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3stanford.edu

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archive.org

This version is from Searle, (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett, 1991. səh. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, С. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell, Norvig, (2003. səh. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John, Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel, Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John, "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3), 1980: 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, 2015-09-23 tarixində orijinalından (PDF) arxivləşdirilib

doi.org

This version is from Searle, (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett, 1991. səh. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, С. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell, Norvig, (2003. səh. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John, Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel, Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John, "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3), 1980: 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, 2015-09-23 tarixində orijinalından (PDF) arxivləşdirilib

oxfordbibliographies.com

"Philosophy of Computer Science". obo (ingilis). 2023-08-27 tarixində arxivləşdirilib. İstifadə tarixi: 2023-09-04.

philpapers.org

Müller, Vincent C. "Philosophy of AI: A structured overview". Nathalie A. Smuha (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook on the Law, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence. 2023-07-24. 2023-07-24 tarixində arxivləşdirilib. İstifadə tarixi: 2023-09-04.

raai.org

"Джон Сёрль. Разум мозга — компьютерная программа?". 2011-09-08 tarixində arxivləşdirilib. İstifadə tarixi: 2020-06-27.

stanford.edu

jmc.stanford.edu

McCarthy, John. "The Philosophy of AI and the AI of Philosophy". jmc.stanford.edu. 2018-10-23 tarixində orijinalından arxivləşdirilib. İstifadə tarixi: 2018-09-18.

plato.stanford.edu

Bringsjord, Selmer; Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar, Artificial Intelligence // Zalta, Edward N. (redaktor), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018, 2019-11-09 tarixində orijinalından arxivləşdirilib, İstifadə tarixi: 2018-09-18

www-formal.stanford.edu

McCarthy və b. 1955. This assertion was printed in the program for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI."also Crevier, 1993. səh. 28 McCarthy, John; Minsky, Marvin; Rochester, Nathan; Shannon, Claude, A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, 1955, 2008-09-30 tarixində orijinalından arxivləşdirilib.

uh.edu

class.uh.edu

This version is from Searle, (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett, 1991. səh. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, С. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell, Norvig, (2003. səh. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John, Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel, Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John, "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3), 1980: 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, 2015-09-23 tarixində orijinalından (PDF) arxivləşdirilib

web.archive.org

"Philosophy of Computer Science". obo (ingilis). 2023-08-27 tarixində arxivləşdirilib. İstifadə tarixi: 2023-09-04.
McCarthy, John. "The Philosophy of AI and the AI of Philosophy". jmc.stanford.edu. 2018-10-23 tarixində orijinalından arxivləşdirilib. İstifadə tarixi: 2018-09-18.
Müller, Vincent C. "Philosophy of AI: A structured overview". Nathalie A. Smuha (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook on the Law, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence. 2023-07-24. 2023-07-24 tarixində arxivləşdirilib. İstifadə tarixi: 2023-09-04.
Bringsjord, Selmer; Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar, Artificial Intelligence // Zalta, Edward N. (redaktor), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018, 2019-11-09 tarixində orijinalından arxivləşdirilib, İstifadə tarixi: 2018-09-18
McCarthy və b. 1955. This assertion was printed in the program for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI."also Crevier, 1993. səh. 28 McCarthy, John; Minsky, Marvin; Rochester, Nathan; Shannon, Claude, A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, 1955, 2008-09-30 tarixində orijinalından arxivləşdirilib.
This version is from Searle, (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett, 1991. səh. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, С. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell, Norvig, (2003. səh. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John, Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel, Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John, "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3), 1980: 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, 2015-09-23 tarixində orijinalından (PDF) arxivləşdirilib
"Джон Сёрль. Разум мозга — компьютерная программа?". 2011-09-08 tarixində arxivləşdirilib. İstifadə tarixi: 2020-06-27.

worldcat.org

This version is from Searle, (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett, 1991. səh. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, С. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell, Norvig, (2003. səh. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John, Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel, Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John, "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3), 1980: 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, 2015-09-23 tarixində orijinalından (PDF) arxivləşdirilib