Auctionomics. Abgerufen am 17. Januar 2021 (amerikanisches Englisch).
doi.org
Paul Milgrom, Nancy Stokey: Information, trade and common knowledge. In: Journal of Economic Theory. Band26, Nr.1, Februar 1982, S.17–27, doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90046-1.
David M Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, Robert Wilson: Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. In: Journal of Economic Theory. Band27, Nr.2, August 1982, S.245–252, doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1.
Paul R. Milgrom, Robert J. Weber: Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information. In: Mathematics of Operations Research. Band10, Nr.4, November 1985, ISSN0364-765X, S.619–632, doi:10.1287/moor.10.4.619.
Drew Fudenberg, David Levine, Eric Maskin: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information. In: Econometrica. Band62, Nr.5, September 1994, S.997, doi:10.2307/2951505, JSTOR:2951505.
Dilip Abreu, Paul Milgrom, David Pearce: Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships. In: Econometrica. Band59, Nr.6, 1991, ISSN0012-9682, S.1713–1733, doi:10.2307/2938286, JSTOR:2938286.
Takuo Sugaya: Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring. In: SSRN Electronic Journal. 2011, ISSN1556-5068, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1789775.
Xavier Vives: Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. Band19, Nr.3, Januar 1990, S.305–321, doi:10.1016/0304-4068(90)90005-T.
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts: Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities. In: Econometrica. Band58, Nr.6, 1990, ISSN0012-9682, S.1255–1277, doi:10.2307/2938316, JSTOR:2938316.
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts: Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games. In: Games and Economic Behavior. Band3, Nr.1, Februar 1991, S.82–100, doi:10.1016/0899-8256(91)90006-Z.
Joshua S. Gans: Best replies and adaptive learning. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. Band30, Nr.3, 1. Dezember 1995, ISSN0165-4896, S.221–234, doi:10.1016/0165-4896(95)00792-X.
Paul Milgrom: CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF MARKET DESIGN. In: Economic Inquiry. Band49, Nr.2, April 2011, S.311–320, doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00357.x.
Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom: Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives. In: Econometrica. Band55, Nr.2, März 1987, S.303, doi:10.2307/1913238, JSTOR:1913238.
Paul Milgrom: An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge. In: Econometrica. Band49, Nr.1, Januar 1981, S.219, doi:10.2307/1911137, JSTOR:1911137.
Paul R. Milgrom: Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding. In: Econometrica. Band49, Nr.4, Juli 1981, S.921, doi:10.2307/1912511, JSTOR:1912511.
Paul R. Milgrom: Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications. In: The Bell Journal of Economics. Band12, Nr.2, 1981, S.380, doi:10.2307/3003562, JSTOR:3003562.
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts: An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations. In: American Journal of Sociology. Band94, Januar 1988, ISSN0002-9602, S.S154–S179, doi:10.1086/228945.
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts: Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities. In: Games and Economic Behavior. Band17, Nr.1, November 1996, S.113–128, doi:10.1006/game.1996.0096.
Michael Powell: An Influence-Cost Model of Organizational Practices and Firm Boundaries. In: The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. Band31, suppl_1, 1. August 2015, ISSN8756-6222, S.i104–i142, doi:10.1093/jleo/ewv005 (oup.com [abgerufen am 17. Januar 2021]).
Lawrence R. Glosten, Paul R. Milgrom: Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders. In: Journal of Financial Economics. Band14, Nr.1, März 1985, S.71–100, doi:10.1016/0304-405X(85)90044-3.
Stanislav Dolgopolov: Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making. ID 440380. Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY 12. Dezember 2003, doi:10.2139/ssrn.440380.
Paul Milgrom, Sharon Oster: Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis. In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Band102, Nr.3, August 1987, S.453, doi:10.2307/1884213.
Drew Fudenberg, David Levine, Eric Maskin: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information. In: Econometrica. Band62, Nr.5, September 1994, S.997, doi:10.2307/2951505, JSTOR:2951505.
Dilip Abreu, Paul Milgrom, David Pearce: Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships. In: Econometrica. Band59, Nr.6, 1991, ISSN0012-9682, S.1713–1733, doi:10.2307/2938286, JSTOR:2938286.
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts: Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities. In: Econometrica. Band58, Nr.6, 1990, ISSN0012-9682, S.1255–1277, doi:10.2307/2938316, JSTOR:2938316.
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts: The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization. In: The American Economic Review. Band80, Nr.3, 1990, ISSN0002-8282, S.511–528, JSTOR:2006681.
Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom: Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives. In: Econometrica. Band55, Nr.2, März 1987, S.303, doi:10.2307/1913238, JSTOR:1913238.
Paul Milgrom: An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge. In: Econometrica. Band49, Nr.1, Januar 1981, S.219, doi:10.2307/1911137, JSTOR:1911137.
Paul R. Milgrom: Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding. In: Econometrica. Band49, Nr.4, Juli 1981, S.921, doi:10.2307/1912511, JSTOR:1912511.
Paul R. Milgrom: Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications. In: The Bell Journal of Economics. Band12, Nr.2, 1981, S.380, doi:10.2307/3003562, JSTOR:3003562.
Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom: The Firm as an Incentive System. In: The American Economic Review. Band84, Nr.4, 1994, ISSN0002-8282, S.972–991, JSTOR:2118041.
Jeanna Smialek: U.S. Auction Theorists Win the 2020 Nobel in Economics. In: The New York Times. 12. Oktober 2020, ISSN0362-4331 (nytimes.com [abgerufen am 17. Januar 2021]).
economix.blogs.nytimes.com
Nancy Folbre: What Makes Teachers Productive? In: Economix Blog. 19. September 2011, abgerufen am 17. Januar 2021 (amerikanisches Englisch).
oup.com
academic.oup.com
Michael Powell: An Influence-Cost Model of Organizational Practices and Firm Boundaries. In: The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. Band31, suppl_1, 1. August 2015, ISSN8756-6222, S.i104–i142, doi:10.1093/jleo/ewv005 (oup.com [abgerufen am 17. Januar 2021]).
stanford.edu
milgrom.people.stanford.edu
Paul Milgrom. Abgerufen am 17. Juni 2022 (englisch).
Jeanna Smialek: U.S. Auction Theorists Win the 2020 Nobel in Economics. In: The New York Times. 12. Oktober 2020, ISSN0362-4331 (nytimes.com [abgerufen am 17. Januar 2021]).
Paul R. Milgrom, Robert J. Weber: Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information. In: Mathematics of Operations Research. Band10, Nr.4, November 1985, ISSN0364-765X, S.619–632, doi:10.1287/moor.10.4.619.
Dilip Abreu, Paul Milgrom, David Pearce: Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships. In: Econometrica. Band59, Nr.6, 1991, ISSN0012-9682, S.1713–1733, doi:10.2307/2938286, JSTOR:2938286.
Takuo Sugaya: Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring. In: SSRN Electronic Journal. 2011, ISSN1556-5068, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1789775.
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts: Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities. In: Econometrica. Band58, Nr.6, 1990, ISSN0012-9682, S.1255–1277, doi:10.2307/2938316, JSTOR:2938316.
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts: The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization. In: The American Economic Review. Band80, Nr.3, 1990, ISSN0002-8282, S.511–528, JSTOR:2006681.
Joshua S. Gans: Best replies and adaptive learning. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. Band30, Nr.3, 1. Dezember 1995, ISSN0165-4896, S.221–234, doi:10.1016/0165-4896(95)00792-X.
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts: An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations. In: American Journal of Sociology. Band94, Januar 1988, ISSN0002-9602, S.S154–S179, doi:10.1086/228945.
Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom: The Firm as an Incentive System. In: The American Economic Review. Band84, Nr.4, 1994, ISSN0002-8282, S.972–991, JSTOR:2118041.
Michael Powell: An Influence-Cost Model of Organizational Practices and Firm Boundaries. In: The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. Band31, suppl_1, 1. August 2015, ISSN8756-6222, S.i104–i142, doi:10.1093/jleo/ewv005 (oup.com [abgerufen am 17. Januar 2021]).