UN-Teilungsplan für Palästina (German Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "UN-Teilungsplan für Palästina" in German language version.

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  • Vergleiche auch Michael Joseph Cohen: Truman und Israel. University of California Press, 1990, S. 163–154 (englisch, google.com): “Greece, the Philippines, and Haiti – three countries utterly dependent on Washington – suddenly came out one after another against its declared policy ...Abba Hillel Silver reported to the American Zionist Emergency Council: 'During this time, we marshalled our forces, Jewish and non-Jewish opinion, leaders and masses alike, converged on the Government and induced the President to assert the authority of his Administration to overcome the negative attitude of the State Department which persisted to the end, and persists today. The result was that our Government made its intense desire for the adoption of the partition plan nown [sic] to the wavering governments.'”
  • George Lenczowski: American Presidents and the Middle East. Duke University Press, 1990, ISBN 978-0-8223-0972-7, S. 28 (englisch, google.com): “The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders — actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats — disturbed and annoyed me."50”, zitiert, Harry S. Truman, Memoirs 2, S. 158.
  • Phyllis Bennis: Before and After. Interlink Publishing Group Incorporated, 2003, ISBN 978-1-56656-462-5 (google.com).
  • Ahron Bregman, Jihan El-Tahri: The fifty years war: Israel and the Arabs. Penguin Books, 1998, ISBN 978-0-14-026827-0, S. 25 (google.com [abgerufen am 29. November 2011]).
  • Quigley, John B.: Palästina und Israel: eine Herausforderung an die Gerechtigkeit. Duke University Press, 1990, ISBN 978-0-8223-1023-5, S. 37 (google.com).
  • Benny Morris: 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9, S. 56 (google.com [abgerufen am 13. Juli 2013]): „Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru's sister, who headed the delegation, occasionally threw out hints that something might change. But Shertok was brought down to earth by historian Kavalam Panikkar, another member of the Indian delegation: 'It is idle for you to try to convince us that the Jews have a case. (…) We know it. (…) But the point is simply this: For us to vote for the Jews means to vote against the Moslems. This is a conflict in which Islam is involved. (…) We have 13 million [sic] Moslems in our midst. (…) Therefore, we cannot do it'“
  • Najma Heptulla: Indo-West Asian relations: the Nehru era. Allied Publishers, 1991, ISBN 978-81-7023-340-4, S. 158 (google.com).
  • Benny Morris: 1948: Eine Geschichte des ersten arabisch-israelischen Krieges. Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9, S. 61 (google.com): "The Arabs had failed to understand the tremendous impact of the Holocaust on the international community — and, in any event, appear to have used the selfsame methods, but with poor results. Wasif Kamal, an AHC official, for example, offered one delegate — perhaps the Russian — a "huge, huge sum of money to vote for the Arabs" (the Russian declined, saying, "You want me to hang myself?”)."
  • Benny Morris: 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9, S. 61 (google.com [abgerufen am 13. Juli 2013]): "The Arab states generally made no bones about their intention to support the Palestinians with "men, money and arms", and sometimes hinted at an eventual invasion by their armies. They also threatened the Western Powers, their traditional allies, with an oil embargo and/or abandonment and realignment with the Soviet Bloc"
  • Burdett, Anita L. P. , Great Britain. Foreign Office , Great Britain. Colonial Office: The Arab League: 1946-1947 (= The Arab League: British Documentary Sources 1943-1963). Archive Editions, 1995, ISBN 978-1-85207-610-8, S. 519 (google.com).
  • Benny Morris: 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9, S. 50 (google.com – Morris gibt keine Primärquelle für das Zitat an): "S. 50, The Arab reaction was just as predictable: "The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East", promised Jamal Husseini.;"
  • Benny Morris: 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9, S. 70 (google.com – Das von Morris angeführte Zitat ist nicht vollständig): "the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish state."

canterbury.ac.nz

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scholarship.law.duke.edu

  • Übersetzt nach Nabil Elaraby: Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition Resolution and the 1949 Armistice Agreements. In: Law and Contemporary Problems. Band 33, Nr. 1, 1968. S. 97–109, hier 101: „It seems anomalous that the procedure adopted for the consideration of the report was delegated to two subcommittees of the Ad Hoc Committee, one composed of pro-partition delegates and the other of Arab delegates plus Colombia and Pakistan, which were sympathetic to the Arab cause. It was obvious that those two sub-committees were so unbalanced as to be unable to achieve anything constructive. As was later evident, the task of reconciling their conflicting recommendations was impossible. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that no serious attention was given to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians.“
  • So zum Beispiel James Crawford: The Creation of States in International Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, ISBN 978-0-19-826002-8. S. 430–434. Strenggenommen hätten danach die Palästinenser Selbstbestimmungsrecht gehabt, aber „(…) the principle of self-determination was not an obstacle to the statehood of Israel. If its creation had involved a violation of self-determination, it is arguable, applying the Rhodesian precedent ex post facto, that Israel should not have been recognized as a State at all. But at that time self-determination was not sufficiently well established as a principle of general international law to constitute a criterion for statehood, especially an overriding or peremptory criterion. (…) It must be concluded that Israel was effectively and lawfully established as a State by secession from Palestine in the period 1948 to 1949. Its original territory was its armistice territory, not the partition territory.“ (S. 434).
    Strenggenommen passt diese Argumentation allerdings besser zu (C) als zu (D): Ursprünglich wurde Israel mit der internationalen Auffassung als Staat anerkannt, dass es das auf der Karte rote Gebiet oder äquivalente Gebiete zurückgeben müsse. Am 11. Mai wurde Israel daher in Resolution 273 (III) mit Rückverweis auf Resolution 181 (II) in die Staatengemeinschaft aufgenommen (UN: Resolution 273 (III). Admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations. Abgerufen am 18. April 2024. Vergleiche Nabil Elaraby: Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition Resolution and the 1949 Armistice Agreements. In: Law and Contemporary Problems. Band 33, Nr. 1, 1968. S. 97–103, hier 103 f.). Am Tag darauf unterzeichnete Israels Vertreter auf internationalen Druck bei der Lausanne-Konferenz den Teilungsplan der UN als Basis für weitere Verhandlungen (United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine: Summary Records of a Meeting between the Conciliation Commission and the Delegation of Israel. Abgerufen am 20. April 2024.; vergleiche Neil Caplan: A Tale of Two Cities: The Rhodes and Lausanne Conferences, 1949. In: Journal of Palestine Studies. Band 21, Nr. 3, 1992. S. 5–34, hier 18 f.). Der US-amerikanische Botschafter schrieb noch am 29. Mai 1949 einen Brief an Ben-Gurion: „In the interests of a just and equitable solution of these critical questions the United States Government, in the U.N. and as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, has supported the position that Israel should be expected to offer territorial compensation for any territorial acquisitions which it expects to effect beyond the boundaries set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947. The Government of Israel has been well aware of this position and of the view of the United States Government that it is based upon elementary principles of fairness and equity.“ (Zitiert nach Victor Kattan: From Coexistence to Conquest. International Law and the Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1891–1949. Pluto Press, London / New York 2009, ISBN 978-0-7453-2578-1. S. 238.) Die Waffenstillstandsverträge, mit denen die Grüne Linie gezogen wurden, waren explizit nicht als Definitionen von Grenzen formuliert worden.

dur.ac.uk

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ecf.org.il

  • „Eine ‚nationale Heimstätte für das jüdische Volk‘ zu schaffen ist nicht gleichbedeutend damit, Palästina zu einem jüdischen Staat zu transformieren, und die Etablierung eines solchen jüdischen Staats könnte nicht geschaffen werden, ohne sich auf schwerste Weise an den ‚zivilen und religiösen Rechten der nicht-jüdischen Gemeinschaften in Palästina‘ zu vergehen. Bei Konferenzen der Kommission mit jüdischen Repräsentanten hat es sich mehrfach ergeben, dass die Zionisten nach einer praktisch vollständigen Enteignung der gegenwärtigen nicht-jüdischen Bewohner durch verschiedenste Formen von [Land-]Käufen streben.“: Henry C. King, Charles R. Crane: The King–Crane Report. Abgerufen am 4. April 2024. S. 36 der PDF.

embassies.gov.il

  • „Die Errichtung einer nationalen Heimstätte in Palästina für das jüdische Volk wird von der Regierung Seiner Majestät mit Wohlwollen betrachtet. Sie wird ihr Bestes tun, um das Erreichen dieses Zieles zu erleichtern, wobei unmissverständlich zu betonen ist, dass nichts getan werden darf, was die Bürgerrechte und religiösen Rechte der in Palästina lebenden nicht-jüdischen Bevölkerung oder die Rechte und den politischen Status der Juden irgendeines anderen Landes nachteilig betrifft.“: Israelische Botschaft in Österreich: 100 Jahre Balfour-Deklaration. 30. Oktober 2017, abgerufen am 16. April 2024.

erudit.org

ethernet.edu.et

ndl.ethernet.edu.et

foreignpolicyjournal.com

galegroup.com

find.galegroup.com

google.de

books.google.de

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icj-cij.org

  • IGH: International Status of South West Africa. Abgerufen am 17. April 2024.
  • So argumentierte die Arabische Liga noch 2023 vor dem IGH: „[…I]t was an illegal secession. Israel was not and is not, therefore, somehow the legal successor or the legal continuation, in a different form (its statehood covering only part of the territory) of the Palestine Mandate. It was and is a novel and separate international legal entity established in defiance of and at odds with the Mandate and its operative legal regime, which was the commitment to independent statehood operating at the level of the entire territory of the Mandate, as set out in the ‚sacred trust of civilization‘ obligations of Article 22 of the Covenant.“: League fo Arab States: Written comments of the League of Arab States. 25. Oktober 2023, abgerufen am 20. April 2024.

ieg-ego.eu

israelforever.org

jewishvirtuallibrary.org

  • Übersetzt nach CIA: Weekly Summary, October 3, 1947. Abgerufen am 20. April 2024.: „[… A] substantial proportion of world Jewry, for varying reasons, does not favor partition as a solution of the Palestine problem. The extreme Zionists reject partition and claim all of Palestine and Transjordan for a Jewish state. (…) The non-Zionist Jews, large in number but generally non-assertive, reject partition, maintaining that the primary interests of world Jewry are jeopardized by the attempt of a militant minority to build a national state on the basis of a religious faith. (In particular, most Jews in the Arab states, other than Palestine, fear that Zionism will antagonize the Arabs and thus endanger the long-established and relatively-secure minority position of the Jews.) (…) The moderate Zionists, represented chiefly by the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency, favor the UNSCOP partition plan but with certain reservations. (…) The Agency, which is not worried by the prospect of civil war in Palestine, has repeatedly asserted that it has sufficient armed forces to defend a Jewish state against the Arabs (…). The Agency thinks that with such support the Jews might be able to enlarge the Jewish state to include all of Palestine and possibly Transjordan as well. Thus, even the moderate Zionists do not look upon partition as a final solution. to the Palestine problem. “

jpost.com

mlwerke.de

ns-archiv.de

nytimes.com

timesmachine.nytimes.com

onb.ac.at

alex.onb.ac.at

  • Völkerbundssatzung (Zu finden in: Gesetz über den Friedensschluß zwischen Deutschland und den alliierten und assoziierten Mächten vom 16. Juli 1919 mit angehängtem Versailler Vertrag vom 28. Juni 1919. In: Reichsgesetzblatt, Nr. 140 vom 12. August 1919, S. 689 ff., Digitalisat. Völkerbundssatzung S. 716ff., Artikel 22 S. 739 f. Digitalisat.)

opiniojuris.org

oxfordbibliographies.com

palestineremembered.com

parliament.uk

api.parliament.uk

  • PALESTINE. In: Parlamentarische Debatten (Hansard). 11. Dezember 1947, abgerufen am 9. April 2024.

redirecter.toolforge.org

  • U.N General Assembly, A/PV.126, 28 November 1947, discussion on the Palestinian question. Archiviert vom Original am 16. Oktober 2013; abgerufen am 15. Oktober 2013 (englisch): „Partition imposed against the will of the majority of the people will jeopardize peace and harmony in the Middle East. Not only the uprising of the Arabs of Palestine is to be expected, but the masses in the Arab world cannot be restrained. The Arab-Jewish relationship in the Arab world will greatly deteriorate. There are more Jews in the Arab world outside of Palestine than there are in Palestine. In Iraq alone, we have about one hundred and fifty thousand Jews who share with Moslems and Christians all the advantages of political and economic rights. Harmony prevails among Moslems, Christians and Jews. But any injustice imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine will disturb the harmony among Jews and non-Jews in Iraq; it will breed inter-religious prejudice and hatred.“

ssrn.com

papers.ssrn.com

un-ilibrary.org

un.org

un.org

  • CEIRPP: The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917–1988. Part II: 1947–1977. Abgerufen am 16. April 2024.
  • CEIRPP: The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917–1988. Part II: 1947–1977. Abgerufen am 16. April 2024.
  • „I have spoken of ‚the Jewish people‘ and ‚the Jewish national home‘. (…) [T]hese, in my judgment, should be regarded as key terms and basic concepts. They were the key terms and the basic concepts of the Balfour Declaration and of the mandate under which Palestine is, or should be, administered today.“: United Nations: Future government of Palestine – GA debate – Verbatim record. Abgerufen am 14. April 2024.
  • „A further issue which the special committee would have to inquire into is that the mandate was intended to be a provisional and transitory form of administration. The neighbouring Arab countries – Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Trans-Jordan – were similarly and at the same time placed under mandate [and are now independent]. (…) There is therefore no justice in the denial to the people of Palestine of the elementary rights of self-government and independence.“: United Nations: Future government of Palestine – GA debate – Verbatim record. Abgerufen am 14. April 2024.
  • „I wish to emphasize, however, that the claim of the Arabs for termination of the mandate and recognition of their independence does not rest on promises or pledges. The Arabs of Palestine are not claiming their country on pledges made to them, for it belongs to them. Nor are the Arabs claiming their independence on assurances; they are entitled to such independence as their natural and inalienable right.
    The value of those pledges, however, is two-fold. In the first place, they nullify any contradictory assurances given to the Jews, if the Balfour Declaration is to be read as meaning more than a cultural home. In the second place, those pledges show that the administration of the country in a manner inconsistent with and contrary to the wishes of the large majority of the inhabitants is a glaring injustice.“: United Nations: Future government of Palestine – GA debate – Verbatim record. Abgerufen am 14. April 2024.
  • Siehe dazu z. B. auch W. Thomas Mallison, Sally V. Mallison: An International Law Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestine Question. United Nations, New York 1979: „The inaccuracies of paragraph 146 [of the UNSCOP-Report], however, are much more fundamental than the qualifications raised by UNSCOP. It is difficult to find anything in either the Balfour Declaration (which was incorporated virtually unchanged in the Palestine Mandate) or in other provisions of the Palestine Mandate which involved ‚international commitments to the Jewish people as a whole‘. The prefatory clause of the Balfour Declaration states that the British Government views ‚with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people‘. The only „rights“ specified in the Balfour Declaration are those which appear in the two safeguards clauses. The first safeguard was designed to protect the rights of the Palestinians, and the second safeguard was designed to protect the rights of Jews living in any other country than Palestine. The safeguard clauses were inserted at the insistence of Edwin Montagu, the only Jewish member of the Cabinet at that time, and the Zionist efforts to have them removed failed. The contentions made by the Zionists that the Mandate specified rights for the claimed legal entity of ‚the Jewish people‘ are not tenable either in fact or in law because the great majority of this entity consisted of Jews who had nationality status in their home countries.“
  • „It is true that Hitler is gone now, but not anti-Semitism. He was the product, not the source of German Jew-hatred. Anti-Semitism in Germany and in many other parts of Europe is as rife as ever and potentially militant and fierce. (…) Actually, most of the Jewish displaced persons are not from Germany itself, but from other countries. Today they are in camps, or they continue as refugees, because they cannot be resettled in Europe. They have now waited for two years, and in all this time no one has come forward with a solution to their problem. (…) They appeal to the world to realize that they form part of a people which has a national will of its own. They want to go to the only country where they will feel at home, both individually and collectively. Their problem is inseparable from the problem of Palestine. It is the problem of Palestine.“: United Nations: Future government of Palestine – GA debate – Verbatim record. Abgerufen am 14. April 2024.
  • „A large part of the Jewish people throughout the world comes from Poland – a fact which our Republic cannot ignore. The Jewish life, economy and institutions which have been built up in Palestine resulted to a large extent from the work and efforts of Polish Jews who were citizens of our country, Jews who speak the Polish language and whose life has been closely connected with that of our own nation. (…) For this reason, we feel very bitter about the fact that brutal force is used by the Palestine administration to destroy the accomplishments which have often changed deserts into blooming lands.“: United Nations: Future government of Palestine – GA debate – Verbatim record. Abgerufen am 14. April 2024.
  • Vereinte Nationen: Resolution der Generalversammlung. Verabschiedet am 29. November 1947. 181 (II). Die künftige Regierung Palästinas. Abgerufen am 16. April 2024.
  • Statement from the Arab Higher Committee. 6. Februar 1948, abgerufen am 20. April 2024.
  • Statement from the Arab Higher Committee. 6. Februar 1948, abgerufen am 20. April 2024.
  • PALESTINE COMMITTEE CONTINUES DEBATE ON ALTERNATIVE PLANS. 24. November 1947, abgerufen am 10. April 2024 (englisch): „If the united Nations decideds to amputate a part of Palestine in order to establish a Jewish state,no force on earth could prevent blood from flowing there (…) However (…) once such bloodshed has commenced, no force on earth can confine it to the borders of Palestine itself. If Arab blood shed in Palestine, Jewish blood will necessarily be shed elsewhere in the Arab World despite all sincere efforts of the Governments concerned to prevent such reprisals. To place in certain and serious danger a million jews simply in order to save a hundred thousand in Europe or to satisfy the Zionist dream?“
  • Übersetzt nach UN: Pressemeldung: The U.N. and Palestine. April 1947 – April 1948. 14. April 1948, abgerufen am 3. April 2024.: „(…) that the armed hostility of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab elements, the lack of cooperation from the Mandatory Power, the disintegrating security situation in Palestine, and the fact that the Security Council did not furnish the Commission with the necessary armed assistance, are the factors which have made it impossible for the Commission to implement the Assembly's resolution.“
  • Arabische Liga: Resolution on Palestine. 28. Oktober 1974, abgerufen am 17. April 2024.
  • So zum Beispiel schon 1947 Henry Cattan: „The principles propounded by President Wilson – namely, the rejection of all ideas of conquest, and recognition of the right of self-determination – were incorporated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant laid down that, to the peoples inhabiting territories which have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the State which formerly governed them, there should be applied the principle that their well-being and development form a sacred trust of civilization.
    Moreover, in particularizing certain communities detached from the Turkish Empire, namely, the Arab nation, Article 22 laid down in regard to their development, the following: ‚… their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.‘ (…)
    One of the points which the special committee of inquiry will have to consider will be the inconsistency of the mandate with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 22 is the primary and enabling instrument from which the mandate can derive its force and validity, if any. If, therefore, the mandate for Palestine has, in its inception or in the interpretation of its objects or in its practical application, deviated or departed from the primary objectives of Article 22 of the Covenant, then it is ultra vires and null and void. There is no power in Article 22 of the Covenant which enables the embodiment in the mandate of provisions prejudicial to the interests of the people of the country.“: United Nations: Future government of Palestine – GA debate – Verbatim record. Abgerufen am 14. April 2024.
  • So zum Beispiel James Crawford: The Creation of States in International Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, ISBN 978-0-19-826002-8. S. 430–434. Strenggenommen hätten danach die Palästinenser Selbstbestimmungsrecht gehabt, aber „(…) the principle of self-determination was not an obstacle to the statehood of Israel. If its creation had involved a violation of self-determination, it is arguable, applying the Rhodesian precedent ex post facto, that Israel should not have been recognized as a State at all. But at that time self-determination was not sufficiently well established as a principle of general international law to constitute a criterion for statehood, especially an overriding or peremptory criterion. (…) It must be concluded that Israel was effectively and lawfully established as a State by secession from Palestine in the period 1948 to 1949. Its original territory was its armistice territory, not the partition territory.“ (S. 434).
    Strenggenommen passt diese Argumentation allerdings besser zu (C) als zu (D): Ursprünglich wurde Israel mit der internationalen Auffassung als Staat anerkannt, dass es das auf der Karte rote Gebiet oder äquivalente Gebiete zurückgeben müsse. Am 11. Mai wurde Israel daher in Resolution 273 (III) mit Rückverweis auf Resolution 181 (II) in die Staatengemeinschaft aufgenommen (UN: Resolution 273 (III). Admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations. Abgerufen am 18. April 2024. Vergleiche Nabil Elaraby: Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition Resolution and the 1949 Armistice Agreements. In: Law and Contemporary Problems. Band 33, Nr. 1, 1968. S. 97–103, hier 103 f.). Am Tag darauf unterzeichnete Israels Vertreter auf internationalen Druck bei der Lausanne-Konferenz den Teilungsplan der UN als Basis für weitere Verhandlungen (United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine: Summary Records of a Meeting between the Conciliation Commission and the Delegation of Israel. Abgerufen am 20. April 2024.; vergleiche Neil Caplan: A Tale of Two Cities: The Rhodes and Lausanne Conferences, 1949. In: Journal of Palestine Studies. Band 21, Nr. 3, 1992. S. 5–34, hier 18 f.). Der US-amerikanische Botschafter schrieb noch am 29. Mai 1949 einen Brief an Ben-Gurion: „In the interests of a just and equitable solution of these critical questions the United States Government, in the U.N. and as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, has supported the position that Israel should be expected to offer territorial compensation for any territorial acquisitions which it expects to effect beyond the boundaries set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947. The Government of Israel has been well aware of this position and of the view of the United States Government that it is based upon elementary principles of fairness and equity.“ (Zitiert nach Victor Kattan: From Coexistence to Conquest. International Law and the Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1891–1949. Pluto Press, London / New York 2009, ISBN 978-0-7453-2578-1. S. 238.) Die Waffenstillstandsverträge, mit denen die Grüne Linie gezogen wurden, waren explizit nicht als Definitionen von Grenzen formuliert worden.

digitallibrary.un.org

  • United Nations: Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly. Volume I: Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly. Verbatim Record, 28 April – 15 May 1947. New York 1947. S. 183.
  • United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly. Volume 1. Lake Success, New York 1947. S. 48
  • „With regard to the principle of self-determination, although international recognition was extended to this principle at the end of the First World War and it was adhered to with regard to the other Arab territories, at the time of the creation of the ‚A‘ Mandates, it was not applied to Palestine, obviously because of the intention to make possible the creation of the Jewish National Home there. Actually, it may well be said that the Jewish National Home and the sui generis Mandate for Palestine run counter to that principle.“: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly. Volume 1. Lake Success, New York 1947. S. 54
  • „A partition scheme for Palestine must take into account both the claims of the Jews to receive immigrants and the needs of the Arab population, which is increasing rapidly by natural means. Thus, as far as possible, both partitioned States must leave some room for further land settlement.“: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly. Volume 1. Lake Success, New York 1947. S. 54
  • „The Jews have brought to agriculture in Palestine both capital and skill which together have had a profound effect on the country, transforming some of it from waste and neglected land to fruitful ground, so that it may truly be said that they have made ‚the desert blossom as the rose.‘ (…) The only extensive areas of good land which are undeveloped are the Huleh Valley in the extreme north-east and the very much more extensive semi-desert area of the northern part of teh Beersheba sub-district. (…) The semi-desert Beersheba area in the south has at present a settled population of 7,000 (mostly in the town of Beersheba) and about 90,000 nomadic Bedouins. The area has a good soil but insufficient rain to support a denser population. It can only be developed by irrigation.“: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly. Volume 1. Lake Success, New York 1947. S. 14 f.
  • „The inclusion of the whole Beersheba sub-district in the Jewish State gives to it a large area, parts of which are very sparsely populated and capable of development, if they can be provided with water for irrigation. The experiments already carried out in this are by the Jews suggest that further development in an appreciable degree should be possible by heavy investment of capital and labour and without impairing the future or prejudicing the rights of the existing Bedouin poulation. The Negeb south of latitude 31, though included in the Jewish State, is desert land of little agricultural value, but is naturally linked with the northern part of the sub-district of Beersheba.“: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly. Volume 1. Lake Success, New York 1947. S. 54.
  • UN, Sub-Committee 1 on the Palestinian Question: Report of Sub-Committee 1 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question of the UN General Assembly 1947. Abgerufen am 15. April 2024.
  • Vergleiche United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly. Volume 1. Lake Success, New York 1947. S. 48
  • UN, Sub-Committee 1 on the Palestinian Question: Report of Sub-Committee 1 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question of the UN General Assembly 1947. Abgerufen am 15. April 2024.

unispal.un.org

  • Palestine Royal Commission Report. (PDF) S. 239, abgerufen am 4. April 2024.
  • Übersetzt nach Palestine Royal Commission Report. (PDF) S. 110 f., abgerufen am 4. April 2024.: „(…) [W]e have no doubt as to what were ‚the underlying causes of the disturbances‘ of last year. They were: –
    (i) The desire of the Arabs for national independence.
    (ii) Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home. (…)
    They were the same underlying causes as those which brought about the ‚disturbances‘ of 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1933.
    (…) They were the only ‚underlying‘ causes.“
  • Vergleiche Palestine Royal Commission Report. (PDF) S. 389–391, abgerufen am 4. April 2024.

documents.un.org

undocs.org

  • So zum Beispiel schon am 15. Mai 1948, dem Tag des Mandatsendes, Isa Nakleh vom Arabischen Hohen Komitee: „I wish to add only one fact which I feel must be made clear before the Security Council[, vor dem er gerade sprach]. As I have already said, there are in Palestine 1,300,000 Arabs who are Palestinian citizens, 300,000 Jews who are Palestinian citizens, and 400,000 Jews who are foreigners. By the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the people of Palestine were recognized provisionally as an independent nation. Now that the Mandate has ended, the people of Palestine consider themselves to be an independent nation. The majority of the population of Palestine, the 1,300,000 Arabs, considers that the Jewsh minority – whether the 300,000 Palestinian citizens or the 400,000 foreigners – is a rebellious minority which has revolted against the sovereignty of the majority of the population of the country. We, the Arab Higher Committee, representing the majority of the people of Palestine, consider that any attempt to create any foreign government in Palestine is nothing but an act of rebellion which will be put down by force.“: UN, Security Council: Official Records. Third Year. No. 66. (PDF) S. 8 f., abgerufen am 17. April 2024.

web.archive.org

  • „As I understand the mandate, the Palestine mandate is an A mandate. The essence of that is that it marks a transitory period, with the aim and object of leading the mandated territory to become an independent self-governing state. Indeed, the articles of the mandate make it clear that that is so.“: League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission: Minutes of the Thirty-Second (Extraordinary) Session Devoted to Palestine. 1937, abgerufen am 13. April 2024.
  • „Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the First World War, a class ‚A‘ Mandate for Palestine was entrusted to Great Britain by the League of Nations, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant, which provided that: ‚Certain communities, formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.‘“: Internationaler Gerichtshof: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004. (PDF) S. 165, abgerufen am 13. April 2024.
  • „Furcht vor den Juden als ökonomischen Konkurrenten haben sich auf zwei Weisen intensiviert. Die politische Kampagne gegen die nationale Heimstätte für das jüdische Volk hat die Furcht in den Köpfen der Araber wachgehalten, und die Folgen des jüdischen Unternehmens und ihres Eindringens waren solcherart, dass sie die frühen Ängste [noch] bestätigten und dazu führten, dass die Araber heute [umso mehr] der Meinung sind, dass sie letzten Endes von ihrem Land ausgeschlossen werden sollen.“: Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929. His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London 1930. S. 151.
  • U.N General Assembly, A/PV.126, 28 November 1947, discussion on the Palestinian question. Archiviert vom Original am 16. Oktober 2013; abgerufen am 15. Oktober 2013 (englisch): „Partition imposed against the will of the majority of the people will jeopardize peace and harmony in the Middle East. Not only the uprising of the Arabs of Palestine is to be expected, but the masses in the Arab world cannot be restrained. The Arab-Jewish relationship in the Arab world will greatly deteriorate. There are more Jews in the Arab world outside of Palestine than there are in Palestine. In Iraq alone, we have about one hundred and fifty thousand Jews who share with Moslems and Christians all the advantages of political and economic rights. Harmony prevails among Moslems, Christians and Jews. But any injustice imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine will disturb the harmony among Jews and non-Jews in Iraq; it will breed inter-religious prejudice and hatred.“
  • Unabhängigkeitserklärung des Staates Palästina. 15. November 1988, abgerufen am 3. April 2024.

yale.edu

avalon.law.yale.edu

  • „His Majesty’s Government are charged as the Mandatory authority ‚to secure the development of self governing institutions‘ in Palestine. Apart from this specific obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain forever under Mandatory tutelage. It is proper that the people of the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by the people of neighbouring countries. (…) The alternatives before His Majesty’s Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty’s Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate.“: British White Paper of 1939. Abgerufen am 14. April 2024.
  • „The Churchill White Paper of 1922[…], therefore, disclaimed the intention of creating a Jewish State in Palestine [and] defined the National Home in terms of a culturally autonomous Jewish community. (…) [T]he Passfield White Paper (…) reiterated the cultural nature of the National Home as defined in the Churchill Paper of 1922, and proposed further restrictions upon immigration and more stringent limitations upon the right of land purchase. (…) The 1939 White Paper announced that the obligation to foster the creation of the National Home had been fulfilled, and that Palestine with its existing population was to be prepared for selfgovernment. The Government, stated the White Paper, regarded it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs that the Arab population should be made subjects of a Jewish State against their will, and had as their objective to foster the creation of an independent state in which Jews and Arabs could share authority.“: Anglo-American Committee of inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. Lausanne 1946. Appendix IV.

zochrot.org