1947–1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "1947–1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine" in English language version.

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  • Melvin I. Urofsky (January 1982). A voice that spoke for justice: the life and times of Stephen S. Wise. SUNY Press. p. 282. ISBN 978-0-87395-538-6.
  • Charles Herbert Levermore; Denys Peter Myers (1921). Yearbook of the League of Nations. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle. p. 63.
  • Shay Hazkani, Dear Palestine: A Social History of the 1948 War, Stanford University Press, 2021 ISBN 978-1-503-62766-6 chapter 1.By the eve of the declaration of independence on May 1948, 105,000 men had answered the call of which 25,000 had been drafted into active service.
  • Morris, R.F.T.I.B.; Morris, B.; Clancy-Smith, J.A.; Benny, M.; Gershoni, I.; Owen, R.; Tripp, C.; Sayigh, Y.; Tucker, J.E. (2004). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge Middle East Studies. Cambridge University Press. p. 139. ISBN 978-0-521-00967-6. Traditionally, Zionist historiography has cited these attacks as the first acts of Palestinian violence against the partition resolution. But it is probable that the attacks were not directly linked to the resolution – and were a product either of a desire to rob Jews... or of a retaliatory cycle that had begun with a British raid on a LHI training exercise (after an Arab had informed the British about the exercise), that resulted in several Jewish dead... The LHI retaliated by executing five members of the beduin Shubaki clan near Herzliya...; and the Arabs retaliated by attacking the buses on 30 Nov....
  • Radai, Itamar (2015). Palestinians in Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1948: A Tale of Two Cities. Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Taylor & Francis. p. 237. ISBN 978-1-317-36805-2. Retrieved 17 April 2022. In November they again strove to cool tempers, following an attack on a Jewish bus on its way to Holon, in retaliation against the killing of five young men of the Shubaki family by LEHI gunmen (who were in turn taking revenge because one of the members of the family had informed to the British about LEHI activities).
  • Morris, B. (2009). 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press. p. 76. ISBN 978-0-300-15112-1. Retrieved 17 April 2022. …the majority view in the HIS—supported by an anonymous Arab flyer posted almost immediately on walls in Jaffa—was that the attackers were driven primarily by a desire to avenge an LHI raid ten days before on a house near Raganana belonging to the Abu Kishk bedouin tribe.
  • Barry Rubin; Wolfgang G. Schwanitz (25 February 2014). Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Yale University Press. p. 241. ISBN 978-0-300-14090-3.
  • Yoav Gelber (2006). Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. p. 50. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. The ALA's diverse supply sources created a bizarre arsenal that caused serious logistic problems and rendered maintenance an impossible task. Munitions were often of low quality, damaging the barrels and failing to function when necessary. In December 1947 Syria bought a quantity of small arms from the Skoda plant in Czechoslovakia for the ALA. Jewish saboteurs blew up the ship that carried the cargo to the Middle East and sank it in the Italian port of Bari. The arms were later salvaged and reshipped in August 1948 to Syria – this time for arming Palestinian combatants – but the Israeli navy intercepted the freight and seized the weapons.
  • Yoav Gelber (2006). Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. to avoid dependence on the population for supplies, and preclude possible intimidation of locals to donate provisions, the League's military committee had arranged to furnish the troops' rations through special contractors. This semblance of logistics apparently marked significant progress in comparison with the 1936–9 rebellion. Introducing medical services for the combatants and the population made an impression on both the British and the Jews.
  • Yoav Gelber (2006). Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. p. 13. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. The British blockade of the Palestinian coast prevented any substantial increase of these quantities until mid-May. Concurrently, the Arabs succeeded in smuggling into the country small arms that their emissaries had purchased in neighbouring countries. The ALA brought a certain number of support arms and a few artillery pieces and armoured vehicles. Although the gap narrowed, the picture did not materially change, and the Haganah continued to maintain its relative edge.
  • Łukasz Hirszowicz (10 November 2016). The Third Reich and the Arab East. Taylor & Francis. pp. 101–102. ISBN 978-1-315-40939-9.
  • Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 116. ISBN 9780300126969. "At the time, Ben-Gurion and the HGS believed that they had initiated a one-shot affair, albeit with the implication of a change of tactics and strategy on the Jerusalem front. In fact, they had set in motion a strategic transformation of Haganah policy. Nahshon heralded a shift from the defensive to the offensive and marked the beginning of the implementation of tochnit dalet (Plan D)—without Ben-Gurion or the HGS ever taking an in principle decision to embark on its implementation.
  • Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 137. ISBN 9780300126969.

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