Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Alan R. White" in English language version.
Discussion of Anscombe's view that perceptual verbs are intentional. White counters this with a distinction between elliptical and non-elliptical- uses of words to explain the apparent divergent senses of perceptual terms which Anscombe's thesis was introduced to explain.
Easily the most difficult but perhaps the most significant of [these essays] is "What Might Have Been", in which Alan R. White examines the relations of could have, may have, and might have, three concepts which embody aspects of the wider notion of possibility. Professor White notes that the question whether someone could have done other than what he did in fact do is central to the problem of freewill and determinism, just as the question whether something may have or might have happened other than what is believed to have happened is central to the thesis of scepticism. Part of his purpose in writing the essay is to help clarify such problems. Anyone at all interested in possibility or its cognates will benefit not only from White's positive views on the subject, but also from his criticisms of the views of other writers, including G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Norman Malcolm.
Professor White tells us that his book is about the nature of knowledge, rather than about claims to knowledge. The chapter headings, "The Objects of Knowledge", "The Extent of Knowledge", "Criteria of Knowledge" and "Theories of Knowledge", however, make its coverage look wider than it is, By "the objects of knowledge", for example, White does not mean such things as mathematics or science, but the different words and phrases that can follow the verb 'know', like 'who', 'what', 'how', 'the colour of" 'French', 'The Ballad of Reading Gaol', 'a man to be honest', 'that the battle was lost'. By talking of the extent of human knowledge White might be expected to be discussing whether it extends to knowledge of the past, the future, other minds, the existence and attributes of the deity, or metaphysics. In fact he is mainly concerned with whether anything that can be believed can also be known, or whether those things which can be believed cannot be known [...] Within its self-imposed limits Professor White has written a clear, concise, well organised, witty, sensitive, elegant, subtle, original and enlightening account of the nature of knowledge.
Easily the most difficult but perhaps the most significant of [these essays] is "What Might Have Been", in which Alan R. White examines the relations of could have, may have, and might have, three concepts which embody aspects of the wider notion of possibility. Professor White notes that the question whether someone could have done other than what he did in fact do is central to the problem of freewill and determinism, just as the question whether something may have or might have happened other than what is believed to have happened is central to the thesis of scepticism. Part of his purpose in writing the essay is to help clarify such problems. Anyone at all interested in possibility or its cognates will benefit not only from White's positive views on the subject, but also from his criticisms of the views of other writers, including G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Norman Malcolm.
Professor White tells us that his book is about the nature of knowledge, rather than about claims to knowledge. The chapter headings, "The Objects of Knowledge", "The Extent of Knowledge", "Criteria of Knowledge" and "Theories of Knowledge", however, make its coverage look wider than it is, By "the objects of knowledge", for example, White does not mean such things as mathematics or science, but the different words and phrases that can follow the verb 'know', like 'who', 'what', 'how', 'the colour of" 'French', 'The Ballad of Reading Gaol', 'a man to be honest', 'that the battle was lost'. By talking of the extent of human knowledge White might be expected to be discussing whether it extends to knowledge of the past, the future, other minds, the existence and attributes of the deity, or metaphysics. In fact he is mainly concerned with whether anything that can be believed can also be known, or whether those things which can be believed cannot be known [...] Within its self-imposed limits Professor White has written a clear, concise, well organised, witty, sensitive, elegant, subtle, original and enlightening account of the nature of knowledge.
In 1958, the year of Moore's death, Professor A. R. White published his book G. E. Moore: A Critical Exposition. White's study, though now, presumably, rarely read, is extremely acute and based on a close reading of Moore's work as he knew it.
Easily the most difficult but perhaps the most significant of [these essays] is "What Might Have Been", in which Alan R. White examines the relations of could have, may have, and might have, three concepts which embody aspects of the wider notion of possibility. Professor White notes that the question whether someone could have done other than what he did in fact do is central to the problem of freewill and determinism, just as the question whether something may have or might have happened other than what is believed to have happened is central to the thesis of scepticism. Part of his purpose in writing the essay is to help clarify such problems. Anyone at all interested in possibility or its cognates will benefit not only from White's positive views on the subject, but also from his criticisms of the views of other writers, including G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Norman Malcolm.
White, whose work has not had the influence it merits, was the most skilful developer of Rylean and, to a lesser degree, Wittgensteinian ideas in philosophical psychology. His early work Attention (1964) was a thorough, refined development of Ryle's remarks on 'heed concepts' (see Concept of Mind, pp. 135-49), viz. attending, noticing, awareness, consciousness, realization, care, etc. His later The Nature of Knowledge (1982) was an equally exhaustive investigation of the concepts of knowledge, knowing how and knowing that, the objects of knowledge, and the relation of knowledge to belief. If anyone surpassed Austin in subtlety and refinement in the discrimination of grammatical differences, it was White. His linguistic imagination was, I think, unparalleled, and he applied it with great finesse to a wide range of problems. In the last decade of his life he also worked on jurisprudential problems pertaining to action, intention, voluntariness, negligence and recklessness (Grounds of Liability, an Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1985) and Misleading Cases (1991).
White, whose work has not had the influence it merits, was the most skilful developer of Rylean and, to a lesser degree, Wittgensteinian ideas in philosophical psychology. His early work Attention (1964) was a thorough, refined development of Ryle's remarks on 'heed concepts' (see Concept of Mind, pp. 135-49), viz. attending, noticing, awareness, consciousness, realization, care, etc. His later The Nature of Knowledge (1982) was an equally exhaustive investigation of the concepts of knowledge, knowing how and knowing that, the objects of knowledge, and the relation of knowledge to belief. If anyone surpassed Austin in subtlety and refinement in the discrimination of grammatical differences, it was White. His linguistic imagination was, I think, unparalleled, and he applied it with great finesse to a wide range of problems. In the last decade of his life he also worked on jurisprudential problems pertaining to action, intention, voluntariness, negligence and recklessness (Grounds of Liability, an Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1985) and Misleading Cases (1991).
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link){{cite news}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)White, whose work has not had the influence it merits, was the most skilful developer of Rylean and, to a lesser degree, Wittgensteinian ideas in philosophical psychology. His early work Attention (1964) was a thorough, refined development of Ryle's remarks on 'heed concepts' (see Concept of Mind, pp. 135-49), viz. attending, noticing, awareness, consciousness, realization, care, etc. His later The Nature of Knowledge (1982) was an equally exhaustive investigation of the concepts of knowledge, knowing how and knowing that, the objects of knowledge, and the relation of knowledge to belief. If anyone surpassed Austin in subtlety and refinement in the discrimination of grammatical differences, it was White. His linguistic imagination was, I think, unparalleled, and he applied it with great finesse to a wide range of problems. In the last decade of his life he also worked on jurisprudential problems pertaining to action, intention, voluntariness, negligence and recklessness (Grounds of Liability, an Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1985) and Misleading Cases (1991).
In 1958, the year of Moore's death, Professor A. R. White published his book G. E. Moore: A Critical Exposition. White's study, though now, presumably, rarely read, is extremely acute and based on a close reading of Moore's work as he knew it.
Professor White tells us that his book is about the nature of knowledge, rather than about claims to knowledge. The chapter headings, "The Objects of Knowledge", "The Extent of Knowledge", "Criteria of Knowledge" and "Theories of Knowledge", however, make its coverage look wider than it is, By "the objects of knowledge", for example, White does not mean such things as mathematics or science, but the different words and phrases that can follow the verb 'know', like 'who', 'what', 'how', 'the colour of" 'French', 'The Ballad of Reading Gaol', 'a man to be honest', 'that the battle was lost'. By talking of the extent of human knowledge White might be expected to be discussing whether it extends to knowledge of the past, the future, other minds, the existence and attributes of the deity, or metaphysics. In fact he is mainly concerned with whether anything that can be believed can also be known, or whether those things which can be believed cannot be known [...] Within its self-imposed limits Professor White has written a clear, concise, well organised, witty, sensitive, elegant, subtle, original and enlightening account of the nature of knowledge.
Easily the most difficult but perhaps the most significant of [these essays] is "What Might Have Been", in which Alan R. White examines the relations of could have, may have, and might have, three concepts which embody aspects of the wider notion of possibility. Professor White notes that the question whether someone could have done other than what he did in fact do is central to the problem of freewill and determinism, just as the question whether something may have or might have happened other than what is believed to have happened is central to the thesis of scepticism. Part of his purpose in writing the essay is to help clarify such problems. Anyone at all interested in possibility or its cognates will benefit not only from White's positive views on the subject, but also from his criticisms of the views of other writers, including G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Norman Malcolm.