Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region" in English language version.
By the mid-to-late 1980s, however, the 'socialism' had been filtered out of Ba'ath ideology, to leave a form of authoritarian populism, with some latitude given to the private sector, and Arab nationalism giving way to Iraqi nationalism.
Despite the decline in enthusiasm for Pan-Arabist policies, Syria's Hafez al-Assad, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi were among those who tried to assume the mantle of Arab leadership after Nasser.
Following two more coups in 1963 and 1968, the Baath Party, a socialist Pan-Arab political party with branches in neighboring Syria and other Arab states, established itself in power. The Baath Party was to rule Iraq for the next 35 years, for 24 of those years under President Saddam Hussein... A dominant feature of the Baath Party's ideology in Iraq was its secularism. This is a feature it shared with other Pan-Arab groups. In general, the Pan-Arab movement wanted to create secular, socialist states for Arabs in which infighting between religious sects would not occur.
Irredentism is especially applicable to Pan-Arabism, most particularly in so far as the Ba'ath ideology is concerned. This became evident in both Syria and Iraq, which the Ba'th movement had ruled since 1963 and 1970, respectively. The clearly irredentist component of the ten-year long Iraq–Iran War is by no means merely incidental. One of Iraq's explicitly-stated objectives in attacking Iran was its desire to retrieve the border area of Arabistan (which Iran calls Khozistan), along with its Arabic-speaking inhabitants... However, it is Ba'thist Syria which provides a perfect model of Pan-Arab irredentism, viewed through the prism of Syrian nationalism. Besides appealing ritually for an all-Arab union, Syria is searching for an irredentist panacea to its own national trauma (as seen by Ba'thist nationalists). Greater Syria has lost several of its components over the years: Alexandretta (now Hatay) to Turkey in 1939; Lebanon, which became independent in 1945; Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan in 1948; and the Golan Heights to Israel in 1967.
Irredentism is especially applicable to Pan-Arabism, most particularly in so far as the Ba'ath ideology is concerned. This became evident in both Syria and Iraq, which the Ba'th movement had ruled since 1963 and 1970, respectively. The clearly irredentist component of the ten-year long Iraq–Iran War is by no means merely incidental. One of Iraq's explicitly-stated objectives in attacking Iran was its desire to retrieve the border area of Arabistan (which Iran calls Khozistan), along with its Arabic-speaking inhabitants... However, it is Ba'thist Syria which provides a perfect model of Pan-Arab irredentism, viewed through the prism of Syrian nationalism. Besides appealing ritually for an all-Arab union, Syria is searching for an irredentist panacea to its own national trauma (as seen by Ba'thist nationalists). Greater Syria has lost several of its components over the years: Alexandretta (now Hatay) to Turkey in 1939; Lebanon, which became independent in 1945; Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan in 1948; and the Golan Heights to Israel in 1967.
Saddam Hussein's Baathist Party regime in Iraq may also be seen as a populist dictatorship.
However, by 1966 the Ba'ath Party had separated into two competing branches, a left-wing Syrian "neo-Ba'ath" and a more centrist Iraqi Ba'ath which welcomed Syrian dissidents belonging to the "old guard" such as Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar.
This struggle sharpened after the Right-wing Baathists seized power in Iraq in 1963 and instituted a reign of terror against the Communists and other progressive forces, which considerably weakened the influence of the Baath Party in all the Arab countries.
This struggle sharpened after the Right-wing Baathists seized power in Iraq in 1963 and instituted a reign of terror against the Communists and other progressive forces, which considerably weakened the influence of the Baath Party in all the Arab countries.
Despite the decline in enthusiasm for Pan-Arabist policies, Syria's Hafez al-Assad, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi were among those who tried to assume the mantle of Arab leadership after Nasser.
Following two more coups in 1963 and 1968, the Baath Party, a socialist Pan-Arab political party with branches in neighboring Syria and other Arab states, established itself in power. The Baath Party was to rule Iraq for the next 35 years, for 24 of those years under President Saddam Hussein... A dominant feature of the Baath Party's ideology in Iraq was its secularism. This is a feature it shared with other Pan-Arab groups. In general, the Pan-Arab movement wanted to create secular, socialist states for Arabs in which infighting between religious sects would not occur.
The Baʿath Party espoused nonalignment and opposition to imperialism and colonialism...
Archival sources on the U.S. relationship with this regime are highly restricted. Many records of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations and the Department of Defense from this period remain classified, and some declassified records have not been transferred to the National Archives or cataloged.
[Kennedy] Administration officials viewed the Iraqi Ba'th Party in 1963 as an agent of counterinsurgency directed against Iraqi communists, and they cultivated supportive relationships with Ba'thist officials, police commanders, and members of the Ba'th Party militia. The American relationship with militia members and senior police commanders had begun even before the February coup, and Ba'thist police commanders involved in the coup had been trained in the United States.
The Baʿath Party espoused nonalignment and opposition to imperialism and colonialism...
Archival sources on the U.S. relationship with this regime are highly restricted. Many records of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations and the Department of Defense from this period remain classified, and some declassified records have not been transferred to the National Archives or cataloged.
[Kennedy] Administration officials viewed the Iraqi Ba'th Party in 1963 as an agent of counterinsurgency directed against Iraqi communists, and they cultivated supportive relationships with Ba'thist officials, police commanders, and members of the Ba'th Party militia. The American relationship with militia members and senior police commanders had begun even before the February coup, and Ba'thist police commanders involved in the coup had been trained in the United States.
CIA involvement in the 1963 coup that first brought the Ba'th to power in Iraq has been an open secret for decades. American government and media have never been asked to fully account for the CIA's role in the coup. On the contrary, the US government has put forward and official narrative riddled with holes–redactions that cannot be declassified for "national security" reasons.
Archival sources on the U.S. relationship with this regime are highly restricted. Many records of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations and the Department of Defense from this period remain classified, and some declassified records have not been transferred to the National Archives or cataloged.
[Kennedy] Administration officials viewed the Iraqi Ba'th Party in 1963 as an agent of counterinsurgency directed against Iraqi communists, and they cultivated supportive relationships with Ba'thist officials, police commanders, and members of the Ba'th Party militia. The American relationship with militia members and senior police commanders had begun even before the February coup, and Ba'thist police commanders involved in the coup had been trained in the United States.
One study from 1961 or 1962 included a section on "the capability of the U.S. Government to provide support to friendly groups, not in power, who are seeking the violent overthrow of a communist dominated and supported government." The study went on to discuss providing "covert assistance" to such groups and advised that, "Pinpointing of enemy concentrations and hideouts can permit effective use of 'Hunter‐Killer' teams." Given the Embassy's concern with the immediate suppression of Baghdad's sarifa population, it seems likely that American intelligence services would be interested in providing support to the Ba'thist "'Hunter‐Killer' teams."
Despite the decline in enthusiasm for Pan-Arabist policies, Syria's Hafez al-Assad, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi were among those who tried to assume the mantle of Arab leadership after Nasser.
Following two more coups in 1963 and 1968, the Baath Party, a socialist Pan-Arab political party with branches in neighboring Syria and other Arab states, established itself in power. The Baath Party was to rule Iraq for the next 35 years, for 24 of those years under President Saddam Hussein... A dominant feature of the Baath Party's ideology in Iraq was its secularism. This is a feature it shared with other Pan-Arab groups. In general, the Pan-Arab movement wanted to create secular, socialist states for Arabs in which infighting between religious sects would not occur.
The Baʿath Party espoused nonalignment and opposition to imperialism and colonialism...
This struggle sharpened after the Right-wing Baathists seized power in Iraq in 1963 and instituted a reign of terror against the Communists and other progressive forces, which considerably weakened the influence of the Baath Party in all the Arab countries.
This struggle sharpened after the Right-wing Baathists seized power in Iraq in 1963 and instituted a reign of terror against the Communists and other progressive forces, which considerably weakened the influence of the Baath Party in all the Arab countries.
CIA involvement in the 1963 coup that first brought the Ba'th to power in Iraq has been an open secret for decades. American government and media have never been asked to fully account for the CIA's role in the coup. On the contrary, the US government has put forward and official narrative riddled with holes–redactions that cannot be declassified for "national security" reasons.
Archival sources on the U.S. relationship with this regime are highly restricted. Many records of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations and the Department of Defense from this period remain classified, and some declassified records have not been transferred to the National Archives or cataloged.
One study from 1961 or 1962 included a section on "the capability of the U.S. Government to provide support to friendly groups, not in power, who are seeking the violent overthrow of a communist dominated and supported government." The study went on to discuss providing "covert assistance" to such groups and advised that, "Pinpointing of enemy concentrations and hideouts can permit effective use of 'Hunter‐Killer' teams." Given the Embassy's concern with the immediate suppression of Baghdad's sarifa population, it seems likely that American intelligence services would be interested in providing support to the Ba'thist "'Hunter‐Killer' teams."
Archival sources on the U.S. relationship with this regime are highly restricted. Many records of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations and the Department of Defense from this period remain classified, and some declassified records have not been transferred to the National Archives or cataloged.
[Kennedy] Administration officials viewed the Iraqi Ba'th Party in 1963 as an agent of counterinsurgency directed against Iraqi communists, and they cultivated supportive relationships with Ba'thist officials, police commanders, and members of the Ba'th Party militia. The American relationship with militia members and senior police commanders had begun even before the February coup, and Ba'thist police commanders involved in the coup had been trained in the United States.