Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Arrow's impossibility theorem" in English language version.
This is a kind of stability property of Condorcet winners: you cannot dislodge a Condorcet winner A by adding a new candidate B to the election if A beats B in a head-to-head majority vote. For example, although the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election in Florida did not use ranked ballots, it is plausible (see Magee 2003) that Al Gore (A) would have won without Ralph Nader (B) in the election, and Gore would have beaten Nader head-to-head. Thus, Gore should still have won with Nader included in the election.
Candidates C and D spoiled the election for B ... With them in the running, A won, whereas without them in the running, B would have won. ... Instant runoff voting ... does not do away with the spoiler problem entirely
Candidates C and D spoiled the election for B ... With them in the running, A won, whereas without them in the running, B would have won. ... Instant runoff voting ... does not do away with the spoiler problem entirely, although it unquestionably makes it less likely to occur in practice.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
This is a kind of stability property of Condorcet winners: you cannot dislodge a Condorcet winner A by adding a new candidate B to the election if A beats B in a head-to-head majority vote. For example, although the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election in Florida did not use ranked ballots, it is plausible (see Magee 2003) that Al Gore (A) would have won without Ralph Nader (B) in the election, and Gore would have beaten Nader head-to-head. Thus, Gore should still have won with Nader included in the election.
It is shown that the utilitarian welfare function satisfies all of Arrow's social choice postulates — avoiding the celebrated impossibility theorem by making use of information which is unavailable in Arrow's original framework.
If f satisfies U, I, P, and CNC then there exists a dictator.
Many value researchers have assumed that rankings of values are more valid than ratings of values because rankings force participants to differentiate more incisively between similarly regarded values ... Results indicated that ratings tended to evidence greater validity than rankings within moderate and low-differentiating participants. In addition, the validity of ratings was greater than rankings overall.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
If f satisfies U, I, P, and CNC then there exists a dictator.
It is shown that the utilitarian welfare function satisfies all of Arrow's social choice postulates — avoiding the celebrated impossibility theorem by making use of information which is unavailable in Arrow's original framework.
One important finding was that having cardinal utilities is not by itself enough to avoid an impossibility result. ... Intuitively speaking, to put information about preference strengths to good use it has to be possible to compare the strengths of different individuals' preferences.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
This is a kind of stability property of Condorcet winners: you cannot dislodge a Condorcet winner A by adding a new candidate B to the election if A beats B in a head-to-head majority vote. For example, although the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election in Florida did not use ranked ballots, it is plausible (see Magee 2003) that Al Gore (A) would have won without Ralph Nader (B) in the election, and Gore would have beaten Nader head-to-head. Thus, Gore should still have won with Nader included in the election.
It is shown that the utilitarian welfare function satisfies all of Arrow's social choice postulates — avoiding the celebrated impossibility theorem by making use of information which is unavailable in Arrow's original framework.
If f satisfies U, I, P, and CNC then there exists a dictator.
Many value researchers have assumed that rankings of values are more valid than ratings of values because rankings force participants to differentiate more incisively between similarly regarded values ... Results indicated that ratings tended to evidence greater validity than rankings within moderate and low-differentiating participants. In addition, the validity of ratings was greater than rankings overall.
