Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Carbon emission trading" in English language version.
{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)The New Zealand ETS does not fit this model because there is no cap and therefore no certainty as to the volume of emissions with which the national economy must operate
In the short term, the Government is unlikely to sell emission units because the Kyoto units allocated to New Zealand will be needed to support New Zealand's international obligations, as well as allocation to eligible sectors under the emissions trading scheme.
However, there often are important trade-offs in terms of efficiency because OBA implicitly subsidizes production, unlike conventional lump-sum allocation mechanisms like grandfathering.
Setting the cap properly matters more to environmental protection than the decision to allow, or not allow, trades
The Bill changes the allocation provisions of the existing CCRA from allocating a fixed pool of emissions to an uncapped approach to allocation. There is no longer an explicit limit on the number of New Zealand units (NZUs) that can be allocated to the industrial sector.
However, there often are important trade-offs in terms of efficiency because OBA implicitly subsidizes production, unlike conventional lump-sum allocation mechanisms like grandfathering.
An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents.
The allocation of free carbon credits to industrial processes is extremely generous and removes the carbon price signal where New Zealand needs one the most
We now have on the table a pathetic ETS which won't actually do anything to reduce emissions
However, there often are important trade-offs in terms of efficiency because OBA implicitly subsidizes production, unlike conventional lump-sum allocation mechanisms like grandfathering.
{{cite news}}: |author= has generic name (help){{cite news}}: |author= has generic name (help)However, there often are important trade-offs in terms of efficiency because OBA implicitly subsidizes production, unlike conventional lump-sum allocation mechanisms like grandfathering.
An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents.
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