Causal closure (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Causal closure" in English language version.

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arxiv.org

  • David Hodgson (2012). "Chapter 7: Science and determinism". Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will. Oxford University Press. p. 121. ISBN 9780199845309. Hodgson relies upon the free will theorem 1 2 of scientists John Conway and Simon Kochen based upon the role of the observer in quantum mechanics, which supports the view that "belief in determinism may thus come to be seen as notably unscientific."

books.google.com

  • Jaegwon Kim (1993). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press. p. 280. ISBN 978-0521439961.
  • Barbara Montero (2003). "Chapter 8: Varieties of causal closure". In Sven Walter; Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.). Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic. p. 173. ISBN 978-0907845461.
  • Sahotra Sarkar; Jessica Pfeifer (2006). "Physicalism: The causal impact argument". Physicalism. The Philosophy of Science: N-Z, Index. Taylor & Francis. p. 566. ISBN 978-0415977104.
  • Max Velmans; Susan Schneider (15 April 2008). The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0-470-75145-9. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
  • Benjamin Libet; Anthony Freeman; Keith Sutherland (2000). "Editors' introduction: The volitional brain". The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Academic. pp. ixxxii. ISBN 9780907845119.
  • F.T. Hong (2005). Vladimir B. Bajić; Tin Wee Tan (eds.). Information Processing and Living Systems. Imperial College Press. p. 388. ISBN 9781860946882. The origination of free will is an illusion from the third-person perspective. However, it is a reality from the first-person perspective.
  • Thomas Nagel (2012). "Chapter 4: Cognition". Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False. Oxford University Press. p. 71. ISBN 9780199919758. [Higher-level cognitive capacities] cannot be understood through physical science alone, and ... their existence cannot be explained by a version of evolutionary theory that is physically reductive.
  • U Mohrhoff (2000). "The physics of interactionism". In Benjamin Libet; Anthony Freeman; Keith Sutherland (eds.). The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Academic. p. 166. ISBN 9780907845119. But the laws of physics presuppose causal closure. Hence it follows that the behaviour of matter in the presence of a causally efficacious non-material mind cannot be fully governed by those laws.
  • David Hodgson (2012). "Chapter 7: Science and determinism". Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will. Oxford University Press. p. 121. ISBN 9780199845309. Hodgson relies upon the free will theorem 1 2 of scientists John Conway and Simon Kochen based upon the role of the observer in quantum mechanics, which supports the view that "belief in determinism may thus come to be seen as notably unscientific."
  • Stewart Goetz; Charles Taliaferro (2008). "Strict naturalism, purposeful explanation, and freedom". Naturalism (Intervensions) (Paperback ed.). Eerdmans. p. 26. ISBN 978-0802807687.

doi.org

jstor.org

  • Jaegwon Kim (1989). "The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism". Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 63 (3): 31–47. doi:10.2307/3130081. JSTOR 3130081.

philpapers.org

semanticscholar.org

api.semanticscholar.org

stanford.edu

plato.stanford.edu