Norbu, China's Tibet Policy (2001), pp. 82–83: "If a strong amban (the title which replaced the Khan in 1711) coupled with a domestic or external crisis situation, coincided with a weak or minor Dalai Lama, Imperial China tended to take stronger measures, and to interfere more than usual in the internal affairs of Tibet.". Norbu, Dawa (2001), China's Tibet Policy, Routledge, ISBN978-1-136-79793-4
Norbu, China's Tibet Policy (2001), p. 169: "The Tibetans showed profound disregard for the treaty stipulations by demolishing the new border markers (pillars). That is, the Tibetans refused to recognize the British takeover of Sikkim and consequently the newly defined boundary between Sikkim and Tibet.... In 1895 the Commissioner of the Rajashahi Division was told flatly at Yatung that, as the Convention was made by the Chinese only, the Tibetan Government refused to recognize it.". Norbu, Dawa (2001), China's Tibet Policy, Routledge, ISBN978-1-136-79793-4
Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 23: "[The British viceroy] realized that China had no practical control over events in Tibet, so he obtained permission from London to try to initiate direct communication and relations with Lhasa.... But China had no control over the Dalai Lama, who ignored these admonitions and fled to exile in Mongolia, fearing he would be compelled to sign an unfavorable agreement.". Goldstein, Melvyn C. (1997), The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, University of California Press, ISBN978-0-520-21951-9
Ho, The Men Who Would Not be Amban (2008), p. 232: "Thus began a fateful chain of events that would have grave ramifications for Sino-Tibetan relations in the twentieth century.". Ho, Dahpon David (April 2008), "The Men Who Would Not Be Amban and the One Who Would", Modern China, 34 (2): 210–246, doi:10.1177/0097700407312856
Mehra, The Elusive Triangle (1990), p. 150: "Tibet also maintains that it did not accept the Anglo-Chinese Convention on Sikkim of 1890, nor the Trade Regulations framed under it three years later. It had not been consulted the drafting of either document.". Mehra, Parshotam (1990), "The Elusive Triangle: Tibet in India-China Relations—A Brief Conspectus", China Report, 26 (2): 145–156, doi:10.1177/000944559002600202
Chung, Comparing China's frontier politics (2018), p. 162: "The Dalai Lama's reduced standing demonstrated Beijing's intention to do away with Tibet's status as an autonomous dependency by exercising full sovereignty over it, and signaled that the traditional personal relationship between the (Dalai Lama) priest and his (Manchu Emperor) patron no longer existed.". Chung, Chien-peng (2018). "Comparing China's frontier politics: how much difference did a century make?". Nationalities Papers. 46 (1): 158–176. doi:10.1080/00905992.2017.1350151.