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Falsifiability (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Falsifiability" in English language version.

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  • Popper discusses the notion of imaginary state of affairs in the context of scientific realism in Popper 1972, Chap.2, Sec.5: (emphasis added) "[H]uman language is essentially descriptive (and argumentative), and an unambiguous description is always realistic: it is of something—of some state of affairs which may be real or imaginary. Thus if the state of affairs is imaginary, then the description is simply false and its negation is a true description of reality, in Tarski's sense." He continues (emphasis added) "Tarski's theory more particularly makes clear just what fact a statement P will correspond to if it corresponds to any fact: namely the fact that p. ... a false statement P is false not because it corresponds to some odd entity like a non-fact, but simply because it does not correspond to any fact: it does not stand in the peculiar relation of correspondence to a fact to anything real, though it stands in a relation like 'describes' to the spurious state of affairs that p." Popper, Karl (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (2003 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875024-6.
  • Popper 1972, Sec. 1.9: "Quite apart from [Hume's psychological theory of induction], I felt that psychology should be regarded as a biological discipline, and especially that any psychological theory of the acquisition of knowledge should be so regarded. Now if we transfer to human and animal psychology [the method that consists in choosing the best tested theory among conjectured theories], we arrive, clearly, at the well-known method of trial and error-elimination." Popper, Karl (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (2003 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875024-6.
  • Popper 1972, Sec. 1.8: "The fundamental difference between my approach and the approach for which I long ago introduced the label 'inductivist' is that I lay stress on negative arguments, such as negative instances or counter-examples, refutations, and attempted refutations—in short, criticism". Popper, Karl (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (2003 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875024-6.
  • Popper 1995, Chap.15 sec. III (page 101 here): "In Marx's view, it is vain to expect that any important change can be achieved by the use of legal or political means; a political revolution can only lead to one set of rulers giving way to another set—a mere exchange of the persons who act as rulers. Only the evolution of the underlying essence, the economic reality can produce any essential or real change—a social revolution." Popper, Karl (1995) [Original version in 1945]. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Routledge.
  • Popper 1972. Popper, Karl (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (2003 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875024-6.
  • Popper 1972, App. 1.III. Popper, Karl (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (2003 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875024-6.
  • Popper 1972, App. 1.II. Popper, Karl (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (2003 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875024-6.
  • Popper 1972, Sec. 1.9. Popper, Karl (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (2003 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875024-6.
  • Popper 1972, p. 30. Popper, Karl (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (2003 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875024-6.
  • Popper 1995, Chap. 15. Popper, Karl (1995) [Original version in 1945]. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Routledge.

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  • Fisher 1930, p. 34: "Since m measures fitness to survive by the objective fact of representation in future generations," Fisher, R.A. (1930). The genetical theory of natural selection. Рипол Классик. ISBN 978-1-176-62502-0. Archived from the original on 12 June 2020. Retrieved 12 June 2020.
  • For example, see Cruzan 2018, p. 156, Muehlenbein 2010, p. 21 or Ridley 2003, website complement Cruzan, Mitchell B. (2018). Evolutionary Biology: A Plant Perspective. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-088268-6. Muehlenbein, M.P. (2010). Human Evolutionary Biology. Cambridge University Press. Ridley, Mark (2003). Evolution (3rd ed.). Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 1-4051-0345-0.
  • Popper 1980, p. 611: "It does appear that some people think that I denied scientific character to the historical sciences, such as palaeontology, or the history of the evolution of life on Earth. This is a mistake, and I here wish to affirm that these and other historical sciences have in my opinion scientific character; their hypotheses can in many cases be tested." Popper, Karl (1980). "Evolution". Letters. New Scientist. Vol. 87, no. 1215. Reed Business Information. p. 611.[permanent dead link]
  • Popper 1983, Introduction, xx: "This theory ['All human actions are egotistic, motivated by self-interest'] is widely held: it has variants in behaviourism, psychoanalysis, individual psychology, utilitarianism, vulgar-marxism, religion, and sociology of knowledge. Clearly this theory, with all its variants, is not falsifiable: no example of an altruistic action can refute the view that there was an egotistic motive hidden behind it." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • Feyerabend 1978, p. 15: "Lakatos realized and admitted that the existing standards of rationality, standards of logic included, are too restrictive and would have hindered science had they been applied with determination. He therefore permitted the scientist to violate them ... However, he demanded that research programmes show certain features in the long run — they must be progressive. In Chapter 16 of [Against Method] (and in my essay 'On the Critique of Scientific Reason': Feyerabend 1978b, p. 120) I have argued that this demand no longer restricts scientific practice. Any development agrees with it. The demand (standard) is rational, but it is also empty. Rationalism and the demands of reason have become purely verbal in the theory of Lakatos." See also Feyerabend 1981, p. 148. Feyerabend, Paul (1978). Science in a Free Society. London: NLB. ISBN 0-86091-008-3. Feyerabend, Paul (1978). "On the Critique of Scientific Reason". In Wartofsky, M.W.; Feyerabend, P.K.; Cohen, R.S. (eds.). Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Vol. 39. pp. 109–143.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link) Feyerabend, Paul (1981). Problems of Empiricism: Volume 2: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press, 1985. ISBN 978-0-521-31641-5.
  • Couvalis 1997, pp. 74-75: "There is a sense in which Feyerabend is right. Lakatos fails to give precise mechanical rules for when a theory has been finally falsified. Yet an appropriate question might be whether such rules are possible or necessary to make science rational. ... There are, however, many rough and ready rules, the application of which has to be learned in practical contexts. ... This does not mean that precise rules cannot be used in certain contexts, but we need to use our judgement to decide when those rules are to be used." Couvalis, George (1997). The Philosophy of Science: Science and Objectivity. SAGE Publications. ISBN 978-0-7619-5101-8.
  • Einstein wrote (see Yehuda 2018, p. 41): "The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them." Yehuda, Elkana (2018). "Einstein and God". Einstein for the 21st Century: His Legacy in Science, Art, and Modern Culture. Princeton University Press. pp. 35–47. ISBN 978-0-691-17790-8.
  • Einstein wrote (see Feldman & Williams 2007, p. 151 and [1]): "I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. ... Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed." Feldman, Burton; Williams, Katherine (2007). Williams, Katherine (ed.). 112 MERCER STREET: Einstein, Russell, Godel, Pauli, and the End of Innocence in Science. New York: Arcade Publishing.
  • Kuhn 1970, pp. 7–8: "Astrology is Sir Karl's most frequently cited example of a 'pseudo-science'. He [Popper] says: 'By making their interpretations and prophecies sufficiently vague they [astrologers] were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophecies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of the theory.' Those generalizations catch something of the spirit of the astrological enterprise. But taken at all literally, as they must be if they are to provide a demarcation criterion, they are impossible to support. The history of astrology during the centuries when it was intellectually reputable records many predictions that categorically failed. Not even astrology's most convinced and vehement exponents doubted the recurrence of such failures. Astrology cannot be barred from the sciences because of the form in which its predictions were cast." Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970) [Reprinted Kuhn 1974]. "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?". In Lakatos, Imre; Musgrave, Alan (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 4. London: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-07826-1. OCLC 94900.
  • Harding 1976, p. X. Harding, Sandra (1976). "Introduction". Can theories be refuted?: essays on the Duhem–Quine thesis. Springer Science & Business Media. pp. IX–XXI. ISBN 978-90-277-0630-0.
  • Popper 1959, p. 32. Popper, Karl (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002 pbk; 2005 ebook ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-27844-7.
  • Popper 1959, pp. 64–65. Popper, Karl (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002 pbk; 2005 ebook ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-27844-7.
  • Popper 1959, p. 65 Footnote *1. Popper, Karl (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002 pbk; 2005 ebook ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-27844-7.
  • Smith 2000, p. 12. Smith, Peter K. (2000). "Philosophie of science and its relevance for the social sciences". In Burton, Dawn (ed.). Research Training for Social Scientists: A Handbook for Postgraduate Researchers. Los Angeles: Sage Publications. pp. 5–20. ISBN 0-7619-6351-0. Archived from the original on 18 August 2016. Retrieved 27 January 2016.

britannica.com

  • Feigl 1978: "Karl Popper, an Austrian-born British philosopher of science, in his Logik der Forschung (1935; The Logic of Scientific Discovery), insisted that the meaning criterion should be abandoned and replaced by a criterion of demarcation between empirical (scientific) and transempirical (nonscientific, metaphysical) questions and answers—a criterion that, according to Popper, is to be testability." Feigl, Herbert (1978). "Positivism". Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 22 April 2020. Retrieved 3 May 2020.

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  • Popper 1983, Introduction 1982: "We must distinguish two meanings of the expressions falsifiable and falsifiability:
    "1) Falsifiable as a logical-technical term, in the sense of the demarcation criterion of falsifiability. This purely logical concept—falsifiable in principle, one might say—rests on a logical relation between the theory in question and the class of basic statements (or the potential falsifiers described by them).
    "2) Falsifiable in the sense that the theory in question can definitively or conclusively or demonstrably be falsified ("demonstrably falsifiable").
    "I have always stressed that even a theory which is obviously falsifiable in the first sense is never falsifiable in this second sense. (For this reason I have used the expression falsifiable as a rule only in the first, technical sense. In the second sense, I have as a rule spoken not of falsifiability but rather of falsification and of its problems)." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • Popper 1983, Introduction 1982: "Although the first sense refers to the logical possibility of a falsification in principle, the second sense refers to a conclusive practical experimental proof of falsity. But anything like conclusive proof to settle an empirical question does not exist. An entire literature rests on the failure to observe this distinction." For a discussion related to this lack of distinction, see Rosende 2009, p. 142. Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665. Rosende, Diego L. (2009). "Popper on Refutability: Some Philosophical and Historical Questions". In Parusnikova, Zuzana; Cohen, Robert S. (eds.). Rethinking Popper. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 135–154. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9338-8_11. ISBN 978-1-4020-9337-1. OCLC 260208425.
  • Popper 1983, chap. 1, sec. 3: "It seems that almost everybody believes in induction; believes, that is, that we learn by the repetition of observations. Even Hume, in spite of his great discovery that a natural law can neither be established nor made 'probable' by induction, continued to believe firmly that animals and men do learn through repetition: through repeated observations as well as through the formation of habits, or the strengthening of habits, by repetition. And he upheld the theory that induction, though rationally indefensible and resulting in nothing better than unreasoned belief, was nevertheless reliable in the main—more reliable and useful at any rate than reason and the processes of reasoning; and that 'experience' was thus the unreasoned result of a (more or less passive) accumulation of observations. As against all this, I happen to believe that in fact we never draw inductive inferences, or make use of what are now called 'inductive procedures'. Rather, we always discover regularities by the essentially different method of trial and error." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • This perspective can be found in any text on model theory. For example, see Ebbinghaus 2017. Ebbinghaus, H.-D. (2017). "Extended Logics: The General Framework". In Barwise, J.; Feferman, S. (eds.). Model-Theoretic Logics. Perspectives in Logic. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316717158. ISBN 978-1-316-71715-8.
  • Popper put as an example of falsifiable statement with failed falsifications Einstein's equivalence principle. See Popper 1983, Introduction, sec. I: "Einstein's principle of proportionality of inert and (passively) heavy mass. This equivalence principle conflicts with many potential falsifiers: events whose observation is logically possible. Yet despite all attempts (the experiments by Eötvös, more recently refined by Rickle) to realize such a falsification experimentally, the experiments have so far corroborated the principle of equivalence." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • Popper 1983, Introduction, xx: "This theory ['All human actions are egotistic, motivated by self-interest'] is widely held: it has variants in behaviourism, psychoanalysis, individual psychology, utilitarianism, vulgar-marxism, religion, and sociology of knowledge. Clearly this theory, with all its variants, is not falsifiable: no example of an altruistic action can refute the view that there was an egotistic motive hidden behind it." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • Waddington 1959, pp. 383–384: "Darwin's major contribution was, of course, the suggestion that evolution can be explained by the natural selection of random variations. Natural selection, which was at first considered as though it were a hypothesis that was in need of experimental or observational confirmation, turns out on closer inspection to be a tautology, a statement of an inevitable, although previously unrecognized, relation. It states that the fittest individuals in a population (defined as those which leave most offspring) will leave most offspring. Once the statement is made, its truth is apparent. This fact in no way reduces the magnitude of Darwin's achievement; only after it was clearly formulated, could biologists realize the enormous power of the principle as a weapon of explanation." Waddington, C.H. (1959). "Evolutionary Adaptation". Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 2 (4). Johns Hopkins University Press: 379–401. doi:10.1353/pbm.1959.0027. ISSN 1529-8795. PMID 13667389. S2CID 9434812.
  • Popper 1994, p. 90: "If, more especially, we accept that statistical definition of fitness which defines fitness by actual survival, then the theory of the survival of the fittest becomes tautological, and irrefutable." Popper, Karl (1994). Notturno, Mark A. (ed.). The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203535806. ISBN 978-0-415-11320-5. OCLC 30156902.
  • Popper 1978, p. 342: "However, Darwin's own most important contribution to the theory of evolution, his theory of natural selection, is difficult to test. There are some tests, even some experimental tests; and in some cases, such as the famous phenomenon known as "industrial melanism", we can observe natural selection happening under our very eyes, as it were. Nevertheless, really severe tests of the theory of natural selection are hard to come by, much more so than tests of otherwise comparable theories in physics or chemistry." Popper, Karl (1978). "Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind". Dialectica. 32 (3/4): 339–355. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1978.tb01321.x. JSTOR 42970324.
  • Surveys were mailed to all active U.S. district court judges in November 1998 (N = 619). 303 usable surveys were obtained for a response rate of 51%. See Krafka 2002, p. 9 in archived pdf. Krafka, Carol L.; Miletich, D. Dean P.; Cecil, Joe S.; Dunn, Meghan A.; Johnson, Mary T. (September 2002). "Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials" (PDF). Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 8 (3): 309–332. doi:10.1037/1076-8971.8.3.309. Archived from the original on 11 April 2020.
  • Zahar wrote a brief summary of Lakatos's position regarding Popper's philosophy. He says (see Zahar 1983, p. 149): "The important question of the possibility of a genuine logic of [scientific] discovery" is the main divergence between Lakatos and Popper. About Popper's view, Zahar wrote (see Zahar 1983, p. 169): "To repeat: Popper offers a Darwinian account of the progress of knowledge. Progress is supposed to result negatively from the elimination by natural selection of defective alternatives. ... There is no genuine logic of discovery, only a psychology of invention juxtaposed to a methodology which appraises fully fledged theories." Zahar, E. G. (1983). "The Popper-Lakatos Controversy in the Light of 'Die Beiden Grundprobleme Der Erkenntnistheorie'". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 34 (2): 149–171. doi:10.1093/bjps/34.2.149. JSTOR 687447. Zahar, E. G. (1983). "The Popper-Lakatos Controversy in the Light of 'Die Beiden Grundprobleme Der Erkenntnistheorie'". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 34 (2): 149–171. doi:10.1093/bjps/34.2.149. JSTOR 687447.
  • Popper 1983, Introduction, V: "The hope further to strengthen this theory of the aims of science by the definition of verisimilitude in terms of truth and of content was, unfortunately, vain. But the widely held view that scrapping this definition weakens my theory is completely baseless." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • Zahar 1983, p. 167: "Lakatos urged Popper explicitly to adopt some inductive principle which would synthetically link verisimilitude to corroboration." Zahar, E. G. (1983). "The Popper-Lakatos Controversy in the Light of 'Die Beiden Grundprobleme Der Erkenntnistheorie'". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 34 (2): 149–171. doi:10.1093/bjps/34.2.149. JSTOR 687447.
  • Watkins 1989, p. 6: "Although Paul Feyerabend and Alan Musgrave evaluated [Lakatos's view] in opposite ways, they agreed about its nature. Feyerabend hailed it as an 'anarchism in disguise' (Feyerabend, Against Method, 1975), while Musgrave rather deplored the fact that Lakatos had 'gone a long way towards epistemological anarchism' (Musgrave 1976, p. 458). Musgrave added: 'Lakatos deprived his standards of practical force, and adopted a position of "anything goes"' (Musgrave 1976, p. 478)." Watkins, John (1989). "The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: A Retrospect". Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 3. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 3–13. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-3025-4. ISBN 978-94-010-7860-3. Musgrave, Alan (1976). "Method or Madness?: Can the Methodology of Research Programmes Be Rescued From Epistemological Anarchism?". In Cohen, R.S.; Feyerabend, P.K.; Wartofsky, M. W. (eds.). Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 457–491. Musgrave, Alan (1976). "Method or Madness?: Can the Methodology of Research Programmes Be Rescued From Epistemological Anarchism?". In Cohen, R.S.; Feyerabend, P.K.; Wartofsky, M. W. (eds.). Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 457–491.
  • Zahar (Zahar 1983, p. 168) recognizes that formal rules in a methodology cannot be rational. Yet, at the level of the technology, that is, at the practical level, he says, scientists must nevertheless take decisions. Popper's methodology does not specify formal rules, but non-rational decisions will still have to be taken. He concludes that "Popper and Lakatos differ only over the levels at which they locate non-rationality in science: Lakatos at the level of an inductive principle which justifies technology, and Popper at the lower-level of technology itself." Zahar, E. G. (1983). "The Popper-Lakatos Controversy in the Light of 'Die Beiden Grundprobleme Der Erkenntnistheorie'". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 34 (2): 149–171. doi:10.1093/bjps/34.2.149. JSTOR 687447.
  • Popper 1994, pp. 155–156: "It is my view that the methods of the natural as well as the social sciences can be best understood if we admit that science always begins and ends with problems. The progress of science lies, essentially, in the evolution of its problems. And it can be gauged by the increasing refinement, wealth, fertility, and depth of its problems. ... The growth of knowledge always consists in correcting earlier knowledge. Historically, science begins with pre-scientific knowledge, with pre-scientific myths and pre-scientific expectations. And these, in turn, have no 'beginnings'." Popper, Karl (1994). Notturno, Mark A. (ed.). The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203535806. ISBN 978-0-415-11320-5. OCLC 30156902.
  • Gelman & Shalizi 2013. Gelman, Andrew; Shalizi, Cosma Rohilla (2013). "Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics". British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology. 66 (1): 8–38. arXiv:1006.3868. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8317.2011.02037.x. PMC 4476974. PMID 22364575.
  • Popper 1983, p. xxxv. Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • Vere, Joseph; Gibson, Barry (2019). "Evidence-based medicine as science". Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice. 25 (6): 997–1002. doi:10.1111/jep.13090. ISSN 1356-1294. PMID 30575209.
  • Simon & Groen 1973. Simon, Herbert A.; Groen, Guy J. (1973). "Ramsey Eliminability and the Testability of Scientific Theories". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 24 (4): 367–380. doi:10.1093/bjps/24.4.367. JSTOR 686617. Retrieved 6 May 2021.
  • Simon 1985. Simon, Herbert A. (1985). "Quantification of Theoretical Terms and the Falsifiability of Theories". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 36 (3): 291–298. doi:10.1093/bjps/36.3.291. JSTOR 687572. Retrieved 5 May 2021.
  • Rynasiewicz 1983, Sec. 2. Rynasiewicz, Robert A. (1983). "Falsifiability and the Semantic Eliminability of Theoretical Languages". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 34 (3): 225–241. doi:10.1093/bjps/34.3.225. JSTOR 687321. Retrieved 3 May 2021.
  • Rudge 2005. Rudge, David W. (2005). "The Beauty of Kettlewell's Classic Experimental Demonstration of Natural Selection". BioScience. 55 (4): 369–375. doi:10.1641/0006-3568(2005)055[0369:TBOKCE]2.0.CO;2.
  • Krafka 2002, p. 17 in archived pdf. Krafka, Carol L.; Miletich, D. Dean P.; Cecil, Joe S.; Dunn, Meghan A.; Johnson, Mary T. (September 2002). "Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials" (PDF). Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 8 (3): 309–332. doi:10.1037/1076-8971.8.3.309. Archived from the original on 11 April 2020.
  • Wilkinson 2013. Wilkinson, Mick (2013). "Testing the null hypothesis: the forgotten legacy of Karl Popper?" (PDF). Journal of Sports Sciences. 31 (9): 919–920. doi:10.1080/02640414.2012.753636. PMID 23249368. S2CID 205512848.
  • Lehmann 1993, p. 201. Lehmann, Erich Leo (1993). "The Fisher, Neyman-Pearson Theories of Testing Hypotheses: One Theory or Two?". Journal of the American Statistical Association. 88 (424): 1242–249. doi:10.2307/2291263. JSTOR 2291263.
  • Howson 2000, p. 88. Howson, Colin (2000). Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198250371.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-825037-1.
  • Gelman & Shalizi 2013, pp. 26–27. Gelman, Andrew; Shalizi, Cosma Rohilla (2013). "Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics". British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology. 66 (1): 8–38. arXiv:1006.3868. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8317.2011.02037.x. PMC 4476974. PMID 22364575.
  • Pera 1989, p. 362. Pera, Marcello (1989). "Methodological Sophisticationism: A Degenerating Project". In Gavroglou, Kōstas; Goudaroulis, Yorgos; Nicolacopoulos, Pantelis (eds.). Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 111. Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 169–187. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-3025-4. ISBN 90-277-2766-X. OCLC 17982125.
  • Fine 2019. Fine, Kit (2019). "Verisimilitude and Truthmaking". Erkenntnis. 86 (5): 1239–1276. doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00152-z. S2CID 203071483.
  • Broad 1979. Broad, W. J. (2 November 1979). "Paul Feyerabend: Science and the Anarchist". Science. 206 (4418): 534–537. Bibcode:1979Sci...206..534B. doi:10.1126/science.386510. ISSN 0036-8075. PMID 386510.
  • Greenland 1998, p. 545. Greenland, Sander (1998). "Induction versus Popper: substance versus semantics". International Epidemiological Association. 27 (4): 543–548. doi:10.1093/ije/27.4.543. PMID 9758105.

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jstor.org

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pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

  • Waddington 1959, pp. 383–384: "Darwin's major contribution was, of course, the suggestion that evolution can be explained by the natural selection of random variations. Natural selection, which was at first considered as though it were a hypothesis that was in need of experimental or observational confirmation, turns out on closer inspection to be a tautology, a statement of an inevitable, although previously unrecognized, relation. It states that the fittest individuals in a population (defined as those which leave most offspring) will leave most offspring. Once the statement is made, its truth is apparent. This fact in no way reduces the magnitude of Darwin's achievement; only after it was clearly formulated, could biologists realize the enormous power of the principle as a weapon of explanation." Waddington, C.H. (1959). "Evolutionary Adaptation". Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 2 (4). Johns Hopkins University Press: 379–401. doi:10.1353/pbm.1959.0027. ISSN 1529-8795. PMID 13667389. S2CID 9434812.
  • Gelman & Shalizi 2013. Gelman, Andrew; Shalizi, Cosma Rohilla (2013). "Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics". British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology. 66 (1): 8–38. arXiv:1006.3868. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8317.2011.02037.x. PMC 4476974. PMID 22364575.
  • Vere, Joseph; Gibson, Barry (2019). "Evidence-based medicine as science". Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice. 25 (6): 997–1002. doi:10.1111/jep.13090. ISSN 1356-1294. PMID 30575209.
  • Wallis 2005. Wallis, Claudia (7 August 2005). "The Evolution Wars". Time. PMID 16116981. Archived from the original on 9 September 2019. Retrieved 9 January 2020.
  • Wilkinson 2013. Wilkinson, Mick (2013). "Testing the null hypothesis: the forgotten legacy of Karl Popper?" (PDF). Journal of Sports Sciences. 31 (9): 919–920. doi:10.1080/02640414.2012.753636. PMID 23249368. S2CID 205512848.
  • Gelman & Shalizi 2013, pp. 26–27. Gelman, Andrew; Shalizi, Cosma Rohilla (2013). "Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics". British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology. 66 (1): 8–38. arXiv:1006.3868. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8317.2011.02037.x. PMC 4476974. PMID 22364575.
  • Broad 1979. Broad, W. J. (2 November 1979). "Paul Feyerabend: Science and the Anarchist". Science. 206 (4418): 534–537. Bibcode:1979Sci...206..534B. doi:10.1126/science.386510. ISSN 0036-8075. PMID 386510.
  • Greenland 1998, p. 545. Greenland, Sander (1998). "Induction versus Popper: substance versus semantics". International Epidemiological Association. 27 (4): 543–548. doi:10.1093/ije/27.4.543. PMID 9758105.

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

northumbria.ac.uk

nrl.northumbria.ac.uk

researchgate.net

  • Kaye 2005, p. 2: "several courts have treated the abstract possibility of falsification as sufficient to satisfy this aspect of the screening of scientific evidence. This essay challenges these views. It first explains the distinct meanings of falsification and falsifiability. It then argues that while the Court did not embrace the views of any specific philosopher of science, inquiring into the existence of meaningful attempts at falsification is an appropriate and crucial consideration in admissibility determinations. Consequently, it concludes that recent opinions substituting mere falsifiability for actual empirical testing are misconstruing and misapplying Daubert." Kaye, David H. (2005). "On 'Falsification' and 'Falsifiability': The First Daubert Factor and the Philosophy of Science". Jurimetrics. 45 (4): 473–481. JSTOR 29762910. SSRN 767086.

semanticscholar.org

api.semanticscholar.org

  • Waddington 1959, pp. 383–384: "Darwin's major contribution was, of course, the suggestion that evolution can be explained by the natural selection of random variations. Natural selection, which was at first considered as though it were a hypothesis that was in need of experimental or observational confirmation, turns out on closer inspection to be a tautology, a statement of an inevitable, although previously unrecognized, relation. It states that the fittest individuals in a population (defined as those which leave most offspring) will leave most offspring. Once the statement is made, its truth is apparent. This fact in no way reduces the magnitude of Darwin's achievement; only after it was clearly formulated, could biologists realize the enormous power of the principle as a weapon of explanation." Waddington, C.H. (1959). "Evolutionary Adaptation". Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 2 (4). Johns Hopkins University Press: 379–401. doi:10.1353/pbm.1959.0027. ISSN 1529-8795. PMID 13667389. S2CID 9434812.
  • Wilkinson 2013. Wilkinson, Mick (2013). "Testing the null hypothesis: the forgotten legacy of Karl Popper?" (PDF). Journal of Sports Sciences. 31 (9): 919–920. doi:10.1080/02640414.2012.753636. PMID 23249368. S2CID 205512848.
  • Fine 2019. Fine, Kit (2019). "Verisimilitude and Truthmaking". Erkenntnis. 86 (5): 1239–1276. doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00152-z. S2CID 203071483.

ssrn.com

papers.ssrn.com

  • Kaye 2005, p. 2: "several courts have treated the abstract possibility of falsification as sufficient to satisfy this aspect of the screening of scientific evidence. This essay challenges these views. It first explains the distinct meanings of falsification and falsifiability. It then argues that while the Court did not embrace the views of any specific philosopher of science, inquiring into the existence of meaningful attempts at falsification is an appropriate and crucial consideration in admissibility determinations. Consequently, it concludes that recent opinions substituting mere falsifiability for actual empirical testing are misconstruing and misapplying Daubert." Kaye, David H. (2005). "On 'Falsification' and 'Falsifiability': The First Daubert Factor and the Philosophy of Science". Jurimetrics. 45 (4): 473–481. JSTOR 29762910. SSRN 767086.

stanford.edu

plato.stanford.edu

  • Thornton 2016, sec. 3: "Popper has always drawn a clear distinction between the logic of falsifiability and its applied methodology. The logic of his theory is utterly simple: if a single ferrous metal is unaffected by a magnetic field it cannot be the case that all ferrous metals are affected by magnetic fields. Logically speaking, a scientific law is conclusively falsifiable although it is not conclusively verifiable. Methodologically, however, the situation is much more complex: no observation is free from the possibility of error—consequently we may question whether our experimental result was what it appeared to be." Thornton, Stephen (2016) [First published 1997]. "Karl Popper". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 18 March 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2018.
  • In Popper's description of the scientific procedure of testing, as explained by Thornton (see Thornton 2016, Sec. 4), there is no discussion of factual observations except in those tests that compare the theory with factual observations, but in these tests too the procedure is mostly logical and involves observations that are only logical constructions (Popper 1959, pp. 9–10): "We may if we like distinguish four different lines along which the testing of a theory could be carried out. First there is the logical comparison of the conclusions among themselves, by which the internal consistency of the system is tested. Secondly, there is the investigation of the logical form of the theory, with the object of determining whether it has the character of an empirical or scientific theory, or whether it is, for example, tautological. Thirdly, there is the comparison with other theories, chiefly with the aim of determining whether the theory would constitute a scientific advance should it survive our various tests. And finally, there is the testing of the theory by way of empirical applications of the conclusions which can be derived from it. ... Here too the procedure of testing turns out to be deductive. With the help of other statements, previously accepted, certain singular statements—which we may call 'predictions'—are deduced from the theory; especially predictions that are easily testable or applicable. From among these statements, those are selected which are not derivable from the current theory, and more especially those which the current theory contradicts." Thornton, Stephen (2016) [First published 1997]. "Karl Popper". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 18 March 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2018. Popper, Karl (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002 pbk; 2005 ebook ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-27844-7.
  • Thornton 2016, Sec. 2: "The Marxist account of history too, Popper held, is not scientific, although it differs in certain crucial respects from psychoanalysis. For Marxism, Popper believed, had been initially scientific, in that Marx had postulated a theory which was genuinely predictive. However, when these predictions were not in fact borne out, the theory was saved from falsification by the addition of ad hoc hypotheses which made it compatible with the facts. By this means, Popper asserted, a theory which was initially genuinely scientific degenerated into pseudo-scientific dogma." Thornton, Stephen (2016) [First published 1997]. "Karl Popper". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 18 March 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2018.
  • Morris & Brown 2021, Sec. 3: Hume explicitly models his account of the fundamental principles of the mind's operations—the principles of association—on the idea of gravitational attraction. Morris, William Edward; Brown, Charlotte R. (2021). "David Hume". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Einstein wrote (see Feldman & Williams 2007, p. 151 and [1]): "I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. ... Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed." Feldman, Burton; Williams, Katherine (2007). Williams, Katherine (ed.). 112 MERCER STREET: Einstein, Russell, Godel, Pauli, and the End of Innocence in Science. New York: Arcade Publishing.
  • Uebel 2019. Uebel, Thomas (2019) [First published 2006]. "Vienna Circle". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 25 February 2021. Retrieved 22 April 2020.
  • Creath 2017. Creath, Richard (2017) [First published 2011]. "Logical Empiricism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 14 June 2020. Retrieved 21 April 2020.
  • Leitgeb & Carus 2021, Sec. 8.1. Leitgeb, Hannes; Carus, André (2021). "Rudolf Carnap". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
  • Hawthorne 2018, Sec. 3.2. Hawthorne, James (19 March 2018). "Inductive Logic". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Hawthorne 2018, Sec. 2.1. Hawthorne, James (19 March 2018). "Inductive Logic". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Morris & Brown 2021, Sec. 4. Morris, William Edward; Brown, Charlotte R. (2021). "David Hume". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Henderson 2018. Henderson, Leah (2018). "The Problem of Induction". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 ed.). Archived from the original on 3 July 2019. Retrieved 7 January 2020.
  • Thornton 2016, Sec 5. Thornton, Stephen (2016) [First published 1997]. "Karl Popper". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 18 March 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2018.

talkorigins.org

techtarget.com

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content.time.com

uscourts.gov

utk.edu

web.eecs.utk.edu

utm.edu

iep.utm.edu

warwick.ac.uk

www2.warwick.ac.uk

web.archive.org

  • Thornton 2016, sec. 3: "Popper has always drawn a clear distinction between the logic of falsifiability and its applied methodology. The logic of his theory is utterly simple: if a single ferrous metal is unaffected by a magnetic field it cannot be the case that all ferrous metals are affected by magnetic fields. Logically speaking, a scientific law is conclusively falsifiable although it is not conclusively verifiable. Methodologically, however, the situation is much more complex: no observation is free from the possibility of error—consequently we may question whether our experimental result was what it appeared to be." Thornton, Stephen (2016) [First published 1997]. "Karl Popper". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 18 March 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2018.
  • Popper 1962, p. 35: "As for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919, I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no difficulty in analysing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. 'Because of my thousandfold experience,' he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: 'And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one-fold.'" Popper, Karl (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (2002 ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28594-0. excerpt: Science as Falsification
  • Feigl 1978: "Karl Popper, an Austrian-born British philosopher of science, in his Logik der Forschung (1935; The Logic of Scientific Discovery), insisted that the meaning criterion should be abandoned and replaced by a criterion of demarcation between empirical (scientific) and transempirical (nonscientific, metaphysical) questions and answers—a criterion that, according to Popper, is to be testability." Feigl, Herbert (1978). "Positivism". Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 22 April 2020. Retrieved 3 May 2020.
  • In Popper's description of the scientific procedure of testing, as explained by Thornton (see Thornton 2016, Sec. 4), there is no discussion of factual observations except in those tests that compare the theory with factual observations, but in these tests too the procedure is mostly logical and involves observations that are only logical constructions (Popper 1959, pp. 9–10): "We may if we like distinguish four different lines along which the testing of a theory could be carried out. First there is the logical comparison of the conclusions among themselves, by which the internal consistency of the system is tested. Secondly, there is the investigation of the logical form of the theory, with the object of determining whether it has the character of an empirical or scientific theory, or whether it is, for example, tautological. Thirdly, there is the comparison with other theories, chiefly with the aim of determining whether the theory would constitute a scientific advance should it survive our various tests. And finally, there is the testing of the theory by way of empirical applications of the conclusions which can be derived from it. ... Here too the procedure of testing turns out to be deductive. With the help of other statements, previously accepted, certain singular statements—which we may call 'predictions'—are deduced from the theory; especially predictions that are easily testable or applicable. From among these statements, those are selected which are not derivable from the current theory, and more especially those which the current theory contradicts." Thornton, Stephen (2016) [First published 1997]. "Karl Popper". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 18 March 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2018. Popper, Karl (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002 pbk; 2005 ebook ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-27844-7.
  • Popper 1962, p. 387: "Before using the terms 'basic' and 'basic statement', I made use of the term 'empirical basis', meaning by it the class of all those statements which may function as tests of empirical theories (that is, as potential falsifiers). In introducing the term 'empirical basis' my intention was, partly, to give an ironical emphasis to my thesis that the empirical basis of our theories is far from firm; that it should be compared to a swamp rather than to solid ground." Popper, Karl (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (2002 ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28594-0. excerpt: Science as Falsification
  • Fisher 1930, p. 34: "Since m measures fitness to survive by the objective fact of representation in future generations," Fisher, R.A. (1930). The genetical theory of natural selection. Рипол Классик. ISBN 978-1-176-62502-0. Archived from the original on 12 June 2020. Retrieved 12 June 2020.
  • Darwin 1869, pp. 72: "I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term natural selection, in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection. But the expression often used by Mr. Herbert Spencer, of the Survival of the Fittest, is more accurate, and is sometimes equally convenient." Darwin, Charles (1869). On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (5th ed.). London: John Murray. Archived from the original on 17 September 2011. Retrieved 22 February 2009.
  • Popper 1962, p. 37: "In some of its earlier formulations (for example in Marx's analysis of the character of the 'coming social revolution') their predictions were testable, and in fact falsified. Yet instead of accepting the refutations the followers of Marx re-interpreted both the theory and the evidence in order to make them agree. In this way they rescued the theory from refutation; but they did so at the price of adopting a device which made it irrefutable. They thus gave a 'conventionalist twist' to the theory; and by this stratagem they destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status." Popper, Karl (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (2002 ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28594-0. excerpt: Science as Falsification
  • Thornton 2016, Sec. 2: "The Marxist account of history too, Popper held, is not scientific, although it differs in certain crucial respects from psychoanalysis. For Marxism, Popper believed, had been initially scientific, in that Marx had postulated a theory which was genuinely predictive. However, when these predictions were not in fact borne out, the theory was saved from falsification by the addition of ad hoc hypotheses which made it compatible with the facts. By this means, Popper asserted, a theory which was initially genuinely scientific degenerated into pseudo-scientific dogma." Thornton, Stephen (2016) [First published 1997]. "Karl Popper". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 18 March 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2018.
  • Surveys were mailed to all active U.S. district court judges in November 1998 (N = 619). 303 usable surveys were obtained for a response rate of 51%. See Krafka 2002, p. 9 in archived pdf. Krafka, Carol L.; Miletich, D. Dean P.; Cecil, Joe S.; Dunn, Meghan A.; Johnson, Mary T. (September 2002). "Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials" (PDF). Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 8 (3): 309–332. doi:10.1037/1076-8971.8.3.309. Archived from the original on 11 April 2020.
  • The Daubert case and subsequent cases that used it as a reference, including General Electric Co. v. Joiner and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, resulted in an amendment of the Federal Rules of Evidence (see Rules of Evidence 2017, p. 15, Rule 702 and Rule 702 Notes 2011). The Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael case and other cases considered the original Daubert factors, but the amended rule, rule 702, even though it is often referred to as the Daubert standard, does not include the original Daubert factors or mention falsifiability or testability and neither does the majority opinion delivered by William Rehnquist in the General Electric Co. v. Joiner case. "Federal Rules of Evidence" (PDF). United States Courts. Federal Judiciary of the United States. Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 November 2017. Retrieved 19 November 2017. "Federal Rules of Evidence 702 (Notes)". Cornell Law School. Legal Information Institute. 26 April 2011. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 28 May 2018.
  • Popper 1962, p. 111: "Against the view here developed one might be tempted to object (following Duhem 28) that in every test it is not only the theory under investigation which is involved, but also the whole system of our theories and assumptions—in fact, more or less the whole of our knowledge—so that we can never be certain which of all these assumptions is refuted. But this criticism overlooks the fact that if we take each of the two theories (between which the crucial experiment is to decide) together with all this background knowledge, as indeed we must, then we decide between two systems which differ only over the two theories which are at stake. It further overlooks the fact that we do not assert the refutation of the theory as such, but of the theory together with that background knowledge; parts of which, if other crucial experiments can be designed, may indeed one day be rejected as responsible for the failure. (Thus we may even characterize a theory under investigation as that part of a vast system for which we have, if vaguely, an alternative in mind, and for which we try to design crucial tests.)" Popper, Karl (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (2002 ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28594-0. excerpt: Science as Falsification
  • Popper 1962, p. 37: "[B]y making their interpretations and prophecies sufficiently vague [astrologers] were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophecies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of their theory. It is a typical soothsayer's trick to predict things so vaguely that the predictions can hardly fail: that they become irrefutable." Popper, Karl (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (2002 ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28594-0. excerpt: Science as Falsification
  • Uebel 2019. Uebel, Thomas (2019) [First published 2006]. "Vienna Circle". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 25 February 2021. Retrieved 22 April 2020.
  • Creath 2017. Creath, Richard (2017) [First published 2011]. "Logical Empiricism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 14 June 2020. Retrieved 21 April 2020.
  • Theobald 2006. Theobald, Douglas L. (2006). "29+ Evidences for Macroevolution: The Scientific Case for Common Descent, Version 2.87". The Talk.Origins Archive. Archived from the original on 14 May 2011. Retrieved 21 April 2020.
  • Wallis 2005. Wallis, Claudia (7 August 2005). "The Evolution Wars". Time. PMID 16116981. Archived from the original on 9 September 2019. Retrieved 9 January 2020.
  • Smith 2000, p. 12. Smith, Peter K. (2000). "Philosophie of science and its relevance for the social sciences". In Burton, Dawn (ed.). Research Training for Social Scientists: A Handbook for Postgraduate Researchers. Los Angeles: Sage Publications. pp. 5–20. ISBN 0-7619-6351-0. Archived from the original on 18 August 2016. Retrieved 27 January 2016.
  • Krafka 2002, p. 17 in archived pdf. Krafka, Carol L.; Miletich, D. Dean P.; Cecil, Joe S.; Dunn, Meghan A.; Johnson, Mary T. (September 2002). "Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials" (PDF). Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 8 (3): 309–332. doi:10.1037/1076-8971.8.3.309. Archived from the original on 11 April 2020.
  • Henderson 2018. Henderson, Leah (2018). "The Problem of Induction". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 ed.). Archived from the original on 3 July 2019. Retrieved 7 January 2020.
  • Thornton 2016, Sec 5. Thornton, Stephen (2016) [First published 1997]. "Karl Popper". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 ed.). Archived from the original on 18 March 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2018.
  • Popper 1962, Chap. 1; Sec IX. Popper, Karl (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (2002 ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28594-0. excerpt: Science as Falsification
  • Martin 2017. Martin, Eric (2017). "Science and Ideology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 4 November 2019. Retrieved 4 November 2019.
  • Miller 2000. Miller, David (2000). "Sokal and Bricmont: Back to the Frying Pan" (PDF). Pli. 9: 156–73. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 September 2007.

wikipedia.org

de.wikipedia.org

  • In practice, technologies change. When the interpretation of a theory is modified by an improved technological interpretation of some properties, the new theory can be seen as the same theory with an enlarged scope. For example, Herbert Keuth [de], (Keuth 2005, p. 43) wrote: "But Popper's falsifiability or testability criterion does not presuppose that a definite distinction between testable and non testable statement is possible ... technology changes. Thus a hypotheses that was first untestable may become testable later on." Keuth, Herbert (2005) [Published in German 2000]. The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1st English ed.). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-54830-4. OCLC 54503549.

wiley.com

onlinelibrary.wiley.com

  • Vere, Joseph; Gibson, Barry (2019). "Evidence-based medicine as science". Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice. 25 (6): 997–1002. doi:10.1111/jep.13090. ISSN 1356-1294. PMID 30575209.

worldcat.org

  • Popper 1983, Introduction 1982: "We must distinguish two meanings of the expressions falsifiable and falsifiability:
    "1) Falsifiable as a logical-technical term, in the sense of the demarcation criterion of falsifiability. This purely logical concept—falsifiable in principle, one might say—rests on a logical relation between the theory in question and the class of basic statements (or the potential falsifiers described by them).
    "2) Falsifiable in the sense that the theory in question can definitively or conclusively or demonstrably be falsified ("demonstrably falsifiable").
    "I have always stressed that even a theory which is obviously falsifiable in the first sense is never falsifiable in this second sense. (For this reason I have used the expression falsifiable as a rule only in the first, technical sense. In the second sense, I have as a rule spoken not of falsifiability but rather of falsification and of its problems)." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • Popper 1983, Introduction 1982: "Although the first sense refers to the logical possibility of a falsification in principle, the second sense refers to a conclusive practical experimental proof of falsity. But anything like conclusive proof to settle an empirical question does not exist. An entire literature rests on the failure to observe this distinction." For a discussion related to this lack of distinction, see Rosende 2009, p. 142. Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665. Rosende, Diego L. (2009). "Popper on Refutability: Some Philosophical and Historical Questions". In Parusnikova, Zuzana; Cohen, Robert S. (eds.). Rethinking Popper. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 135–154. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9338-8_11. ISBN 978-1-4020-9337-1. OCLC 260208425.
  • Popper 1983, chap. 1, sec. 3: "It seems that almost everybody believes in induction; believes, that is, that we learn by the repetition of observations. Even Hume, in spite of his great discovery that a natural law can neither be established nor made 'probable' by induction, continued to believe firmly that animals and men do learn through repetition: through repeated observations as well as through the formation of habits, or the strengthening of habits, by repetition. And he upheld the theory that induction, though rationally indefensible and resulting in nothing better than unreasoned belief, was nevertheless reliable in the main—more reliable and useful at any rate than reason and the processes of reasoning; and that 'experience' was thus the unreasoned result of a (more or less passive) accumulation of observations. As against all this, I happen to believe that in fact we never draw inductive inferences, or make use of what are now called 'inductive procedures'. Rather, we always discover regularities by the essentially different method of trial and error." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • In practice, technologies change. When the interpretation of a theory is modified by an improved technological interpretation of some properties, the new theory can be seen as the same theory with an enlarged scope. For example, Herbert Keuth [de], (Keuth 2005, p. 43) wrote: "But Popper's falsifiability or testability criterion does not presuppose that a definite distinction between testable and non testable statement is possible ... technology changes. Thus a hypotheses that was first untestable may become testable later on." Keuth, Herbert (2005) [Published in German 2000]. The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1st English ed.). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-54830-4. OCLC 54503549.
  • Popper put as an example of falsifiable statement with failed falsifications Einstein's equivalence principle. See Popper 1983, Introduction, sec. I: "Einstein's principle of proportionality of inert and (passively) heavy mass. This equivalence principle conflicts with many potential falsifiers: events whose observation is logically possible. Yet despite all attempts (the experiments by Eötvös, more recently refined by Rickle) to realize such a falsification experimentally, the experiments have so far corroborated the principle of equivalence." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • Popper 1983, Introduction, xx: "This theory ['All human actions are egotistic, motivated by self-interest'] is widely held: it has variants in behaviourism, psychoanalysis, individual psychology, utilitarianism, vulgar-marxism, religion, and sociology of knowledge. Clearly this theory, with all its variants, is not falsifiable: no example of an altruistic action can refute the view that there was an egotistic motive hidden behind it." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • Keuth 2005, p. 46: "[T]he existential quantifier in the symbolized version of "Every solid has a melting point" is not inevitable; rather this statement is actually a negligent phrasing of what we really mean." Keuth, Herbert (2005) [Published in German 2000]. The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1st English ed.). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-54830-4. OCLC 54503549.
  • Waddington 1959, pp. 383–384: "Darwin's major contribution was, of course, the suggestion that evolution can be explained by the natural selection of random variations. Natural selection, which was at first considered as though it were a hypothesis that was in need of experimental or observational confirmation, turns out on closer inspection to be a tautology, a statement of an inevitable, although previously unrecognized, relation. It states that the fittest individuals in a population (defined as those which leave most offspring) will leave most offspring. Once the statement is made, its truth is apparent. This fact in no way reduces the magnitude of Darwin's achievement; only after it was clearly formulated, could biologists realize the enormous power of the principle as a weapon of explanation." Waddington, C.H. (1959). "Evolutionary Adaptation". Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 2 (4). Johns Hopkins University Press: 379–401. doi:10.1353/pbm.1959.0027. ISSN 1529-8795. PMID 13667389. S2CID 9434812.
  • Popper 1994, p. 90: "If, more especially, we accept that statistical definition of fitness which defines fitness by actual survival, then the theory of the survival of the fittest becomes tautological, and irrefutable." Popper, Karl (1994). Notturno, Mark A. (ed.). The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203535806. ISBN 978-0-415-11320-5. OCLC 30156902.
  • In his critique of Popper (see Kuhn 1970, p. 15), Kuhn says that the methodological rules are not sufficient to provide a logic of discovery: "rules or conventions like the following: 'Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its mettle, it may not be allowed to drop out without 'good reason'. A 'good reason' may be, for instance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is better testable; or the falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis.'
    Rules like these, and with them the entire logical enterprise described above, are no longer simply syntactic in their import. They require that both the epistemological investigator and the research scientist be able to relate sentences derived from a theory not to other sentences but to actual observations and experiments. This is the context in which Sir Karl's term 'falsification' must function, and Sir Karl is entirely silent about how it can do so." Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970) [Reprinted Kuhn 1974]. "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?". In Lakatos, Imre; Musgrave, Alan (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 4. London: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-07826-1. OCLC 94900.
  • Popper 1983, Introduction, V: "The hope further to strengthen this theory of the aims of science by the definition of verisimilitude in terms of truth and of content was, unfortunately, vain. But the widely held view that scrapping this definition weakens my theory is completely baseless." Popper, Karl (1983) [Originally written in 1962]. Bartley, III (ed.). Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203713969. ISBN 0-415-08400-8. OCLC 25130665.
  • Kuhn 1974, p. 802: "I suggest then that Sir Karl has characterized the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts. His emphasis is natural and common: the exploits of a Copernicus or Einstein make better reading than those of a Brahe or Lorentz; Sir Karl would not be the first if he mistook what I call normal science for an intrinsically uninteresting enterprise. Nevertheless, neither science nor the development of knowledge is likely to be understood if research is viewed exclusively through the revolutions it occasionally produces." Kuhn, Thomas S. (1974) [First published Kuhn 1970]. "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?". In Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.). The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Vol. II. Illinois: Open Court. pp. 798–819. ISBN 0-87548-142-6. OCLC 2580491.
  • Watkins 1970, p. 28: "Thus we have the following clash: the condition which Kuhn regards as the normal and proper condition of science is a condition which, if it actually obtained, Popper would regard as unscientific, a state of affairs in which critical science had contracted into defensive metaphysics. Popper has suggested that the motto of science should be: Revolution in permanence! For Kuhn, it seems, a more appropriate maxim would be: Not nostrums but normalcy!" Watkins, John (1970). "Against 'Normal Science'". In Lakatos, Imre; Musgrave, Alan (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 4. London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 25–37. ISBN 0-521-07826-1. OCLC 94900.
  • Popper 1994, pp. 155–156: "It is my view that the methods of the natural as well as the social sciences can be best understood if we admit that science always begins and ends with problems. The progress of science lies, essentially, in the evolution of its problems. And it can be gauged by the increasing refinement, wealth, fertility, and depth of its problems. ... The growth of knowledge always consists in correcting earlier knowledge. Historically, science begins with pre-scientific knowledge, with pre-scientific myths and pre-scientific expectations. And these, in turn, have no 'beginnings'." Popper, Karl (1994). Notturno, Mark A. (ed.). The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality. London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203535806. ISBN 978-0-415-11320-5. OCLC 30156902.
  • Kuhn 1970, pp. 7–8: "Astrology is Sir Karl's most frequently cited example of a 'pseudo-science'. He [Popper] says: 'By making their interpretations and prophecies sufficiently vague they [astrologers] were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophecies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of the theory.' Those generalizations catch something of the spirit of the astrological enterprise. But taken at all literally, as they must be if they are to provide a demarcation criterion, they are impossible to support. The history of astrology during the centuries when it was intellectually reputable records many predictions that categorically failed. Not even astrology's most convinced and vehement exponents doubted the recurrence of such failures. Astrology cannot be barred from the sciences because of the form in which its predictions were cast." Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970) [Reprinted Kuhn 1974]. "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?". In Lakatos, Imre; Musgrave, Alan (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 4. London: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-07826-1. OCLC 94900.
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  • Keuth 2005, pp. 44–45. Keuth, Herbert (2005) [Published in German 2000]. The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1st English ed.). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-54830-4. OCLC 54503549.
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