Bento, Cláudio Moreira- Rafael Pinto Bandeira in O Tuiuti, nr. 95, Academia de Historia Militar Terrestre do Brasil, 2013, pp. 3–18.
ahimtb.org.br
Bento, Cláudio Moreira- Brasil, conflitos externos 1500–1945 (electronic version), Academia de História Militar Terrestre do Brasil, chapter 5: As guerras no Sul 1763–77.
"When coupled with the defeats suffered in Portugal (...), the fall of Havana amounted to a loss of prestige from which Spain never recovered. " In Navy Records Society- Publications of the Navy Record Society, Vol. 114, George Allen & Unwin, Great Britain, 1970, p. xxxiv.
"The war between Spain and Portugal ended favourably for the latter ... The Spaniards, notwithstanding their superior forces, had to retreat vanquished into their own country. The Count of Lippe soon returned as a conquering hero into his little German principality. " In Cobb, James Francis- Stories of Success, Jas. Tauscott and Son, London, 1872, p. 172.
"During Pombal's reign Portugal faced foreign threats, such as the Spanish invasion during the Seven Years' War in 1762. Even if Portugal was able to defeat the Spanish with the help of their British allies, this war of Spain and France against British hegemony made him concerned about Portuguese independence and Portugal's colonies. " In Leutzsch, Andreas; Vogt, Roland; Cristaudo, Wayne – European National Identities: elements, transitions, conflicts, Transaction Publishers, London, 2014, chapter 10, p. 188.
"(…). Portugal had not accepted the invitation to join France and Spain in this alliance and the latter powers... invaded Portugal. England sent a fleet promptly to Lisbon with 8,000 soldiers who helped drive the invaders back and followed them into Spain herself. She had entered the war too late to help France or herself. The blows she had received were staggering (...)" In Hart, Francis Russel – The Siege of Havana: 1762, Houghton Mifflin, 1931, p. 52.
"Portugal refused to enter the war against the English, and its territories were invades by French and Spanish troops (Trás-os-Montes, 1762). However, Portugal repelled the invaders, under the leadership of Wilhelm, count of Schaumburg-Lippe, and with aid from the English, as well as from Swiss mercenaries." In Delon, Michael- Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Routledge, New York, 2013, p. 1256.
"The land on their own side [Portuguese side of the river Guaporé] afforded nothing on which they could rely, whereas the country of the [Spanish] Missions [left bank of the Guaporé] abounded with cattle... The Spaniards... designed... to intercept the communication [of the Portuguese in S. Rosa] with Para... and... Villa Bella. This blockade might be easily maintained, because they drew their supplies from the reductions; whereas the garrison [of S. Rosa], being confined to their own shore, would be distressed for food... and might thus be reduced without a blow. (...). The Portuguese...made an expedition against the Reduction of S. Miguel, which had been removed from the right Bank [to the left bank of the river Guaporé, in 1760, in accordance to the Treaty of Madrid, 1750]... they got possession of supplies which were intended for the [Spanish] army at Itanomas... the Portuguese kept possession of the territory of S. Miguel, which abounded with kine, horses and pigs... the Reduction of S. Martin voluntarily offered submission...D. António ventured to attack the Spaniards in their camp...the estacade was found too strong; but the boldness of this measure, thought unsuccessful, discouraged the Spaniards... they soon removed from their station... the encampment on the Mamoré was abandoned also: shortly after they fell back to S. Pedro: the Spaniards then returnrd to S. Cruz, and the expedition was broken up. The Portuguese then withdrew from the left shore." In Southern, Robert – History of Brazil, part third, London, 1819, p. 584.
"... disease [caused by tropical conditions and the use of biological warfare by the Portuguese, according to the Spanish commander] and desertion had trimmed Verdugo [the Spanish Governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra]'s levies from 610 to 303 by the time they reached San Pedro [head of the missions in Moxos, Bolivia, to where the Spanish remnants retreated]. (...) after two months on the Guaporé, the governor returned to Santa Cruz [Bolivia], leaving behind a skeleton force (...). In 1763 Moura retired from Mato Grosso the victor. He had advanced to the Guaporé [and beyond it, occupying Spanish territory in the left bank of this river until the end of the war: the territory of the Missions of S. Miguel and S. Martin, main sources of supply to the Spanish army.], fortified Portuguese positions on the river, and remained in the field as his rival retired. Moura’s service earned him a hero’s welcome from his commanders, a Knighthood, and eventually the office of Viceroy of Brazil." In Block, David – Mission Culture on the Upper Amazon: native Tradition, Jesuit enterprise and Secular Policy in Moxos, 1660–1880, University of Nebraska Press, 1994, p. 51.
"During its progression [through the Rio Negro valley, the Spanish] advancement was beyond San Carlos, since the Spaniards had managed to occupy the posts of Marabitanas and San Gabriel, from which they were dislodged by the Portuguese, who fortified them, under the German captain Felipe [Phillip Sturm]. They were armed with cannons brought by the Spanish commission of limits. (...)" In Ojer, Pablo- La Década Fundamental en la Controversia de Límites entre Venezuela y Colombia, 1881–1891 (in Spanish), Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1988, p. 292.
"(...). In this 'race for the Rio Grande [territory]', the border of Rio Pardo was the only one who resisted the Spanish invasion, thanks to Barreto Pereira Pinto courage and, above all, Francisco Pinto Bandeira, which shattered the army of captain Antonio Cattani on 1 January 1763. Pinto Bandeira, with only 230 dragoons and adventurers of St. Paul, fell like a hurricane over the 2,500 enemy soldiers. 'Never saw this territory such a stampede.' (...). Cattani’s troops disbanded in panic. The commander, no time to put on the uniform, fled in underwear." In Barbosa, Fidélis D. – História do Rio Grande do Sul, Edições Est, 4th edition, Porto Alegre, 1976, p. 60.
"In January 1762, Spain opened hostilities with England [and against Portugal on 5 May 1762]. However, the effects were very different from those expected. (…)The outcome: the Loss of Havana and Manila [and most of the Rio Negro Valley in North Brazil] while our army engaged an unfortunate ground campaign against Portugal. Only the conquest of Colónia do Sacramento by Pedro Cevallos, from Uruguay, put a positive note on the Spanish side, but however, had no influence on subsequent agreements that ended the war." In Álvarez, Manuel Fernàndez- España Y Los Españoles En Los Tiempos Modernos, Universidad Salamanca, Spain, 1979, p. 439.
"The army was in no better shape. Only 8,000 effective [Portuguese] soldiers stood in the face of the coming Spanish onslaught. They wore 'rags and patches' and begged in the streets, as they received little or no pay from the central government." In Speelman, Patrick and Danley, Mark – The Seven Year’s War: Global Views, 2012, p. 436.
"The British troops which embarked for Lisbon under their veteran commander consisted of 7, 104 officers and men of al arms [official figures when boarding in Britain]. This force had been dispatched in consequence of the threatening attitude of France and Spain towards Portugal, whose monarch had declined to enter into an alliance with the above two powers in order to 'curb the pride of the British nation which aspired to become despotic over the sea'." In Dalton, Charles- George The First's Army, 1714–1727, Vol. II, 1912, p. 31
"British casualties were light overall – there were fourteen combat deaths compared to 804 from other means..." In Speelman, Patrick and Danley, Mark – The Seven Year’s War: Global Views, 2012, p. 448
"Disappointed, facing incredible resistance and losing everything in the field, the Spaniards abandoned the fight and left behind twenty-five thousand men ..." In Henry, Isabelle – Dumouriez: Général de la Révolution (1739–1823), L'Harmattan, Paris, 2002, p. 87.
Edward Hay, British minister in Portugal (letter to the 2nd Earl of Egremont, 8 November 1762) reported a total of 30,000 Franco-Spanish casualties during the first two invasions of Portugal (half of them deserters, many of whom became prisoners), representing almost three-quarters of the initial invading army. See British Scholar C. R. Boxer in Descriptive List of the State Papers Portugal, 1661–1780, in the Public Record Office, London: 1724–1765, Vol II, Lisbon, Academia das Ciências de Lisboa, with the collaboration of the British Academy and the P.R.O., 1979, p. 415. See also COSTA, Fernando Dores- Nova História Militar de Portugal, Círculo de Leitores, Vol. II, Coordinator: António Hespanha, 2004, p. 358, footnote 280.
"Preparations the Spanish Government made for war after signing the compact with France focused more on Portugal than the colonies. (...)", In Greentree, David – A Far-Flung Gamble – Havana 1762[permanent dead link], Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2010, p. 30.
"This operation was without doubt the greatest mobilisation of troops on mainland Spain throughout the whole eighteenth century, and the figures themselves bear witness to the government's interest in the operation...and meant leaving the rest of mainland Spain largely unguarded...by way of comparison, the Battle of Almansa of 1707...involved a Spanish-French army of over 25,000 men...while the famous attack on Algiers in 1775 involved a mobilisation of little more than 19,000 infantry and cavalry men..." in Enciso, Agustín González (Spanish) – "Mobilising Resources for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period", Eunsa, Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, S.A., Spain, 2006, p. 159, ISBN9788431323844.
"After the Seven Years' War, relations between them in 1763 were extremely bitter (...). Portugal could not at once forget the sudden invasion of her territory, as that of an English ally, by an army from Spain, when that Power decided to enter the recent international conflict, while Spain smarted from a sense of humiliation at the remembrance of the failure of that campaign." In Holmes, Vera Brown- Studies in the History of Spain in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 15 and 16, The Dept. of history of Smith college, 1929, USA, p. 65.
"after the failed attempt of General Sarria, Charles III of Spain gave the command of the campaign to a younger and proud military, the count of Aranda...", In Huarte, Eulogio Zudaire- Don Agustín de Jáuregui y Aldecoa, Vol. I, Institución Príncipe de Viana, 1978, p. 45
"This province [of Trás-os Montes] is not worth an attack in a war between Spain and Portugal; it is even dangerous for the Spaniards to penetrate into it, as they found to their cost in the late war; 40,000 men advanced to Chaves, Bragança and Miranda...and about a fourth of their number died there..." In Dumouriez, Charles – An Account of Portugal, as it Appeared in 1766 to Dumouriez, Lausanne (1775), and London (1797), p. 20.
in Arquivo Nacional, Vol. 11, Edições 522–573, Empresa Nacional de Publicidade, 1942, p. 319
"... Spain ordered 40,000 men to march into Portugal (page 247) ... The Spanish forces, when they arrived at the frontier, were reduced to 25,000 men, (...). This war, which might have crushed Portugal, gave it a degree of vigour and elasticity ... and produced a military spirit (page 254) ...", in Dumouriez, Charles – An Account of Portugal, as it Appeared in 1766 to Dumouriez, Lausanne (1775) and London (1797).
"...Osório, arrives at Castilhos on the shores of Merín Lagoon with 400 men of the Dragoon Regiment of rio Pardo, 10 small artillery pieces, plus a work column, to commence construction ... of a border keep to be called Fort Santa Tereza...", In Marley, David- Wars of the Americas: a chronology of armed conflict in the New World, 1492 to the present, vol. II, ABC-CLIO, USA, 2008, p. 441.
"This disavowal is the consequence of the double humiliation that Spain has just undergone on the international scene, with the defeat of its army in Portugal and with the capture of Havana by the English. Confining itself to a disaster, the Seven Years' War marks a major shift in the Charles III policy …" In Glesener, Eric- L´Empire des Exilés: Les Flamands et le Gouvernment de l´Espagne au XVIIIº Siècle., Casa de Velázquez, Madrid, 2017, p. 268.
"When coupled with the defeats suffered in Portugal (...), the fall of Havana amounted to a loss of prestige from which Spain never recovered. " In Navy Records Society- Publications of the Navy Record Society, Vol. 114, George Allen & Unwin, Great Britain, 1970, p. xxxiv.
"The war between Spain and Portugal ended favourably for the latter ... The Spaniards, notwithstanding their superior forces, had to retreat vanquished into their own country. The Count of Lippe soon returned as a conquering hero into his little German principality. " In Cobb, James Francis- Stories of Success, Jas. Tauscott and Son, London, 1872, p. 172.
"During Pombal's reign Portugal faced foreign threats, such as the Spanish invasion during the Seven Years' War in 1762. Even if Portugal was able to defeat the Spanish with the help of their British allies, this war of Spain and France against British hegemony made him concerned about Portuguese independence and Portugal's colonies. " In Leutzsch, Andreas; Vogt, Roland; Cristaudo, Wayne – European National Identities: elements, transitions, conflicts, Transaction Publishers, London, 2014, chapter 10, p. 188.
"(…). Portugal had not accepted the invitation to join France and Spain in this alliance and the latter powers... invaded Portugal. England sent a fleet promptly to Lisbon with 8,000 soldiers who helped drive the invaders back and followed them into Spain herself. She had entered the war too late to help France or herself. The blows she had received were staggering (...)" In Hart, Francis Russel – The Siege of Havana: 1762, Houghton Mifflin, 1931, p. 52.
"Portugal refused to enter the war against the English, and its territories were invades by French and Spanish troops (Trás-os-Montes, 1762). However, Portugal repelled the invaders, under the leadership of Wilhelm, count of Schaumburg-Lippe, and with aid from the English, as well as from Swiss mercenaries." In Delon, Michael- Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Routledge, New York, 2013, p. 1256.
"... disease [caused by tropical conditions and the use of biological warfare by the Portuguese, according to the Spanish commander] and desertion had trimmed Verdugo [the Spanish Governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra]'s levies from 610 to 303 by the time they reached San Pedro [head of the missions in Moxos, Bolivia, to where the Spanish remnants retreated]. (...) after two months on the Guaporé, the governor returned to Santa Cruz [Bolivia], leaving behind a skeleton force (...). In 1763 Moura retired from Mato Grosso the victor. He had advanced to the Guaporé [and beyond it, occupying Spanish territory in the left bank of this river until the end of the war: the territory of the Missions of S. Miguel and S. Martin, main sources of supply to the Spanish army.], fortified Portuguese positions on the river, and remained in the field as his rival retired. Moura’s service earned him a hero’s welcome from his commanders, a Knighthood, and eventually the office of Viceroy of Brazil." In Block, David – Mission Culture on the Upper Amazon: native Tradition, Jesuit enterprise and Secular Policy in Moxos, 1660–1880, University of Nebraska Press, 1994, p. 51.
"During its progression [through the Rio Negro valley, the Spanish] advancement was beyond San Carlos, since the Spaniards had managed to occupy the posts of Marabitanas and San Gabriel, from which they were dislodged by the Portuguese, who fortified them, under the German captain Felipe [Phillip Sturm]. They were armed with cannons brought by the Spanish commission of limits. (...)" In Ojer, Pablo- La Década Fundamental en la Controversia de Límites entre Venezuela y Colombia, 1881–1891 (in Spanish), Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1988, p. 292.
"The army was in no better shape. Only 8,000 effective [Portuguese] soldiers stood in the face of the coming Spanish onslaught. They wore 'rags and patches' and begged in the streets, as they received little or no pay from the central government." In Speelman, Patrick and Danley, Mark – The Seven Year’s War: Global Views, 2012, p. 436.
"The British troops which embarked for Lisbon under their veteran commander consisted of 7, 104 officers and men of al arms [official figures when boarding in Britain]. This force had been dispatched in consequence of the threatening attitude of France and Spain towards Portugal, whose monarch had declined to enter into an alliance with the above two powers in order to 'curb the pride of the British nation which aspired to become despotic over the sea'." In Dalton, Charles- George The First's Army, 1714–1727, Vol. II, 1912, p. 31
"British casualties were light overall – there were fourteen combat deaths compared to 804 from other means..." In Speelman, Patrick and Danley, Mark – The Seven Year’s War: Global Views, 2012, p. 448
"Disappointed, facing incredible resistance and losing everything in the field, the Spaniards abandoned the fight and left behind twenty-five thousand men ..." In Henry, Isabelle – Dumouriez: Général de la Révolution (1739–1823), L'Harmattan, Paris, 2002, p. 87.
"Preparations the Spanish Government made for war after signing the compact with France focused more on Portugal than the colonies. (...)", In Greentree, David – A Far-Flung Gamble – Havana 1762[permanent dead link], Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2010, p. 30.
"This operation was without doubt the greatest mobilisation of troops on mainland Spain throughout the whole eighteenth century, and the figures themselves bear witness to the government's interest in the operation...and meant leaving the rest of mainland Spain largely unguarded...by way of comparison, the Battle of Almansa of 1707...involved a Spanish-French army of over 25,000 men...while the famous attack on Algiers in 1775 involved a mobilisation of little more than 19,000 infantry and cavalry men..." in Enciso, Agustín González (Spanish) – "Mobilising Resources for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period", Eunsa, Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, S.A., Spain, 2006, p. 159, ISBN9788431323844.
"After the Seven Years' War, relations between them in 1763 were extremely bitter (...). Portugal could not at once forget the sudden invasion of her territory, as that of an English ally, by an army from Spain, when that Power decided to enter the recent international conflict, while Spain smarted from a sense of humiliation at the remembrance of the failure of that campaign." In Holmes, Vera Brown- Studies in the History of Spain in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 15 and 16, The Dept. of history of Smith college, 1929, USA, p. 65.
"after the failed attempt of General Sarria, Charles III of Spain gave the command of the campaign to a younger and proud military, the count of Aranda...", In Huarte, Eulogio Zudaire- Don Agustín de Jáuregui y Aldecoa, Vol. I, Institución Príncipe de Viana, 1978, p. 45
"This province [of Trás-os Montes] is not worth an attack in a war between Spain and Portugal; it is even dangerous for the Spaniards to penetrate into it, as they found to their cost in the late war; 40,000 men advanced to Chaves, Bragança and Miranda...and about a fourth of their number died there..." In Dumouriez, Charles – An Account of Portugal, as it Appeared in 1766 to Dumouriez, Lausanne (1775), and London (1797), p. 20.
"... the main central attack on Portugal [second invasion] failed utterly...partly through the skilful measures of the Count of Lippe, who had been placed in charge of the Portuguese army, and strengthened by 7,000 British troops, partly through the bold partisan enterprises carried out against their line of communications by General John Burgoyne [and the guerrillas]...But mainly the invasion failed through the absolute lack of munitions and food; the Portuguese – as was their wont – had swept the countryside clean [a deadly scorched earth strategy], (...). After starving for some weeks in a roadless wilderness, the Spanish army retired into Estremadura [Spain] in a sad state. The next spring, Charles III sued for peace. " in Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall Yard, Vol. 63, W. Mitchell, United Kingdom, 1918, p. 196.
"As soon as the enemy began to retire upon Castello Branco, Major-general Fraser was sent...to attack his rear...General Burgoyne advanced [he reoccupied Vila Velha de Ródão]... while General Townsend occupied Penamacor and Monsanto...the Count of Aranda kept his Head-quarters at Castello Branco... Lippe, with his small army, determined to attack this force...and Aranda retreated at leisure, leaving his sick and wounded in the hospital at Castello Branco, with a letter, recommending them to the attention of the allied army...On the 15th of November, therefore, the whole of their force retired into Spanish Estremadura...and Portugal, with the exception of Almeida and Chaves, was freed from the enemy." In The Royal Military Chronicle, vol V, London, 1812, pp. 52, 53.
in Arquivo Nacional, Vol. 11, Edições 522–573, Empresa Nacional de Publicidade, 1942, p. 319
"... Spain ordered 40,000 men to march into Portugal (page 247) ... The Spanish forces, when they arrived at the frontier, were reduced to 25,000 men, (...). This war, which might have crushed Portugal, gave it a degree of vigour and elasticity ... and produced a military spirit (page 254) ...", in Dumouriez, Charles – An Account of Portugal, as it Appeared in 1766 to Dumouriez, Lausanne (1775) and London (1797).
"The first place which the enemy attempted to take was Marvão. This small town was attacked by a corps of 4,000 or 5,000 men, but the firmness of Captain Brown not only saved the place, but obliged the enemy to retire with considerable loss. Ouguela, another small fort, was next attempted, but here the bravery of Captain Braz de Carvalho and his small garrison was equally conspicuous, as the enemy were driven from before the place with considerable loss and obliged to abandon the attempt. The resistance which the Spaniards met with in these...places, had a visible effect upon their movements, and convinced them...", in The Royal Military Chronicle, vol V, London, 1812, p. 53.
" [Portuguese colonel] Osório built a small fort which he called Santa Teresa, where he took shelter with 400 men and little artillery (January 1763). Next April, Ceballos, who had gathered in Maldonado a well provisioned army of more than 3,000 men with much artillery, invested the Lusitanian position. After a weak resistance, Osório surrendered with the remaining 130 men. All the other had deserted." In Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul- Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul, Edições 132–134, Brazil, 1998, p. 12.
"...Osório, arrives at Castilhos on the shores of Merín Lagoon with 400 men of the Dragoon Regiment of rio Pardo, 10 small artillery pieces, plus a work column, to commence construction ... of a border keep to be called Fort Santa Tereza...", In Marley, David- Wars of the Americas: a chronology of armed conflict in the New World, 1492 to the present, vol. II, ABC-CLIO, USA, 2008, p. 441.
"In the whole region of the Rio Grande, the Portuguese government did not have more than 1,000 soldiers, including regular and militia troops, spread over several trims." In Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul- Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul, Edições 132–134, Brazil, 1998, p. 12.
"While the Spanish army advanced along the coast, fully reaching their goals, another enemy column, consisting of five hundred militiamen from the Corrientes Province and about 2,000 Guaranis came from the Misiones Orientales against Rio Pardo, under lieutenant colonel Antonio Cattani and fortified next to the stream of Santa Barbara..." in Vellinho, Moysés- Fronteira, Editora Globo, 1975, p. 105.
google.pt
"(...). In this 'race for the Rio Grande [territory]', the border of Rio Pardo was the only one who resisted the Spanish invasion, thanks to Barreto Pereira Pinto courage and, above all, Francisco Pinto Bandeira, which shattered the army of captain Antonio Cattani on 1 January 1763. Pinto Bandeira, with only 230 dragoons and adventurers of St. Paul, fell like a hurricane over the 2,500 enemy soldiers. 'Never saw this territory such a stampede.' (...). Cattani’s troops disbanded in panic. The commander, no time to put on the uniform, fled in underwear." In Barbosa, Fidélis D. – História do Rio Grande do Sul, Edições Est, 4th edition, Porto Alegre, 1976, p. 60.
"Under Count Von Lippe´s administration, the Portuguese army became an efficient and well-uniformed war machine and the strong Prussian influence of its mentor contributed to repulsing the expansionist attempts of the Spanish Crown." In Moreira, Maria and Veludo, Sérgio- Portuguese Studies Review, Volume 16, nr. 2, Baywolf Press, 2008, p. 83, ISSN 1057-1515.
"...the militia of Portuguese peasants, whose intervention, coupled with the inaccessibility of the terrain, caused the failure of the Spanish invasion by the North [ Portugal] in 1762...", see Arenas, Mar García – Los Proyectos del General Dumouriez Sobre la Invasión de Portugal in El Equilibrio de los Imperios: de Utrecht a Trafalgar, Actas de la VIII Reunión Científica de la Fundación Española de Historia Moderna (Madrid, 2–4 de Junio de 2004), vol. II, Fundación Española de Historia Moderna, 2005, p. 548.
wikipedia.org
pt.wikipedia.org
"The land on their own side [Portuguese side of the river Guaporé] afforded nothing on which they could rely, whereas the country of the [Spanish] Missions [left bank of the Guaporé] abounded with cattle... The Spaniards... designed... to intercept the communication [of the Portuguese in S. Rosa] with Para... and... Villa Bella. This blockade might be easily maintained, because they drew their supplies from the reductions; whereas the garrison [of S. Rosa], being confined to their own shore, would be distressed for food... and might thus be reduced without a blow. (...). The Portuguese...made an expedition against the Reduction of S. Miguel, which had been removed from the right Bank [to the left bank of the river Guaporé, in 1760, in accordance to the Treaty of Madrid, 1750]... they got possession of supplies which were intended for the [Spanish] army at Itanomas... the Portuguese kept possession of the territory of S. Miguel, which abounded with kine, horses and pigs... the Reduction of S. Martin voluntarily offered submission...D. António ventured to attack the Spaniards in their camp...the estacade was found too strong; but the boldness of this measure, thought unsuccessful, discouraged the Spaniards... they soon removed from their station... the encampment on the Mamoré was abandoned also: shortly after they fell back to S. Pedro: the Spaniards then returnrd to S. Cruz, and the expedition was broken up. The Portuguese then withdrew from the left shore." In Southern, Robert – History of Brazil, part third, London, 1819, p. 584.
"... disease [caused by tropical conditions and the use of biological warfare by the Portuguese, according to the Spanish commander] and desertion had trimmed Verdugo [the Spanish Governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra]'s levies from 610 to 303 by the time they reached San Pedro [head of the missions in Moxos, Bolivia, to where the Spanish remnants retreated]. (...) after two months on the Guaporé, the governor returned to Santa Cruz [Bolivia], leaving behind a skeleton force (...). In 1763 Moura retired from Mato Grosso the victor. He had advanced to the Guaporé [and beyond it, occupying Spanish territory in the left bank of this river until the end of the war: the territory of the Missions of S. Miguel and S. Martin, main sources of supply to the Spanish army.], fortified Portuguese positions on the river, and remained in the field as his rival retired. Moura’s service earned him a hero’s welcome from his commanders, a Knighthood, and eventually the office of Viceroy of Brazil." In Block, David – Mission Culture on the Upper Amazon: native Tradition, Jesuit enterprise and Secular Policy in Moxos, 1660–1880, University of Nebraska Press, 1994, p. 51.
"During its progression [through the Rio Negro valley, the Spanish] advancement was beyond San Carlos, since the Spaniards had managed to occupy the posts of Marabitanas and San Gabriel, from which they were dislodged by the Portuguese, who fortified them, under the German captain Felipe [Phillip Sturm]. They were armed with cannons brought by the Spanish commission of limits. (...)" In Ojer, Pablo- La Década Fundamental en la Controversia de Límites entre Venezuela y Colombia, 1881–1891 (in Spanish), Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1988, p. 292.
