Ford Pinto (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Ford Pinto" in English language version.

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  • Sherefkin 2003. Sherefkin, Robert (June 16, 2003). "Lee Iacocca's Pinto: A fiery failure". Automotive News. Retrieved March 6, 2016.
  • Sherefkin 2003: Iacocca ordered a rush program to build the Pinto ... The Pinto quickly became known as "Lee's car." He demanded that it weigh no more than 2,000 pounds and sell for $2,000 ... Iacocca was in a hurry. He wanted the car in showrooms for the 1971 model year. That meant one of the shortest production planning periods in modern automotive history: just 25 months when the normal time span was 43 months. That also meant that the Pinto's tooling was developed at the same time as product development. Sherefkin, Robert (June 16, 2003). "Lee Iacocca's Pinto: A fiery failure". Automotive News. Retrieved March 6, 2016.
  • Sherefkin 2003: Ford customers filed 117 lawsuits, according to Peter Wyden in The Unknown Iacocca. Sherefkin, Robert (June 16, 2003). "Lee Iacocca's Pinto: A fiery failure". Automotive News. Retrieved March 6, 2016.
  • Sherefkin 2003: The low point for Ford came in 1979 when Indiana authorities charged the automaker with reckless homicide in a criminal trial. Sherefkin, Robert (June 16, 2003). "Lee Iacocca's Pinto: A fiery failure". Automotive News. Retrieved March 6, 2016.

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  • "Ford Recalls 26,000 Pinto Cars". Chicago Tribune. October 31, 1970. Archived from the original on February 2, 2017. Retrieved March 6, 2016. Ford Motor Co. announced today it is recalling 26,000 early production models of its 1971 Pinto equipped with the 1600 cubic centimeter engine because of an accelerator problem ... The company found that when the throttle is opened more than halfway, it is possible that it may not always return to the closed position when pressure on the accelerator pedal is removed
  • Strobel 1979: Ford then joined other automakers in an aggressive lobbying campaign that was successful in delaying and softening proposed federal standards on how strong fuel systems must be to resist rupture and potential explosion. Strobel, Lee (October 13, 1979). "Ford ignored Pinto fire peril, secret memos show; Tests of gas tank indicated hazards". Chicago Tribune. p. 1. Retrieved March 12, 2016.

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  • Dole, Charles E. (March 14, 1980). "Pinto verdict lets US industry off hook". The Christian Science Monitor. Archived from the original on November 11, 2020. Retrieved March 3, 2016. An Indiana farm country jury in the 10-week landmark trial found Ford "not guilty" in the deaths of three teen-age girls whose 1973-model Pinto exploded when a speeding van struck it in the rear Aug. 10, 1978.

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  • Danley 2005: Initial planning on the Pinto, a second-generation subcompact, began in 1967 ... In January 1969, in a victory for Iaccoca, Ford's Board approved the recommendation of the Product Planning Committee (December 1968) to produce the Pinto. Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Gioia 1992: The Pinto was brought from inception to production in the record time of approximately 25 months (compared to the industry average of 43 months), a time frame that suggested the necessity for doing things expediently. In addition to the time pressure, the engineering and development teams were required to adhere to the production "limits of 2000" for the diminutive car: it was not to exceed either $2000 in cost or 2000 pounds in weight. Any decisions that threatened these targets or the timing of the car's introduction were discouraged. Under normal conditions design, styling, product planning, engineering, etc., were completed prior to production tooling. Because of the foreshortened time frame, however, some of these usually sequential processes were executed in parallel. As a consequence, tooling was already well underway (thus "freezing" the basic design) ... Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. S2CID 189918233.
  • Helms, Marilyn M.; Hutchins, Betty A. (1992). "Poor quality products: Is their production unethical?". Management Decision. 30 (5): 35. doi:10.1108/00251749210015661. When a decision was made to produce the Pinto, it was given the shortest production planning schedule in history. Tooling went on at the same time as product development so, when testing revealed a serious defect with the gas tank, the $200 million Pinto tooling machines were almost completely built. The directive came from the top, President Lee Iacocca, who emphasized that the Pinto was not to weigh an ounce over 2,000lb and not cost a cent over $2,000 and that safety was not a priority, because "safety doesn't sell".
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: The Pinto story has become a landmark narrative" (Nichols 1997:324), a definitive story used to support the construction of amoral corporate behavior as a pervasive social problem. This narrative was first stated publicly by investigative journalist Mark Dowie (1977) in a scathing Pulitzer Prize-winning exposé, "Pinto Madness," published in Mother Jones magazine. Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: Conventional wisdom holds that Ford Motor Company decided to rush the Pinto into production in 1970 to compete with compact foreign imports, despite internal pre-production tests that showed gas tank ruptures in low-speed rear-end collisions would produce deadly fires. This decision purportedly derived from an infamous seven-page cost-benefit analysis (the "Grush/Saunby Report" [1973]) that valued human lives at $200,000. Settling burn victims' lawsuits would have cost $49.5 million, far less than the $137 million needed to make minor corrections. According to this account, the company made an informed, cynical, and impressively coordinated decision that "payouts" (Kelman and Hamilton 1989:311) to families of burn victims were more cost-effective than improving fuel tank integrity. This description provides the unambiguous foundation on which the media and academics have built a Pinto gas tank decision-making narrative. Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Danley 2005 Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: pg 36, 43 Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: In the design stage (1967–1970), no company or government standard on rear-end fuel tank integrity existed to guide the engineers, but their actions were consistent with the taken-for-granted, industry-wide tradition of building lower levels of crashworthiness into small cars. This situation changed in the marketing stage (post-1970). Shortly after the 1971 model year Pintos were released, Ford adopted an internal 20 mile-per-hour moving barrier standard for the 1973 model year-the only manufacturer to do so (Gioia 1996; Strobel 1994). The extant legal/regulatory environment reinforced engineers' beliefs that this standard was quite reasonable" since it was the "same one recommended at that time by the federal General Services Administration; the Canadian equivalent of the GSA; the Society of Automotive Engineers; and a private consulting firm hired by NHTSA ..." and by NHTSA itself in 1969 (Strobel 1980:205). This standard would constrain future debates by certifying the Pinto as safe" to Ford's subunit charged with evaluating potential recallable safety problems. Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Gioia 1992: The tank was positioned between the rear bumper and the rear axle (a standard industry practice for the time). Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. S2CID 189918233.
  • Danley 2005: A few months later Ford began crash-testing modified Mavericks In part to prepare a response to NHTSA'S proposed regulations. The results demonstrated the vulnerability of fuel-integrity at fairly low speeds and some modifications were made. In August of 1970, the first model year Pinto, the 1971, went into production. Post-production testing revealed similar results. Still, there were no federal performance standards at the time and the proposed regulations addressed only front-end collisions. Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: Engineers in the design stage were still trying "to find out how to conduct crash tests" (Feaheny 1997; see also Lacey 1986:613). For example, an internal Pinto test report dated November 1970 listed as its objective "To develop a test procedure to Be used to provide baseline data on vehicle fuel system integrity" (NHTSA C7−38-Al.5, Final Test Report #T-0738). In this test, a Pinto sedan exhibited "excessive fuel tank leakage" when towed rearward into a fixed barrier at 21.5 miles per hour, considered roughly equivalent to a car-to-car impact At 35 miles per hour. Nothing in this, or any other, Ford test report indicates that participants felt cause for concern or organizational action. Although some Ford engineers were not especially pleased, they felt that the data were inconclusive or the risks acceptable (Feaheny 1997; Strobel 1980), or they kept their concerns to themselves (Camps 1997). Some felt that cars would rarely be subjected to the extreme forces generated In a fixed-barrier test In real-world collisions (Feaheny 1997; Devine 1996). NHTSA agreed and ultimately replaced the proposed fixed barrier test with a less-stringent moving-barrier test In its final standard (U.S. Department of Transportation 1988) Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Gioia 1992: Ford had crash-tested 11 vehicles; 8 of these cars suffered potentially catastrophic gas tank ruptures. The only 3 cars that survived intact had each been modified in some way to protect the tank. Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. S2CID 189918233.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: Occupational caution encouraged engineers to view many design adjustments that improved test performance as "unproven" in real-world accidents (Devine 1996; Feaheny 1997; Schwartz 1991; Strickland 1996; Strobel 1980). Engineers, who typically value "uncertainty avoidance" (Allison 1971:72 ), chose to stick with an existing design rather than face uncertainties associated with novel ones (Devine 1996; Strobel 1980). One series of tests, for instance, showed that Pintos equipped with pliable foam-like gas tanks would not leak in 30-mile-per-hour crashes. However, some engineers feared that such a tank might melt and disagreed with others who felt it was safer than the existing metal design (Devine 1996, see also Strobel 1980). Other engineers believed that rubber bladders improved performance in tests, but anticipated problems under real-world conditions (Strobel 1980). Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: Ford whistle-blower Harley Copp's argument - that the Pinto would have been safer had its gas tank been placed above the axle rather than behind it - is often cited in Pinto narratives as an example of safety being sacrificed to profits, or at least trunk space, in the design stage (Cullen, Maakestad and Cavender 1987; Dowie 1977; Strobel1994). Yet Copp did not reach this conclusion until 1977 (Strobel1980). Other engineers were considerably less certain about it, even though the above-the-axle design did perform better in one set of crash tests. The engineer overseeing the Pinto's design, Harold MacDonald (whose father died in a fuel tank fire when his Model A Ford exploded after a frontal collision with a tree), felt that the above-the-axle placement was less safe under real-world conditions because the tank was closer to the passenger compartment and more likely to be punctured by items in the trunk (Strobel1980). Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Gioia 1992: I began to construct my own files of incoming safety problems. One of these new files concerned reports of Pintos "lighting up" (in the words of a field representative) in rear-end accidents. There were actually very few reports, perhaps because component failure was not initially assumed. These cars simply were consumed by fire after apparently very low-speed accidents. Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. S2CID 189918233.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: When Gioia became Recall Coordinator, he inherited about 100 active recall campaigns, half of them safety-related. As with most jobs, the enormous workload required him to use standard operating procedures" (SOPs) to organize and manage information for decision-making (d. Kriesberg 1976:1102). SOPs increase organizational efficiency by operating as cognitive scripts that transform decision-making opportunities into largely predetermined action patterns. Existing SOPs required that, to be "recallable," problems needed either high frequency or a directly traceable causal link to a design defect. When reports began to trickle in to Gioia that Pintos were "lighting up" in relatively low-speed accidents, and after viewing the burned wreckage of a Pinto, he initiated a meeting to determine if this represented a recallable problem. His workgroup voted unanimously not to recall the Pinto because the weak data did not meet SOP criteria (Gioia 1996). The workgroup was unaware of any cost-benefit analyses or Pinto crash test results. Reports of Pinto fires continued to trickle in, and eventually, Gioia did become aware of and concerned about the crash test results. Again he wondered if the Pinto had a recallable problem, so he initiated a second meeting to convince his co-workers that crash tests showed a possible design flaw. But others again saw no design flaws—after all, the Pinto met internal company standards, and no contradictory external standard existed. The workgroup conceived the tank leak "problem" not as a defect, but as a fundamental and unalterable design feature: the car's small size, the use of light metals, and unibody construction produced a tendency for Pintos (and others in its class) to "crush up like an accordion" in rear-end collisions (Gioia 1996). Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Gioia 1992: The National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA, a federal agency) had approved the use of cost-benefit analysis as an appropriate means for establishing automotive safety design standards. Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. S2CID 189918233.
  • Danley 2005: In calculating the benefits, the analysis used a figure of $200,000 per life. NHTSA developed this figure in 1972. Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: Based on the information given to it by lawyers preparing cases against Ford, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned NHTSA in the mid-1970s to investigate the Pinto's rear-end design. According to the material presented on the Center's website, Dowie's article is based on that information, made available to him by the Center (www.autosafety.org). "Pinto Madness" is still available on the Mother Jones website along with a video clip showing a Pinto catching fire after being rear-ended. In an interview with Gary T. Schwartz of the Rutgers Law Review, Copp asserted that he was also a major source of the information for the Mother Jones story, Schwartz, "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case," 1027, n.53 Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: Dowie (1977) accurately explains in part of his Mother Jones article that Ford employees wrote this document as part of an ongoing lobbying effort to influence NHTSA (24, 28). But his readers have relied exclusively on his other claim, that it was the "internal" (20, 24) memo on which Ford based its decision to market the dangerous Pinto and settle the few inevitable lawsuits (31). Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999:pg 41 Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Dardis & Zent 1982: On August 10, 1977, Ralph Nader and Mark Dowie held a press conference to notify the public that unnecessary deaths and injuries were being suffered as a result of the faulty design of the pre-1977 model year Pinto. Dardis, Rachel; Zent, Claudia (December 1, 1982). "The Economics of the Pinto Recall". Journal of Consumer Affairs. 16 (2): 261–277. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6606.1982.tb00175.x.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: By 1977, the social context had changed. Dowie's (1977:18) article had labeled the Pinto a "firetrap" and accused the agency of buckling to auto-industry pressure. Public interest generated by the article forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that NHTSA would be under a microscope for its duration. Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Dardis & Zent 1982: On August 11, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began an investigation of the claims. Dardis, Rachel; Zent, Claudia (December 1, 1982). "The Economics of the Pinto Recall". Journal of Consumer Affairs. 16 (2): 261–277. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6606.1982.tb00175.x.
  • Dardis & Zent 1982: In May 1978, NHTSA determined that pre-1977 model year Ford Pintos were subject to "fuel tank damage, Fuel leakage and fire occurrences which had resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries" when impacted at "moderate speeds," and that the "fire threshold" in those vehicles was reached at closing speeds of 30–35 MPH. Dardis, Rachel; Zent, Claudia (December 1, 1982). "The Economics of the Pinto Recall". Journal of Consumer Affairs. 16 (2): 261–277. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6606.1982.tb00175.x.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: NHTSA engineer Lee Strickland was assigned to determine if Pinto (and Chevrolet Vega) tank problems warranted a mandatory recall. Strickland's workgroup held the Pinto and Vega to a higher standard than other cars (Strickland 1996). It dispensed with the usual moving barrier. Instead, it intentionally selected a large and particularly rigid "bullet car" to hit the Pinto's rear end. It weighed down the bullet car's nose to slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. It also turned on the bullet car's headlights to provide a ready source of ignition. It completely filled the gas tanks in both cars with gasoline rather than the non-flammable Stoddard fluid normally used. Strickland justified these actions as approximating real-world worst-case circumstances (Davidson 1983; NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). For NHTSA, the tests seemed an unqualified success: two 1972 Pintos burst into flame upon impact. In the summer of 1978, NHTSA announced that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, leading to the largest recall campaign in automobile history at that time (NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall 1971–1976 Pintos. Other small cars sold during the 1970s were not recalled, even though most were comparable, or in the case of the AMC Gremlin probably less safe (Schwartz 1991; NHTSA C7-38; Swigert and Farrell 198081:180). Their manufacturers successfully defended them as acceptable risks (see Wallace 1978). When we asked why NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing the 35 mile-per-hour test, although most small cars could not withstand such a test, Strickland ( 1996) analogized that, "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too." Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: Beginning in the late 1970s, claims consistent with "Pinto Madness" readily gained public acceptance, but credible contradictory claims did not (e.g., Davidson 1983; Epstein 1980). For instance, Dowie's "conservative" estimate of 500 deaths (1977:18) was accepted, while NHTSA's report that it could document only 27 Pinto fire-related deaths (NHTSA C7-38; Frank 1985) was ignored. A transmission problem that also caused 27 Pinto deaths (and 180 on other Ford products [Clarke 1988]) never became a social problem. Similarly, the public accepted claims of safety errors leveled by Harley Copp, a Ford engineer who was apparently overseas when early crucial decisions were made (Camps 1997; Strobel 1980) but ignored other safety-conscious Pinto engineers who believed windshield retention was a more important safety problem (Camps 1997), and lack of safety glass caused more deaths (Feaheny 1997). Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: By the time of its Pinto investigation, NHTSA had essentially abandoned its original mission of forcing industry-wide safety improvements, in favor of investigating and recalling specific cars (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). NHTSA had two primary incentives in reinforcing the extant Nfocal organization" imagery of the Pinto narrative. First, NHTSA was pressured by specific organizations in its network (e.g., the Center for Auto Safety) and members of the public (see NHTSA C7-38) to take action concerning the Pinto's gas tank. Second, other network actors (e.g., courts, the Nixon administration, and the auto industry) had increasingly limited NHTSA's ability to address systemic auto safety issues. Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Danley 2005: Ford could have refused to recall and have chosen instead to defend the Pinto's design in the formal recall hearings at NHTSA." While this tactic could easily have delayed any forced recall for months, if not for more than a year, the cost of the publicized hearings to Ford's reputation could have been substantial, even if Ford had been successful in the end. Ford agreed to "voluntarily recall" the Pinto in June 1978. Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: the Pinto was the subject of the largest recall in automobile history at the time. Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Danley 2005: Two important legal cases were central. One was a civil trial that began in August 1977 in Orange County California, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company. The other was a case involving criminal reckless homicide in Indiana. Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Danley 2005: pg 208 Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Lee & Ermann 1999: Based on information given to it by lawyers preparing cases against Ford, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned NHTSA in the mid-1970s to investigate the Pinto's rear-end design. According to material presented on the Center's website, Dowie's article is based on that information, made available to him by the Center (www.autosafety.org). "Pinto Madness" is still available on the Mother Jones website along with a video clip showing a Pinto catching fire after being rear-ended. In an interview with Schwartz, Copp asserted that he was also a major source of the information for the Mother Jones story, Schwartz, "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case," 1027, n.53 Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. doi:10.1525/sp.1999.46.1.03x0240f.
  • Danley 2005: pg 209 Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Viscusi, W. Kip (February 2000). "Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 52 (3): 569. doi:10.2307/1229473. hdl:1803/6556. JSTOR 1229473. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-01-24. Retrieved 2016-04-14. The basic problem is that jurors do not undertake a comprehensive risk analysis approach, regardless of its character. Jurors have a tendency to compare the often very small per-unit safety cost with the costs borne by the injured victim. Rather than examine the entire market and the associated benefits and costs, jurors will be offended by, or will not fully understand, a comprehensive risk-analysis approach and will focus their assessment more narrowly on the identified victim and the costs of preventing that injury. The fact that these costs would also have been incurred for thousands of consumers who were not injured will not loom as large, as Judge Easterbrook emphasized. Thus, there is a tendency to exhibit "hindsight bias" rather than to consider the expected costs and expected benefits at the time of the safety decision.
  • Viscusi, W. Kip (February 2000). "Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 52 (3): 569. doi:10.2307/1229473. hdl:1803/6556. JSTOR 1229473. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-01-24. Retrieved 2016-04-14.
  • Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: There is little doubt about the importance of State of Indiana v. Ford Motor Company from a legal standpoint. This case was the first time criminal charges were brought against an American corporation for faulty product design. According to attorney Malcolm Wheeler (1981, p. 250), "[n]ewspapers referred to it as the most important economic case of the century ..." The notion that a corporation could be held accountable for its criminal actions was a novel legal concept at the time. Wheeler was not alone in his estimation of the case as influential. Because of the application of criminal law to corporate behavior, others have referred to this litigation as "unprecedented" (Welty, 1982) and as a "landmark case" (Clinard, 1990; Frank & Lynch, 1992; Hills, 1987; Maakestad, 1987). Maakestad (1987, p. 7) stated that the case "[r]eestablished an important precedent: In certain cases involving human health and safety, corporations and their executives could be required to submit not only to the scrutiny and sanctions of traditional federal regulatory agencies, but to state criminal courts as well." Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586.
  • Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002 Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586.
  • Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: Two main perspectives emerged after the Pinto trial as to how the case outcome would affect future uses of criminal law against corporations for product liability issues. One viewpoint was stated by the then president of the National District Attorneys Association, Robert Johnson, Sr. He is quoted as saying "We'll see more prosecutions like this ... A psychological barrier has been broken, and the big corporations are now vulnerable" (Bodine, 1980, p. 3). The popular idea was that corporate malfeasance would be curtailed if corporations were held accountable for their actions. Thus, the feeling among some legal commentators was that the Pinto case represented a fundamental shift in how the criminal courts would perceive corporations. ... Another perspective was that the case was completely frivolous. Commenting on civil litigation, Harry Philo, then president-elect of the Association of American Trial Lawyers of America, commented that "In my opinion, the Pinto case was a completely irrelevant prosecution" (Stuart, 1980, p.4). However, he also stated that "[t]he verdict won't deter civil lawsuits" (Mleczko, 1980, llA). Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586.
  • Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: The very fact that there has not been another product liability criminal prosecution since that case tells you one major impact of the case was ... [that] it said the criminal law is a very, very poor tool to use for product litigation. It's just not appropriate Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586.
  • Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: Paul Weaver worked for the Ford Motor Company from 1978 to 1980 in the corporation's public affairs staff preparing company positions on public policy issues. He criticized Ford for how it dealt with the controversy surrounding the Pinto. According to Weaver (1988, p.94), "[t]he design of its [Pinto's] fuel system was essentially the same as that of other cars of its size and generation" and "Pintos had about the same rate of death from fire due to rear-end collision as other small cars." His assertion is that the Pinto was not unusual compared to similar models. Weaver admits that "[w]e should simply have told the truth about the car" and "[w]e did not fight to vindicate ourselves." Thus, by refusing to mount a major publicity campaign, Ford gave the impression that it was guilty. ... These remarks add an interesting dimension to the Pinto case in that one of the clear lessons was to confront issues raised about defective products. This concern illustrates that after the Pinto case, corporations became much more willing and adept at handling images stemming from poor design. In other words, the Pinto case made corporations much more willing to wage public relations battles over design and production flaws. Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586.

forbes.com

  • Lienert, Dan (January 27, 2004). "The worst cars of all time". Forbes. Archived from the original on November 16, 2019. Retrieved March 6, 2016. "You don't want to talk about the Pinto," said a Ford official. "Leave that one in the cemetery." Apparently, Ford has not forgotten the lawsuits and the public relations disasters forged by its Pinto hatchback and sedan. The Pinto's famous safety flaw, of course, was that it was prone to blowing up if rear-ended. When people talk about how bad American small cars created an opportunity for the Japanese to come in and clean house in the 1970s and '80s, they are referring to vehicles like this (and see Chevrolet Vega, second slide).

fordpinto.com

pintopage.fordpinto.com

gt-cars.co.uk

handle.net

hdl.handle.net

  • Viscusi, W. Kip (February 2000). "Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 52 (3): 569. doi:10.2307/1229473. hdl:1803/6556. JSTOR 1229473. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-01-24. Retrieved 2016-04-14. The basic problem is that jurors do not undertake a comprehensive risk analysis approach, regardless of its character. Jurors have a tendency to compare the often very small per-unit safety cost with the costs borne by the injured victim. Rather than examine the entire market and the associated benefits and costs, jurors will be offended by, or will not fully understand, a comprehensive risk-analysis approach and will focus their assessment more narrowly on the identified victim and the costs of preventing that injury. The fact that these costs would also have been incurred for thousands of consumers who were not injured will not loom as large, as Judge Easterbrook emphasized. Thus, there is a tendency to exhibit "hindsight bias" rather than to consider the expected costs and expected benefits at the time of the safety decision.
  • Viscusi, W. Kip (February 2000). "Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 52 (3): 569. doi:10.2307/1229473. hdl:1803/6556. JSTOR 1229473. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-01-24. Retrieved 2016-04-14.

hbr.org

  • Bazerman, Max H.; Tenbrunsel, Ann E. (April 2011). "Ethical Breakdowns". Harvard Business Review. 89 (4): 58–65, 137. PMID 21510519. Archived from the original on November 30, 2020. Retrieved February 28, 2015.

hemmings.com

howstuffworks.com

auto.howstuffworks.com

jenningsforddirect.co.uk

jstor.org

  • Viscusi, W. Kip (February 2000). "Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 52 (3): 569. doi:10.2307/1229473. hdl:1803/6556. JSTOR 1229473. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-01-24. Retrieved 2016-04-14. The basic problem is that jurors do not undertake a comprehensive risk analysis approach, regardless of its character. Jurors have a tendency to compare the often very small per-unit safety cost with the costs borne by the injured victim. Rather than examine the entire market and the associated benefits and costs, jurors will be offended by, or will not fully understand, a comprehensive risk-analysis approach and will focus their assessment more narrowly on the identified victim and the costs of preventing that injury. The fact that these costs would also have been incurred for thousands of consumers who were not injured will not loom as large, as Judge Easterbrook emphasized. Thus, there is a tendency to exhibit "hindsight bias" rather than to consider the expected costs and expected benefits at the time of the safety decision.
  • Viscusi, W. Kip (February 2000). "Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 52 (3): 569. doi:10.2307/1229473. hdl:1803/6556. JSTOR 1229473. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-01-24. Retrieved 2016-04-14.

latimes.com

lov2xlr8.no

minneapolisfed.org

motherjones.com

  • Dowie 1977: Ford knows the Pinto is a firetrap, yet it has paid out millions to settle damage suits out of court, and it is prepared to spend millions more lobbying against safety standards ... Ford waited eight years because its internal "cost-benefit analysis," which places a dollar value on human life, said it wasn't profitable to make the changes sooner. Dowie, Mark (September 1977). "Pinto Madness". Mother Jones. Retrieved January 17, 2014.

motortrend.com

nbcnews.com

usnews.nbcnews.com

news.google.com

newyorker.com

  • Gladwell 2015: A former head of the N.H.T.S.A. testified on Ford's behalf, stating that in his opinion the Pinto's design was no more or less safe than that of any other car in its class, like the Chevrolet Vega or the A.M.C. Gremlin. Gladwell, Malcolm (May 4, 2015). "The Engineer's Lament". The New Yorker. Retrieved March 3, 2016.

nhtsa.gov

nih.gov

pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

  • Bazerman, Max H.; Tenbrunsel, Ann E. (April 2011). "Ethical Breakdowns". Harvard Business Review. 89 (4): 58–65, 137. PMID 21510519. Archived from the original on November 30, 2020. Retrieved February 28, 2015.

oldcarbrochures.com

oldcarbrochures.org

paintref.com

people.com

pinimg.com

i.pinimg.com

pointoflaw.com

  • Schwartz 1991 Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: Having reflected on these invocations of the Ford Pinto case, I have arrived at two general observations. One is that several significant factual misconceptions surround the public's understanding of the case. Given the cumulative force of these misconceptions, the case can be properly referred to as "mythical." Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: In August 1970, 1971 model-year Pintos began coming off the assembly line. Just a few days later, NHTSA-which had never acted on its earlier proposal-advanced a more demanding set of proposed regulations. Three months later, Ford officials decided that for purposes of the 1973 model year, Ford would adopt, as its own internal objective, the regulations that NHTSA had suggested in 1969. To respond to NHTSA's more recent proposal, Ford engineers, with actual Pintos now available, stepped up the crash-testing process and identified several design modifications that might improve the Pinto's performance. In October 1971, Ford officials decided against incorporating any of these modifications into the current Pintos; rather, it would wait until NHTSA clarified its position. In 1973, NHTSA promulgated its fuel-tank standard but ruled that this standard would apply only to 1977 models. Ford adopted a 20 mph moving-barrier standard for all 1973 cars. Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: Page 1015 and Footnote 9, "The court of appeal opinion referred to the Pinto's bumper as the flimsiest of any American car. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 774, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360. Mark Robinson, Jr., co-counsel for the plaintiffs, is emphatic that this reference is correct. Telephone interview with Mark Robinson, Jr. (Sept. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Robinson Interview). In the later criminal case, however, Byron Bloch, a prosecution witness, stated in cross-examination that the Pinto's bumper was about the same as those of the Gremlin, Vega, and Dodge Colt. See L. Strobel, supra note 5, at 157 ("I would say they were all bad.")." Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: As for additional design proposals brought forward by the plaintiffs, several of them-for example, a bladder within the gas tank, and a "tank within the tank"-concerned somewhat innovative technology that had never been utilized in actual auto production. At trial, there was testimony that a bladder would have been feasible in the early 1970s, but also rebuttal testimony that a bladder was at this time beyond the bounds of feasibility. Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991:The Mother Jones article is suffused with outrage at companies that apply a pernicious cost-benefit analysis to achieve "corporate profits". Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: According to the Mother Jones article, as of 1977, somewhere between 500 and 900 persons had been killed in fires attributed to the Pinto's unique design features Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991:To sum up, the Ford document has been assigned an operational significance that it never possessed, and has been condemned as unethical on account of characterizations of the document that are in significant part unwarranted. Of course, the condemnation of Ford's report is linked to the condemnation imposed by the public on the Pinto itself. The common belief is that the Pinto, on account of its fuel-tank design, was a "firetrap." The Mother Jones article derived emotional power from its presentation of the Pinto as a "firetrap, a "death trap," and a "lethal car."47 The combination of that article, the verdict in the Ford Pinto case, the NHTSA initial determination, and the Pinto recall clearly conveyed this sense of the Pinto-as-firetrap to the general public. Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: Pg 1019, Schwartz noted, "The Mother Jones article had encouraged consumers to write to NHTSA and demand a recall of earlier Pintos. Responding to the wave of consumer complaints it received, NHTSA began a recall proceeding relating to 1971–1976 Pintos." Also see footnote 15. Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: Relying on a variety of external sources (including Ford), NHTSA indicated that it was aware of thirty-eight instances in which rear-end impact on Pintos had resulted in fuel-tank leakage or fire; these instances, in turn, resulted in twenty-seven deaths and twenty-four nonfatal burn injuries.66 The NHTSA report also incorporated the data internally provided by NHTSA's own Fatal Accident Reporting System ("FARS"), which had begun operation in 1975. FARS data showed that from January 1975 through the middle of 1977, seventeen people had died in accidents in which Pinto rear-end collisions resulted in fires. 67 In comparing NHTSA's figure of twenty-seven deaths for 1971–77 with the FARS figure of seventeen for 1975–77, 68 one should keep in mind that the number of Pintos on the road was cumulatively increasing every year. The NHTSA figure of twenty-seven fatalities hence seems roughly in the ballpark by way of suggesting the number of people who had died in Pinto rear-end fires. In setting forth this number, however, NHTSA made no effort to estimate how many of these deaths were caused by the Pinto's specific design features. Many fire deaths undeniably result from high-speed collisions that would induce leakage even in state-of-the-art fuel systems;69 Moreover, cars in the subcompact class generally entail a relatively high fatality risk.70 Yet the NHTSA report did not compare the performance results of the Pinto to the results of other cars then on the road, including other subcompacts. Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: The Pinto was then struck by a car, which had originally been traveling at about fifty miles per hour but which had braked down to a speed of perhaps thirty miles per hour at the point of impact.9 ... [footnote 9] For reasons quite beyond the court's control, its opinion must be treated cautiously as a source of actual facts. Because the defendant was appealing a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the court was under an obligation to view all the evidence in a way most favorable to the plaintiffs and essentially to ignore evidence in the record that might be favorable to the defendant. See id. at 773, 820, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 388. In fact, Ford's basic position at trial-which the court's opinion at no point mentions was that the approaching car (a Ford Galaxie) had not slowed down at all, and had struck the Gray car at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour. There was an enormous amount of evidence at trial supporting each of the parties' factual claims as to the Galaxie's closing speed. Had the jury accepted Ford's speed estimate, there would not have been much of an issue of crashworthiness: for the plaintiffs' position throughout the trial was that even a state-of-the-art fuel system could not maintain integrity in a 50 mile-per-hour collision. Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991:pg 1016 Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: after deliberating for eight hours - awarded the Gray family wrongful death damages of $560,000; Grimshaw was awarded over $2.5 million in compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages as well. The trial judge reduced the punitive damage award to $3.5 million as a condition for denying a new trial. Two years later the court of appeal affirmed these results in all respects; the state supreme court then denied a hearing. Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: Hence, there was nothing clearly wrong in subjecting Ford to liability for harms resulting from that latter category of fires. The punitive damage award in the Ford Pinto case is, however, much more difficult to justify. To a large extent, it rested on the premise that Ford had behaved reprehensibly when it balanced safety against cost in designing the Pinto. However, the process by which manufacturers render such trade-off design decisions seems not only to be anticipated but endorsed by the prevailing risk-benefit standard for design liability. Accordingly, the Pinto jury's decision that punitive damages were appropriate - a decision that was affirmed by the trial judge and the court of appeal - raises serious questions about the operational viability of the risk-benefit standard itself. Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991: In August 1978 - half a year after the verdict in the tort case - a 1973 Pinto was involved in a fatal crash in Ulrich, Indiana. Indiana public officials decided to prosecute Ford for the crime of reckless homicide. Because the reckless homicide statute had been enacted only in 1977, Ford could not be prosecuted for the reckless design of the Pinto; rather, the prosecution needed to show a reckless post-1977 failure by Ford to repair or warn. Largely because of the narrowness of the resulting issue, at trial the prosecution was not able to secure the admission of internal Ford documents on which it had hoped to build its case. Ford's defense effort in this criminal case was vastly more ambitious than the effort the company had previously mounted in defending itself against Grimshaw's tort claim. In March 1980 the Indiana jury found Ford not guilty. The jury seemed ambivalent about the Pinto, but concluded that Ford had avoided recklessness in the conduct of its recall program. Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991 Footnote pg 1029 Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991 pg 1031 Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
  • Schwartz 1991 pg 1033 Schwartz, Gary T. (1991). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.

popularmechanics.com

  • Wojdyla 2011: The genesis of the Ford Pinto came sometime in 1968 when Ford's then-president Lee Iaccoca decided that his company would not sit idly by as new Japanese competitors dominated the small-car segment. He pushed the board to greenlight the Pinto program, and by August 1968 the program was underway. It would have aggressive targets: no more than 2000 pounds, not a penny over $2000, and a delivery deadline of just 25 months, a record at the time and still impressive today. Wojdyla, Ben (May 20, 2011). "The Top Automotive Engineering Failures: The Ford Pinto Fuel Tanks". Popular Mechanics. Retrieved February 28, 2015.
  • Wojdyla 2011: But at the time, management's attitude was to get the product out the door as fast as possible. Wojdyla, Ben (May 20, 2011). "The Top Automotive Engineering Failures: The Ford Pinto Fuel Tanks". Popular Mechanics. Retrieved February 28, 2015.
  • Huffman, John Pearley (February 12, 2010). "5 Most Notorious Recalls of All Time". Popular Mechanics. Archived from the original on November 16, 2019. Retrieved March 5, 2016.

semanticscholar.org

api.semanticscholar.org

  • Danley 2005: Initial planning on the Pinto, a second-generation subcompact, began in 1967 ... In January 1969, in a victory for Iaccoca, Ford's Board approved the recommendation of the Product Planning Committee (December 1968) to produce the Pinto. Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Gioia 1992: The Pinto was brought from inception to production in the record time of approximately 25 months (compared to the industry average of 43 months), a time frame that suggested the necessity for doing things expediently. In addition to the time pressure, the engineering and development teams were required to adhere to the production "limits of 2000" for the diminutive car: it was not to exceed either $2000 in cost or 2000 pounds in weight. Any decisions that threatened these targets or the timing of the car's introduction were discouraged. Under normal conditions design, styling, product planning, engineering, etc., were completed prior to production tooling. Because of the foreshortened time frame, however, some of these usually sequential processes were executed in parallel. As a consequence, tooling was already well underway (thus "freezing" the basic design) ... Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. S2CID 189918233.
  • Danley 2005 Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Gioia 1992: The tank was positioned between the rear bumper and the rear axle (a standard industry practice for the time). Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. S2CID 189918233.
  • Danley 2005: A few months later Ford began crash-testing modified Mavericks In part to prepare a response to NHTSA'S proposed regulations. The results demonstrated the vulnerability of fuel-integrity at fairly low speeds and some modifications were made. In August of 1970, the first model year Pinto, the 1971, went into production. Post-production testing revealed similar results. Still, there were no federal performance standards at the time and the proposed regulations addressed only front-end collisions. Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Gioia 1992: Ford had crash-tested 11 vehicles; 8 of these cars suffered potentially catastrophic gas tank ruptures. The only 3 cars that survived intact had each been modified in some way to protect the tank. Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. S2CID 189918233.
  • Gioia 1992: I began to construct my own files of incoming safety problems. One of these new files concerned reports of Pintos "lighting up" (in the words of a field representative) in rear-end accidents. There were actually very few reports, perhaps because component failure was not initially assumed. These cars simply were consumed by fire after apparently very low-speed accidents. Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. S2CID 189918233.
  • Gioia 1992: The National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA, a federal agency) had approved the use of cost-benefit analysis as an appropriate means for establishing automotive safety design standards. Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. S2CID 189918233.
  • Danley 2005: In calculating the benefits, the analysis used a figure of $200,000 per life. NHTSA developed this figure in 1972. Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Danley 2005: Ford could have refused to recall and have chosen instead to defend the Pinto's design in the formal recall hearings at NHTSA." While this tactic could easily have delayed any forced recall for months, if not for more than a year, the cost of the publicized hearings to Ford's reputation could have been substantial, even if Ford had been successful in the end. Ford agreed to "voluntarily recall" the Pinto in June 1978. Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Danley 2005: Two important legal cases were central. One was a civil trial that began in August 1977 in Orange County California, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company. The other was a case involving criminal reckless homicide in Indiana. Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Danley 2005: pg 208 Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Danley 2005: pg 209 Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. doi:10.5840/beq200515211. S2CID 145219885.
  • Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: There is little doubt about the importance of State of Indiana v. Ford Motor Company from a legal standpoint. This case was the first time criminal charges were brought against an American corporation for faulty product design. According to attorney Malcolm Wheeler (1981, p. 250), "[n]ewspapers referred to it as the most important economic case of the century ..." The notion that a corporation could be held accountable for its criminal actions was a novel legal concept at the time. Wheeler was not alone in his estimation of the case as influential. Because of the application of criminal law to corporate behavior, others have referred to this litigation as "unprecedented" (Welty, 1982) and as a "landmark case" (Clinard, 1990; Frank & Lynch, 1992; Hills, 1987; Maakestad, 1987). Maakestad (1987, p. 7) stated that the case "[r]eestablished an important precedent: In certain cases involving human health and safety, corporations and their executives could be required to submit not only to the scrutiny and sanctions of traditional federal regulatory agencies, but to state criminal courts as well." Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586.
  • Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002 Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586.
  • Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: Two main perspectives emerged after the Pinto trial as to how the case outcome would affect future uses of criminal law against corporations for product liability issues. One viewpoint was stated by the then president of the National District Attorneys Association, Robert Johnson, Sr. He is quoted as saying "We'll see more prosecutions like this ... A psychological barrier has been broken, and the big corporations are now vulnerable" (Bodine, 1980, p. 3). The popular idea was that corporate malfeasance would be curtailed if corporations were held accountable for their actions. Thus, the feeling among some legal commentators was that the Pinto case represented a fundamental shift in how the criminal courts would perceive corporations. ... Another perspective was that the case was completely frivolous. Commenting on civil litigation, Harry Philo, then president-elect of the Association of American Trial Lawyers of America, commented that "In my opinion, the Pinto case was a completely irrelevant prosecution" (Stuart, 1980, p.4). However, he also stated that "[t]he verdict won't deter civil lawsuits" (Mleczko, 1980, llA). Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586.
  • Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: The very fact that there has not been another product liability criminal prosecution since that case tells you one major impact of the case was ... [that] it said the criminal law is a very, very poor tool to use for product litigation. It's just not appropriate Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586.
  • Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: Paul Weaver worked for the Ford Motor Company from 1978 to 1980 in the corporation's public affairs staff preparing company positions on public policy issues. He criticized Ford for how it dealt with the controversy surrounding the Pinto. According to Weaver (1988, p.94), "[t]he design of its [Pinto's] fuel system was essentially the same as that of other cars of its size and generation" and "Pintos had about the same rate of death from fire due to rear-end collision as other small cars." His assertion is that the Pinto was not unusual compared to similar models. Weaver admits that "[w]e should simply have told the truth about the car" and "[w]e did not fight to vindicate ourselves." Thus, by refusing to mount a major publicity campaign, Ford gave the impression that it was guilty. ... These remarks add an interesting dimension to the Pinto case in that one of the clear lessons was to confront issues raised about defective products. This concern illustrates that after the Pinto case, corporations became much more willing and adept at handling images stemming from poor design. In other words, the Pinto case made corporations much more willing to wage public relations battles over design and production flaws. Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586.

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  • Viscusi, W. Kip (February 2000). "Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 52 (3): 569. doi:10.2307/1229473. hdl:1803/6556. JSTOR 1229473. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-01-24. Retrieved 2016-04-14. The basic problem is that jurors do not undertake a comprehensive risk analysis approach, regardless of its character. Jurors have a tendency to compare the often very small per-unit safety cost with the costs borne by the injured victim. Rather than examine the entire market and the associated benefits and costs, jurors will be offended by, or will not fully understand, a comprehensive risk-analysis approach and will focus their assessment more narrowly on the identified victim and the costs of preventing that injury. The fact that these costs would also have been incurred for thousands of consumers who were not injured will not loom as large, as Judge Easterbrook emphasized. Thus, there is a tendency to exhibit "hindsight bias" rather than to consider the expected costs and expected benefits at the time of the safety decision.
  • Viscusi, W. Kip (February 2000). "Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 52 (3): 569. doi:10.2307/1229473. hdl:1803/6556. JSTOR 1229473. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-01-24. Retrieved 2016-04-14.

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  • Joseph, Damian (October 30, 2009). "Ugliest Cars of the Past 50 Years". Bloomberg Businessweek. Archived from the original on February 20, 2010. Retrieved March 6, 2016. The Pinto doesn't seem so bad—that is, until you remember how sexy Fords from the 1960s were. The design devolved into hexagonal headlight housings, a grille that's only a few inches tall yet wide enough to become the car's focal point, and a rear end that apparently melted from the roof.