"Failures and Successes of Kashmir War: Muzaffarabad Seminar – 27 November 1990", Defence and Media 1991, Inter Services Public Relations, Pakistan, 1991, p. 114: Quoting General Wajahat Hussain, former ADC to Muhammad Ali Jinnah: "This was the time to take important decisions and it appears that either he wanted to evade making decisions or pretended to be innocent about the conspiracy hatched by high-ranking British officers. His leave enabled General Gracey to take over as the acting Chief and he had to take the blame."
Razvi, Mujtaba (1971), The Frontiers of Pakistan: A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy, National Publishing House: [From Cunningham's diary for 7 November 1947] "Messervy came up from Pindi for a talk; just back from England. He was in Delhi two days ago and was surprised to find Mountbatten directing the military operations in Kashmir. M. B. [Mountbatten] is daily becoming more and more an anathema to our Muslims, and it certainly seems as if he could see nothing except through Hindu eyes."
"Failures and Successes of Kashmir War: Muzaffarabad Seminar – 27 November 1990", Defence and Media 1991, Inter Services Public Relations, 1991, p. 115: "A cell for planning on Kashmir was created in Military Operations Directorate under Brigadier Sher Khan.... Such officers were sent to assist the Mujahideen and were shown as retired or absent without leave. .. General Wajahat further said that "apart from planning military operations, General Messervy had a close liaison with the civil authorities. He used to come to the office at half past seven, Brigadier Sher Khan would present the report on the previous twenty four hours and get instructions for the next day. Then they would visit the operations room where consultations would continue till 10 a.m."
Webb, Matthew J. (2012). "Escaping history or merely rewriting it? The significance of Kashmir's accession to its political future". Contemporary South Asia. 20 (4): 471–485. doi:10.1080/09584935.2012.737311. S2CID143608576.: "While India's intervention was militarily successful, it was also highly controversial. General Sir Frank Messervy, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, alleged that India had planned to militarily intervene in the state several weeks before the event."
Snedden, Christopher (2005), "Would a plebiscite have resolved the Kashmir dispute?", South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 28 (1): 64–86, doi:10.1080/00856400500056145, S2CID145020726
jstor.org
Thorner, Alice (January 1949), "The Kashmir Conflict, Parts I and II", Middle East Journal, 3 (1), Middle East Institute, JSTOR4322039: 'On November 12, General Sir Frank Messervy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, issued a communique stating that "there is absolutely no truth in the allegations made by the Government of India that serving Pakistan Army officers are directing operations in Kashmir against State forces" (Quoted by Sir Zafrullah Khan to the Security Council on January 17, 1948, Document S/P.V. 220, 63–65).'
Webb, Matthew J. (2012). "Escaping history or merely rewriting it? The significance of Kashmir's accession to its political future". Contemporary South Asia. 20 (4): 471–485. doi:10.1080/09584935.2012.737311. S2CID143608576.: "While India's intervention was militarily successful, it was also highly controversial. General Sir Frank Messervy, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, alleged that India had planned to militarily intervene in the state several weeks before the event."
Snedden, Christopher (2005), "Would a plebiscite have resolved the Kashmir dispute?", South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 28 (1): 64–86, doi:10.1080/00856400500056145, S2CID145020726
