Stephen Hutcheon; Mark Doman; Alex Palmer (10 July 2020). "High stakes in a Himalayan hotspot". ABC News (Australia). Archived from the original on 23 February 2021. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
"Zooming in, you can see excavators at work. One is transferring earth from the mountain side. Another is working on the edge of the river bank. The construction teams also appear to have built several crossings over the river. And the width of the bank suggests that it can easily accommodate a two-lane road. Another 1.3km upstream there is a larger Chinese camp."
Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), p. 117: "The other main route ran through Shamal Lungpa and Samzung Ling [Samzungling] to Dehra Compas, along the upper valley of the Qara Qash River to Qizil Jilga and Chungtosh, through the Qara Tagh Pass and the Chibra valley to Malikshah and Shahidulla." Fisher, Margaret W.; Rose, Leo E.; Huttenback, Robert A. (1963), Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, Praeger – via archive.org
Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), p. 103: 'However, the "Big Map of the People's Republic of China" published in 1956, reverted to the alignment shown on the 1947 Kuomintang map. It is important to note that Chou En-lai, in a letter of December 17, 1959, stated that the 1956 map "correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector."' Fisher, Margaret W.; Rose, Leo E.; Huttenback, Robert A. (1963), Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, Praeger – via archive.org
Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), pp. 7–8: "When questioned on the divergence between the two maps, Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, made the demonstrably absurd assertion that the boundaries as marked on both maps were equally valid. There is only one interpretation that could make this statement meaningful: this was an implied threat to produce another map claiming additional Indian territory if New Delhi continued in its stubborn refusal to cede Aksai Chin." Fisher, Margaret W.; Rose, Leo E.; Huttenback, Robert A. (1963), Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, Praeger – via archive.org
Buck, Pearl S. (1970), Mandala, New York: The John Day Company, p. 115 – via archive.org
Johri, Chinese Invasion of Ladakh (1969), p. 106: "The peculiarity of the Galwan theatre was that the main Karakoram Range in this region is better defined than in the Northern Sector. It is cut by the Galwan river at a place about 30 miles to the east of the Shyok-Galwan river junction." Johri, Sitaram (1969), Chinese Invasion of Ladakh, Himalaya Publications
Johri, Chinese Invasion of Ladakh (1969), p. 106: "In the south it divides itself into two ranges. One separates the Kugrang river from the Changlung and the other runs along the left bank of the latter and is also called the Nischu Mountains. The first is named Karakoram I and the second Karakoram II." Johri, Sitaram (1969), Chinese Invasion of Ladakh, Himalaya Publications
Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute (1967), pp. 101–102: "The Chinese officials maintained ... [the] traditional customary line, reflected in their map, was formed gradually through a long historical process, mainly by the extent up to which each side had exercised administrative jurisdiction;... Without admitting any inconsistency they also argued that the line of actual control differed from the traditional customary line because of British imperialism and the recent pushing forward of India. These factors apparently could not contribute to the continuous process of change." Van Eekelen, Willem Frederik (1967), Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China, Springer, ISBN978-94-017-6555-8
Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal (1971), p. 311: "In September, 1961, we prepared another note on the problems of frontier security and suggested that in Northern Ladakh we should reconnoitre the Galwan River Valley and open posts as far eastward as possible, because this valley was connected with the Shyok valley through which the Shyok River ran and finally joined the Indus in Pakistan-held territory. If the Chinese commanded the Galwan valley, it would give them easy access to Skardu, Gilgit, etc. and our routes to Murgo, Daulat Beg Oldi, Panamik would be cut." Mullik, B. N. (1971), My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, Allied Publishers
Kler, Unsung Battles of 1962 (1995), pp. 110–111: He [General Daulet Singh] concluded that, in the circumstances, no Indian post could be established at Samzungling but Kaul overruled him. "The Galwan river was an axis along which the Chinese can make a substantial advance", he replied, and therefore they must be forestalled.' Kler, Gurdip Singh (1995), Unsung Battles of 1962, Lancer Publishers, ISBN978-1-897829-09-7
Shishir Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off (2014), Chapter 3: "In 2003, China initiated a major highway renovation project, which led to an upgrading of 51,000 km of roads in Tibet by the Beijing Olympics in 2008.... According to official Indian estimates, the road development undertaken by Beijing has given it the capability to move 11,500 tonnes per day whereas only 200 tonnes per day are required to sustain major military operations for sustained periods." Gupta, Shishir (2014), The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte, Hachette India, ISBN978-93-5009-606-2
India, Ministry of External Affairs, ed. (1962), Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question, Government of India Press, Chinese Report, Part 1Archived 13 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine, pp. 4–5
The location and terrain features of this traditional customary boundary line are now described as follows in three sectors, western, middle and eastern. ... [From the Chip Chap river] It then turns south-east along the mountain ridge and passes through peak 6,845 (approximately 78° 12' E, 34° 57' N) and peak 6,598 (approximately 78° 13' E, 34° 54' N). From peak 6,598 it runs along the mountain ridge southwards until it crosses the Galwan River at approximately 78° 13' E, 34° 46' N.
Ajai Shukla, A new and worrying chapter: Chinese intrusions in Ladakh gather paceArchived 3 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine, Business Standard, 23 May 2020: "That means that, in sending thousands of PLA troops three-to-four kilometres into the Galwan Valley, China has violated its own claim line and occupied territory that Beijing itself has traditionally acknowledged to be Indian.... Indian troops in the area were taken by surprise when a large Chinese force crossed the LAC into the Galwan area in late April."
India, Ministry of External Affairs, ed. (1962), Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question, Government of India Press, Chinese Report, Part 1Archived 13 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine, pp. 4–5
The location and terrain features of this traditional customary boundary line are now described as follows in three sectors, western, middle and eastern. ... [From the Chip Chap river] It then turns south-east along the mountain ridge and passes through peak 6,845 (approximately 78° 12' E, 34° 57' N) and peak 6,598 (approximately 78° 13' E, 34° 54' N). From peak 6,598 it runs along the mountain ridge southwards until it crosses the Galwan River at approximately 78° 13' E, 34° 46' N.
cnn.com
edition.cnn.com
Brad Lendon, Maneeva Suri, Satellite images show buildup at site of deadly India-China border clashArchived 12 February 2021 at the Wayback Machine, CNN, 26 June 2020.
"[Nathan] Ruser said his analysis of satellite photos showed that since May the number of Chinese troops and vehicles within a kilometer of the border had gone from three to 46 while on the Indian side that number had decreased from 84 to 17."
doi.org
Even though the map is of very low resolution, it is apparent that the Chip Chap River, a headwater of the Shyok River is shown entirely within Ladakh. Qaratagh-su, a stream that flows down from the Qaratagh Pass and joins the Karakash River is shown as the source of Karakash. Karackattu, The Corrosive Compromise (2020, Figure 1) gives more detailed maps showing Samzungling and Galwan river as part of Ladakh. Karackattu, Joe Thomas (2020). "The Corrosive Compromise of the Sino-Indian Border Management Framework: From Doklam to Galwan". Asian Affairs. 51 (3): 590–604. doi:10.1080/03068374.2020.1804726. ISSN0306-8374. S2CID222093756.
China provided the coordinates of the post as "34 degrees 37 minutes 30 seconds north, 78 degrees 35 minutes 30 seconds east" (34°37′30″N78°35′30″E / 34.625°N 78.5917°E / 34.625; 78.5917) and described it as "six kilometres inside Chinese territory in the Galwan Valley area".[30]
Henry Boyd, Meia Nouwens, Understanding the military build-up on the China–India borderArchived 22 June 2020 at the Wayback Machine, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 June 2020. "There is little indication that this detachment is equipped with armour or artillery, and the planned Chinese road along the valley remains unfinished, complicating the PLA’s ability to maintain a more substantial presence in this area for now."
Sushant Singh, India builds road north of Ladakh lake, China warns of ‘necessary counter-measures’Archived 28 May 2020 at the Wayback Machine, The Indian Express, 21 May 2020. "The Chinese, sources said, have objected to construction of a new road which branches off the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road along the riverbank towards the LAC.... “Galwan is not a disputed area between India and China, unlike Pangong Tso. Both sides agree on the LAC and patrol accordingly. There was no transgression by Chinese patrols in the area in the past two years. The issue is the construction of the road, which is well inside our territory, and, therefore, their objection is hard to comprehend,” a source said."
Manu Pubby, Troops rushed to Galwan amid Chinese buildupArchived 20 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine, The Economic Times, 19 May 2020. ProQuest2404087053.
"The Chinese side has over 80 tents and has made temporary defensive positions, with reports coming in that fast response reinforcements have also been moved closer to the Galwan river."
Manu Pubby, Troops rushed to Galwan amid Chinese buildupArchived 20 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine, The Economic Times, 19 May 2020. ProQuest2404087053.
'Titled "Chinese troops tighten control in Galwan Valley after India trespasses Chinese territory", the article says India has built defensive fortifications and obstacles to "unilaterally change the current border control situation".'
Vinayak Bhat, How China channelled Galwan river to claim territoryArchived 7 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine, India Today, 21 June 2020.
"The Chinese soon realised that there is no space for deployment of a large force along this waterway. Chinese engineers then thought of a unique method of claiming-- by canalising the Galwan river deeper with dozers and JCBs in order to restrict its size."
Hudson, Aksai Chin (1963), p. 15: "There is no evidence that under the Ch'ing dynasty China ever attempted to come further south than this [a pillar 64 miles south of the Suget Pass]. In other words, they accepted the Kuen Lun range as the frontier, and both Kashmir and the Government of India were equally willing to accept it..." Hudson, G. F. (1963), "Aksai Chin", Far Eastern Affairs, St. Antony's Papers, vol. 14, London: Chatto & Windus
Hudson, Aksai Chin (1963), pp. 17–18: "As a part of India, it [Aksai Chin] formed an awkward salient projecting between Sinkiang and Tibet; to get rid of this salient must be an objective of Chinese policy whenever opportunity might offer". Hudson, G. F. (1963), "Aksai Chin", Far Eastern Affairs, St. Antony's Papers, vol. 14, London: Chatto & Windus
preview-dwnews.com
Dongpo, 中国公布加勒万河谷流血冲突全过程：印度早前同意撤人拆越界建筑Archived 5 June 2021 at the Wayback Machine (China Announces the Whole Process of the Bleeding Conflict in the Calvin Valley), Deutsche Welle (Chinese), 20 June 2020. Machine-translated:
"Since April this year, the Indian border defense forces have unilaterally continued to build roads, bridges and other facilities in the Galle Valley region. China has repeatedly made representations and protests on this, but the Indian side has intensified cross-border troubles."
Manu Pubby, Troops rushed to Galwan amid Chinese buildupArchived 20 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine, The Economic Times, 19 May 2020. ProQuest2404087053.
"The Chinese side has over 80 tents and has made temporary defensive positions, with reports coming in that fast response reinforcements have also been moved closer to the Galwan river."
Manu Pubby, Troops rushed to Galwan amid Chinese buildupArchived 20 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine, The Economic Times, 19 May 2020. ProQuest2404087053.
'Titled "Chinese troops tighten control in Galwan Valley after India trespasses Chinese territory", the article says India has built defensive fortifications and obstacles to "unilaterally change the current border control situation".'
Even though the map is of very low resolution, it is apparent that the Chip Chap River, a headwater of the Shyok River is shown entirely within Ladakh. Qaratagh-su, a stream that flows down from the Qaratagh Pass and joins the Karakash River is shown as the source of Karakash. Karackattu, The Corrosive Compromise (2020, Figure 1) gives more detailed maps showing Samzungling and Galwan river as part of Ladakh. Karackattu, Joe Thomas (2020). "The Corrosive Compromise of the Sino-Indian Border Management Framework: From Doklam to Galwan". Asian Affairs. 51 (3): 590–604. doi:10.1080/03068374.2020.1804726. ISSN0306-8374. S2CID222093756.
sina.com.cn
mil.news.sina.com.cn
加勒万河谷冲突我军因何占上风 这三点因素是关键Archived 5 June 2021 at the Wayback Machine (Three factors are the key to the conflict in the Kalwan Valley: why our army has the upper hand), news.sina.com, 21 June 2020. Machine-translated: 'In fact, as early as September last year, my country initiated the construction of a large number of supporting facilities for the river valley area, and the cross-border provocation by the Indian army did not affect the progress of Chinese highways. It is foreseeable that the People’s Liberation Army will follow up the same "infrastructure construction" as in the Donglang area to ensure that we can have permanent outposts and a better patrol environment in the highlands of the Kalwan River valley, and prevent the Indian army from reusing better geography.'
Ajai Shukla, A new and worrying chapter: Chinese intrusions in Ladakh gather paceArchived 3 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine, Business Standard, 23 May 2020: "That means that, in sending thousands of PLA troops three-to-four kilometres into the Galwan Valley, China has violated its own claim line and occupied territory that Beijing itself has traditionally acknowledged to be Indian.... Indian troops in the area were taken by surprise when a large Chinese force crossed the LAC into the Galwan area in late April."
India, Ministry of External Affairs, ed. (1962), Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question, Government of India Press, Chinese Report, Part 1Archived 13 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine, pp. 4–5
The location and terrain features of this traditional customary boundary line are now described as follows in three sectors, western, middle and eastern. ... [From the Chip Chap river] It then turns south-east along the mountain ridge and passes through peak 6,845 (approximately 78° 12' E, 34° 57' N) and peak 6,598 (approximately 78° 13' E, 34° 54' N). From peak 6,598 it runs along the mountain ridge southwards until it crosses the Galwan River at approximately 78° 13' E, 34° 46' N.
加勒万河谷冲突我军因何占上风 这三点因素是关键Archived 5 June 2021 at the Wayback Machine (Three factors are the key to the conflict in the Kalwan Valley: why our army has the upper hand), news.sina.com, 21 June 2020. Machine-translated: 'In fact, as early as September last year, my country initiated the construction of a large number of supporting facilities for the river valley area, and the cross-border provocation by the Indian army did not affect the progress of Chinese highways. It is foreseeable that the People’s Liberation Army will follow up the same "infrastructure construction" as in the Donglang area to ensure that we can have permanent outposts and a better patrol environment in the highlands of the Kalwan River valley, and prevent the Indian army from reusing better geography.'
Dongpo, 中国公布加勒万河谷流血冲突全过程：印度早前同意撤人拆越界建筑Archived 5 June 2021 at the Wayback Machine (China Announces the Whole Process of the Bleeding Conflict in the Calvin Valley), Deutsche Welle (Chinese), 20 June 2020. Machine-translated:
"Since April this year, the Indian border defense forces have unilaterally continued to build roads, bridges and other facilities in the Galle Valley region. China has repeatedly made representations and protests on this, but the Indian side has intensified cross-border troubles."
Sushant Singh, India builds road north of Ladakh lake, China warns of ‘necessary counter-measures’Archived 28 May 2020 at the Wayback Machine, The Indian Express, 21 May 2020. "The Chinese, sources said, have objected to construction of a new road which branches off the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road along the riverbank towards the LAC.... “Galwan is not a disputed area between India and China, unlike Pangong Tso. Both sides agree on the LAC and patrol accordingly. There was no transgression by Chinese patrols in the area in the past two years. The issue is the construction of the road, which is well inside our territory, and, therefore, their objection is hard to comprehend,” a source said."
Henry Boyd, Meia Nouwens, Understanding the military build-up on the China–India borderArchived 22 June 2020 at the Wayback Machine, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 June 2020. "There is little indication that this detachment is equipped with armour or artillery, and the planned Chinese road along the valley remains unfinished, complicating the PLA’s ability to maintain a more substantial presence in this area for now."
Manu Pubby, Troops rushed to Galwan amid Chinese buildupArchived 20 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine, The Economic Times, 19 May 2020. ProQuest2404087053.
"The Chinese side has over 80 tents and has made temporary defensive positions, with reports coming in that fast response reinforcements have also been moved closer to the Galwan river."
Manu Pubby, Troops rushed to Galwan amid Chinese buildupArchived 20 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine, The Economic Times, 19 May 2020. ProQuest2404087053.
'Titled "Chinese troops tighten control in Galwan Valley after India trespasses Chinese territory", the article says India has built defensive fortifications and obstacles to "unilaterally change the current border control situation".'
Vinayak Bhat, How China channelled Galwan river to claim territoryArchived 7 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine, India Today, 21 June 2020.
"The Chinese soon realised that there is no space for deployment of a large force along this waterway. Chinese engineers then thought of a unique method of claiming-- by canalising the Galwan river deeper with dozers and JCBs in order to restrict its size."
Stephen Hutcheon; Mark Doman; Alex Palmer (10 July 2020). "High stakes in a Himalayan hotspot". ABC News (Australia). Archived from the original on 23 February 2021. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
"Zooming in, you can see excavators at work. One is transferring earth from the mountain side. Another is working on the edge of the river bank. The construction teams also appear to have built several crossings over the river. And the width of the bank suggests that it can easily accommodate a two-lane road. Another 1.3km upstream there is a larger Chinese camp."
Brad Lendon, Maneeva Suri, Satellite images show buildup at site of deadly India-China border clashArchived 12 February 2021 at the Wayback Machine, CNN, 26 June 2020.
"[Nathan] Ruser said his analysis of satellite photos showed that since May the number of Chinese troops and vehicles within a kilometer of the border had gone from three to 46 while on the Indian side that number had decreased from 84 to 17."
Even though the map is of very low resolution, it is apparent that the Chip Chap River, a headwater of the Shyok River is shown entirely within Ladakh. Qaratagh-su, a stream that flows down from the Qaratagh Pass and joins the Karakash River is shown as the source of Karakash. Karackattu, The Corrosive Compromise (2020, Figure 1) gives more detailed maps showing Samzungling and Galwan river as part of Ladakh. Karackattu, Joe Thomas (2020). "The Corrosive Compromise of the Sino-Indian Border Management Framework: From Doklam to Galwan". Asian Affairs. 51 (3): 590–604. doi:10.1080/03068374.2020.1804726. ISSN0306-8374. S2CID222093756.
