Inductive reasoning (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Inductive reasoning" in English language version.

refsWebsite
Global rank English rank
1st place
1st place
3rd place
3rd place
2nd place
2nd place
11th place
8th place
26th place
20th place
179th place
183rd place
18th place
17th place
5th place
5th place
2,779th place
1,997th place
low place
low place
6th place
6th place
1,865th place
1,260th place
1,379th place
1,175th place
2,242nd place
1,513th place
low place
low place
69th place
59th place
low place
low place

archive.org (Global: 6th place; English: 6th place)

arxiv.org (Global: 69th place; English: 59th place)

books.google.com (Global: 3rd place; English: 3rd place)

  • Johnson, Dale D.; Johnson, Bonnie; Ness, Daniel; Farenga, Stephen J. (2005). Trivializing Teacher Education: The Accreditation Squeeze. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 182–83. ISBN 9780742535367.
  • J.M., Bochenski (2012). Caws, Peter (ed.). The Methods of Contemporary Thought. Springer Science & Business Media. pp. 108–09. ISBN 978-9401035781. Retrieved 5 June 2020.
  • Roberto Torretti, The Philosophy of Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 219–21 Archived 9 May 2022 at the Wayback Machine[216] Archived 9 May 2022 at the Wayback Machine.
  • Stefano Gattei, Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science: Rationality without Foundations (New York: Routledge, 2009), ch. 2 "Science and philosophy", pp. 28–30.
  • Roberto Torretti, The Philosophy of Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 226 Archived 9 May 2022 at the Wayback Machine, 228–29 Archived 9 May 2022 at the Wayback Machine.
  • David Andrews, Keynes and the British Humanist Tradition: The Moral Purpose of the Market (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 63–65.
  • Russell, Bertrand (1927). An Outline of Philosophy. London and New York: Allen and Unwin. reprinted in Bertrand Russell, The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell (New York: Routledge, 2009), "The validity of inference"], pp. 157–64, quote on p. 159 Archived 9 May 2022 at the Wayback Machine.
  • Gregory Landini, Russell (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 230 Archived 9 May 2022 at the Wayback Machine.
  • Chowdhry, K.R. (2015). Fundamentals of Discrete Mathematical Structures (3rd ed.). PHI Learning Pvt. Ltd. p. 26. ISBN 978-8120350748. Retrieved 1 December 2016.
  • Donald Gillies, "Problem-solving and the problem of induction", in Rethinking Popper (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), Zuzana Parusniková & Robert S Cohen, eds, pp. 103–05.
  • Ch 5 "The controversy around inductive logic" in Richard Mattessich, ed, Instrumental Reasoning and Systems Methodology: An Epistemology of the Applied and Social Sciences (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1978), pp. 141–43 Archived 9 May 2022 at the Wayback Machine.
  • Donald Gillies, "Problem-solving and the problem of induction", in Rethinking Popper (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), Zuzana Parusniková & Robert S Cohen, eds, p. 111 Archived 9 May 2022 at the Wayback Machine: "I argued earlier that there are some exceptions to Popper's claim that rules of inductive inference do not exist. However, these exceptions are relatively rare. They occur, for example, in the machine learning programs of AI. For the vast bulk of human science both past and present, rules of inductive inference do not exist. For such science, Popper's model of conjectures which are freely invented and then tested out seems to be more accurate than any model based on inductive inferences. Admittedly, there is talk nowadays in the context of science carried out by humans of 'inference to the best explanation' or 'abductive inference', but such so-called inferences are not at all inferences based on precisely formulated rules like the deductive rules of inference. Those who talk of 'inference to the best explanation' or 'abductive inference', for example, never formulate any precise rules according to which these so-called inferences take place. In reality, the 'inferences' which they describe in their examples involve conjectures thought up by human ingenuity and creativity, and by no means inferred in any mechanical fashion, or according to precisely specified rules".

dartmouth.edu (Global: 2,242nd place; English: 1,513th place)

doi.org (Global: 2nd place; English: 2nd place)

eserver.org (Global: low place; English: low place)

18th.eserver.org

harvard.edu (Global: 18th place; English: 17th place)

ui.adsabs.harvard.edu

hut.fi (Global: low place; English: low place)

cs.hut.fi

jstor.org (Global: 26th place; English: 20th place)

openreview.net (Global: low place; English: low place)

philpapers.org (Global: 1,865th place; English: 1,260th place)

rug.nl (Global: 2,779th place; English: 1,997th place)

pure.rug.nl

semanticscholar.org (Global: 11th place; English: 8th place)

api.semanticscholar.org

stanford.edu (Global: 179th place; English: 183rd place)

plato.stanford.edu

utm.edu (Global: 1,379th place; English: 1,175th place)

iep.utm.edu

  • Ted Poston "Foundationalism" Archived 26 September 2019 at the Wayback Machine, § b "Theories of proper inference", §§ iii "Liberal inductivism", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 10 Jun 2010 (last updated): "Strict inductivism is motivated by the thought that we have some kind of inferential knowledge of the world that cannot be accommodated by deductive inference from epistemically basic beliefs. A fairly recent debate has arisen over the merits of strict inductivism. Some philosophers have argued that there are other forms of nondeductive inference that do not fit the model of enumerative induction. C.S. Peirce describes a form of inference called 'abduction' or 'inference to the best explanation'. This form of inference appeals to explanatory considerations to justify belief. One infers, for example, that two students copied answers from a third because this is the best explanation of the available data—they each make the same mistakes and the two sat in view of the third. Alternatively, in a more theoretical context, one infers that there are very small unobservable particles because this is the best explanation of Brownian motion. Let us call 'liberal inductivism' any view that accepts the legitimacy of a form of inference to the best explanation that is distinct from enumerative induction. For a defense of liberal inductivism, see Gilbert Harman's classic (1965) paper. Harman defends a strong version of liberal inductivism according to which enumerative induction is just a disguised form of inference to the best explanation".

web.archive.org (Global: 1st place; English: 1st place)

worldcat.org (Global: 5th place; English: 5th place)

search.worldcat.org