Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Instant-runoff voting" in English language version.
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...15 seats where preferences definitely determined the result by electing a second placed candidate
This format allows a voter to select a first-choice candidate in the first column, a second-choice candidate in the second column, and a third-choice candidate in the third column.
The method was, however, mentioned by Condorcet, but only to be condemned.
This method is a perfectly feasible and practicable one for elections on any scale ... [i]t is a simple and obvious extension of the French system...
The method was, however, mentioned by Condorcet, but only to be condemned.
a majority of voters liked the centrist candidate Montroll better than Kiss, and a majority of voters liked Montroll better than Wright ... yet Montroll was tossed in the first round.
Since Begich wins both ... he is the Condorcet winner of the election ... AK election also contains a Condorcet loser: Sarah Palin. ... she is also a spoiler candidate
En effet, lorsqu'il y a plus de trois concurrents, le véritable vœu de la pluralité peut être pour un candidat qui n'ait eu aucune des voix dans le premier scrutin.
Candidates C and D spoiled the election for B ... With them in the running, A won, whereas without them in the running, B would have won. ... Instant runoff voting ... does not do away with the spoiler problem entirely, although it ... makes it less likely
IRV is excellent for preventing classic spoilers-minor candidates who irrationally tip the election from one major candidate to another. It is not so good when the 'spoiler' has a real chance of winning
En effet, lorsqu'il y a plus de trois concurrents, le véritable vœu de la pluralité peut être pour un candidat qui n'ait eu aucune des voix dans le premier scrutin.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to winning
However, squeezed by surrounding opponents, a centrist candidate may receive few first-place votes and be eliminated under Hare.
the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to winning
However, squeezed by surrounding opponents, a centrist candidate may receive few first-place votes and be eliminated under Hare.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
A long-established response to the 'wasted vote' problem is the method advocated by Hare...
A display of non-monotonicity under the Alternative Vote method was reported recently, for the March 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, Vermont.
Although the Democrat was the Condorcet winner (a majority of voters preferred him in all two way contests), he received the fewest first-place votes and so was eliminated ... 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, VT, which illustrates the key features of an upward monotonicity failure
the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to winning
However, squeezed by surrounding opponents, a centrist candidate may receive few first-place votes and be eliminated under Hare.
the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to winning
However, squeezed by surrounding opponents, a centrist candidate may receive few first-place votes and be eliminated under Hare.
In San Francisco, ranked-choice voting is sometimes called 'instant run-off voting.' The Department of Elections generally uses the term ranked-choice voting, because it describes the voting method—voters are directed to rank their first-, second- and third-choice candidates. The Department also uses the term ranked-choice voting because the word 'instant' might create an expectation that final results will be available immediately after the polls close on election night.
successfully prevented the election of the candidate who would likely have won under plurality rules, but would have lost to either of the other top finishers in a runoff
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
However, squeezed by surrounding opponents, a centrist candidate may receive few first-place votes and be eliminated under Hare.
However, squeezed by surrounding opponents, a centrist candidate may receive few first-place votes and be eliminated under Hare.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
A long-established response to the 'wasted vote' problem is the method advocated by Hare...
Although the Democrat was the Condorcet winner (a majority of voters preferred him in all two way contests), he received the fewest first-place votes and so was eliminated ... 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, VT, which illustrates the key features of an upward monotonicity failure
We waited to bring in the signatures because we didn't want this to be about Kurt Wright losing after being ahead, or Andy Montroll who had more first and second place votes and didn't win. We wanted this to be about IRV.
With instant runoff voting ... The strategy for the liberal voter is the same as for plurality voting: Her favorite candidate cannot win, so she casts her vote for her favorite candidate with a realistic chance of winning
election where Democratic candidate for mayor was Condorcet winner but finished third behind Republican and 'Progressive'
K was elected even though M was a clear Condorcet winner and W was a clear Plurality winner.
However, ranked-choice voting makes it more difficult to elect moderate candidates when the electorate is polarized. For example, in a three-person race, the moderate candidate may be preferred by a majority of voters to each of the more extreme candidates. However, voters with far-left and far-right views will rank the candidate in second place rather than in first place. Since ranked-choice voting counts only the number of first-choice votes (among the remaining candidates), the moderate candidate would be eliminated in the first round, leaving one of the extreme candidates to be declared the winner.
However, ranked-choice voting makes it more difficult to elect moderate candidates when the electorate is polarized. For example, in a three-person race, the moderate candidate may be preferred by a majority of voters to each of the more extreme candidates. However, voters with far-left and far-right views will rank the candidate in second place rather than in first place. Since ranked-choice voting counts only the number of first-choice votes (among the remaining candidates), the moderate candidate would be eliminated in the first round, leaving one of the extreme candidates to be declared the winner.
HRSV and HRSN are abbreviations for 'highly resistant to strategic voting', and 'highly resistant to strategic nomination'. (Of course, reducing the simulation results to a binary score requires the imposition of a somewhat arbitrary cut-off, but in general, the methods deemed 'highly resistant' in each category perform substantially better than the others.)
...15 seats where preferences definitely determined the result by electing a second placed candidate
In San Francisco, ranked-choice voting is sometimes called 'instant run-off voting.' The Department of Elections generally uses the term ranked-choice voting, because it describes the voting method—voters are directed to rank their first-, second- and third-choice candidates. The Department also uses the term ranked-choice voting because the word 'instant' might create an expectation that final results will be available immediately after the polls close on election night.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to winning
However, squeezed by surrounding opponents, a centrist candidate may receive few first-place votes and be eliminated under Hare.
the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to winning
However, squeezed by surrounding opponents, a centrist candidate may receive few first-place votes and be eliminated under Hare.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
A long-established response to the 'wasted vote' problem is the method advocated by Hare...
A display of non-monotonicity under the Alternative Vote method was reported recently, for the March 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, Vermont.
Although the Democrat was the Condorcet winner (a majority of voters preferred him in all two way contests), he received the fewest first-place votes and so was eliminated ... 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, VT, which illustrates the key features of an upward monotonicity failure
