Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Juventus FC" in English language version.
[Quote from Sergio Santoro, former president of the FIGC's Federal court and member of Italy's Council of State] 'I find it unusual that the president of the court that handed down the sentence in January 2023 is the same one who, in May 2022, issued the sentence of acquittal in the same trial. ... We don't know if the court has decided to sanction Juventus and its directors for the capital gains affair. If this were the case, it would be a decision in contrast with the precedents of intra-federal justice in matters of capital gains. We need to understand the reasons for this sudden change in jurisprudence. Furthermore, if the penalty imposed is a consequence of capital gains violations, it is unclear how this violation could have been committed by a single company. The capital gain is realized by at least two subjects, while in the case in question no other companies appear to have been punished for this offence.'
Juventus has been acquitted, the offending championships (2004/2005 and 2005/2006) have been declared regular, and the reasons for the conviction of Luciano Moggi are vague; mostly, they condemn his position, that he was in a position to commit a crime. In short, be careful to enter a shop without surveillance because even if you don't steal, you would have had the opportunity. And go on to explain to your friends that you're honest people after the morbid and pro-sales campaign of the newspapers. ... a club has been acquitted, and no one has heard of it, and whoever has heard of it, they don't accept it. The verdict of 2006, made in a hurry, was acceptable, that of Naples was not. The problem then lies not so much in vulgar journalism as in readers who accept the truths that are convenient. Juventus was, rightly or wrongly, the best justification for the failures of others, and it was in popular sentiment, as evidenced by the new controversies concerning 'The System.' But how? Wasn't the rotten erased? The referees since 2006 make mistakes in good faith, the word of Massimo Moratti (the only 'honest'). ... it isn't a question of tifo, but of a critical spirit, of the desire to deepen and not be satisfied with the headlines (as did Oliviero Beha, a well-known Viola [Fiorentina] fan, who, however, drew conclusions outside the chorus because, despite enjoying it as a tifoso, he suffered as a journalist. He wasn't satisfied and went into depth. He was one of the few).
'Neither can we overlook the data of the resizing of the scope of the accusation which derives from the partiality with which the events of the 2004/2005 championship were examined, to run after only Moggi's misdeeds, of which modalities have been ascertained, as regards the sports fraud, to the limit of the existence of the crime of attempt, with the consequent further difficulty of hooking up to the responsibility of the employer, supplier of the occasion for the criminal action.'
Juventus have formally submitted an appeal to the penalty. The 15-point penalty is harsher than the nine-point deduction recommended by an FIGC prosecutor earlier in the day. This all comes after the club's recent financial statements were under scrutiny by prosecutors and Italian market regulator CONSOB in the past months for alleged false accounting and market manipulation. ... The investigation led to the board stepping down in November, which also marked the end of an era for Agnelli and Nedved. The club acknowledged the so-called 'salary maneuvers' from the 2019–20 and 2020–21 fiscal years, adding that 'the complexity of such profiles on valuation elements may be subject to different interpretations.'
'... [Juventus] was acquitted in the ordinary [justice] proceedings as Moggi himself also acted out of personal interest [to favour Lazio and Fiorentina].'
The suspicion, in short, is that the path of summary justice was chosen, to eliminate from the scene characters like Moggi, ultimately expelled from Juve and then condemned by sports justice based on wiretapping which, are the words of the sentences, did not prove none of the allegations. Based on the first interceptions ordered by the Turin's public prosecutor and prosecutor Raffaele Guariniello, who had ordered the dismissal of the investigation opened for alleged sports fraud already in July 2005 on the grounds that, for the crime in question, 'are not allowed.' The prosecutor had underlined the 'weakness of the accusatory hypothesis.' Yet, according to the authors, the investigation that led to the commissioner of the FIGC, the landing in via Allegri of Guido Rossi, and the new head of the investigation office, Francesco Saverio Borrelli, started from that weak accusatory hypothesis, to the involvement of referees and designators, of six first and second row clubs (in addition to Juve, Milan, Fiorentina, Lazio, Reggina and Arezzo) and, finally, to the real sentence for a few. Indeed, only for Moggi and Juve, kicked out and relegated to B.
'Ours is a purely statistical study. We are not interested, nor are we able to establish, if Moggi and the other executives under investigation could influence the matches, but from our point of view we can highlight three hypotheses more than valid: either there was no referee conditioning in the 2004–05 championship, or it existed but did not produce relevant results, or it's possible to think of a clash between executives for the acquisition of the football system that gave rise to winning and losing clubs in that which we can define as a 'parallel championship'.
The Juventus defence, among other things, objects that a sum of several Articles 1 (unfair and dishonest sporting conduct) cannot lead to an indictment for Article 6 (sporting offence), using for example the metaphor that so many defamations do not carry a murder conviction: an unimpeachable objection. ... Hence the grotesque concept of 'standings altered without any match-fixing'. The 'Calciopoli' rulings state that there is no match-fixing. That the championship under investigation, 2004–2005, is to be considered regular. But that the Juventus management has achieved effective standings advantages for Juventus FC even without altering the individual matches. In practice, Juventus was convicted of murder, with no one dead, no evidence, no accomplices, no murder weapon. Only for the presence of a hypothetical motive.
'We recognized everything about the CAF ruling, apart from two episodes: the falsified championship, the repeated offences of Juventus, [and] the existence of a system.'
... the motivations in 558 pages are summarized as follows. 1) Championships not altered (therefore championships unjustly taken away from Juve...), matches not fixed, referees not corrupted, investigations conducted incorrectly by the investigators of the Public Prosecutor's Office (interceptions of the Carabinieri which were even manipulated in the confrontation in the Chamber). 2) The SIM cards, the foreign telephone cards that Moggi has distributed to some referees and designators, would be proof of the attempt to alter and condition the system, even without the effective demonstration of the rigged result. 3) Moggi's attitude, like a real 'telephone' boss, is invasive even when he tries to influence the [Italian Football Federation] and the national team, see the phone calls with Carraro and Lippi. 4) That these phone calls and this 'mafia' or 'sub-mafia' promiscuity aimed at 'creating criminal associations' turned out to be common practice in the environment as is evident, does not acquit Moggi and C.: and therefore here is the sentence. ... Finally point 1), the so-called positive part of the motivations, that is, in fact everything is regular. And then the scandal of 'Scommettopoli' [the Italian football scandal of 2011] in which it's coming out that the 2010–2011 championship [won by Milan] as a whole with tricks is to be considered really and decidedly irregular? The Chief Prosecutor of Cremona, Di Martino, says so for now, while sports justice takes its time as always, but I fear that many will soon repeat it, unless everything is silenced. With all due respect to those who want the truth and think that Moggi has objectively become the 'scapegoat'. Does the framework of information that does not investigate, analyze, compare, and take sides out of ignorance or bias seem slightly clearer to you?
During the exposition of his defensive line, the Juventus lawyer Nicola Apa asked that the revocation procedure be rejected for a formal question. The public prosecutor's office allegedly exceeded the time limit for presenting the request. As emerged from press articles, the public prosecutor's office had contacted the Turin prosecutors on 26 October and on 27 October the news of a visit to Turin by a prosecutor's envoy had spread. So the first new facts would have come into the possession of the prosecution at the end of October. And the sporting justice code prescribes a 30-day deadline for submitting the revocation request, which arrived, however, only on December 22, i.e. 56 days later.
Justice decided that Moggi and Giraudo actually 'polluted' the system, it decided so in 2006 and did not want to know or understand other truths. Indeed, it had already decided it during the investigations, when all the phone calls that could exonerate or alleviate the position of Juventus' executives had not been taken into consideration, to the point of dismantling the very concept of the Cupola. Moggi and Giraudo, therefore, 'polluted' the system: a term that serves to dodge the fact that no judge has ever returned enough evidence to affirm that championship (the subject of investigation was only 2004–05) has actually been altered. Indeed, in the first instance sentence we basically read the opposite.
However, the accusatory castle exists, built with interceptions expertly selected by the 170,000. That is, there are the famous 'barbecues', or the telephone calls between Moggi and the Bergamo designator, during which the two established the referees to be included in the drawing scheme. Phone calls that have particularly affected the Cassation which cites them as an example of pollution. In short, the fact that other managers (Meani from Milan, Facchetti from Inter, just to give an example, but the list could be long) also called Bergamo to plead their case and explicitly ask this or that referee isn't taken into consideration (Collina, for example...). But then, how many domes were there? The Cassation does not tell us, even if it admits between the lines that 'the system of preparing the grids was quite widespread' and admits that the developments of the behaviors of Meani and Facchetti (explicitly mentioned) 'were not investigated in depth'.
Of course there is a precedent that is also quite close in time: Milan and Inter ended up on trial in 2008 for the 2004 budgets, which ended up in the sights of the Judiciary for the usual capital gains. But they were acquitted because 'the fact does not constitute a crime'. The problem is the scientific definition of the value of a player in the transfer market. In short, there are no exact parameters for deciding that an evaluation is 'false', given that the number of factors and conditions that can influence it. Thirteen years after the acquittal of the Milanese [clubs], the investigation brings back the age-old question of capital gains in the offices of a prosecutor, just as [FIFA president] Infantino, only a couple of weeks ago, hypothesised the introduction of a mathematical algorithm to decide the player rating.
The suspicion, in short, is that the path of summary justice was chosen, to eliminate from the scene characters like Moggi, ultimately expelled from Juve and then condemned by sports justice based on wiretapping which, are the words of the sentences, did not prove none of the allegations. Based on the first interceptions ordered by the Turin's public prosecutor and prosecutor Raffaele Guariniello, who had ordered the dismissal of the investigation opened for alleged sports fraud already in July 2005 on the grounds that, for the crime in question, 'are not allowed.' The prosecutor had underlined the 'weakness of the accusatory hypothesis.' Yet, according to the authors, the investigation that led to the commissioner of the FIGC, the landing in via Allegri of Guido Rossi, and the new head of the investigation office, Francesco Saverio Borrelli, started from that weak accusatory hypothesis, to the involvement of referees and designators, of six first and second row clubs (in addition to Juve, Milan, Fiorentina, Lazio, Reggina and Arezzo) and, finally, to the real sentence for a few. Indeed, only for Moggi and Juve, kicked out and relegated to B.
'We recognized everything about the CAF ruling, apart from two episodes: the falsified championship, the repeated offences of Juventus, [and] the existence of a system.'
'Ours is a purely statistical study. We are not interested, nor are we able to establish, if Moggi and the other executives under investigation could influence the matches, but from our point of view we can highlight three hypotheses more than valid: either there was no referee conditioning in the 2004–05 championship, or it existed but did not produce relevant results, or it's possible to think of a clash between executives for the acquisition of the football system that gave rise to winning and losing clubs in that which we can define as a 'parallel championship'.
Justice decided that Moggi and Giraudo actually 'polluted' the system, it decided so in 2006 and did not want to know or understand other truths. Indeed, it had already decided it during the investigations, when all the phone calls that could exonerate or alleviate the position of Juventus' executives had not been taken into consideration, to the point of dismantling the very concept of the Cupola. Moggi and Giraudo, therefore, 'polluted' the system: a term that serves to dodge the fact that no judge has ever returned enough evidence to affirm that championship (the subject of investigation was only 2004–05) has actually been altered. Indeed, in the first instance sentence we basically read the opposite.
'... [Juventus] was acquitted in the ordinary [justice] proceedings as Moggi himself also acted out of personal interest [to favour Lazio and Fiorentina].'
Juventus has been acquitted, the offending championships (2004/2005 and 2005/2006) have been declared regular, and the reasons for the conviction of Luciano Moggi are vague; mostly, they condemn his position, that he was in a position to commit a crime. In short, be careful to enter a shop without surveillance because even if you don't steal, you would have had the opportunity. And go on to explain to your friends that you're honest people after the morbid and pro-sales campaign of the newspapers. ... a club has been acquitted, and no one has heard of it, and whoever has heard of it, they don't accept it. The verdict of 2006, made in a hurry, was acceptable, that of Naples was not. The problem then lies not so much in vulgar journalism as in readers who accept the truths that are convenient. Juventus was, rightly or wrongly, the best justification for the failures of others, and it was in popular sentiment, as evidenced by the new controversies concerning 'The System.' But how? Wasn't the rotten erased? The referees since 2006 make mistakes in good faith, the word of Massimo Moratti (the only 'honest'). ... it isn't a question of tifo, but of a critical spirit, of the desire to deepen and not be satisfied with the headlines (as did Oliviero Beha, a well-known Viola [Fiorentina] fan, who, however, drew conclusions outside the chorus because, despite enjoying it as a tifoso, he suffered as a journalist. He wasn't satisfied and went into depth. He was one of the few).
The Juventus defence, among other things, objects that a sum of several Articles 1 (unfair and dishonest sporting conduct) cannot lead to an indictment for Article 6 (sporting offence), using for example the metaphor that so many defamations do not carry a murder conviction: an unimpeachable objection. ... Hence the grotesque concept of 'standings altered without any match-fixing'. The 'Calciopoli' rulings state that there is no match-fixing. That the championship under investigation, 2004–2005, is to be considered regular. But that the Juventus management has achieved effective standings advantages for Juventus FC even without altering the individual matches. In practice, Juventus was convicted of murder, with no one dead, no evidence, no accomplices, no murder weapon. Only for the presence of a hypothetical motive.
FIGC's actions in relegating Juventus and handing the title to Inter Milan were somewhat peculiar. Of course, Moggi and Juventus deserved punishment; that is not up for dispute. However, the severity of the ruling and the new location for the Scudetto was unprecedented and arguably should never have happened. The final ruling in the Calciopoli years later judged that Juventus had never breached article 6. As a result, the Serie A champions should never have encountered a shock 1–1 draw away to Rimini in the season's curtain-raiser. Nor should they have trounced Piacenza 4–0 in Turin or handed a 5–1 thrashing away to Arezzo in Tuscany. The findings stated that some club officials had violated article 6, but none had originated from Juventus. FIGC created a structured article violation with their decision-making. This means that instead of finding an article 6 breach, several article 1 violations were pieced together to create evidence damning to warrant relegation from Italy's top flight. Article 1 violations in Italian football usually command fines, bans, or points deductions, but certainly not relegation.
'Neither can we overlook the data of the resizing of the scope of the accusation which derives from the partiality with which the events of the 2004/2005 championship were examined, to run after only Moggi's misdeeds, of which modalities have been ascertained, as regards the sports fraud, to the limit of the existence of the crime of attempt, with the consequent further difficulty of hooking up to the responsibility of the employer, supplier of the occasion for the criminal action.'
... the motivations in 558 pages are summarized as follows. 1) Championships not altered (therefore championships unjustly taken away from Juve...), matches not fixed, referees not corrupted, investigations conducted incorrectly by the investigators of the Public Prosecutor's Office (interceptions of the Carabinieri which were even manipulated in the confrontation in the Chamber). 2) The SIM cards, the foreign telephone cards that Moggi has distributed to some referees and designators, would be proof of the attempt to alter and condition the system, even without the effective demonstration of the rigged result. 3) Moggi's attitude, like a real 'telephone' boss, is invasive even when he tries to influence the [Italian Football Federation] and the national team, see the phone calls with Carraro and Lippi. 4) That these phone calls and this 'mafia' or 'sub-mafia' promiscuity aimed at 'creating criminal associations' turned out to be common practice in the environment as is evident, does not acquit Moggi and C.: and therefore here is the sentence. ... Finally point 1), the so-called positive part of the motivations, that is, in fact everything is regular. And then the scandal of 'Scommettopoli' [the Italian football scandal of 2011] in which it's coming out that the 2010–2011 championship [won by Milan] as a whole with tricks is to be considered really and decidedly irregular? The Chief Prosecutor of Cremona, Di Martino, says so for now, while sports justice takes its time as always, but I fear that many will soon repeat it, unless everything is silenced. With all due respect to those who want the truth and think that Moggi has objectively become the 'scapegoat'. Does the framework of information that does not investigate, analyze, compare, and take sides out of ignorance or bias seem slightly clearer to you?
However, the accusatory castle exists, built with interceptions expertly selected by the 170,000. That is, there are the famous 'barbecues', or the telephone calls between Moggi and the Bergamo designator, during which the two established the referees to be included in the drawing scheme. Phone calls that have particularly affected the Cassation which cites them as an example of pollution. In short, the fact that other managers (Meani from Milan, Facchetti from Inter, just to give an example, but the list could be long) also called Bergamo to plead their case and explicitly ask this or that referee isn't taken into consideration (Collina, for example...). But then, how many domes were there? The Cassation does not tell us, even if it admits between the lines that 'the system of preparing the grids was quite widespread' and admits that the developments of the behaviors of Meani and Facchetti (explicitly mentioned) 'were not investigated in depth'.
[Quote from Sergio Santoro, former president of the FIGC's Federal court and member of Italy's Council of State] 'I find it unusual that the president of the court that handed down the sentence in January 2023 is the same one who, in May 2022, issued the sentence of acquittal in the same trial. ... We don't know if the court has decided to sanction Juventus and its directors for the capital gains affair. If this were the case, it would be a decision in contrast with the precedents of intra-federal justice in matters of capital gains. We need to understand the reasons for this sudden change in jurisprudence. Furthermore, if the penalty imposed is a consequence of capital gains violations, it is unclear how this violation could have been committed by a single company. The capital gain is realized by at least two subjects, while in the case in question no other companies appear to have been punished for this offence.'
Of course there is a precedent that is also quite close in time: Milan and Inter ended up on trial in 2008 for the 2004 budgets, which ended up in the sights of the Judiciary for the usual capital gains. But they were acquitted because 'the fact does not constitute a crime'. The problem is the scientific definition of the value of a player in the transfer market. In short, there are no exact parameters for deciding that an evaluation is 'false', given that the number of factors and conditions that can influence it. Thirteen years after the acquittal of the Milanese [clubs], the investigation brings back the age-old question of capital gains in the offices of a prosecutor, just as [FIFA president] Infantino, only a couple of weeks ago, hypothesised the introduction of a mathematical algorithm to decide the player rating.
Juventus have formally submitted an appeal to the penalty. The 15-point penalty is harsher than the nine-point deduction recommended by an FIGC prosecutor earlier in the day. This all comes after the club's recent financial statements were under scrutiny by prosecutors and Italian market regulator CONSOB in the past months for alleged false accounting and market manipulation. ... The investigation led to the board stepping down in November, which also marked the end of an era for Agnelli and Nedved. The club acknowledged the so-called 'salary maneuvers' from the 2019–20 and 2020–21 fiscal years, adding that 'the complexity of such profiles on valuation elements may be subject to different interpretations.'
During the exposition of his defensive line, the Juventus lawyer Nicola Apa asked that the revocation procedure be rejected for a formal question. The public prosecutor's office allegedly exceeded the time limit for presenting the request. As emerged from press articles, the public prosecutor's office had contacted the Turin prosecutors on 26 October and on 27 October the news of a visit to Turin by a prosecutor's envoy had spread. So the first new facts would have come into the possession of the prosecution at the end of October. And the sporting justice code prescribes a 30-day deadline for submitting the revocation request, which arrived, however, only on December 22, i.e. 56 days later.
FIGC's actions in relegating Juventus and handing the title to Inter Milan were somewhat peculiar. Of course, Moggi and Juventus deserved punishment; that is not up for dispute. However, the severity of the ruling and the new location for the Scudetto was unprecedented and arguably should never have happened. The final ruling in the Calciopoli years later judged that Juventus had never breached article 6. As a result, the Serie A champions should never have encountered a shock 1–1 draw away to Rimini in the season's curtain-raiser. Nor should they have trounced Piacenza 4–0 in Turin or handed a 5–1 thrashing away to Arezzo in Tuscany. The findings stated that some club officials had violated article 6, but none had originated from Juventus. FIGC created a structured article violation with their decision-making. This means that instead of finding an article 6 breach, several article 1 violations were pieced together to create evidence damning to warrant relegation from Italy's top flight. Article 1 violations in Italian football usually command fines, bans, or points deductions, but certainly not relegation.
