Lascelles Principles (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Lascelles Principles" in English language version.

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  • SENEX (2 May 1950) [article dated April 29]. "Dissolution of Parliament: Factors in Crown's Choice: to the Editor of The Times". Correspondence. The Times. No. 51680. London, England. p. 5. Gale CS84888226.
  • Hennessy, Peter (24 December 1994 – 6 January 1995) [Peter Hennessy is professor of rhetoric at Gresham College, London. This article is based on a lecture he gave under Gresham's auspices in London in October 1994, the first in a series on the British constitution that will be collected and published by Cassell in the coming year.]. "The throne behind the power". The Monarchy; By Invitation. The Economist. Vol. 333, no. 7895. London, England. pp. 31–33 (especially p. 32). eISSN 1476-8860. ISSN 0013-0613. Gale GP4100261174, A15962437, A16542614. ProQuest 224132836 (accession number 00963530, 02202289).

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  • Kelly, Richard (30 June 2021). Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill 2021-22 (PDF). Commons Library Research Briefing. House of Commons Library. Number 9267. Archived (PDF) from the original on 5 July 2021. Retrieved 9 June 2022.

proquest.com

  • Hennessy, Peter (24 December 1994 – 6 January 1995) [Peter Hennessy is professor of rhetoric at Gresham College, London. This article is based on a lecture he gave under Gresham's auspices in London in October 1994, the first in a series on the British constitution that will be collected and published by Cassell in the coming year.]. "The throne behind the power". The Monarchy; By Invitation. The Economist. Vol. 333, no. 7895. London, England. pp. 31–33 (especially p. 32). eISSN 1476-8860. ISSN 0013-0613. Gale GP4100261174, A15962437, A16542614. ProQuest 224132836 (accession number 00963530, 02202289).

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  • "Chapter Two: A government holds office by virtue of its ability to command the confidence of the House of Commons, chosen by the electorate in a general election.". The Cabinet Manual: A guide to laws, conventions and rules on the operation of government (PDF) (1st ed.). London: Cabinet Office. October 2011. pp. 12–19 (especially pp. 14, 19). Ref 406764/1011. Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 February 2025. [p. 14:] 2.9 Historically, the Sovereign has made use of reserve powers to dismiss a Prime Minister or to make a personal choice of successor, although this was last used in 1834 and was regarded as having undermined the Sovereign.11 In modern times the convention has been that the Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics, and if there is doubt it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process, and in particular the parties represented in Parliament, to seek to determine and communicate clearly to the Sovereign who is best placed to be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons. As the Crown's principal adviser this responsibility falls especially on the incumbent Prime Minister, who at the time of his or her resignation may also be asked by the Sovereign for a recommendation on who can best command the confidence of the House of Commons in his or her place. 2.10 The application of these principles depends on the specific circumstances and it remains a matter for the Prime Minister, as the Sovereign's principal adviser, to judge the appropriate time at which to resign, either from their individual position as Prime Minister or on behalf of the government.12 Recent examples suggest that previous Prime Ministers have not offered their resignations until there was a situation in which clear advice could be given to the Sovereign on who should be asked to form a government.13 It remains to be seen whether or not these examples will be regarded in future as having established a constitutional convention. [footnotes on p. 19:] 11 William IV dismissed Lord Melbourne's government that had majority support in the House of Commons. 12 It has been suggested in evidence to select committees that the incumbent Prime Minister's responsibility involves a duty to remain in office until it is clear who should be appointed in their place (Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (2011) Lessons from the process of Government formation after the 2010 General Election (HC528). London: The Stationery Office, paragraphs 16–22). Whether the responsibilities of the Prime Minister in these circumstances amount to a duty and how far they extend has been questioned, and the House of Lords Constitution Committee concluded that an incumbent Prime Minister has no duty to remain in office following an inconclusive general election until it is clear what form any alternative government might take. (House of Lords Constitution Committee (2011) 12th Report: The Cabinet Manual (HL107). London: The Stationery Office, paragraph 61). 13 Margaret Thatcher's resignation statement on 22 November 1990 said that she had informed Her Majesty the Queen that she did not intend to contest the second ballot of the election for leadership of the Conservative Party and gave notice of her intention to resign as Prime Minister as soon as a new leader had been elected. She formally tendered her resignation on 28 November 1990. On 10 May 2007 Tony Blair announced his intention to resign once a new leader of the Labour Party had been elected. He formally tendered his resignation on 27 June 2007. Following the 2010 general election, which took place on 6 May, Gordon Brown resigned on 11 May, by when it was clear that David Cameron should be asked to form a government.]

web.archive.org

  • Kelly, Richard (30 June 2021). Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill 2021-22 (PDF). Commons Library Research Briefing. House of Commons Library. Number 9267. Archived (PDF) from the original on 5 July 2021. Retrieved 9 June 2022.
  • "Chapter Two: A government holds office by virtue of its ability to command the confidence of the House of Commons, chosen by the electorate in a general election.". The Cabinet Manual: A guide to laws, conventions and rules on the operation of government (PDF) (1st ed.). London: Cabinet Office. October 2011. pp. 12–19 (especially pp. 14, 19). Ref 406764/1011. Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 February 2025. [p. 14:] 2.9 Historically, the Sovereign has made use of reserve powers to dismiss a Prime Minister or to make a personal choice of successor, although this was last used in 1834 and was regarded as having undermined the Sovereign.11 In modern times the convention has been that the Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics, and if there is doubt it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process, and in particular the parties represented in Parliament, to seek to determine and communicate clearly to the Sovereign who is best placed to be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons. As the Crown's principal adviser this responsibility falls especially on the incumbent Prime Minister, who at the time of his or her resignation may also be asked by the Sovereign for a recommendation on who can best command the confidence of the House of Commons in his or her place. 2.10 The application of these principles depends on the specific circumstances and it remains a matter for the Prime Minister, as the Sovereign's principal adviser, to judge the appropriate time at which to resign, either from their individual position as Prime Minister or on behalf of the government.12 Recent examples suggest that previous Prime Ministers have not offered their resignations until there was a situation in which clear advice could be given to the Sovereign on who should be asked to form a government.13 It remains to be seen whether or not these examples will be regarded in future as having established a constitutional convention. [footnotes on p. 19:] 11 William IV dismissed Lord Melbourne's government that had majority support in the House of Commons. 12 It has been suggested in evidence to select committees that the incumbent Prime Minister's responsibility involves a duty to remain in office until it is clear who should be appointed in their place (Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (2011) Lessons from the process of Government formation after the 2010 General Election (HC528). London: The Stationery Office, paragraphs 16–22). Whether the responsibilities of the Prime Minister in these circumstances amount to a duty and how far they extend has been questioned, and the House of Lords Constitution Committee concluded that an incumbent Prime Minister has no duty to remain in office following an inconclusive general election until it is clear what form any alternative government might take. (House of Lords Constitution Committee (2011) 12th Report: The Cabinet Manual (HL107). London: The Stationery Office, paragraph 61). 13 Margaret Thatcher's resignation statement on 22 November 1990 said that she had informed Her Majesty the Queen that she did not intend to contest the second ballot of the election for leadership of the Conservative Party and gave notice of her intention to resign as Prime Minister as soon as a new leader had been elected. She formally tendered her resignation on 28 November 1990. On 10 May 2007 Tony Blair announced his intention to resign once a new leader of the Labour Party had been elected. He formally tendered his resignation on 27 June 2007. Following the 2010 general election, which took place on 6 May, Gordon Brown resigned on 11 May, by when it was clear that David Cameron should be asked to form a government.]

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  • Hennessy, Peter (24 December 1994 – 6 January 1995) [Peter Hennessy is professor of rhetoric at Gresham College, London. This article is based on a lecture he gave under Gresham's auspices in London in October 1994, the first in a series on the British constitution that will be collected and published by Cassell in the coming year.]. "The throne behind the power". The Monarchy; By Invitation. The Economist. Vol. 333, no. 7895. London, England. pp. 31–33 (especially p. 32). eISSN 1476-8860. ISSN 0013-0613. Gale GP4100261174, A15962437, A16542614. ProQuest 224132836 (accession number 00963530, 02202289).