Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System" in English language version.

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airforcemag.com

Tirpak, John A.; Everstine, Brian W. (March 22, 2019), "USAF Reviewing Training After MAX 8 Crashes; KC-46 Uses Similar MCAS", Air Force Magazine website, archived from the original on July 23, 2021, retrieved August 1, 2021

aljazeera.com

Bazley, Tarek (March 11, 2019). "Control system under scrutiny after Ethiopian Airlines crash". Al Jazeera.

apnews.com

Koenig, David; Krisher, Tom (June 7, 2019). "Boeing wanted to wait 3 years to fix safety alert on 737 Max". AP NEWS. Retrieved June 11, 2019.

avherald.com

Hradecky, Simon (January 14, 2019). "Crash: Lion B38M near Jakarta on Oct 29th 2018, aircraft lost height and crashed into Java Sea, wrong AoA data". The Aviation Herald. Retrieved March 2, 2020.

aviationtoday.com

"Lion Air Report Analyzes Pilot Struggle With 737 MAX Trim System". Avionics. November 30, 2018. Retrieved July 15, 2019.

aviationweek.com

Broderick, Sean; Norris, Guy; Warwick, Graham (March 20, 2019). "The Boeing 737 MAX MCAS Explained". Aviation Week & Space Technology.
Warwick, Graham (March 20, 2019). "The Boeing 737 MAX MCAS Explained". Aviation Week. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
Sean Broderick (May 10, 2019). "Ethiopian MAX Crash Simulator Scenario Stuns Pilots". Aviation Week Network.
"Boeing 737 MAX: What Happened, And What Now?". Aviation Week Network. Retrieved August 22, 2019.
Broderick, Sean (August 1, 2019). "Software Fix Will Address Most Recent MAX Issue". Aviation Week & Space Technology.

b737.org.uk

Brady, Chris. "The Boeing 737 Runaway Stabilizer Procedure". The Boeing 737 Technical Site. Retrieved January 23, 2024.

bizjournals.com

Daniel McCoy (April 24, 2019). "Boeing CEO: Nothing slipped through in original 737 MAX certification". Wichita Business Journal.

bloomberg.com

Levin, Alan. "Clue Linking Mysterious Boeing 737 Max Disasters Came From Space". Bloomberg News. Retrieved June 6, 2019.
"Boeing 737 Max's Autopilot Has Problem, European Regulators Find". Bloomberg News. July 5, 2019. Retrieved July 6, 2019.
Levin, Alan (November 8, 2019). "Delays in Boeing Max Return Began With Near-Crash in Simulator". Bloomberg.com. Retrieved November 9, 2019.
"Latest 737 Max Fault That Alarmed Test Pilots Rooted in Software". Bloomberg News.
"Boeing Fixing New Software Bug on Max; Key Test Flight Nears". Bloomberg. February 6, 2020.

boeing.com

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- "Boeing: The "e-cab" – a test flight deck". www.boeing.com. Retrieved October 22, 2019.

brightcove.net

players.brightcove.net

"The "e-cab" – A Test Flight Deck". players.brightcove.net. Boeing. November 30, 2015. Retrieved October 22, 2019.

businessinsider.com

Zhang, Benjamin (April 29, 2019). "Boeing's CEO explains why the company didn't tell 737 Max pilots about the software system that contributed to 2 fatal crashes". Business Insider.

cbc.ca

"Air Canada says their 737 Max jets have all safety features Boeing sells as extras". CBC.ca. March 21, 2019.

cbsnews.com

"Congress holds fiery hearings on Boeing 737 Max 8 approval". CBS News. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
"Boeing CEO says he would put his family in a 737 Max "without any hesitation"". CBS News. May 29, 2019. Retrieved June 12, 2019.

cnbc.com

Josephs, Leslie (May 16, 2019). "Boeing says it has completed a software update for 737 Max anti-stall system linked to fatal crashes". CNBC. Retrieved May 27, 2019.
Newburger, Emma (March 21, 2019). "Crashed jets reportedly lacked key safety features because Boeing charged extra for them". CNBC. Retrieved March 26, 2019.

cnn.com

Rappard, Anna-Maja; Wallace, Gregory (May 16, 2019). "Boeing says it has completed 737 Max software fix". CNN. Retrieved May 17, 2019.
Curt Devine; Drew Griffin (April 30, 2019). "Boeing relied on single sensor for 737 Max that had been flagged 216 times to FAA". CNN. Retrieved September 26, 2019.

cornell.edu

law.cornell.edu

"14 CFR § 25.203 - Stall characteristics". Electronic Code of Federal Regulations. Legal Information Institute. Retrieved July 2, 2019.
"14 CFR § 21.197 - Special flight permits". LII / Legal Information Institute. Retrieved March 14, 2019.

eetimes.com

George Leopold (March 27, 2019). "Software Won't Fix Boeing's 'Faulty' Airframe". EE Times.

europa.eu

easa.europa.eu

"Explanatory Note to TCDS IM.A.120 – Boeing 737" (PDF). European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). May 24, 2019. Archived from the original (PDF) on June 2, 2022. Retrieved February 23, 2020.

faa.gov

"Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community" (PDF). FAA. March 11, 2019. Archived from the original (PDF) on May 13, 2023.
Hart (2019). Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System : Observations, Findings, and Recommendations (PDF). FAA.
"FAA Updates on Boeing 737 MAX". www.faa.gov. Retrieved October 19, 2019.
Standard Operating Procedures and Pilot Monitoring Duties for Flight Deck Crewmembers (PDF). Advisory Circulars. FAA. January 10, 2017. AC 120-71B.

rgl.faa.gov

"Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes". rgl.faa.gov. November 20, 2020. Archived from the original on April 18, 2022. Retrieved December 12, 2020.
This article incorporates public domain material from Airworthiness directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes. Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved December 12, 2020.

flightglobal.com

Hemmerdinger, Jon (April 2, 2020). "Simulator tests demonstrate 737 Max manual trim difficulties". FlightGlobal.

flyingmag.com

"FAA Issues Emergency AD Against Boeing 737 Max 8". Flying. November 8, 2018. Retrieved July 2, 2019.

ft.com

See also Hill, Andrew (October 6, 2019). "Boeing Report Highlights Human Factors No Company Should Ignore". Financial Times.

govinfo.gov

"Hearing before the committee on transportation and infrastructure" (PDF). The Boeing 737 MAX: examining the design development and marketing of the aircraft. House of Representatives. October 30, 2019.

handle.net

hdl.handle.net

Le Vie, Lisa R. (August 1, 2014). Review of Research On Angle-of-Attack Indicator Effectiveness (Report). NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). hdl:2060/20140011419. NASA/TM–2014-218514. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.

house.gov

transportation.house.gov

"After 18-Month Investigation, Chairs DeFazio and Larsen Release Final Committee Report on Boeing 737 MAX" (Press release). House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. September 16, 2020. Archived from the original on July 14, 2022. Retrieved September 17, 2020.

houstonchronicle.com

Leinfelder, Andrea (August 22, 2019). "Did Boeing, aviation industry heed lessons of 2009 Air France crash?". Houston Chronicle. Retrieved September 1, 2019.

ieee.org

spectrum.ieee.org

Travis, Gregory (April 18, 2019). "How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer". IEEE Spectrum. Archived from the original on April 24, 2019.

inc.com

Zetlin, Minda (March 24, 2019). "Boeing CEO Says Safety Is Highest Priority. The Company's Pricing Says Something Different". Inc. Retrieved July 27, 2019.

intelligent-aerospace.com

"The Boeing 737 MAX: Is the problem with the plane or the pilots?". Intelligent Aerospace. March 12, 2019. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

latimes.com

Vartabedian, Ralph (March 15, 2019), "Must Reads: How a 50-year-old design came back to haunt Boeing with its troubled 737 Max jet", Los Angeles Times, retrieved May 23, 2022
"Boeing wanted to wait three years to fix safety alert on 737 Max". Los Angeles Times. Associated Press. June 7, 2019. Retrieved August 3, 2019.
Levin, Alan; Johnsson, Julie; Courtney, Shaun (June 27, 2019). "Boeing needs up to three months to fix newly discovered 737 Max glitch". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved July 4, 2019.

leehamnews.com

Stuart-Menteth, Oliver (November 1, 2019), "A Basic "MCAS" System was installed in the Boeing 707 in the 1960s", Leeham News and Analysis, retrieved January 3, 2021
Fehrm, Bjorn (November 14, 2018). "Boeing's automatic trim for the 737 MAX was not disclosed to the Pilots". Leeham News and Analysis.
Fehrm, Bjorn (April 5, 2019). "Bjorn's Corner: ET302 crash report, the first analysis". Leeham News and Analysis.
Bjorn, Fehrm (April 3, 2019). "ET302 used the Cut-Out switches to stop MCAS". Leeham News and Analysis.
Fehrm, Bjorn (March 27, 2019). "Boeing presents MCAS fix to pilots, regulators and media". Leeham News and Analysis. Retrieved July 30, 2019.
Fehrm, Bjorn (November 15, 2019). "Bjorn's Corner: Analysing the Lion Air JT610 crash, Part 3". Leeham News and Analysis. Retrieved November 15, 2019.
Fehrm, Bjorn (June 28, 2019). "New pitch trim issue forces further changes to 737 MAX software". Leeham News and Analysis.

mediaroom.com

boeing.mediaroom.com

"Boeing Statement on Operations Manual Bulletin". Boeing. November 6, 2018. Retrieved July 2, 2019.
"Boeing Statement on AOA Disagree Alert" (Press release). Boeing. May 5, 2019. Retrieved May 7, 2019.
"Boeing Statement on 737 MAX software" (Press release). Boeing. June 26, 2019. Retrieved June 27, 2019.

nasa.gov

ntrs.nasa.gov

Le Vie, Lisa R. (August 1, 2014). Review of Research On Angle-of-Attack Indicator Effectiveness (Report). NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). hdl:2060/20140011419. NASA/TM–2014-218514. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.

newyorker.com

MacGillis, Alec (November 11, 2019). "The Case Against Boeing". The New Yorker. ISSN 0028-792X. Retrieved November 11, 2019.

ntsb.gov

"Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance" (PDF). www.ntsb.gov. NTSB. September 19, 2019. Retrieved September 26, 2019.
- Lay summary in: "Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance". National Transportation Safety Board. September 19, 2019. Archived from the original on September 26, 2019.
- National Transportation Safety Board (September 19, 2019). "Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on September 14, 2021. Retrieved September 24, 2021. This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the National Transportation Safety Board.
  - Lay summary in: "Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance". National Transportation Safety Board. September 19, 2019. Archived from the original on September 26, 2019.
  - "NTSB Issues 7 Safety Recommendations to FAA related to Ongoing Lion Air, Ethiopian Airlines Crash Investigations". NTSB. Retrieved September 30, 2019.

nytimes.com

Beech, Hannah; Suhartono, Muktita (March 20, 2019). "Confusion, Then Prayer, in Cockpit of Doomed Lion Air Jet". The New York Times. Retrieved March 21, 2019.
Nicas, Jack; Kitroeff, Natalie; Gelles, David; Glanz, James (June 1, 2019). "Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved June 7, 2019.
Kitroeff, Natalie (September 26, 2019). "Boeing Underestimated Cockpit Chaos on 737 Max, N.T.S.B. Says". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved September 26, 2019.
Gelles, David; Kitroeff, Natalie (October 11, 2019). "Review of 737 Max Certification Finds Fault With Boeing and F.A.A." The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
Kitroeff, Natalie (September 26, 2019). "Boeing Underestimated Cockpit Chaos on 737 Max, N.T.S.B. Says". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved September 24, 2021.
Tabucho, Hiroko; Gelles, David (March 21, 2019). "Doomed Boeing Jets Lacked 2 Safety Features That Company Sold Only as Extras". The New York Times. Retrieved March 21, 2019.
Gelles, David; Kitroeff, Natalie (May 5, 2019). "Boeing Believed a 737 Max Warning Light Was Standard. It Wasn't". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved May 11, 2019.
Glanz, James; Creswell, Julie; Kaplan, Thomas; Wichter, Zach (February 3, 2019). "After a Lion Air 737 Max Crashed in October, Questions About the Plane Arose". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved July 27, 2019.
Gelles, David; Kitroeff, Natalie (May 5, 2019). "Boeing Believed a 737 Max Warning Light Was Standard. It Wasn't". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved August 27, 2019.
Tabuchi, Hiroko; Gelles, David (March 21, 2019). "Doomed Boeing Jets Lacked 2 Safety Features That Company Sold Only as Extras". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved August 27, 2019.

radio-canada.ca

ici.radio-canada.ca

Vu Van, Binh An (November 10, 2019), "Des révélations troublantes sur le Boeing 737 MAX 8", Radio-Canada website (in Canadian French), archived from the original on November 11, 2019, retrieved November 11, 2019, Sur les courbes, Sylvain Alarie et Gilles Primeau observent un glissement progressif de 0,2 degré du stabilisateur horizontal. Ça peut sembler peu, « mais c'est un ordre de grandeur supérieur à ce qui est normalement permis quand on conçoit des systèmes comme ceux-ci, » ajoute Gilles Primeau. « Ces mouvements sont facilement observables, et, selon nous, selon le règlement 395A, ne devraient pas avoir lieu. »

reuters.com

"Exclusive: Boeing kept FAA in the dark on key 737 MAX design changes - U.S. IG report". Reuters. July 1, 2020.
"FAA failed to properly review 737 MAX jet anti-stall system: JATR findings". Reuters. October 11, 2019. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
Freed, Jamie; Johnson, Eric (November 30, 2018). "Optional warning light could have aided Lion Air engineers before crash: experts". Reuters.
"Regulators knew before crashes that 737 MAX trim control was confusing in some conditions: document". Reuters. Retrieved September 17, 2019.
"Optional warning light could have aided Lion Air engineers before crash: experts". Reuters. November 30, 2018. Retrieved November 13, 2019.
"Optional warning light could have aided Lion Air engineers before crash: experts". Reuters. November 30, 2018. Retrieved November 13, 2019.

graphics.reuters.com

"Change to 737 MAX controls may have imperiled planes". Reuters. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

sae.org

saemobilus.sae.org

"Boeing flies first 737 MAX 7 with MCAS software update". saemobilus.sae.org. Archived from the original on October 25, 2020. Retrieved June 6, 2019.

seattletimes.com

Gates, Dominic (March 18, 2019). "Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system". The Seattle Times. Retrieved March 19, 2019.
Gates, Dominic (April 1, 2019). "Boeing's software fix for 737 MAX still weeks away from delivery to FAA". The Seattle Times. Retrieved April 2, 2019.
"The inside story of MCAS: How Boeing's 737 MAX system gained power and lost safeguards". The Seattle Times. June 22, 2019. Retrieved June 24, 2019.
Baker, Mike; Gates, Dominic (March 26, 2019). "Lack of redundancies on Boeing 737 MAX system baffles some involved in developing the jet". The Seattle Times.
Gates, Dominic (March 17, 2019). "Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing and FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system". The Seattle Times.
Gates, Dominic (October 29, 2019). "Live coverage: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg testifies to Congress about 737 MAX". The Seattle Times.
Mike Baker; Dominic Gates (May 10, 2019). "Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit, limiting ability to shut off MCAS". The Seattle Times.
Dominic Gates (April 29, 2019). "Facing sharp questions, Boeing CEO refuses to admit flaws in 737 MAX design". Seattle Times.
"Why Boeing's emergency directions may have failed to save 737 MAX". The Seattle Times. April 3, 2019. Retrieved June 3, 2019.
Gates, Dominic (April 3, 2019). "Why Boeing's emergency directions may have failed to save 737 MAX". The Seattle Times. Retrieved September 27, 2019.
"Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit, limiting ability to shut off MCAS". The Seattle Times. May 10, 2019. Retrieved October 15, 2019.
Gates, Dominic (September 10, 2019). "European regulator plans its own test flights of Boeing 737 MAX in sign of rift with FAA". The Seattle Times. Retrieved September 11, 2019.
Baker, Mike; Gates, Dominic (March 26, 2019). "Lack of redundancies on Boeing 737 MAX system baffles some involved in developing the jet". The Seattle Times. Retrieved August 4, 2019.
Gates, Dominic (August 1, 2019). "Newly stringent FAA tests spur a fundamental software redesign of Boeing's 737 MAX flight controls". The Seattle Times. Retrieved August 2, 2019.

skybrary.aero

"Multi Operator Message" (PDF). MOM MOM 18 0664 01B. The Boeing Company. November 10, 2018. Retrieved August 1, 2021.

slashgear.com

"Boeing finds yet another 737 MAX software issue". SlashGear. January 19, 2020. Retrieved January 20, 2020.

sullysullenberger.com

"My Testimony Today Before the 𝐇𝐨𝐮𝐬𝐞 Subcommittee on Aviation". Sully Sullenberger. June 19, 2019. Retrieved June 20, 2019.^{[permanent dead link‍]}
"My Testimony Today Before the House Subcommittee on Aviation". Sully Sullenberger. June 19, 2019. Retrieved June 20, 2019.
"My Letter to the Editor of New York Times Magazine". Sully Sullenberger. October 13, 2019. Retrieved October 14, 2019.

theaircurrent.com

"Boeing's MCAS may not have been needed on the 737 Max at all". The Air Current. January 10, 2021. Retrieved August 3, 2021.
Ostrower, Jon (January 10, 2021), "Boeing's MCAS may not have been needed on the 737 Max at all", The Air Current, archived from the original on January 10, 2021
Ostrower, Jon (November 13, 2018). "What is the Boeing 737 Max Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System". The Air Current. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
Ostrower, Jon (November 13, 2018). "What is the Boeing 737 Max Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System". The Air Current. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
"Transport Canada safety official urges removal of MCAS from 737 Max". The Air Current. November 23, 2019. Retrieved November 24, 2019.
"Checklists come into focus as pace-setter for 737 Max return". The Air Current. October 9, 2019. Retrieved October 9, 2019.
"Vestigal design issue clouds 737 MAX crash investigations". April 4, 2019.
Jon Ostrower; "Vestigial design issue clouds 737 Max crash investigations", The Air Current, April 4, 2019. (retrieved November 21, 2019)
"Southwest is adding new Angle of Attack indicators to its 737 Max fleet". The Air Current. November 30, 2018. Retrieved June 5, 2019.
Ostrower, Jon (June 27, 2019). "FAA and Boeing initially disagreed on severity of "catastrophic" 737 Max software glitch". The Air Current.

theatlantic.com

Useem, Jerry (November 20, 2019). "The Long-Forgotten Flight That Sent Boeing Off Course". The Atlantic. Retrieved November 24, 2019.

theregister.co.uk

Corfield, Gareth (March 19, 2019). "Boeing big cheese repeats pledge of 737 Max software updates following fatal crashes". The Register. Retrieved April 2, 2019.
Corfield, Gareth (April 9, 2020). "Stop us if you've heard this before: Boeing's working on 737 Max software fixes for autopilot, stabilization bugs". www.theregister.co.uk. Retrieved April 9, 2020.

theverge.com

Campbell, Darryl (May 2, 2019). "The many human errors that brought down the Boeing 737 Max". The Verge. Retrieved June 13, 2019.
Campbell, Darryl (April 9, 2020). "The ancient computers in the Boeing 737 Max are holding up a fix". The Verge. Retrieved June 27, 2020.
O'Kane, Sean (February 6, 2020). "Boeing finds another software problem on the 737 Max". The Verge. Retrieved February 7, 2020.

time.com

Levin, Alan (September 26, 2019). "Boeing Failed to Predict That Slew of 737 Max Warning Alarms Would Confuse Pilots, Investigators Say". Time. Retrieved September 24, 2021.

transportation.gov

"The State of Airline Safety: Federal Oversight of Commercial Aviation". U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). March 27, 2019. Archived from the original on July 27, 2019. Retrieved July 27, 2019. On January 21, 2019, Boeing submitted a proposed MCAS software enhancement to the FAA for certification. To date, the FAA has tested this enhancement to the 737 MAX flight control system in both the simulator and the aircraft. The testing, which was conducted by FAA flight test engineers and flight test pilots, included aerodynamic stall situations and recovery procedures. The FAA's ongoing review of this software installation and training is an agency priority, as will be the roll-out of any software, training, or other measures to operators of the 737 MAX.

voanews.com

"Boeing CEO Admits Mistake in Handling Warning-System Problem". Associated Press. June 16, 2019 – via VOA.

washingtonpost.com

Lazo, Luz; Laris, Michael; Aratani, Lori; Paletta, Damian (March 13, 2019). "FAA's emergency order grounding Boeing jets came after the agency identified similarities between crashes in Ethiopia, Indonesia". The Washington Post. Retrieved March 13, 2019.
MacMillan, Douglas (May 16, 2019). "Boeing says 737 Max update is being held up by FAA questions". The Washington Post. Retrieved May 19, 2019.
Gregg, Aaron (April 4, 2019). "Boeing CEO apologizes for lives lost and acknowledges role of company's flight-control system in two crashes". The Washington Post.
"Boeing's 737 Max design contains fingerprints of hundreds of suppliers". Washington Post. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
Laris, Michael (October 18, 2019). "Messages show Boeing employees knew in 2016 of problems that turned deadly on the 737 Max". The Washington Post. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
Frankel, Todd C. (March 17, 2019). "Sensor cited as potential factor in Boeing crashes draws scrutiny". The Washington Post.
Davis, Aaron C.; Lazo, Luz; Schemm, Paul (April 4, 2019). "Additional software problem detected in Boeing 737 Max flight control system, officials say". The Washington Post. Retrieved April 4, 2019.

web.archive.org

"Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community" (PDF). FAA. March 11, 2019. Archived from the original (PDF) on May 13, 2023.
"Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes". rgl.faa.gov. November 20, 2020. Archived from the original on April 18, 2022. Retrieved December 12, 2020.
Tirpak, John A.; Everstine, Brian W. (March 22, 2019), "USAF Reviewing Training After MAX 8 Crashes; KC-46 Uses Similar MCAS", Air Force Magazine website, archived from the original on July 23, 2021, retrieved August 1, 2021
Ostrower, Jon (January 10, 2021), "Boeing's MCAS may not have been needed on the 737 Max at all", The Air Current, archived from the original on January 10, 2021
"Boeing flies first 737 MAX 7 with MCAS software update". saemobilus.sae.org. Archived from the original on October 25, 2020. Retrieved June 6, 2019.
"The State of Airline Safety: Federal Oversight of Commercial Aviation". U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). March 27, 2019. Archived from the original on July 27, 2019. Retrieved July 27, 2019. On January 21, 2019, Boeing submitted a proposed MCAS software enhancement to the FAA for certification. To date, the FAA has tested this enhancement to the 737 MAX flight control system in both the simulator and the aircraft. The testing, which was conducted by FAA flight test engineers and flight test pilots, included aerodynamic stall situations and recovery procedures. The FAA's ongoing review of this software installation and training is an agency priority, as will be the roll-out of any software, training, or other measures to operators of the 737 MAX.
Travis, Gregory (April 18, 2019). "How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer". IEEE Spectrum. Archived from the original on April 24, 2019.
"Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance" (PDF). www.ntsb.gov. NTSB. September 19, 2019. Retrieved September 26, 2019.
- Lay summary in: "Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance". National Transportation Safety Board. September 19, 2019. Archived from the original on September 26, 2019.
- "After 18-Month Investigation, Chairs DeFazio and Larsen Release Final Committee Report on Boeing 737 MAX" (Press release). House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. September 16, 2020. Archived from the original on July 14, 2022. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
- National Transportation Safety Board (September 19, 2019). "Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on September 14, 2021. Retrieved September 24, 2021. This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the National Transportation Safety Board.
  - Lay summary in: "Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance". National Transportation Safety Board. September 19, 2019. Archived from the original on September 26, 2019.
  - "Explanatory Note to TCDS IM.A.120 – Boeing 737" (PDF). European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). May 24, 2019. Archived from the original (PDF) on June 2, 2022. Retrieved February 23, 2020.
  - Vu Van, Binh An (November 10, 2019), "Des révélations troublantes sur le Boeing 737 MAX 8", Radio-Canada website (in Canadian French), archived from the original on November 11, 2019, retrieved November 11, 2019, Sur les courbes, Sylvain Alarie et Gilles Primeau observent un glissement progressif de 0,2 degré du stabilisateur horizontal. Ça peut sembler peu, « mais c'est un ordre de grandeur supérieur à ce qui est normalement permis quand on conçoit des systèmes comme ceux-ci, » ajoute Gilles Primeau. « Ces mouvements sont facilement observables, et, selon nous, selon le règlement 395A, ne devraient pas avoir lieu. »

wingsoverquebec.com

Allard, André (July 3, 2019). "MAX's computer has reached its limit". Wings Over Québec.

worldcat.org

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wsj.com

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yahoo.com

news.yahoo.com

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youtube.com

"Boeing a-t-il fait preuve de négligence?" [Was Boeing negligent?] (in French). Radio-Canada info. April 1, 2019. Retrieved November 14, 2019.