National Resident Matching Program (English Wikipedia)

Roth, A.E. (1984). "The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory". Journal of Political Economy. 92 (6): 991–1016. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.535.561. doi:10.1086/261272.

r-project.org (Global: 7,871^st place; English: 5,225^th place)

cran.at.r-project.org

Klein, T. (2015). "Analysis of Stable Matchings in R: Package matchingMarkets" (PDF). Vignette to R Package MatchingMarkets.
"matchingMarkets: Analysis of Stable Matchings". R Project. 8 August 2023.

residencyprogramslist.com (Global: low place; English: low place)

Residency Match Application Experience.

siam.org (Global: low place; English: 6,473^rd place)

Robinson, Sara (April 2003). "Are Medical Students Meeting Their (Best Possible) Match?" (PDF). SIAM News (3): 36. Archived from the original (PDF) on 18 November 2016. Retrieved 14 October 2010.

stanford.edu (Global: 179^th place; English: 183^rd place)

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Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 748. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 749. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 752, 760. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 759. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 757. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 758. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.

studentdoctor.net (Global: low place; English: low place)

"Using "SOAP" to Clean Up the Scramble". Studentdoctor.net. 2010-10-24. Retrieved 2013-09-09.
"The Residency Scramble: How It Works and How It Can Be Improved". Studentdoctor.net. 2009-03-12. Archived from the original on 2013-08-18. Retrieved 2013-09-09.

toronto.edu (Global: low place; English: 8,821^st place)

cs.toronto.edu

Gusfield & Irving 1989, pp. 3–4. Description of market based on Roth 1984. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 64 references Roth 1984 as proving that the pre-1995 algorithm is essentially the hospital-optimal algorithm described in Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 39. Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 41 demonstrates that the hospital-optimal algorithm is also applicant-pessimal. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 38. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 41. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 59. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 54 gives an example of a situation with no stable solution and states that proof of NP completeness comes from Ronn 1990.^[26] Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.

web.archive.org (Global: 1^st place; English: 1^st place)

"Match by the Numbers" (PDF). NRMP. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 May 2021. Retrieved 6 May 2021.
Robinson, Sara (April 2003). "Are Medical Students Meeting Their (Best Possible) Match?" (PDF). SIAM News (3): 36. Archived from the original (PDF) on 18 November 2016. Retrieved 14 October 2010.
Evaluation of changes to be considered in the NRMP algorithm, by Alvin E. Roth. October 24, 1995
"Analysis of the National Residency Matching Program". Tedlab.mit.edu. Archived from the original on 2013-03-25. Retrieved 2013-09-09.
[1] Archived December 26, 2011, at the Wayback Machine
"The Residency Scramble: How It Works and How It Can Be Improved". Studentdoctor.net. 2009-03-12. Archived from the original on 2013-08-18. Retrieved 2013-09-09.
"Frequently Asked Questions : U.S. Seniors". Archived from the original on December 2, 2011. Retrieved December 6, 2011.

worldcat.org (Global: 5^th place; English: 5^th place)

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Ronn, Eytan (June 1990). "NP-complete stable matching problems". Journal of Algorithms. 11 (2): 285–304. doi:10.1016/0196-6774(90)90007-2. ISSN 0196-6774.

National Resident Matching Program (English Wikipedia)

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