National Resident Matching Program (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "National Resident Matching Program" in English language version.

refsWebsite

Global rank English rank

11doi.org

2^nd place

8nih.gov

4^th place

7nrmp.org

low place

7stanford.edu

179^th place

183^rd place

6toronto.edu

low place

8,821^st place

6web.archive.org

1^st place

2jamanetwork.com

2,650^th place

3,409^th place

2studentdoctor.net

low place

2r-project.org

7,871^st place

5,225^th place

2harvard.edu

18^th place

17^th place

1nobelprize.org

301^st place

478^th place

1siam.org

low place

6,473^rd place

1psu.edu

207^th place

136^th place

1mit.edu

415^th place

327^th place

1worldcat.org

5^th place

1kinstacdn.com

low place

1residencyprogramslist.com

low place

1nytimes.com

7^th place

1matchingtools.com

low place

doi.org

Alvin E. Roth (2003). "The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match". JAMA. 289 (7): 909–912. doi:10.1001/jama.289.7.909. PMID 12588278. Retrieved 6 May 2021.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 748. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth, A.E. (1984). "The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory". Journal of Political Economy. 92 (6): 991–1016. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.535.561. doi:10.1086/261272.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 749. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 752, 760. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Ronn, Eytan (June 1990). "NP-complete stable matching problems". Journal of Algorithms. 11 (2): 285–304. doi:10.1016/0196-6774(90)90007-2. ISSN 0196-6774.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 759. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 757. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 758. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Wilde, H.; Knight, V.; Gillard, J. (2020). "Matching: A Python library for solving matching games". Journal of Open Source Software. 5 (48): 2169. Bibcode:2020JOSS....5.2169W. doi:10.21105/joss.02169.

harvard.edu

isites.harvard.edu

Antitrust Against the Resident Match.

ui.adsabs.harvard.edu

Wilde, H.; Knight, V.; Gillard, J. (2020). "Matching: A Python library for solving matching games". Journal of Open Source Software. 5 (48): 2169. Bibcode:2020JOSS....5.2169W. doi:10.21105/joss.02169.

jamanetwork.com

Alvin E. Roth (2003). "The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match". JAMA. 289 (7): 909–912. doi:10.1001/jama.289.7.909. PMID 12588278. Retrieved 6 May 2021.
"THE MATCHING PLAN FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF INTERNS". JAMA. Retrieved 6 May 2021.

kinstacdn.com

mk0nrmp3oyqui6wqfm.kinstacdn.com

"2021 Main Residency Match® By the Numbers*" (PDF). nrmp.org. NRMP. Retrieved 19 April 2021.

matchingtools.com

"MatchingTools API".

mit.edu

tedlab.mit.edu

"Analysis of the National Residency Matching Program". Tedlab.mit.edu. Archived from the original on 2013-03-25. Retrieved 2013-09-09.

nih.gov

pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

Alvin E. Roth (2003). "The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match". JAMA. 289 (7): 909–912. doi:10.1001/jama.289.7.909. PMID 12588278. Retrieved 6 May 2021.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 748. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 749. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 752, 760. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 759. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 757. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 758. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.

nobelprize.org

Roth, Alvin E. (December 8, 2012). "The Theory and Practice of Market Design" (PDF). Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB.

nrmp.org

NRMP homepage Retrieved on June 16, 2017
"Match by the Numbers" (PDF). NRMP. Retrieved 6 May 2021.
"About NRMP". NRMP. Retrieved 6 May 2021.
[1] Archived December 26, 2011, at the Wayback Machine
"Frequently Asked Questions : U.S. Seniors". Archived from the original on December 2, 2011. Retrieved December 6, 2011.
"Main match results" (PDF). Nrmp.org. 2016. Retrieved 2019-06-14.
The Registration Process.

nytimes.com

Robinson S. Antitrust Lawsuit Over Medical Residency System Is Dismissed. Aug. 2004.

psu.edu

citeseerx.ist.psu.edu

Roth, A.E. (1984). "The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory". Journal of Political Economy. 92 (6): 991–1016. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.535.561. doi:10.1086/261272.

r-project.org

cran.at.r-project.org

Klein, T. (2015). "Analysis of Stable Matchings in R: Package matchingMarkets" (PDF). Vignette to R Package MatchingMarkets.
"matchingMarkets: Analysis of Stable Matchings". R Project. 8 August 2023.

residencyprogramslist.com

Residency Match Application.

siam.org

Robinson, Sara (April 2003). "Are Medical Students Meeting Their (Best Possible) Match?" (PDF). SIAM News (3): 36. Archived from the original (PDF) on 18 November 2016. Retrieved 14 October 2010.

stanford.edu

web.stanford.edu

Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 748. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 749. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 752, 760. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 759. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 757. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999, p. 758. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
Roth & Peranson 1999. Roth, Alvin; Peranson, Elliott (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 748–780. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. PMID 29115787. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.

studentdoctor.net

"Using "SOAP" to Clean Up the Scramble". Studentdoctor.net. 2010-10-24. Retrieved 2013-09-09.
"The Residency Scramble: How It Works and How It Can Be Improved". Studentdoctor.net. 2009-03-12. Archived from the original on 2013-08-18. Retrieved 2013-09-09.

toronto.edu

cs.toronto.edu

Gusfield & Irving 1989, pp. 3–4. Description of market based on Roth 1984. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 64 references Roth 1984 as proving that the pre-1995 algorithm is essentially the hospital-optimal algorithm described in Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 39. Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 41 demonstrates that the hospital-optimal algorithm is also applicant-pessimal. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 38. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 41. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 59. Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
Gusfield & Irving 1989, p. 54 gives an example of a situation with no stable solution and states that proof of NP completeness comes from Ronn 1990.^[26] Gusfield, Dan; Irving, Robert W. (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (PDF). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.

web.archive.org

Robinson, Sara (April 2003). "Are Medical Students Meeting Their (Best Possible) Match?" (PDF). SIAM News (3): 36. Archived from the original (PDF) on 18 November 2016. Retrieved 14 October 2010.
Evaluation of changes to be considered in the NRMP algorithm, by Alvin E. Roth. October 24, 1995
"Analysis of the National Residency Matching Program". Tedlab.mit.edu. Archived from the original on 2013-03-25. Retrieved 2013-09-09.
[1] Archived December 26, 2011, at the Wayback Machine
"The Residency Scramble: How It Works and How It Can Be Improved". Studentdoctor.net. 2009-03-12. Archived from the original on 2013-08-18. Retrieved 2013-09-09.
"Frequently Asked Questions : U.S. Seniors". Archived from the original on December 2, 2011. Retrieved December 6, 2011.

worldcat.org

search.worldcat.org

Ronn, Eytan (June 1990). "NP-complete stable matching problems". Journal of Algorithms. 11 (2): 285–304. doi:10.1016/0196-6774(90)90007-2. ISSN 0196-6774.