Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Nuclear program of Iran" in English language version.
'They have to stop all enrichment,' Netanyahu told CNN in an interview in Jerusalem, adding that he would not accept Iran enriching uranium to even three percent, which is near the level required for peaceful atomic energy.
[A] breach of an IAEA safeguards agreement does not per se equate to a violation of the NPT.
This concern led Western governments to withdraw support for Iran's nuclear program. Pressure on France, which in 1973 signed a deal to build two reactors at Darkhovin, and Germany, whose Kraftwerk Union began building a pair of reactors at Bushehr in 1975, led to the cancellation of both projects.
Iran argues that this experience indicates that joint ownership of foreign facilities does not solve the problem of assuring fuel supply ... The recent experience in which Russian fuel supply to Bushehr was delayed for an extended period as disputes over Iran's nuclear program continued also contributed to Iran's perception that foreign fuel supply is unreliable.
Since 2003, the IAEA Secretariat has reported specific cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements by Iran, Libya, South Korea and Egypt to the board (Step 2). The actions taken by the board in each case were inconsistent and, if they go uncorrected, will create unfortunate precedents.
South Korea publicly disclosed its past secret nuclear research activities, revealing that it had conducted chemical uranium enrichment from 1979 to 1981, separated small quantities of plutonium in 1982, experimented with uranium enrichment in 2000, and manufactured depleted uranium munitions from 1983 to 1987. The South Korean government had violated its international agreements by not declaring any of these activities to the IAEA in Vienna.
South Korea publicly disclosed its past secret nuclear research activities, revealing that it had conducted chemical uranium enrichment from 1979 to 1981, separated small quantities of plutonium in 1982, experimented with uranium enrichment in 2000, and manufactured depleted uranium munitions from 1983 to 1987. The South Korean government had violated its international agreements by not declaring any of these activities to the IAEA in Vienna.
[A] finding by the IAEA of non-compliance with the terms of a sagefuards agreement thus does not automatically amount to non-compliance with the NPT.
In official consultations with the Agency and member-states throughout the 1990s, Iran underlined its plan to acquire, for exclusively peaceful purposes, various aspects of nuclear technology, including fuel enrichment.
In accordance with Article IV of the NPT, States Parties undertook to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Indeed, the inalienable right of all States Parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination constitutes the very foundation of the Treaty.
Iran argues that this experience indicates that joint ownership of foreign facilities does not solve the problem of assuring fuel supply ... The recent experience in which Russian fuel supply to Bushehr was delayed for an extended period as disputes over Iran's nuclear program continued also contributed to Iran's perception that foreign fuel supply is unreliable.
The agency's Director General and Board of Governors recognized Iran had breached its NPT safeguards obligations, but argued that it actually had a right under the treaty to make nuclear fuel ... U.S. officials and the IAEA board of governors chose in 2004 and 2005 to use this same line of reasoning to decide not to forward reports of safeguards infractions by South Korea and Egypt to the UN Security Council.
South Korea publicly disclosed its past secret nuclear research activities, revealing that it had conducted chemical uranium enrichment from 1979 to 1981, separated small quantities of plutonium in 1982, experimented with uranium enrichment in 2000, and manufactured depleted uranium munitions from 1983 to 1987. The South Korean government had violated its international agreements by not declaring any of these activities to the IAEA in Vienna.
We judge in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities and that the halt lasted at least several years... Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them... develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them.
Any nuclear activity may entail proliferation concerns. But there are internationally-agreed mechanisms to address such concerns, ... Iran has been the only country, with comparable technology, that has been prepared to implement these proposals.
The agency's Director General and Board of Governors recognized Iran had breached its NPT safeguards obligations, but argued that it actually had a right under the treaty to make nuclear fuel ... U.S. officials and the IAEA board of governors chose in 2004 and 2005 to use this same line of reasoning to decide not to forward reports of safeguards infractions by South Korea and Egypt to the UN Security Council.
In official consultations with the Agency and member-states throughout the 1990s, Iran underlined its plan to acquire, for exclusively peaceful purposes, various aspects of nuclear technology, including fuel enrichment.
This concern led Western governments to withdraw support for Iran's nuclear program. Pressure on France, which in 1973 signed a deal to build two reactors at Darkhovin, and Germany, whose Kraftwerk Union began building a pair of reactors at Bushehr in 1975, led to the cancellation of both projects.
In 2006, it embarked on a uranium enrichment programme, defining it as part of its civilian nuclear energy programme, which is permitted under Article IV of the NPT.
In accordance with Article IV of the NPT, States Parties undertook to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Indeed, the inalienable right of all States Parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination constitutes the very foundation of the Treaty.
We judge in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities and that the halt lasted at least several years... Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them... develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them.
'They have to stop all enrichment,' Netanyahu told CNN in an interview in Jerusalem, adding that he would not accept Iran enriching uranium to even three percent, which is near the level required for peaceful atomic energy.
[A] breach of an IAEA safeguards agreement does not per se equate to a violation of the NPT.
[A] finding by the IAEA of non-compliance with the terms of a sagefuards agreement thus does not automatically amount to non-compliance with the NPT.
In 2006, it embarked on a uranium enrichment programme, defining it as part of its civilian nuclear energy programme, which is permitted under Article IV of the NPT.
Any nuclear activity may entail proliferation concerns. But there are internationally-agreed mechanisms to address such concerns, ... Iran has been the only country, with comparable technology, that has been prepared to implement these proposals.
