References analysis of the Wikipedia article "Operation Ezra and Nehemiah" in the English version

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Szulc 1991, p. 208c, "Avlgur kept Schwartz informed of this enterprise and the Joint was able to finance the majority of the airlift - $4 million - which in the end brought 120,000 Jews from Iraq to Israel. It was the Joint's largest - but not the last - immigration operation after Israeli independence." Szulc, Tad (1991). The Secret Alliance: The Extraordinary Story of the Rescue of the Jews Since World War II. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. ISBN 978-0-374-24946-5.

Hillel 1987 Hillel, Shlomo (1987). Operation Babylon : The Story of the Rescue of the Jews of Iran. Translated by Friedman, Ina. Doubleday. ISBN 9780385235976. OCLC 966124447.

Shiblak 1986 "In a confidential telegram sent on November 2, 1949, the British ambassador to Washington explained ... the general view of officials in the State Department is that the [Zionist] agitation has been deliberately worked up for two reasons: (a) To assist fund-raising in the United States (b) To create favourable sentiments in the United Nations Assembly to offset the bad impression caused by the Jewish attitudes to Arab refugees. They suggest that the Israeli Government is fully aware of the Iraqi Jews, but is prepared to be callous towards the community, the bulk of which, as Dr Elath admitted, has no wish to transfer its allegiance to Israel." Shiblak, Abbas (1986). The lure of Zion : the case of the Iraqi Jews. Al Saqi Books. ISBN 9780863560330. OCLC 16711193.

Shiblak 1986, p. 79, "Many studies, however, while not rejecting all the official Iraqi justifications out of hand, see the law as the result of continuous pressure on Iraq from the British, American, and Israeli governments. Some studies go further, regarding Law 1/1950 as the culmination of secret negotiations involving these parties together with the al-Suwaidi government." Shiblak, Abbas (1986). The lure of Zion : the case of the Iraqi Jews. Al Saqi Books. ISBN 9780863560330. OCLC 16711193.

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Pasachoff & Littman 2005, p. 301 Pasachoff, Naomi E.; Littman, Robert J. (2005). ""Operation Magic Carpet" and "Operation Ezra and Nehemiah"". A Concise History of the Jewish People. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 9780742543669. Retrieved June 28, 2008.

Simon, Laskier & Reguer 2003, p. 350 Simon, Reeva; Laskier, Michael; Reguer, Sara (2003). The Jews of the Middle East and North Africa in Modern Times. Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231507592. OCLC 614998544.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 213 Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Bashkin 2012 Bashkin, Orit (2012). New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-8201-2.

Marqusee 2010, p. 215 Marqusee, Mike (2010). If I am not for myself : journey of an anti-Zionist Jew (2nd ed.). Verso Books. ISBN 9781844674350. OCLC 467772291.

Bashkin 2012, pp. 141–182 Bashkin, Orit (2012). New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-8201-2.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 213, Sereni's letter stated "If we thought before we came here and when we started our work that our main task would be to organize and encourage — today we have to admit that there is not much point in either of these activities.... We are today eating the fruit of many years of neglect, and what we didn't do can't be corrected now through propaganda and creating one-day-old enthusiasm.... We have to prepare for the future, to educate a generation of young people, to prepare a young guard that can do our work here. Forming a Zionist organization, a youth movement, a vanguard are the main tasks of the hour." Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 14, "In the first half of the 1940s, the Iraqi people were incited against Zionism by propaganda campaigns in the press, initiated by Nuri al-Said himself." Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 19, "(In 1944) The Jewish Leaders, who had issued anti-Zionist statements in the 1930, now boldly and vehemently refused a similar request. They did so not because they had changed their minds about Zionism but as a protest against the authorities treatment of Jewish community." Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Avi Shlaim, Three Worlds: Memoirs of an Arab-Jew, Oneworld Publications ISBN 978-0-861-54464-6 2023 ch.7.

Rogan & Shlaim 2001, p. 142 Rogan, Eugene L.; Shlaim, Avi (2001). The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-79476-3.

Bashkin 2012, p. 90, "the general sentiment was that if a man as well-connected and powerful as Adas could be eliminated by the state, other Jews would not be protected any longer." Bashkin, Orit (2012). New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-8201-2.

Simon, Laskier & Reguer 2003, p. 365 Simon, Reeva; Laskier, Michael; Reguer, Sara (2003). The Jews of the Middle East and North Africa in Modern Times. Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231507592. OCLC 614998544.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 296, "Throughout that time (1948–1949), Iraq took in only about 5,000 refugees and consistently refused to admit any more, despite British and American efforts to persuade Iraq and Syria to do more to solve the problem." Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Morris 2008, p. 413 Morris, Benny (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-14524-3.

Tripp 2002, p. 125 Tripp, Charles (2002). A History of Iraq (Revised ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521529006.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 297a, "Nuri's proposals for a forced population exchange were not intended to solve either the problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees or the problem of the Jewish minority in Iraq, but to torpedo plans to resettle Palestinian Arab refugees in Iraq. He knew that Britain and the United States would not condone the deportation of Iraqi Jews to Israel." Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Tovy 2014, p. 163, "On Oct 1949 ... al-Said raised the exchange of population concept with them (their economic mission survey)." Tovy, Jacob (2014). Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Issue: The Formulation of a Policy, 1948–1956. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-81077-3.

Black 1991, p. 89 Black, Ian (1991). Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services. Grove Press. ISBN 978-0-8021-3286-4.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 204 Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 202a Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 202, "For the first few weeks after the enactment of the law, the Zionist activists forbade registration; they were waiting for a clarification of the aliyah routes and a decision by the Israeli government as to its willingness to take in the Jews of Iraq. This ban heightened the tension in the Jewish community. The Zionist leadership (that is, the leaders of Hehalutz and the Haganah, along with the emissaries) convened and discussed the registration issue in view of the pressure from huge numbers of people who wanted to sign up. At the end of the meeting, the leadership decided to instruct the people to register and not to wait for instructions from Tel Aviv. A bomb had blown up that day in a Jewish cafe, wounding four people, and the two events were presumably related… The activists' faith in the Zionist ideal and their zeal to implement it, combined with their confidence that Israel would not ignore the aliyah needs of Iraqi Jewry, paved the way to this decision. To inform the Jews of the decision, the leadership issued a proclamation... The fact that the proclamation was written in the name of the State of Israel lent it added force and gave the Jews the impression that the State of Israel and the Israeli government were calling on them to leave Iraq and move to Israel." Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 204, "As a result, by September 1950, while 70,000 Jews had registered to leave, many selling their property and losing their jobs, only 10,000 had left the country." Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 203 Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 205 Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 205, "in mid September 1950, Nuri al-Said replaced...as prime minister. Nuri was determined to drive the Jews out of his country as quickly as possible." Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Bashkin 2012, p. 277 "By 1951 Sa'id realized that the Jews were about to leave Iraq, and wanted to see them depart immediately regardless of the Palestinian question. The British report that he asked the Jordanians to stop deceiving refugees on the possibility of their being admitted to Israel and for all Arab countries to take steps to resettle them. FO 371/91635, 15 January 1951, from Sir A. Kirkbride (Amman) to Foreign Office (London) (a report on Nuri Sa'id's visit to Jordan)." Bashkin, Orit (2012). New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-8201-2.

Kirkbride 1976, pp. 115–117, "It arose from a decision of the Iraqi government to retaliate for the expulsion of Arab refugees from Palestine by forcing the majority of the Jewish community of Iraq to go to Israel. Nuri Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, who was on a visit to Amman, came out with the astounding proposition that a convoy of Iraqi Jews should be brought over in army lorries escorted by armed cars, taken to the Jordanian-Israeli frontier and forced to cross the line. Q... the passage of the Jews through Jordan would almost certainly have touched off serious trouble amongst the very disgruntled Arab refugees who were crowded into the country. Either the Iraqi Jews would have been massacred or their Iraqi guards would have had to shoot other Arabs to protect the lives of their charges. ... I replied at once that the matter at issue was no concern of His Majesty's Government. Samir refused his assent as politely as possible, but Nuri lost his temper at being rebuffed and he said: 'So. you do not want to do It, do you?' Samir snapped back, 'Of course I do not want to be party to such a crime', Nuri there upon exploded with rage." Kirkbride, Alec (1976). From the Wings: Amman Memoirs, 1947-1951. Psychology Press. ISBN 9780714630618.

Hakohen 2003, p. 124 Hakohen, Devorah (2003). Immigrants in Turmoil: Mass Immigration to Israel and Its Repercussions in the 1950s and After. Syracuse University Press. ISBN 978-0-8156-2990-0.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 206 #2, "On 10 March 1951, precisely one year after the Denaturalization Law had come into effect, when 64,000 people were still waiting to emigrate, the Iraqi legislature enacted a law blocking the assets of Jews who had given up their citizenship." Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Meir-Glitzenstein 2004, p. 202, "For the first few weeks after the enactment of the law, the Zionist activists forbade registration; they were waiting for a clarification of the aliyah routes and a decision by the Israeli government as to its willingness to take in the Jews of Iraq. This ban heightened the tension in the Jewish community. On 8 April 1950, the Zionist leadership (that is, the leaders of Hehalutz and the Haganah, along with the emissaries) convened and discussed the registration issue in view of the pressure from huge numbers of people who wanted to sign up. At the end of the meeting, the leadership decided to instruct the people to register and not to wait for instructions from Tel Aviv. A bomb had blown up that day in a Jewish cafe, wounding four people, and the two events were presumably related… The activists' faith in the Zionist ideal and their zeal to implement it, combined with their confidence that Israel would not ignore the aliyah needs of Iraqi Jewry, paved the way to this decision. To inform the Jews of the decision, the leadership issued a proclamation... The fact that the proclamation was written in the name of the State of Israel lent it added force and gave the Jews the impression that the State of Israel and the Israeli government were calling on them to leave Iraq and move to Israel." Meir-Glitzenstein, Esther (2004). Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-76862-1.

Hirst 2003, p. 400 Hirst, David (2003). The gun and the olive branch: the roots of violence in the Middle East. Nation Books. ISBN 1-56025-483-1. Retrieved April 5, 2010.

Marozzi, Justin (2015). Baghdad: City of Peace, City of Blood. Penguin Books. ISBN 9780141047102.

doi.org

Gat, Moshe (1998). "The Immigration of Iraqi Jewry to Israel as Reflected in Literature / L'immigration des Juifs Irak en Israël vue travers son reflet dans la littérature". Revue européenne de migrations internationales (in French). 14 (3): 45–60. doi:10.3406/remi.1998.1643. Fear of a renewed outburst of this kind (of the Farhud) menaced over the community until its eventual dissolution. The Farhud shocked the community to the core, and in effect marked the beginning of a process which was to end with the emigration of the vast majority of Iraqi Jews. … The situation of the Jews grew increasingly grave as the decision on the fate of Palestine approached. Immediately after the establishment of the State of Israel, the Iraqi government adopted a policy of anti-Jewish discrimination, mass dismissals from government service, and arrests. …. The Jews felt the ground burning under their feet. At the end of 1949, Jews began to flee to Iran, and thence to Israel, in such large numbers that all efforts by the Iraqi government to halt their flight proved fruitless. … the Denationalization Law on March 1950…. The Jews took advantage of the law, and by the end of 1952, most of them had emigrated to Israel, practically bringing to a close the history of the community

Shenhav 1999, p. 610, "Shortly after his government assumed power in January 1949, Nuri al-Said toyed with the idea of deporting the Iraqi Jews to Israel; however, the British ambassador in Palestine warned him that such an act could have serious unanticipated repercussions. Israel, the ambassador explained, would welcome the arrival of cheap Jewish labor and would demand that in return the Arab states assimilate Palestinian refugees. In February 1949, the Foreign Office instructed the British ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Henry Mack, to caution Nuri al-Said against expelling the Jews, as this would adversely affect the position of the Arab states." Shenhav, Yehouda (1999). "The Jews of Iraq, Zionist Ideology, and the Property of the Palestinian Refugees of 1948: An Anomaly of National Accounting". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 31 (4): 605–630. doi:10.1017/s0020743800057111. ISSN 1471-6380. S2CID 159733170.

Shenhav 1999, p. 613, "In July 1949, the British, fearing the decline of their influence in the Middle East, put forward a proposal for a population transfer and tried to persuade Nuri al-Said to settle 100,000 Palestinian refugees in Iraq. A letter sent by the British Foreign Office to its legations in the Middle East spoke of an "arrangement whereby Iraqi Jews moved into Israel, received compensation for their property from the Israeli government, while the Arab refugees were installed with the property in Iraq". The British Foreign Office believed that "the Israeli government would find it hard to resist an opportunity of bringing a substantial number of Jews to Israel." In return, Nuri al-Said demanded that half the Palestinian refugees be settled in the territory of Palestine and the rest in the Arab states. If the refugee arrangement were indeed fair, he said, the Iraqi government would permit a voluntary move by Iraqi Jews to Palestine. Under the terms of the plan, an international committee was to assess the value of the property left behind by the Palestinian refugees who would be settled in Iraq, and they would receive restitution drawn from the property of the Iraqi Jews who would be sent to Palestine.... In October 1949, the world and Israeli press reported the Iraqi-British plan for a population exchange (e.g., Davar, 16 October 1949). The publicity embarrassed the other Arab leaders and caused a stir in the refugee camps of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In a message to the Foreign Office, Henry Mack, the British ambassador to Iraq, said that the Palestinian refugees would not agree to settle in Iraq." Shenhav, Yehouda (1999). "The Jews of Iraq, Zionist Ideology, and the Property of the Palestinian Refugees of 1948: An Anomaly of National Accounting". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 31 (4): 605–630. doi:10.1017/s0020743800057111. ISSN 1471-6380. S2CID 159733170.

lrb.co.uk

Shatz, Adam (November 6, 2008). "Leaving Paradise". London Review of Books. pp. 23–25. ISSN 0260-9592. Retrieved June 23, 2017. Yet Sasson Somekh insists that the farhud was not 'the beginning of the end'. Indeed, he claims it was soon 'almost erased from the collective Jewish memory', washed away by 'the prosperity experienced by the entire city from 1941 to 1948'. Somekh, who was born in 1933, remembers the 1940s as a 'golden age' of 'security', 'recovery' and 'consolidation', in which the 'Jewish community had regained its full creative drive'. Jews built new homes, schools and hospitals, showing every sign of wanting to stay. They took part in politics as never before; at Bretton Woods, Iraq was represented by Ibrahim al-Kabir, the Jewish finance minister. Some joined the Zionist underground, but many more waved the red flag. Liberal nationalists and Communists rallied people behind a conception of national identity far more inclusive than the Golden Square's Pan-Arabism, allowing Jews to join ranks with other Iraqis – even in opposition to the British and Nuri al-Said, who did not take their ingratitude lightly.

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Shlaim 2023,'All in all, twelve caches were uncovered by the CID, yielding a substantial haul. The sentences passed against those convicted cited 425 grenades, 33 submachineguns, 186 revolvers, 24,647 bullets, 79 magazines for submachineguns and 32 daggers.' Shlaim, Avi (2023). Three Worlds: Memoirs of an Arab-Jew. Oneworld Publications. ISBN 978-0861544639. OL 39565778M.

Shlaim 2023,'Salih al-Haidari. He had also told me that this was an act of revenge against the Jews, who he claimed had wronged him. But now he surprised me by saying that Haidari was put up to it by a police officer of the Bataween district. This did not make much sense and I said so. Why should an Iraqi police officer do the dirty job for the Zionist underground by putting pressure on the Jews to emigrate to Israel? On hearing Karkoukli’s explanation, I nearly fell off my chair: the man in question was a collaborator who had received a bribe from the Zionist underground. The movement wanted to frighten the Jews who still hoped to stay in Iraq, so they had bribed the police officer, who had hired Haidari to do the dirty deed.' Shlaim, Avi (2023). Three Worlds: Memoirs of an Arab-Jew. Oneworld Publications. ISBN 978-0861544639. OL 39565778M.

Shlaim 2023,'Moshe Sasson, of the Foreign Ministry’s Middle East Division, to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett maintained that many Iraqi immigrants, residents of the transit camps, greeted the hanging with the attitude: “That is God’s revenge on the movement that brought us to such depths.” The bitterness of that reaction attests to an acute degree of discontent among the newly arrived Iraqi Jews. It suggests that a good number of them did not view their immigration as the joyous return to Zion depicted by the community’s Zionist activists.' Shlaim, Avi (2023). Three Worlds: Memoirs of an Arab-Jew. Oneworld Publications. ISBN 978-0861544639. OL 39565778M.

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Goldberg, David J. (August 27, 2010). "In Ishmael's House: A History of Jews in Muslim Lands by Martin Gilbert". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved June 23, 2017. while it is pertinent to point out that 850,000 Jewish refugees from Arab lands have been fed, housed and absorbed by Israel since 1948 while 750,000 Palestinian refugees languish in camps, dependent on United Nations handouts

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Marqusee 2010, p. 215 Marqusee, Mike (2010). If I am not for myself : journey of an anti-Zionist Jew (2nd ed.). Verso Books. ISBN 9781844674350. OCLC 467772291.

Gat 2013, pp. 23–24 Gat, Moshe (2013). The Jewish exodus from Iraq : 1948-1951. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 9780714642239. OCLC 833072860.

Hillel 1987 Hillel, Shlomo (1987). Operation Babylon : The Story of the Rescue of the Jews of Iran. Translated by Friedman, Ina. Doubleday. ISBN 9780385235976. OCLC 966124447.

Somekh 2007 Somekh, Sasson (2007). Baghdad, yesterday: The making of an Arab Jew. Ibis Editions. ISBN 9789659012589. OCLC 891546268.

Gat 2013, p. 36 Gat, Moshe (2013). The Jewish exodus from Iraq : 1948-1951. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 9780714642239. OCLC 833072860.

Gat 2013, pp. 119, 124, 125, 127 Gat, Moshe (2013). The Jewish exodus from Iraq : 1948-1951. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 9780714642239. OCLC 833072860.

Gat 2013, pp. 123–125 "He declared to the Arab world that the despatch of large numbers of Jews was intended to expedite the collapse of the infant state of Israel, since its capacity was limited, and it could not absorb the flood of immigrants. One cannot ignore this aspect of the situation. It is highly likely that one of Nuri as-Said's motives in trying to expel large numbers of Jews was the desire to aggravate Israel's economic problems. At the same time, however, he was well aware of Israel's absorption policy, namely her capacity for absorbing immigrants on which she based her future." Gat, Moshe (2013). The Jewish exodus from Iraq : 1948-1951. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 9780714642239. OCLC 833072860.

Gat 2013, p. 119 Gat, Moshe (2013). The Jewish exodus from Iraq : 1948-1951. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 9780714642239. OCLC 833072860.

Gat 2013, p. 128 Gat, Moshe (2013). The Jewish exodus from Iraq : 1948-1951. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 9780714642239. OCLC 833072860.

Operation Ezra and Nehemiah (English Wikipedia)

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