References analysis of the Wikipedia article "Operation Grand Slam" in the English version

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In Pakistani theory, the border between Pakistani Punjab and Indian-administered Kashmir was a "working boundary", not an international border. India did not such recognise such a distinction. (Nawaz, Crossed Swords (2008, p. 207)) Nawaz, Shuja (2008), Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-547660-6

Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent (2013), p. 159: "Despite its bold objectives and initial success, Grand Slam failed in both its military and its political objectives. Militarily, Grand Slam was to result in the capture of the vital town of Akhnur which was a clear and stated objective of the operation, the only question mark being what troops of the 12 Division would do next...Politically, too, Grand Slam failed in its primary objective; the application of military force inside ICK had failed to convince either the Indian government or the international community that it was time for India to accept arbitration or a plebiscite in Kashmir to resolve the issue once and for all.'" Bajwa, Farooq (2013), From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, London: C. Hurst & Co, ISBN 978-1-84904-230-7

Nawaz, Crossed Swords (2008), p. 207. Nawaz, Shuja (2008), Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-547660-6

Roy & Gates, Unconventional Warfare in South Asia (2014): "By late 1964, Pakistan had developed two interrelated plans known as Operation GIBRALTAR and Operation GRANDSLAM to 'liberate' Kashmir." Roy, Kaushik; Gates, Scott (2014), Unconventional Warfare in South Asia: Shadow Warriors and Counterinsurgency, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., ISBN 978-1-4724-0579-1

Sirrs, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (2016), p. 52. Sirrs, Owen L. (2016), Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations, Routledge, ISBN 978-1-317-19609-9

Nawaz, Crossed Swords (2008), p. 208: "Akhtar Malik, while reluctant to fully tie himself down to that objective, acceded to the request in his meeting with Ayub and others. But, in his operational instructions to his commanders, he kept the option open once he had broken through the Indian defences [at Akhnur]." Nawaz, Shuja (2008), Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-547660-6

Nawaz, Crossed Swords (2008), p. 213: "He wanted to keep the attack on Jammu his secret weapon, since that would have effectively cut off all Indian troops in Kashmir from India proper by commanding a choke point that would cut off the road from Pathankot through Jammu via Udhampur and Srinagar. Jammu was not on the official list of targets for that very reason; Pakistan did not want to provoke a wider war." (emphasis added) Nawaz, Shuja (2008), Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-547660-6

Van Praagh, The Greater Game (2003), p. 293: "By slicing the road between Delhi and Srinagar, Islamic Pakistan sought finally to cut off the treasured Vale of Kashmir and its defenders from hated Hindu India." Van Praagh, David (2003), The Greater Game: India's Race with Destiny and China, McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP, ISBN 978-0-7735-2639-6

Sirrs, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (2016), p. 52: "The result of this second plan was Operation GRAND SLAM, which would only be implemented if GIBRALTAR had succeeded in liberating Srinagar." Sirrs, Owen L. (2016), Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations, Routledge, ISBN 978-1-317-19609-9

Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism (2015), p. 44: In order to be able to retrieve the situation in case this operation got into trouble, to give it a new lease on life, or to fully exploit the advantage gained in the event of its success, Operation Grand Slam was planned... According to some Pakistani Army officers, it was foreseen then that the value of Operation Gibraltar would be fully encashed after Grand Slam succeeded in wresting control of Akhnur. Abbas, Hassan (2015), Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, Routledge, ISBN 978-1-317-46328-3

Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 83: "The operation, which aimed at capturing Akhnur, was not a clearly defined military plan.... The more likely goal was for the operation to build pressure on the Indian army while the Gibraltar forces carried on their work." Jamal, Arif (2009), Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir, Melville House, ISBN 978-1-933633-59-6

Nawaz, Crossed Swords (2008), p. 207: "The Chief [Musa] and the CGS, General Sher Bahadur, had from its inception viewed Gibraltar as a bastard child, born of the liaison between the Foreign Minister [Bhutto] and General Malik." Nawaz, Shuja (2008), Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-547660-6

Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 83: "Operation Grand Slam required Pakistani troops to cross a small section of the international border between Jammu in Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir and the Pakistani city of Sialkot." Jamal, Arif (2009), Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir, Melville House, ISBN 978-1-933633-59-6

Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent (2013), p. 130: "Not only did it mean that the Pakistan Army would have to cross a small section of the international border between Sialkot and Jammu, it also made the prospect of an all-out war very real." Bajwa, Farooq (2013), From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, London: C. Hurst & Co, ISBN 978-1-84904-230-7

Pradhan, R. D. (2007), 1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War, Atlantic Publishers & Dist, p. 12, ISBN 978-81-269-0762-5

Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent (2013), p. 130. Bajwa, Farooq (2013), From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, London: C. Hurst & Co, ISBN 978-1-84904-230-7

Jamal, Shadow War 2009, p. 83. Jamal, Arif (2009), Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir, Melville House, ISBN 978-1-933633-59-6

Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent (2013), p. 130–132. Bajwa, Farooq (2013), From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, London: C. Hurst & Co, ISBN 978-1-84904-230-7

Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent (2013), p. 132. Bajwa, Farooq (2013), From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, London: C. Hurst & Co, ISBN 978-1-84904-230-7

Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent (2013), p. 133: "Whatever Ayub's hope of a short war and Bhutto's hope of India confining the war to Kashmir, there was little doubt in the minds of 12 Division and its commander [General Malik] that the launch of Grand Slam would lead to general war with India. In a briefing to his senior officers before its launch, Malik was told by an obviously startled brigadier that 'This would mean war with India'. Malik replied sarcastically, 'You've been paid long enough to make a war.'" Bajwa, Farooq (2013), From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, London: C. Hurst & Co, ISBN 978-1-84904-230-7

Hiranandani, Vice Admiral GM (2013), Transition to Guardianship: The Indian Navy 1991–2000, Lancer Publishers LLC, ISBN 978-1-935501-66-4

Operation Grand Slam (English Wikipedia)

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