Peano 1889, p. 1. Peano, Giuseppe (1889). Arithmetices principia, nova methodo exposita [The principles of arithmetic, presented by a new method]. An excerpt of the treatise where Peano first presented his axioms, and recursively defined arithmetical operations. Fratres Bocca. pp. 83–97.
Fritz 1952, p. 137 An illustration of 'interpretation' is Russell's own definition of 'cardinal number'. The uninterpreted system in this case is Peano's axioms for the number system, whose three primitive ideas and five axioms, Peano believed, were sufficient to enable one to derive all the properties of the system of natural numbers. Actually, Russell maintains, Peano's axioms define any progression of the form of which the series of the natural numbers is one instance. Fritz, Charles A. Jr. (1952). Bertrand Russell's construction of the external world. New York, Humanities Press.
Gray 2013, p. 133 So Poincaré turned to see whether logicism could generate arithmetic, more precisely, the arithmetic of ordinals. Couturat, said Poincaré, had accepted the Peano axioms as a definition of a number. But this will not do. The axioms cannot be shown to be free of contradiction by finding examples of them, and any attempt to show that they were contradiction-free by examining the totality of their implications would require the very principle of mathematical induction Couturat believed they implied. For (in a further passage dropped from S&M) either one assumed the principle in order to prove it, which would only prove that if it is true it is not self-contradictory, which says nothing; or one used the principle in another form than the one stated, in which case one must show that the number of steps in one's reasoning was an integer according to the new definition, but this could not be done (1905c, 834). Gray, Jeremy (2013). "The Essayist". Henri Poincaré: A scientific biography. Princeton University Press. p. 133. ISBN978-0-691-15271-4.
Fritz 1952, p. 137 An illustration of 'interpretation' is Russell's own definition of 'cardinal number'. The uninterpreted system in this case is Peano's axioms for the number system, whose three primitive ideas and five axioms, Peano believed, were sufficient to enable one to derive all the properties of the system of natural numbers. Actually, Russell maintains, Peano's axioms define any progression of the form of which the series of the natural numbers is one instance. Fritz, Charles A. Jr. (1952). Bertrand Russell's construction of the external world. New York, Humanities Press.
Gray 2013, p. 133 So Poincaré turned to see whether logicism could generate arithmetic, more precisely, the arithmetic of ordinals. Couturat, said Poincaré, had accepted the Peano axioms as a definition of a number. But this will not do. The axioms cannot be shown to be free of contradiction by finding examples of them, and any attempt to show that they were contradiction-free by examining the totality of their implications would require the very principle of mathematical induction Couturat believed they implied. For (in a further passage dropped from S&M) either one assumed the principle in order to prove it, which would only prove that if it is true it is not self-contradictory, which says nothing; or one used the principle in another form than the one stated, in which case one must show that the number of steps in one's reasoning was an integer according to the new definition, but this could not be done (1905c, 834). Gray, Jeremy (2013). "The Essayist". Henri Poincaré: A scientific biography. Princeton University Press. p. 133. ISBN978-0-691-15271-4.
Wang 1957, pp. 145, 147, "It is rather well-known, through Peano's own acknowledgement, that Peano […] made extensive use of Grassmann's work in his development of the axioms. It is not so well-known that Grassmann had essentially the characterization of the set of all integers, now customary in texts of modern algebra, that it forms an ordered integral domain in wihich each set of positive elements has a least member. […] [Grassmann's book] was probably the first serious and rather successful attempt to put numbers on a more or less axiomatic basis.". Wang, Hao (June 1957). "The Axiomatization of Arithmetic". The Journal of Symbolic Logic. 22 (2). Association for Symbolic Logic: 145–158. doi:10.2307/2964176. JSTOR2964176. S2CID26896458.
Meseguer & Goguen 1986, sections 2.3 (p. 464) and 4.1 (p. 471). Meseguer, José; Goguen, Joseph A. (Dec 1986). "Initiality, induction, and computability". In Maurice Nivat and John C. Reynolds (ed.). Algebraic Methods in Semantics(PDF). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 459–541. ISBN978-0-521-26793-9.
jstor.org
Wang 1957, pp. 145, 147, "It is rather well-known, through Peano's own acknowledgement, that Peano […] made extensive use of Grassmann's work in his development of the axioms. It is not so well-known that Grassmann had essentially the characterization of the set of all integers, now customary in texts of modern algebra, that it forms an ordered integral domain in wihich each set of positive elements has a least member. […] [Grassmann's book] was probably the first serious and rather successful attempt to put numbers on a more or less axiomatic basis.". Wang, Hao (June 1957). "The Axiomatization of Arithmetic". The Journal of Symbolic Logic. 22 (2). Association for Symbolic Logic: 145–158. doi:10.2307/2964176. JSTOR2964176. S2CID26896458.
Wang 1957, pp. 145, 147, "It is rather well-known, through Peano's own acknowledgement, that Peano […] made extensive use of Grassmann's work in his development of the axioms. It is not so well-known that Grassmann had essentially the characterization of the set of all integers, now customary in texts of modern algebra, that it forms an ordered integral domain in wihich each set of positive elements has a least member. […] [Grassmann's book] was probably the first serious and rather successful attempt to put numbers on a more or less axiomatic basis.". Wang, Hao (June 1957). "The Axiomatization of Arithmetic". The Journal of Symbolic Logic. 22 (2). Association for Symbolic Logic: 145–158. doi:10.2307/2964176. JSTOR2964176. S2CID26896458.