References analysis of the Wikipedia article "Philosophical aspects of the abortion debate" in the English version

archive.org

Warren 1973, p. 457. The same point is made in Tooley 1972, pp. 40–43; Singer 2000, pp. 126–128, 155–156; Pojman 1994, p. 280; and elsewhere. "Person" can also be used in two senses. In John Locke's sense (consciousness as the basis of personal identity, which is often employed in discussions of personal identity), "person" is a descriptive term that tells us about a being's psychological properties. In Warren's sense, "person" is a moral or evaluative term that tells us about a being's moral properties. Warren and others hold, however, that being a person in the moral sense actually requires being a person in the psychological sense. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.

Warren, M A (1996) [1982]. "Postscript on Infanticide" (PDF). On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion (4th ed. excerpt excl. notes).

Mappes & DeGrazia 2001

Warren 1973

Tooley, Michael (Autumn 1972). "Abortion and Infanticide". Philosophy and Public Affairs. 2 (1). pp. 37–65, at 52–53.

Singer, P (2000). Writings on an Ethical Life. Ecco (HarperCollins). ISBN 978-0-06-019838-1.

Pojman, L (1994). "Abortion: A Defense of the Personhood Argument". The Abortion Controversy.

Pojman & Beckwith 1998

Singer 2000, pp. 128, 156–157. Singer, P (2000). Writings on an Ethical Life. Ecco (HarperCollins). ISBN 978-0-06-019838-1.
Stretton 2004b, p. 267, original emphasis; see Glover 1977, pp. 98–99; Singer 2000, p. 137; Boonin 2003, pp. 64–70. Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039. Glover, J (1977). Causing Death and Saving Lives. London: Penguin. Singer, P (2000). Writings on an Ethical Life. Ecco (HarperCollins). ISBN 978-0-06-019838-1. Boonin, D (2003). A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.
Singer 2000, pp. 186–193. Singer, P (2000). Writings on an Ethical Life. Ecco (HarperCollins). ISBN 978-0-06-019838-1.

colorado.edu

spot.colorado.edu

Warren 1973. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.

Warren, M A (1996) [1982]. "Postscript on Infanticide" (PDF). On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion (4th ed. excerpt excl. notes).

Mappes & DeGrazia 2001

Warren 1973

Warren 1973, p. 457. The same point is made in Tooley 1972, pp. 40–43; Singer 2000, pp. 126–128, 155–156; Pojman 1994, p. 280; and elsewhere. "Person" can also be used in two senses. In John Locke's sense (consciousness as the basis of personal identity, which is often employed in discussions of personal identity), "person" is a descriptive term that tells us about a being's psychological properties. In Warren's sense, "person" is a moral or evaluative term that tells us about a being's moral properties. Warren and others hold, however, that being a person in the moral sense actually requires being a person in the psychological sense. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
- Warren 1973, p. 458. Glover 1977, p. 127 and English 1975, pp. 316–317 also refer to a "cluster" of properties as constituting personhood. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
  - Warren 1973, pp. 458–459. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
    - Warren 1973; Steinbock 1992, p. 78. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.

doi.org

Kerckhove, Lee F; Waller, Sara (1998). "Fetal personhood and the sorites paradox". The Journal of Value Inquiry. 32 (2): 175–189. doi:10.1023/a:1004375726894. PMID 15295850. S2CID 37563125.

Warren, M A (1996) [1982]. "Postscript on Infanticide" (PDF). On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion (4th ed. excerpt excl. notes).

Mappes & DeGrazia 2001

Warren 1973

Warren 1973, p. 457. The same point is made in Tooley 1972, pp. 40–43; Singer 2000, pp. 126–128, 155–156; Pojman 1994, p. 280; and elsewhere. "Person" can also be used in two senses. In John Locke's sense (consciousness as the basis of personal identity, which is often employed in discussions of personal identity), "person" is a descriptive term that tells us about a being's psychological properties. In Warren's sense, "person" is a moral or evaluative term that tells us about a being's moral properties. Warren and others hold, however, that being a person in the moral sense actually requires being a person in the psychological sense. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
- Warren 1973, p. 458. Glover 1977, p. 127 and English 1975, pp. 316–317 also refer to a "cluster" of properties as constituting personhood. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
  - Warren 1973, pp. 458–459. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
    - Michael Tooley argues that the bearer of a right to life must conceive of itself "as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states" (Tooley 1972, p. 44), or must at some time possess "the concept of a continuing self or mental substance" (Tooley 1984, p. 218). Tooley, Michael (Autumn 1972). "Abortion and Infanticide". Philosophy and Public Affairs. 2 (1). pp. 37–65, at 52–53. Tooley, M (1984). "In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide". What Is a Person?. pp. 83–114. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-3950-5_4. ISBN 978-1-4612-8412-3. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 209–233.
    - Jones, D. Gareth (1 December 1989). "Brain birth and personal identity". Journal of Medical Ethics. 15 (4): 173–185. doi:10.1136/jme.15.4.173. ISSN 0306-6800. PMC 1375829. PMID 2614785.
    - Jones, D. Gareth (1998). "The Problematic Symmetry between Brain Birth and Brain Death". Journal of Medical Ethics. 24 (4): 237–42. doi:10.1136/jme.24.4.237. JSTOR 27718134. PMC 1377672. PMID 9752625.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 197; Schwarz 1990, p. 89; Rogers 1992; Beckwith 1993, p. 108; Larmer 1995, pp. 245–248; Lee & George 2005, p. 263. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094. Schwarz, S (1990). The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Chapter 8. Rogers, K (1992). "Personhood, Potentiality, and the Temporarily Comatose Patient". Public Affairs Quarterly. 6 (2): 245–254. PMID 11652631. Beckwith, F (1993). Politically Correct Death. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books. Chapter 7. Larmer, R (1995). "Abortion, Personhood and the Potential for Consciousness". Journal of Applied Philosophy. 12 (3): 241–251. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1995.tb00136.x. Lee, P; George, R (2005). "The Wrong of Abortion". In Cohen, A; Wellman, C (eds.). Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 13–26, at 20–21.
    - Stretton 2004b, p. 267, original emphasis; see Glover 1977, pp. 98–99; Singer 2000, p. 137; Boonin 2003, pp. 64–70. Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039. Glover, J (1977). Causing Death and Saving Lives. London: Penguin. Singer, P (2000). Writings on an Ethical Life. Ecco (HarperCollins). ISBN 978-0-06-019838-1. Boonin, D (2003). A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.
    - Warren 1982. Warren, M A (July 1982). "Abortion and Moral Theory". Analytic Philosophy. 23 (3): 184–187. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1982.tb00178.x.
    - Grisez 1970, pp. 277–287; Lee 1996, 2004; Lee & George 2005, pp. 16–20; Schwarz 1990, pp. 91–93; Beckwith 1993, pp. 108–110; Reichlin 1997, pp. 22–23; and many others. By contrast, on Marquis's view, one could fail to have a right to life, for example by becoming irreversibly comatose, since one's future would then lack valuable experiences and activities. Grisez, G (1970). Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York: Corpus Books. Lee, P (1996). Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. Chapter 4. Lee, P (June 2004). "The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defense". Bioethics. 18 (3): 249–263. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00393.x. PMID 15341038. Lee, P; George, R (2005). "The Wrong of Abortion". In Cohen, A; Wellman, C (eds.). Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 13–26, at 20–21. Schwarz, S (1990). The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Chapter 8. Beckwith, F (1993). Politically Correct Death. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books. Chapter 7. Reichlin, M (1997). "The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal". Bioethics. 11 (1): 1–23. doi:10.1111/1467-8519.00041. PMID 11656607.
    - See Lee 2004, pp. 254–255; Lee & George 2005, pp. 18–19; Schwarz 1990, pp. 108–109. Lee, P (June 2004). "The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defense". Bioethics. 18 (3): 249–263. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00393.x. PMID 15341038. Lee, P; George, R (2005). "The Wrong of Abortion". In Cohen, A; Wellman, C (eds.). Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 13–26, at 20–21. Schwarz, S (1990). The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Chapter 8.
    - McMahan 2002, pp. 261–265; Stretton 2004b, pp. 281–-282. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press. Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039.
    - Stretton 2004b, pp. 270–274 (both responses); McMahan 2002, p. 217 (spectrum argument only). Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press.
    - McMahan 2002, pp. 209–217; Stretton 2004b, pp. 275–276. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press. Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039.
    - Stretton 2004b, p. 276 (both points); Boonin 2003, p. 55 (irreversibly comatose only). Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039. Boonin, D (2003). A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.
    - Marquis 1989. For a similar argument (published earlier), see Stone 1987; Stone 1994. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094. Stone, J (1987). "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17 (4): 815–30. doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920. S2CID 147106418. Stone, J (1994). "Why Potentiality Still Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 24 (2): 281–94. doi:10.1080/00455091.1994.10717370. S2CID 170338877.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 190. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 189. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 190. The type of wrongness appealed to here is presumptive or prima facie wrongness, and may be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 192. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 183. Although Marquis views the killing of an embryo or normal human adult as seriously wrong, he avoids any reference to "rights" or the "right to life", and so is apparently not committed to deontological ethics. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Stone 1987, pp. 816–817; cf Marquis 1989, pp. 201–202. Stone, J (1987). "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17 (4): 815–30. doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920. S2CID 147106418. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Supporters of the embodied mind view include Tooley 1984, pp. 218–219 (using the term "subject of consciousness"); McMahan 2002, ch 1; and Hasker 1999, ch 7. Supporters of the personhood view include Warren 1978, p. 18; McInerney 1990 (though there is some ambiguity); Doepke 1996, ch 9; and Baker 2000. Tooley, M (1984). "In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide". What Is a Person?. pp. 83–114. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-3950-5_4. ISBN 978-1-4612-8412-3. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 209–233. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press. Hasker, W (1999). The Emergent Self. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Warren, M A (1978). "Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?". In Sikora, R I; Barry, B (eds.). Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. pp. 14–30. ISBN 9781874267317. JSTOR j.ctv289dvx3.5. McInerney, P K (May 1990). "Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?". Journal of Philosophy. 87 (5): 264–268. doi:10.2307/2026834. JSTOR 2026834. PMID 11782096. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 357–360. Doepke, F (1996). The Kinds of Things. Chicago: Open Court. Baker, L (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 198. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Cf Stone 1994, 282 n 4. Stone, J (1994). "Why Potentiality Still Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 24 (2): 281–94. doi:10.1080/00455091.1994.10717370. S2CID 170338877.
    - Paske 1994, p. 365; Stretton 2004b, pp. 250–260; see also McMahan 2002, pp. 234–235, 271. Paske, G (1994). "Abortion and the Neo-Natal Right to Life: A Critique of Marquis's Futurist Argument". The Abortion Controversy. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 361–371. Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press.
    - McInerney 1990; McMahan 2002, p. 271; Stretton 2004a, pp. 171–179. McInerney, P K (May 1990). "Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?". Journal of Philosophy. 87 (5): 264–268. doi:10.2307/2026834. JSTOR 2026834. PMID 11782096. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 357–360. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press. Stretton, D (2004a). "The Deprivation Argument Against Abortion". Bioethics. 18 (2): 144–180. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00386.x. PMID 15148946.
    - Pruski, Michal; Playford, Richard C. (21 October 2022). "Artificial Wombs, Thomson and Abortion – What Might Change?". Diametros. 19 (73): 35–53. doi:10.33392/diam.1794. ISSN 1733-5566. Archived from the original on 24 October 2023.
    - Warren 1973; Steinbock 1992, p. 78. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
      - Beckwith 2006. Beckwith, F (April 2006). "Defending Abortion Philosophically". Journal of Medicine & Philosophy. 31: 177–203. doi:10.1080/03605310600588723.

jstor.org

Jones, D. Gareth (1998). "The Problematic Symmetry between Brain Birth and Brain Death". Journal of Medical Ethics. 24 (4): 237–42. doi:10.1136/jme.24.4.237. JSTOR 27718134. PMC 1377672. PMID 9752625.

Marquis 1989, p. 197; Schwarz 1990, p. 89; Rogers 1992; Beckwith 1993, p. 108; Larmer 1995, pp. 245–248; Lee & George 2005, p. 263. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094. Schwarz, S (1990). The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Chapter 8. Rogers, K (1992). "Personhood, Potentiality, and the Temporarily Comatose Patient". Public Affairs Quarterly. 6 (2): 245–254. PMID 11652631. Beckwith, F (1993). Politically Correct Death. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books. Chapter 7. Larmer, R (1995). "Abortion, Personhood and the Potential for Consciousness". Journal of Applied Philosophy. 12 (3): 241–251. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1995.tb00136.x. Lee, P; George, R (2005). "The Wrong of Abortion". In Cohen, A; Wellman, C (eds.). Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 13–26, at 20–21.

Marquis 1989. For a similar argument (published earlier), see Stone 1987; Stone 1994. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094. Stone, J (1987). "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17 (4): 815–30. doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920. S2CID 147106418. Stone, J (1994). "Why Potentiality Still Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 24 (2): 281–94. doi:10.1080/00455091.1994.10717370. S2CID 170338877.

Marquis 1989, p. 190. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.

Marquis 1989, p. 189. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.

Marquis 1989, p. 190. The type of wrongness appealed to here is presumptive or prima facie wrongness, and may be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.

Marquis 1989, p. 192. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.

Marquis 1989, p. 183. Although Marquis views the killing of an embryo or normal human adult as seriously wrong, he avoids any reference to "rights" or the "right to life", and so is apparently not committed to deontological ethics. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.

Stone 1987, pp. 816–817; cf Marquis 1989, pp. 201–202. Stone, J (1987). "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17 (4): 815–30. doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920. S2CID 147106418. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.

Supporters of the embodied mind view include Tooley 1984, pp. 218–219 (using the term "subject of consciousness"); McMahan 2002, ch 1; and Hasker 1999, ch 7. Supporters of the personhood view include Warren 1978, p. 18; McInerney 1990 (though there is some ambiguity); Doepke 1996, ch 9; and Baker 2000. Tooley, M (1984). "In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide". What Is a Person?. pp. 83–114. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-3950-5_4. ISBN 978-1-4612-8412-3. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 209–233. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press. Hasker, W (1999). The Emergent Self. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Warren, M A (1978). "Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?". In Sikora, R I; Barry, B (eds.). Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. pp. 14–30. ISBN 9781874267317. JSTOR j.ctv289dvx3.5. McInerney, P K (May 1990). "Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?". Journal of Philosophy. 87 (5): 264–268. doi:10.2307/2026834. JSTOR 2026834. PMID 11782096. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 357–360. Doepke, F (1996). The Kinds of Things. Chicago: Open Court. Baker, L (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.

Marquis 1989, p. 198. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.

McInerney 1990; McMahan 2002, p. 271; Stretton 2004a, pp. 171–179. McInerney, P K (May 1990). "Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?". Journal of Philosophy. 87 (5): 264–268. doi:10.2307/2026834. JSTOR 2026834. PMID 11782096. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 357–360. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press. Stretton, D (2004a). "The Deprivation Argument Against Abortion". Bioethics. 18 (2): 144–180. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00386.x. PMID 15148946.

Manninen, Bertha Alvarez (2013). "Yes, the baby should live: a pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva". Journal of Medical Ethics. 39 (5): 330–335. ISSN 0306-6800. JSTOR 43282725.

Hursthouse, Rosalind (1991). "Virtue Theory and Abortion". Philosophy & Public Affairs. 20 (3): 223–246. JSTOR 2265432. PMID 11659356.

nih.gov

pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

Kerckhove, Lee F; Waller, Sara (1998). "Fetal personhood and the sorites paradox". The Journal of Value Inquiry. 32 (2): 175–189. doi:10.1023/a:1004375726894. PMID 15295850. S2CID 37563125.

Warren, M A (1996) [1982]. "Postscript on Infanticide" (PDF). On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion (4th ed. excerpt excl. notes).

Mappes & DeGrazia 2001

Warren 1973

Warren 1973, p. 457. The same point is made in Tooley 1972, pp. 40–43; Singer 2000, pp. 126–128, 155–156; Pojman 1994, p. 280; and elsewhere. "Person" can also be used in two senses. In John Locke's sense (consciousness as the basis of personal identity, which is often employed in discussions of personal identity), "person" is a descriptive term that tells us about a being's psychological properties. In Warren's sense, "person" is a moral or evaluative term that tells us about a being's moral properties. Warren and others hold, however, that being a person in the moral sense actually requires being a person in the psychological sense. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
- Warren 1973, p. 458. Glover 1977, p. 127 and English 1975, pp. 316–317 also refer to a "cluster" of properties as constituting personhood. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
  - Warren 1973, pp. 458–459. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
    - Jones, D. Gareth (1 December 1989). "Brain birth and personal identity". Journal of Medical Ethics. 15 (4): 173–185. doi:10.1136/jme.15.4.173. ISSN 0306-6800. PMC 1375829. PMID 2614785.
    - Jones, D. Gareth (1998). "The Problematic Symmetry between Brain Birth and Brain Death". Journal of Medical Ethics. 24 (4): 237–42. doi:10.1136/jme.24.4.237. JSTOR 27718134. PMC 1377672. PMID 9752625.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 197; Schwarz 1990, p. 89; Rogers 1992; Beckwith 1993, p. 108; Larmer 1995, pp. 245–248; Lee & George 2005, p. 263. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094. Schwarz, S (1990). The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Chapter 8. Rogers, K (1992). "Personhood, Potentiality, and the Temporarily Comatose Patient". Public Affairs Quarterly. 6 (2): 245–254. PMID 11652631. Beckwith, F (1993). Politically Correct Death. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books. Chapter 7. Larmer, R (1995). "Abortion, Personhood and the Potential for Consciousness". Journal of Applied Philosophy. 12 (3): 241–251. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1995.tb00136.x. Lee, P; George, R (2005). "The Wrong of Abortion". In Cohen, A; Wellman, C (eds.). Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 13–26, at 20–21.
    - Stretton 2004b, p. 267, original emphasis; see Glover 1977, pp. 98–99; Singer 2000, p. 137; Boonin 2003, pp. 64–70. Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039. Glover, J (1977). Causing Death and Saving Lives. London: Penguin. Singer, P (2000). Writings on an Ethical Life. Ecco (HarperCollins). ISBN 978-0-06-019838-1. Boonin, D (2003). A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.
    - Grisez 1970, pp. 277–287; Lee 1996, 2004; Lee & George 2005, pp. 16–20; Schwarz 1990, pp. 91–93; Beckwith 1993, pp. 108–110; Reichlin 1997, pp. 22–23; and many others. By contrast, on Marquis's view, one could fail to have a right to life, for example by becoming irreversibly comatose, since one's future would then lack valuable experiences and activities. Grisez, G (1970). Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York: Corpus Books. Lee, P (1996). Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. Chapter 4. Lee, P (June 2004). "The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defense". Bioethics. 18 (3): 249–263. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00393.x. PMID 15341038. Lee, P; George, R (2005). "The Wrong of Abortion". In Cohen, A; Wellman, C (eds.). Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 13–26, at 20–21. Schwarz, S (1990). The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Chapter 8. Beckwith, F (1993). Politically Correct Death. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books. Chapter 7. Reichlin, M (1997). "The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal". Bioethics. 11 (1): 1–23. doi:10.1111/1467-8519.00041. PMID 11656607.
    - See Lee 2004, pp. 254–255; Lee & George 2005, pp. 18–19; Schwarz 1990, pp. 108–109. Lee, P (June 2004). "The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defense". Bioethics. 18 (3): 249–263. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00393.x. PMID 15341038. Lee, P; George, R (2005). "The Wrong of Abortion". In Cohen, A; Wellman, C (eds.). Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 13–26, at 20–21. Schwarz, S (1990). The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Chapter 8.
    - McMahan 2002, pp. 261–265; Stretton 2004b, pp. 281–-282. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press. Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039.
    - Stretton 2004b, pp. 270–274 (both responses); McMahan 2002, p. 217 (spectrum argument only). Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press.
    - McMahan 2002, pp. 209–217; Stretton 2004b, pp. 275–276. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press. Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039.
    - Stretton 2004b, p. 276 (both points); Boonin 2003, p. 55 (irreversibly comatose only). Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039. Boonin, D (2003). A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.
    - Marquis 1989. For a similar argument (published earlier), see Stone 1987; Stone 1994. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094. Stone, J (1987). "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17 (4): 815–30. doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920. S2CID 147106418. Stone, J (1994). "Why Potentiality Still Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 24 (2): 281–94. doi:10.1080/00455091.1994.10717370. S2CID 170338877.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 190. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 189. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 190. The type of wrongness appealed to here is presumptive or prima facie wrongness, and may be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 192. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 183. Although Marquis views the killing of an embryo or normal human adult as seriously wrong, he avoids any reference to "rights" or the "right to life", and so is apparently not committed to deontological ethics. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Stone 1987, pp. 816–817; cf Marquis 1989, pp. 201–202. Stone, J (1987). "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17 (4): 815–30. doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920. S2CID 147106418. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Supporters of the embodied mind view include Tooley 1984, pp. 218–219 (using the term "subject of consciousness"); McMahan 2002, ch 1; and Hasker 1999, ch 7. Supporters of the personhood view include Warren 1978, p. 18; McInerney 1990 (though there is some ambiguity); Doepke 1996, ch 9; and Baker 2000. Tooley, M (1984). "In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide". What Is a Person?. pp. 83–114. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-3950-5_4. ISBN 978-1-4612-8412-3. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 209–233. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press. Hasker, W (1999). The Emergent Self. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Warren, M A (1978). "Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?". In Sikora, R I; Barry, B (eds.). Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. pp. 14–30. ISBN 9781874267317. JSTOR j.ctv289dvx3.5. McInerney, P K (May 1990). "Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?". Journal of Philosophy. 87 (5): 264–268. doi:10.2307/2026834. JSTOR 2026834. PMID 11782096. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 357–360. Doepke, F (1996). The Kinds of Things. Chicago: Open Court. Baker, L (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
    - Marquis 1989, p. 198. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
    - Paske 1994, p. 365; Stretton 2004b, pp. 250–260; see also McMahan 2002, pp. 234–235, 271. Paske, G (1994). "Abortion and the Neo-Natal Right to Life: A Critique of Marquis's Futurist Argument". The Abortion Controversy. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 361–371. Stretton, D (2004b). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. PMID 15341039. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press.
    - McInerney 1990; McMahan 2002, p. 271; Stretton 2004a, pp. 171–179. McInerney, P K (May 1990). "Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?". Journal of Philosophy. 87 (5): 264–268. doi:10.2307/2026834. JSTOR 2026834. PMID 11782096. In Pojman & Beckwith 1998, pp. 357–360. McMahan, J (2002). The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press. Stretton, D (2004a). "The Deprivation Argument Against Abortion". Bioethics. 18 (2): 144–180. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00386.x. PMID 15148946.
    - Warren 1973; Steinbock 1992, p. 78. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.
      - Hursthouse, Rosalind (1991). "Virtue Theory and Abortion". Philosophy & Public Affairs. 20 (3): 223–246. JSTOR 2265432. PMID 11659356.
      ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
      - Jones, D. Gareth (1 December 1989). "Brain birth and personal identity". Journal of Medical Ethics. 15 (4): 173–185. doi:10.1136/jme.15.4.173. ISSN 0306-6800. PMC 1375829. PMID 2614785.
      - Jones, D. Gareth (1998). "The Problematic Symmetry between Brain Birth and Brain Death". Journal of Medical Ethics. 24 (4): 237–42. doi:10.1136/jme.24.4.237. JSTOR 27718134. PMC 1377672. PMID 9752625.

philarchive.org

semanticscholar.org

api.semanticscholar.org

Kerckhove, Lee F; Waller, Sara (1998). "Fetal personhood and the sorites paradox". The Journal of Value Inquiry. 32 (2): 175–189. doi:10.1023/a:1004375726894. PMID 15295850. S2CID 37563125.

Warren 1973, p. 458. Glover 1977, p. 127 and English 1975, pp. 316–317 also refer to a "cluster" of properties as constituting personhood. Warren, M A (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist. 57 (1): 43–61. doi:10.5840/monist197357133. PMID 11661013. Reprinted in Mappes & DeGrazia 2001, pp. 456–463.

Warren, M A (1996) [1982]. "Postscript on Infanticide" (PDF). On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion (4th ed. excerpt excl. notes).

Mappes & DeGrazia 2001

Warren 1973

Glover, J (1977). Causing Death and Saving Lives. London: Penguin.

English, J (1975). "Abortion and the Concept of a Person". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 5 (2): 233–243. doi:10.1080/00455091.1975.10716109. PMID 11663579. S2CID 38354546.

Marquis 1989. For a similar argument (published earlier), see Stone 1987; Stone 1994. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094. Stone, J (1987). "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17 (4): 815–30. doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920. S2CID 147106418. Stone, J (1994). "Why Potentiality Still Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 24 (2): 281–94. doi:10.1080/00455091.1994.10717370. S2CID 170338877.
Stone 1987, pp. 816–817; cf Marquis 1989, pp. 201–202. Stone, J (1987). "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17 (4): 815–30. doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920. S2CID 147106418. Marquis, D (April 1989). "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. JSTOR 2026961. PMID 11782094.
Cf Stone 1994, 282 n 4. Stone, J (1994). "Why Potentiality Still Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 24 (2): 281–94. doi:10.1080/00455091.1994.10717370. S2CID 170338877.

Philosophical aspects of the abortion debate (English Wikipedia)

archive.org

bmj.com

jme.bmj.com

cedarville.edu

digitalcommons.cedarville.edu

colorado.edu

spot.colorado.edu

doi.org

jstor.org

nih.gov

pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

philarchive.org

prolifeadvocate.us

qctimes.com

semanticscholar.org

api.semanticscholar.org

uj.edu.pl

diametros.uj.edu.pl

web.archive.org

wired.com

worldcat.org