Philosophy of artificial intelligence (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Philosophy of artificial intelligence" in English language version.

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"[P]eople always tell me it was very hard to define consciousness, but I think if you're just looking for the kind of commonsense definition that you get at the beginning of the investigation, and not at the hard nosed scientific definition that comes at the end, it's not hard to give commonsense definition of consciousness." The Philosopher's Zone: The question of consciousness, Archived 2007-11-28 at the Wayback Machine. Also see Dennett 1991. Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9

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Heder, Mihaly; Paksi, Daniel (2012). "Autonomous Robots and Tacit Knowledge". Appraisal. 9 (2): 8–14 – via academia.edu.

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Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 947 define the philosophy of AI as consisting of the first two questions, and the additional question of the ethics of artificial intelligence. Fearn 2005, p. 55 writes "In the current literature, philosophy has two chief roles: to determine whether or not such machines would be conscious, and, second, to predict whether or not such machines are possible." The last question bears on the first two. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, p. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, p. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, p. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Dreyfus 1972, Dreyfus 1979, Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986. See also Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 950–952, Crevier 1993, pp. 120–132 and Fearn 2005, pp. 50–51. Dreyfus, Hubert (1972), What Computers Can't Do, New York: MIT Press, ISBN 978-0-06-011082-6 Dreyfus, Hubert (1979), What Computers Still Can't Do, New York: MIT Press Dreyfus, Hubert; Dreyfus, Stuart (1986), Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
Searle 1980. See also Cole 2004, Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 958–960, Crevier 1993, pp. 269–272 and Fearn 2005, pp. 43–50. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
Searle 1984. Searle, John (1984), Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures, Harvard University Press, ISBN 978-0-674-57631-5

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Article at Asimovlaws.com, July 2004, accessed 7/27/09. Archived June 30, 2009, at the Wayback Machine.

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Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 947 define the philosophy of AI as consisting of the first two questions, and the additional question of the ethics of artificial intelligence. Fearn 2005, p. 55 writes "In the current literature, philosophy has two chief roles: to determine whether or not such machines would be conscious, and, second, to predict whether or not such machines are possible." The last question bears on the first two. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
This is a paraphrase of the essential point of the Turing test. Turing 1950, Haugeland 1985, pp. 6–9, Crevier 1993, p. 24, Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 2–3, 948. Haugeland, John (1985), Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Newell & Simon 1976 and Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 18. Newell, Allen; Simon, H. A. (1976). "Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search". Communications of the ACM. 19 (3): 113–126. doi:10.1145/360018.360022. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, p. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, p. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, p. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
See Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 3, where they make the distinction between acting rationally and being rational, and define AI as the study of the former. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Turing 1950 and see Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 948, where they call his paper "famous" and write "Turing examined a wide variety of possible objections to the possibility of intelligent machines, including virtually all of those that have been raised in the half century since his paper appeared." Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 3. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 4–5, 32, 35, 36 and 56. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Russell & Norvig (2003, pp. 48–52) consider a thermostat a simple form of intelligent agent, known as a reflex agent. For an in-depth treatment of the role of the thermostat in philosophy see Chalmers (1996, pp. 293–301) "4. Is Experience Ubiquitous?" subsections What is it like to be a thermostat?, Whither panpsychism?, and Constraining the double-aspect principle. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Chalmers, David J (1996), The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, ISBN 978-0-19-511789-9
Kurzweil 2005, p. 262. Also see Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 957 and Crevier 1993, pp. 271 and 279. The most extreme form of this argument (the brain replacement scenario) was put forward by Clark Glymour in the mid-1970s and was touched on by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Searle in 1980. Kurzweil, Ray (2005), The Singularity is Near, New York: Viking Press, ISBN 978-0-670-03384-3 Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3.
Lucas 1961, Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 949–950, Hofstadter 1979, pp. 471–473, 476–477. Lucas, John (1961), "Minds, Machines and Gödel", in Anderson, A. R. (ed.), Minds and Machines Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Hofstadter, Douglas (1979), Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid
Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 950. They point out that real machines with finite memory can be modeled using propositional logic, which is formally decidable, and Gödel's argument does not apply to them. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Hofstadter 1979, pp. 476–477, Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 950, Turing 1950 under "The Argument from Mathematics" where he writes "although it is established that there are limitations to the powers of any particular machine, it has only been stated, without sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to the human intellect." Hofstadter, Douglas (1979), Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Dreyfus 1972, Dreyfus 1979, Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986. See also Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 950–952, Crevier 1993, pp. 120–132 and Fearn 2005, pp. 50–51. Dreyfus, Hubert (1972), What Computers Can't Do, New York: MIT Press, ISBN 978-0-06-011082-6 Dreyfus, Hubert (1979), What Computers Still Can't Do, New York: MIT Press Dreyfus, Hubert; Dreyfus, Stuart (1986), Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 950–951. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 52. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Turing 1950, under "(4) The Argument from Consciousness". See also Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 952–953, where they identify Searle's argument with Turing's "Argument from Consciousness." Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 947. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 954–956. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Searle 1980. See also Cole 2004, Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 958–960, Crevier 1993, pp. 269–272 and Fearn 2005, pp. 43–50. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
Searle 1980, under "1. The Systems Reply (Berkeley)", Crevier 1993, p. 269, Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 959, Cole 2004, 4.1. Among those who hold to the "system" position (according to Cole) are Ned Block, Jack Copeland, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Ray Kurzweil and Georges Rey. Those who have defended the "virtual mind" reply include Marvin Minsky, Alan Perlis, David Chalmers, Ned Block and J. Cole (again, according to Cole 2004). Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Newell & Simon 1976 and Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 18. Newell, Allen; Simon, H. A. (1976). "Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search". Communications of the ACM. 19 (3): 113–126. doi:10.1145/360018.360022. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, p. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, p. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, p. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Turing, Alan M. (1950). "Computing Machinery and Intelligence". Mind. 49 (236): 433–460. doi:10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433. Archived from the original on 2021-12-22. Retrieved 2020-10-18 – via cogprints.
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McCulloch & Pitts1943. McCulloch, Warren S.; Pitts, Walter (1 December 1943). "A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity". Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics. 5 (4): 115–133. doi:10.1007/BF02478259. ISSN 1522-9602.
Searle 1980, p. 11. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980, p. 7. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle writes "I like the straight forwardness of the claim." Searle 1980, p. 4. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Litt, Abninder; Eliasmith, Chris; Kroon, Frederick W.; Weinstein, Steven; Thagard, Paul (6 May 2006). "Is the Brain a Quantum Computer?". Cognitive Science. 30 (3): 593–603. doi:10.1207/s15516709cog0000_59. PMID 21702826.
See Brooks 1990, and Moravec 1988. Brooks, Rodney (1990), "Elephants Don't Play Chess" (PDF), Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 6 (1–2): 3–15, CiteSeerX 10.1.1.588.7539, doi:10.1016/S0921-8890(05)80025-9, retrieved 2007-08-30 Moravec, Hans (1988), Mind Children, Harvard University Press
For example, John Searle writes: "Can a machine think? The answer is, obvious, yes. We are precisely such machines." (Searle 1980, p. 11). Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980. See also Cole 2004, Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 958–960, Crevier 1993, pp. 269–272 and Fearn 2005, pp. 43–50. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
Searle 1980, p. 13. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980, under "1. The Systems Reply (Berkeley)", Crevier 1993, p. 269, Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 959, Cole 2004, 4.1. Among those who hold to the "system" position (according to Cole) are Ned Block, Jack Copeland, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Ray Kurzweil and Georges Rey. Those who have defended the "virtual mind" reply include Marvin Minsky, Alan Perlis, David Chalmers, Ned Block and J. Cole (again, according to Cole 2004). Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "2. The Robot Reply (Yale)". Cole 2004, 4.3 ascribes this position to Margaret Boden, Tim Crane, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Stevan Harnad, Hans Moravec and Georges Rey. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "3. The Brain Simulator Reply (Berkeley and M.I.T.)", Cole 2004, ascribes this position to Paul and Patricia Churchland and Ray Kurzweil. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980 under "5. The Other Minds Reply", Cole 2004, 4.4. Turing 1950 makes this reply under "(4) The Argument from Consciousness." Cole ascribes this position to Daniel Dennett and Hans Moravec. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"Kaplan Andreas; Michael Haenlein". Business Horizons. 62 (1): 15–25. January 2019. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2018.08.004. S2CID 158433736.

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This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, p. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, p. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, p. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Saygin 2000. Saygin, A. P.; Cicekli, I.; Akman, V. (2000), "Turing Test: 50 Years Later" (PDF), Minds and Machines, 10 (4): 463–518, doi:10.1023/A:1011288000451, hdl:11693/24987, S2CID 990084, archived from the original (PDF) on 9 April 2011, retrieved 7 January 2004
Searle 1980, p. 11. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980, p. 7. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle writes "I like the straight forwardness of the claim." Searle 1980, p. 4. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
For example, John Searle writes: "Can a machine think? The answer is, obvious, yes. We are precisely such machines." (Searle 1980, p. 11). Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980. See also Cole 2004, Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 958–960, Crevier 1993, pp. 269–272 and Fearn 2005, pp. 43–50. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
Searle 1980, p. 13. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980, under "1. The Systems Reply (Berkeley)", Crevier 1993, p. 269, Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 959, Cole 2004, 4.1. Among those who hold to the "system" position (according to Cole) are Ned Block, Jack Copeland, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Ray Kurzweil and Georges Rey. Those who have defended the "virtual mind" reply include Marvin Minsky, Alan Perlis, David Chalmers, Ned Block and J. Cole (again, according to Cole 2004). Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "2. The Robot Reply (Yale)". Cole 2004, 4.3 ascribes this position to Margaret Boden, Tim Crane, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Stevan Harnad, Hans Moravec and Georges Rey. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "3. The Brain Simulator Reply (Berkeley and M.I.T.)", Cole 2004, ascribes this position to Paul and Patricia Churchland and Ray Kurzweil. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980 under "5. The Other Minds Reply", Cole 2004, 4.4. Turing 1950 makes this reply under "(4) The Argument from Consciousness." Cole ascribes this position to Daniel Dennett and Hans Moravec. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"Kaplan Andreas; Michael Haenlein". Business Horizons. 62 (1): 15–25. January 2019. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2018.08.004. S2CID 158433736.

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Searle 1980. See also Cole 2004, Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 958–960, Crevier 1993, pp. 269–272 and Fearn 2005, pp. 43–50. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
Cole 2004, 2.1, Leibniz 1714, 17. Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Leibniz, Gottfried (1714), Monadology, translated by Ross, George MacDonald, archived from the original on July 3, 2011
Cole 2004, 2.3. Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "1. The Systems Reply (Berkeley)", Crevier 1993, p. 269, Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 959, Cole 2004, 4.1. Among those who hold to the "system" position (according to Cole) are Ned Block, Jack Copeland, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Ray Kurzweil and Georges Rey. Those who have defended the "virtual mind" reply include Marvin Minsky, Alan Perlis, David Chalmers, Ned Block and J. Cole (again, according to Cole 2004). Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Cole 2004, 4.2 ascribes this position to Ned Block, Daniel Dennett, Tim Maudlin, David Chalmers, Steven Pinker, Patricia Churchland and others. Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "2. The Robot Reply (Yale)". Cole 2004, 4.3 ascribes this position to Margaret Boden, Tim Crane, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Stevan Harnad, Hans Moravec and Georges Rey. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "3. The Brain Simulator Reply (Berkeley and M.I.T.)", Cole 2004, ascribes this position to Paul and Patricia Churchland and Ray Kurzweil. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980 under "5. The Other Minds Reply", Cole 2004, 4.4. Turing 1950 makes this reply under "(4) The Argument from Consciousness." Cole ascribes this position to Daniel Dennett and Hans Moravec. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Saygin 2000. Saygin, A. P.; Cicekli, I.; Akman, V. (2000), "Turing Test: 50 Years Later" (PDF), Minds and Machines, 10 (4): 463–518, doi:10.1023/A:1011288000451, hdl:11693/24987, S2CID 990084, archived from the original (PDF) on 9 April 2011, retrieved 7 January 2004

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This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, p. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, p. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, p. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
Searle 1980, p. 11. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980, p. 7. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle writes "I like the straight forwardness of the claim." Searle 1980, p. 4. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
For example, John Searle writes: "Can a machine think? The answer is, obvious, yes. We are precisely such machines." (Searle 1980, p. 11). Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980. See also Cole 2004, Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 958–960, Crevier 1993, pp. 269–272 and Fearn 2005, pp. 43–50. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
Searle 1980, p. 13. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980, under "1. The Systems Reply (Berkeley)", Crevier 1993, p. 269, Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 959, Cole 2004, 4.1. Among those who hold to the "system" position (according to Cole) are Ned Block, Jack Copeland, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Ray Kurzweil and Georges Rey. Those who have defended the "virtual mind" reply include Marvin Minsky, Alan Perlis, David Chalmers, Ned Block and J. Cole (again, according to Cole 2004). Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "2. The Robot Reply (Yale)". Cole 2004, 4.3 ascribes this position to Margaret Boden, Tim Crane, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Stevan Harnad, Hans Moravec and Georges Rey. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "3. The Brain Simulator Reply (Berkeley and M.I.T.)", Cole 2004, ascribes this position to Paul and Patricia Churchland and Ray Kurzweil. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980 under "5. The Other Minds Reply", Cole 2004, 4.4. Turing 1950 makes this reply under "(4) The Argument from Consciousness." Cole ascribes this position to Daniel Dennett and Hans Moravec. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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McCarthy et al. 1955. This assertion was printed in the program for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI." also Crevier 1993, p. 28. McCarthy, John; Minsky, Marvin; Rochester, Nathan; Shannon, Claude (1955), A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, archived from the original on 2008-09-30 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3.
This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, p. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, p. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, p. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
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Searle 1980, p. 11. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980, p. 7. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
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Searle writes "I like the straight forwardness of the claim." Searle 1980, p. 4. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Oppy, Graham (20 January 2015). "Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 3 May 2021. Retrieved 27 April 2016. These Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments are, however, problematic, and there is wide consensus that they fail.
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-4299-6935-2. Archived from the original on March 15, 2023. Retrieved April 8, 2012.
"[P]eople always tell me it was very hard to define consciousness, but I think if you're just looking for the kind of commonsense definition that you get at the beginning of the investigation, and not at the hard nosed scientific definition that comes at the end, it's not hard to give commonsense definition of consciousness." The Philosopher's Zone: The question of consciousness, Archived 2007-11-28 at the Wayback Machine. Also see Dennett 1991. Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9
For example, John Searle writes: "Can a machine think? The answer is, obvious, yes. We are precisely such machines." (Searle 1980, p. 11). Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Searle 1980. See also Cole 2004, Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 958–960, Crevier 1993, pp. 269–272 and Fearn 2005, pp. 43–50. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Fearn, Nicholas (2005), Philosophy: The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions, London: Atlantic Books, ISBN 1-84354-066-5
Searle 1980, p. 13. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23
Cole 2004, 2.1, Leibniz 1714, 17. Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Leibniz, Gottfried (1714), Monadology, translated by Ross, George MacDonald, archived from the original on July 3, 2011
Searle 1980, under "1. The Systems Reply (Berkeley)", Crevier 1993, p. 269, Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 959, Cole 2004, 4.1. Among those who hold to the "system" position (according to Cole) are Ned Block, Jack Copeland, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Ray Kurzweil and Georges Rey. Those who have defended the "virtual mind" reply include Marvin Minsky, Alan Perlis, David Chalmers, Ned Block and J. Cole (again, according to Cole 2004). Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Crevier, Daniel (1993). AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. New York, NY: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-02997-3. Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "2. The Robot Reply (Yale)". Cole 2004, 4.3 ascribes this position to Margaret Boden, Tim Crane, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Stevan Harnad, Hans Moravec and Georges Rey. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980, under "3. The Brain Simulator Reply (Berkeley and M.I.T.)", Cole 2004, ascribes this position to Paul and Patricia Churchland and Ray Kurzweil. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Searle 1980 under "5. The Other Minds Reply", Cole 2004, 4.4. Turing 1950 makes this reply under "(4) The Argument from Consciousness." Cole ascribes this position to Daniel Dennett and Hans Moravec. Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, p. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, p. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, p. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis." Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN 978-0-465-04521-1, OCLC 231867665 Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 978-0-7139-9037-9 Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs" (PDF), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, S2CID 55303721, archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-09-23 Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2
McCulloch & Pitts1943. McCulloch, Warren S.; Pitts, Walter (1 December 1943). "A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity". Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics. 5 (4): 115–133. doi:10.1007/BF02478259. ISSN 1522-9602.

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