Price of anarchy in auctions (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Price of anarchy in auctions" in English language version.

refsWebsite
Global rank English rank
2nd place
2nd place
207th place
136th place
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11th place
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acm.org (Global: 1,185th place; English: 840th place)

dl.acm.org

arxiv.org (Global: 69th place; English: 59th place)

doi.org (Global: 2nd place; English: 2nd place)

  • Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Milgrom, Paul (2005). "The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction". Combinatorial Auctions. p. 17. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.120.7158. doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002. ISBN 9780262033428.
  • Christodoulou, George; Kovács, Annamária; Schapira, Michael (2016). "Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions". Journal of the ACM. 63 (2): 1. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.721.5346. doi:10.1145/2835172. S2CID 17082117.
  • Bhawalkar, Kshipra; Roughgarden, Tim (2011). "Welfare Guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding". Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. p. 700. doi:10.1137/1.9781611973082.55. ISBN 978-0-89871-993-2.
  • Hassidim, Avinatan; Kaplan, Haim; Mansour, Yishay; Nisan, Noam (2011). "Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods". Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '11. p. 295. arXiv:1103.3950. doi:10.1145/1993574.1993619. ISBN 9781450302616.
  • A similar result for the case of complete information has already been presented by Bikhchandani, Sushil (1999). "Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects". Games and Economic Behavior. 26 (2): 193–220. doi:10.1006/game.1998.0659.: "In simultaneous first-price auctions, the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations contains the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium allocations which in turn contains the set of strict Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Hence, pure strategy Nash equilibria (when they exist) are efficient. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria may be inefficient. In simultaneous second-price auctions, any efficient allocation can be implemented as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if a Walrasian equilibrium exists."
  • Feldman, Michal; Fu, Hu; Gravin, Nick; Lucier, Brendan (2013). "Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient". Proceedings of the 45th annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing - STOC '13. p. 201. arXiv:1209.4703. doi:10.1145/2488608.2488634. ISBN 9781450320290.
  • Fu, Hu; Kleinberg, Robert; Lavi, Ron (2012). "Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding". Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC '12. p. 586. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.230.6195. doi:10.1145/2229012.2229055. ISBN 9781450314152.
  • Leme, Renato Paes; Syrgkanis, Vasilis; Tardos, Eva (2012). "Sequential Auctions and Externalities". Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. p. 869. arXiv:1108.2452. doi:10.1137/1.9781611973099.70. ISBN 978-1-61197-210-8.
  • Bae, Junjik; Beigman, Eyal; Berry, Randall; Honig, Michael; Vohra, Rakesh (2008). "Sequential Bandwidth and Power Auctions for Distributed Spectrum Sharing". IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. 26 (7): 1193. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.616.8533. doi:10.1109/JSAC.2008.080916. S2CID 28436853.
  • Bae, Junjik; Beigman, Eyal; Berry, Randall; Honig, Michael L.; Vohra, Rakesh (2009). "On the efficiency of sequential auctions for spectrum sharing". 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks. p. 199. doi:10.1109/gamenets.2009.5137402. ISBN 978-1-4244-4176-1.
  • Feldman, Michal; Lucier, Brendan; Syrgkanis, Vasilis (2013). "Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions". Web and Internet Economics. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 8289. p. 160. arXiv:1309.2529. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_14. ISBN 978-3-642-45045-7.
  • Syrgkanis, Vasilis; Tardos, Eva (2012). "Bayesian sequential auctions". Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce – EC '12. p. 929. arXiv:1206.4771. doi:10.1145/2229012.2229082. ISBN 9781450314152.
  • Leme, Renato Paes; Tardos, Eva (2010). "Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction". 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. p. 735. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.168.6636. doi:10.1109/FOCS.2010.75. ISBN 978-1-4244-8525-3.
  • Lucier, Brendan; Paes Leme, Renato (2011). "GSP auctions with correlated types". Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '11. p. 71. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.232.5139. doi:10.1145/1993574.1993587. ISBN 9781450302616.
  • Caragiannis, Ioannis; Kaklamanis, Christos; Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis; Kyropoulou, Maria (2011). "On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions". Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '11. p. 81. doi:10.1145/1993574.1993588. ISBN 9781450302616.
  • Alon, Noga; Emek, Yuval; Feldman, Michal; Tennenholtz, Moshe (2012). "Bayesian ignorance". Theoretical Computer Science. 452: 1–11. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2012.05.017.

psu.edu (Global: 207th place; English: 136th place)

citeseerx.ist.psu.edu

  • Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Milgrom, Paul (2005). "The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction". Combinatorial Auctions. p. 17. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.120.7158. doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002. ISBN 9780262033428.
  • Christodoulou, George; Kovács, Annamária; Schapira, Michael (2016). "Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions". Journal of the ACM. 63 (2): 1. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.721.5346. doi:10.1145/2835172. S2CID 17082117.
  • Fu, Hu; Kleinberg, Robert; Lavi, Ron (2012). "Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding". Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC '12. p. 586. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.230.6195. doi:10.1145/2229012.2229055. ISBN 9781450314152.
  • Bae, Junjik; Beigman, Eyal; Berry, Randall; Honig, Michael; Vohra, Rakesh (2008). "Sequential Bandwidth and Power Auctions for Distributed Spectrum Sharing". IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. 26 (7): 1193. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.616.8533. doi:10.1109/JSAC.2008.080916. S2CID 28436853.
  • Leme, Renato Paes; Tardos, Eva (2010). "Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction". 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. p. 735. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.168.6636. doi:10.1109/FOCS.2010.75. ISBN 978-1-4244-8525-3.
  • Lucier, Brendan; Paes Leme, Renato (2011). "GSP auctions with correlated types". Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '11. p. 71. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.232.5139. doi:10.1145/1993574.1993587. ISBN 9781450302616.

semanticscholar.org (Global: 11th place; English: 8th place)

api.semanticscholar.org