Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Roman Shukhevych" in English language version.
...on the German side and Roman Shukhevych ('Tur', 'Taras Chuprynka') as head of the Ukrainian staff, wore the uniform of the Wehrmacht.
Numerous lieux de memoire in the Western Ukraine eternalize OUN and UPA deeds. Moreover, a special law adopted in 2015 enshrines this memory and declares "unlawful" any public disrespect towards it. The nationalist memory narrative has been successfully customized in school textbooks since the 2000s. Not surprisingly, it neglects, ignores, or omits controversial aspects of the history and memory of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. For instance, it avoids discussions about the totalitarian and xenophobic nature of the OUN political program of the interwar period. It emphasizes the evolution of the nationalist movement towards "democracy and inclusion" since 1943 (forgetting that this evolution caused a bitter split within the OUN due to the stance of orthodox nationalists headed by Stepan Bandera, who did not accept this evolution). This narrative relativizes the collaboration of the OUN with Nazis, presenting it as an unavoidable necessity. It refutes the involvement of the OUN members in the extermination of Jews. It silences the killings of civilian Ukrainians by OUN and UPA members or justifies these actions as necessary. Similarly, it minimizes the role of the OUN and UPA in anti-Polish ethnic cleansing in Volhynia, relativizes it as a part of the Polish- Ukrainian war, and even justifies it as a Ukrainian response to the politics of the Polish state in the 1920s and the 1930s.
The OUN-UPA-planned ethnic cleansing continued unabated throughout summer 1943. The crescendo came on the night of July 11–12, 1943 when the UPA planned a highly coordinated attack (known among Poles as the 'Peter and Paul action' for the holiday on which it occurred) against Polish villages in three raions: Kovel', Khorokhiv, and Volodymyr-Volyns'kyi. Over one hundred localities were targeted in this action, and some 4,000 Poles were murdered. Finally, the last wave of attacks came in December 1943 before Shukhevych decided to move the cleansing operations to Galicia where tens of thousands more Galician Poles were murdered. Following the killings in Volhynia, the UPA-North group gave the order to 'destroy all traces of the Poles' by 'destroying all Polish churches and all other Polish places of worship'.
A diarist who was an OUN-B member in the Nachtigall Battalion travelled from L'viv to Vinnytsia, and noted: 'During our march, we saw with our own eyes the victims of the Jewish–Bolshevik terror, which strengthened our hatred of the Jews, and so, after that, we shot all the Jews we encountered in 2 villages'
Numerous lieux de memoire in the Western Ukraine eternalize OUN and UPA deeds. Moreover, a special law adopted in 2015 enshrines this memory and declares "unlawful" any public disrespect towards it. The nationalist memory narrative has been successfully customized in school textbooks since the 2000s. Not surprisingly, it neglects, ignores, or omits controversial aspects of the history and memory of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. For instance, it avoids discussions about the totalitarian and xenophobic nature of the OUN political program of the interwar period. It emphasizes the evolution of the nationalist movement towards "democracy and inclusion" since 1943 (forgetting that this evolution caused a bitter split within the OUN due to the stance of orthodox nationalists headed by Stepan Bandera, who did not accept this evolution). This narrative relativizes the collaboration of the OUN with Nazis, presenting it as an unavoidable necessity. It refutes the involvement of the OUN members in the extermination of Jews. It silences the killings of civilian Ukrainians by OUN and UPA members or justifies these actions as necessary. Similarly, it minimizes the role of the OUN and UPA in anti-Polish ethnic cleansing in Volhynia, relativizes it as a part of the Polish- Ukrainian war, and even justifies it as a Ukrainian response to the politics of the Polish state in the 1920s and the 1930s.
The OUN-UPA-planned ethnic cleansing continued unabated throughout summer 1943. The crescendo came on the night of July 11–12, 1943 when the UPA planned a highly coordinated attack (known among Poles as the 'Peter and Paul action' for the holiday on which it occurred) against Polish villages in three raions: Kovel', Khorokhiv, and Volodymyr-Volyns'kyi. Over one hundred localities were targeted in this action, and some 4,000 Poles were murdered. Finally, the last wave of attacks came in December 1943 before Shukhevych decided to move the cleansing operations to Galicia where tens of thousands more Galician Poles were murdered. Following the killings in Volhynia, the UPA-North group gave the order to 'destroy all traces of the Poles' by 'destroying all Polish churches and all other Polish places of worship'.
Presidents Yushchenko and Poroshenko, their parties, far right organizations, and many Ukrainian historians attempted to recast the OUN-B and the UPA as parts of a popular national liberation movement that fought against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and to present the OUN-B and UPA leaders as national heroes. They denied, minimized or justified the involvement of the OUN-B and the UPA leaders and members in the mass murder of Jews, Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians.
A diarist who was an OUN-B member in the Nachtigall Battalion travelled from L'viv to Vinnytsia, and noted: 'During our march, we saw with our own eyes the victims of the Jewish–Bolshevik terror, which strengthened our hatred of the Jews, and so, after that, we shot all the Jews we encountered in 2 villages'
Presidents Yushchenko and Poroshenko, their parties, far right organizations, and many Ukrainian historians attempted to recast the OUN-B and the UPA as parts of a popular national liberation movement that fought against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and to present the OUN-B and UPA leaders as national heroes. They denied, minimized or justified the involvement of the OUN-B and the UPA leaders and members in the mass murder of Jews, Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians.
A diarist who was an OUN-B member in the Nachtigall Battalion travelled from L'viv to Vinnytsia, and noted: 'During our march, we saw with our own eyes the victims of the Jewish–Bolshevik terror, which strengthened our hatred of the Jews, and so, after that, we shot all the Jews we encountered in 2 villages'
Numerous lieux de memoire in the Western Ukraine eternalize OUN and UPA deeds. Moreover, a special law adopted in 2015 enshrines this memory and declares "unlawful" any public disrespect towards it. The nationalist memory narrative has been successfully customized in school textbooks since the 2000s. Not surprisingly, it neglects, ignores, or omits controversial aspects of the history and memory of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. For instance, it avoids discussions about the totalitarian and xenophobic nature of the OUN political program of the interwar period. It emphasizes the evolution of the nationalist movement towards "democracy and inclusion" since 1943 (forgetting that this evolution caused a bitter split within the OUN due to the stance of orthodox nationalists headed by Stepan Bandera, who did not accept this evolution). This narrative relativizes the collaboration of the OUN with Nazis, presenting it as an unavoidable necessity. It refutes the involvement of the OUN members in the extermination of Jews. It silences the killings of civilian Ukrainians by OUN and UPA members or justifies these actions as necessary. Similarly, it minimizes the role of the OUN and UPA in anti-Polish ethnic cleansing in Volhynia, relativizes it as a part of the Polish- Ukrainian war, and even justifies it as a Ukrainian response to the politics of the Polish state in the 1920s and the 1930s.
