"This focus of U.S. competition law, on protection of competition rather than competitors, is not necessarily the only possible focus or purpose of competition law. For example, it has also been said that competition law in the European Union (EU) tends to protect the competitors in the marketplace, even at the expense of market efficiencies and consumers."< Cseres, Katalin Judit (2005). Competition law and consumer protection. Kluwer Law International. pp. 291–293. ISBN9789041123800. Archived from the original on May 12, 2013. Retrieved July 15, 2009.
Footnote 15 appears here:
"The history of the Sherman Act, as contained in the legislative proceedings, is emphatic in its support for the conclusion that "business competition" was the problem considered, and that the act was designed to prevent restraints of trade which had a significant effect on such competition.
On July 10, 1888, the Senate adopted without discussion a resolution offered by Senator Sherman which directed the Committee on Finance to inquire into, and report in connection with, revenue bills
"such measures as it may deem expedient to set aside, control, restrain or prohibit all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations, made with a view, or which tend to prevent free and full competition . . . with such penalties and provisions . . . as will tend to preserve freedom of trade and production, the natural competition of increasing production, the lowering of prices by such competition . . ."
(19 Cong.Rec. 6041).
This resolution explicitly presented the economic theory of the proponents of such legislation. The various bills introduced between 1888 and 1890 follow the theory of this resolution. Many bills sought to make void all arrangements
"made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition in the production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic growth or production, . . ."
S. 3445; S. 3510; H.R. 11339; all of the 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888) were bills of this type. In the 51st Cong. (1889), the bills were in a similar vein. See S. 1, sec. 1 (this bill as redrafted by the Judiciary Committee ultimately became the Sherman Law); H.R. 202, sec. 3; H.R. 270; H.R. 286; H.R. 402; H.R. 509; H.R. 826; H.R. 3819. See Bills and Debates in Congress relating to Trusts (1909), Vol. 1, pp. 1025–1031.
Only one, which was never enacted, S. 1268 in the 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892), introduced by Senator Peffer, sought to prohibit
"every willful act . . . which shall have the effect to in any way interfere with the freedom of transit of articles in interstate commerce, . . ."
When the antitrust bill (S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.) came before Congress for debate, the debates point to a similar purpose. Senator Sherman asserted the bill prevented only "business combinations" "made with a view to prevent competition", 21 Cong.Rec. 2457, 2562; see also ibid. at 2459, 2461.
Senator Allison spoke of combinations which "control prices," ibid., 2471; Senator Pugh of combinations "to limit production" for "the purpose of destroying competition", ibid., 2558; Senator Morgan of combinations "that affect the price of commodities," ibid., 2609; Senator Platt, a critic of the bill, said this bill proceeds on the assumption that "competition is beneficent to the country," ibid., 2729; Senator George denounced trusts which crush out competition, "and that is the great evil at which all this legislation ought to be directed," ibid., 3147.
In the House, Representative Culberson, who was in charge of the bill, interpreted the bill to prohibit various arrangements which tend to drive out competition, ibid., 4089; Representative Wilson spoke in favor of the bill against combinations among
"competing producers to control the supply of their product, in order that they may dictate the terms on which they shall sell in the market, and may secure release from the stress of competition among themselves,"
ibid., 4090.
The unanimity with which foes and supporters of the bill spoke of its aims as the protection of free competition permits use of the debates in interpreting the purpose of the act. See White, C.J. in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,221 U. S. 50Archived 2009-05-01 at the Wayback Machine; United States v. San Francisco, ante, p. 310 U. S. 16Archived 2009-05-25 at the Wayback Machine.
See also Report of Committee on Interstate Commerce on Control of Corporations Engaged in Interstate Commerce, S.Rept. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913), pp. 2, 4; Report of Federal Trade Commission, S.Doc. 226, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929), pp. 343–345."
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384U.S.563, 570–71 (1966); see also Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 825 (3d Cir. 1984).
Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 50 n. 16 (limiting United States v. Topco Assocs., 405U.S.596, 608 (1972) by making vertical market division rule-of-reason analysis).
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493U.S.411 for collusive effects and NW Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472U.S.284 (1985) for exclusionary effects.
Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 49. The inquiry focuses on the restraint's effect on competition. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435U.S.679, 691 (1978).
See Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 45 (citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388U.S.365, 382 (1967)), and geographic market, see United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334U.S.495, 519 (1948).
Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 49; see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221U.S.1, 58 (1911) (Congress only intended to prohibit agreements that were "unreasonably restrictive of competitive (conditions").
"This focus of U.S. competition law, on protection of competition rather than competitors, is not necessarily the only possible focus or purpose of competition law. For example, it has also been said that competition law in the European Union (EU) tends to protect the competitors in the marketplace, even at the expense of market efficiencies and consumers."< Cseres, Katalin Judit (2005). Competition law and consumer protection. Kluwer Law International. pp. 291–293. ISBN9789041123800. Archived from the original on May 12, 2013. Retrieved July 15, 2009.
Footnote 15 appears here:
"The history of the Sherman Act, as contained in the legislative proceedings, is emphatic in its support for the conclusion that "business competition" was the problem considered, and that the act was designed to prevent restraints of trade which had a significant effect on such competition.
On July 10, 1888, the Senate adopted without discussion a resolution offered by Senator Sherman which directed the Committee on Finance to inquire into, and report in connection with, revenue bills
"such measures as it may deem expedient to set aside, control, restrain or prohibit all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations, made with a view, or which tend to prevent free and full competition . . . with such penalties and provisions . . . as will tend to preserve freedom of trade and production, the natural competition of increasing production, the lowering of prices by such competition . . ."
(19 Cong.Rec. 6041).
This resolution explicitly presented the economic theory of the proponents of such legislation. The various bills introduced between 1888 and 1890 follow the theory of this resolution. Many bills sought to make void all arrangements
"made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition in the production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic growth or production, . . ."
S. 3445; S. 3510; H.R. 11339; all of the 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888) were bills of this type. In the 51st Cong. (1889), the bills were in a similar vein. See S. 1, sec. 1 (this bill as redrafted by the Judiciary Committee ultimately became the Sherman Law); H.R. 202, sec. 3; H.R. 270; H.R. 286; H.R. 402; H.R. 509; H.R. 826; H.R. 3819. See Bills and Debates in Congress relating to Trusts (1909), Vol. 1, pp. 1025–1031.
Only one, which was never enacted, S. 1268 in the 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892), introduced by Senator Peffer, sought to prohibit
"every willful act . . . which shall have the effect to in any way interfere with the freedom of transit of articles in interstate commerce, . . ."
When the antitrust bill (S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.) came before Congress for debate, the debates point to a similar purpose. Senator Sherman asserted the bill prevented only "business combinations" "made with a view to prevent competition", 21 Cong.Rec. 2457, 2562; see also ibid. at 2459, 2461.
Senator Allison spoke of combinations which "control prices," ibid., 2471; Senator Pugh of combinations "to limit production" for "the purpose of destroying competition", ibid., 2558; Senator Morgan of combinations "that affect the price of commodities," ibid., 2609; Senator Platt, a critic of the bill, said this bill proceeds on the assumption that "competition is beneficent to the country," ibid., 2729; Senator George denounced trusts which crush out competition, "and that is the great evil at which all this legislation ought to be directed," ibid., 3147.
In the House, Representative Culberson, who was in charge of the bill, interpreted the bill to prohibit various arrangements which tend to drive out competition, ibid., 4089; Representative Wilson spoke in favor of the bill against combinations among
"competing producers to control the supply of their product, in order that they may dictate the terms on which they shall sell in the market, and may secure release from the stress of competition among themselves,"
ibid., 4090.
The unanimity with which foes and supporters of the bill spoke of its aims as the protection of free competition permits use of the debates in interpreting the purpose of the act. See White, C.J. in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,221 U. S. 50Archived 2009-05-01 at the Wayback Machine; United States v. San Francisco, ante, p. 310 U. S. 16Archived 2009-05-25 at the Wayback Machine.
See also Report of Committee on Interstate Commerce on Control of Corporations Engaged in Interstate Commerce, S.Rept. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913), pp. 2, 4; Report of Federal Trade Commission, S.Doc. 226, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929), pp. 343–345."
