Space Launch System (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Space Launch System" in English language version.

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  • "What is ICPS?". United Launch Alliance. 23 June 2021. Archived from the original on 23 June 2021. Retrieved 4 October 2021.

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  • "NASA HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION: Persistent Delays and Cost Growth Reinforce Concerns over Management of Programs" (PDF). GAO. Archived (PDF) from the original on 3 October 2021. Retrieved 15 September 2020. NASA's current approach for reporting cost growth misrepresents the cost performance of the program and thus undermines the usefulness of a baseline as an oversight tool. NASA's space flight program and project management requirements state that the agency baseline commitment for a program is the basis for the agency's commitment to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congress based on program requirements, cost, schedule, technical content, and an agreed-to joint cost and schedule confidence level. Removing effort that amounts to more than a tenth of a program's development cost baseline is a change in the commitment to OMB and the Congress and results in a baseline that does not reflect actual effort. [...] Further, the baseline is a key tool against which to measure the cost and schedule performance of a program. A program must be rebaselined and reauthorized by the Congress if the Administrator determines that development costs will increase by more than 30 percent. Accounting for shifted costs, our analysis indicates that NASA has reached 29.0 percent development cost growth for the SLS program. [...] In addition, as we previously reported in May 2014, NASA does not have a cost and schedule baseline for SLS beyond the first flight. As a result, NASA cannot monitor or track costs shifted beyond EM-1 against a baseline. We recommended that NASA establish cost and schedule baselines that address the life cycle of each SLS increment, as well as for any evolved Orion or ground systems capability. NASA partially concurred with the recommendation, but has not taken any action to date. [...] By not adjusting the SLS baseline to account for the reduced scope, NASA will continue to report costs against an inflated baseline, hence underreporting the extent of cost growth. NASA's Associate Administrator and Chief Financial Officer stated that they understood our rationale for removing these costs from the EM-1 baseline and agreed that not doing so could result in underreporting of cost growth. Further, the Associate Administrator told us that the agency will be relooking at the SLS program's schedule, baseline, and calculation of cost growth.

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  • "NASA's Management of the Space Launch System Stages Contract" (PDF). oig.nasa.gov. NASA Office of Inspector General Office of Audits. 10 October 2018. Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 October 2018. Retrieved 14 October 2018. Public Domain This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  • "NASA'S MANAGEMENT OF THE ARTEMIS MISSIONS" (PDF). Office of Inspector General (United States). NASA. 15 November 2021. p. numbered page 23, PDF page 29. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 November 2021. Retrieved 15 November 2021. SLS/Orion Production and Operating Costs Will Average Over $4 Billion Per Launch [...] We project the cost to fly a single SLS/Orion system through at least Artemis IV to be $4.1 billion per launch at a cadence of approximately one mission per year. Building and launching one Orion capsule costs approximately $1 billion, with an additional $300 million for the Service Module supplied by the ESA [...] In addition, we estimate the single-use SLS will cost $2.2 billion to produce, including two rocket stages, two solid rocket boosters, four RS-25 engines, and two stage adapters. Ground systems located at Kennedy where the launches will take placeβ€”the Vehicle Assembly Building, Crawler-Transporter, Mobile Launcher 1, Launch Pad, and Launch Control Centerβ€”are estimated to cost $568 million per year due to the large support structure that must be maintained. The $4.1 billion total cost represents production of the rocket and the operations needed to launch the SLS/Orion system including materials, labor, facilities, and overhead, but does not include any money spent either on prior development of the system or for next-generation technologies such as the SLS's Exploration Upper Stage, Orion's docking system, or Mobile Launcher 2. [...] The cost per launch was calculated as follows: $1 billion for the Orion based on information provided by ESD officials and NASA OIG analysis; $300 million for the ESA's Service Module based on the value of a barter agreement between ESA and the United States in which ESA provides the service modules in exchange for offsetting its ISS responsibilities; $2.2 billion for the SLS based on program budget submissions and analysis of contracts; and $568 million for EGS costs related to the SLS/Orion launch as provided by ESD officials.
  • "NASA’s Transition of the Space Launch System to a Commercial Services Contract Archived 25 July 2024 at the Wayback Machine" oig.nasa.gov. 12 October 2023. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  • "Report No. IG-20-018: NASA's Management of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program" (PDF). Office of Inspector General (United States). NASA. 16 July 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 July 2020. Retrieved 17 July 2020.
  • "NASA'S MANAGEMENT OF SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM PROGRAM COSTS AND CONTRACTS" (PDF). NASA – Office of Inspector General – Office of Audits. 10 March 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 28 August 2020. Retrieved 14 September 2020. Based on our review of SLS Program cost reporting, we found that the Program exceeded its Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC) by at least 33 percent at the end of FY 2019, a figure that could reach 43 percent or higher if additional delays push the launch date for Artemis I beyond November 2020. This is due to cost increases tied to Artemis I and a December 2017 replan that removed almost $1 billion of costs from the ABC without lowering the baseline, thereby masking the impact of Artemis I's projected 19-month schedule delay from November 2018 to a June 2020 launch date. Since the replan, the SLS Program now projects the Artemis I launch will be delayed to at least spring 2021 or later. Further, we found NASA's ABC cost reporting only tracks Artemis I-related activities and not additional expenditures of almost $6 billion through FY 2020 that are not being reported or tracked through the official congressional cost commitment or the ABC. [...] as a result of delaying Artemis I up to 19 months to June 2020, NASA conducted a replan of the SLS Program in 2017 and removed $889 million in Booster and RS-25 Engine-related development costs because SLS Program officials determined those activities were not directly tied to Artemis I. [...] In our judgement, the removal of these costs should have reduced the SLS Program's ABC development costs from $7.02 billion to $6.13 billion. [...] SLS Program and HEOMD officials disagreed with our assessment and stated the SLS Program's change in cost estimates for the Booster and Engines element offices were not a removal of costs but rather a reallocation of those activities to appropriately account for them as non-Artemis I costs. [...] Federal law requires that any time Agency program managers have reasonable knowledge that development costs are likely to exceed the ABC by more than 30 percent, they must notify the NASA Administrator. Once the Administrator determines the SLS Program will exceed the development cost baseline by 30 percent or more, NASA is required to notify Congress and rebaseline program costs and schedule commitments. If the Administrator notifies Congress of the need to rebaseline, NASA is required to stop funding program activities within 18 months unless Congress provides approval and additional appropriations. In our judgement, using NASA's cost estimates from October 2019 and accounting for the removed costs from the replan, the SLS Program was required to rebaseline when the program exceeded its ABC by 33 percent at the end of FY 2019, an increase that could reach 43 percent or higher by the Artemis I launch date.

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