Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Stephen Breyer" in English language version.
Breyеr received bachelor's degrees from Stanford University (1959) and the University of Oxford (1961), which he attended on a Rhodes Scholarship, and a law degree from Harvard University (1964). In 1964–65 he clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg. He taught law at Harvard University from 1967 to 1994.
Breyer thinks that, as compared with a single-minded focus on literal text, his approach will tend to make the law more sensible, almost by definition. He also contends that it 'helps to implement the public's will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution's democratic purpose.' Breyer concludes that an emphasis on legislative purpose 'means that laws will work better for the people they are presently meant to affect. Law is tied to life, and a failure to understand how a statute is so tied can undermine the very human activity that the law seeks to benefit.'Quote is at p. 1726.
Breyer thinks that, as compared with a single-minded focus on literal text, his approach will tend to make the law more sensible, almost by definition. He also contends that it 'helps to implement the public's will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution's democratic purpose.' Breyer concludes that an emphasis on legislative purpose 'means that laws will work better for the people they are presently meant to affect. Law is tied to life, and a failure to understand how a statute is so tied can undermine the very human activity that the law seeks to benefit.'Quote is at p. 1726.
Breyer thinks that, as compared with a single-minded focus on literal text, his approach will tend to make the law more sensible, almost by definition. He also contends that it 'helps to implement the public's will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution's democratic purpose.' Breyer concludes that an emphasis on legislative purpose 'means that laws will work better for the people they are presently meant to affect. Law is tied to life, and a failure to understand how a statute is so tied can undermine the very human activity that the law seeks to benefit.'Quote is at p. 1726.
As his decision to characterize both the New Deal and Warren Courts as centrally committed to democracy and 'active liberty' makes clear, Justice Breyer identifies his own constitutional agenda with that of these earlier courts, and positions himself, in significant respects, as a partisan of midcentury constitutional liberalism.
As his decision to characterize both the New Deal and Warren Courts as centrally committed to democracy and 'active liberty' makes clear, Justice Breyer identifies his own constitutional agenda with that of these earlier courts, and positions himself, in significant respects, as a partisan of midcentury constitutional liberalism.
Breyеr received bachelor's degrees from Stanford University (1959) and the University of Oxford (1961), which he attended on a Rhodes Scholarship, and a law degree from Harvard University (1964). In 1964–65 he clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg. He taught law at Harvard University from 1967 to 1994.
Breyer thinks that, as compared with a single-minded focus on literal text, his approach will tend to make the law more sensible, almost by definition. He also contends that it 'helps to implement the public's will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution's democratic purpose.' Breyer concludes that an emphasis on legislative purpose 'means that laws will work better for the people they are presently meant to affect. Law is tied to life, and a failure to understand how a statute is so tied can undermine the very human activity that the law seeks to benefit.'Quote is at p. 1726.
Breyer thinks that, as compared with a single-minded focus on literal text, his approach will tend to make the law more sensible, almost by definition. He also contends that it 'helps to implement the public's will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution's democratic purpose.' Breyer concludes that an emphasis on legislative purpose 'means that laws will work better for the people they are presently meant to affect. Law is tied to life, and a failure to understand how a statute is so tied can undermine the very human activity that the law seeks to benefit.'Quote is at p. 1726.
