Strategyproofness (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Strategyproofness" in English language version.

refsWebsite

Global rank English rank

6doi.org

2^nd place

3worldcat.org

5^th place

1cmu.edu

1,564^th place

1,028^th place

1web.archive.org

1^st place

1rochester.edu

2,691^st place

1,948^th place

1arxiv.org

69^th place

59^th place

1semanticscholar.org

11^th place

8^th place

1psu.edu

207^th place

136^th place

1aeaweb.org

7,762^nd place

5,451^st place

1ssrn.com

703^rd place

501^st place

1acm.org

1,185^th place

840^th place

acm.org (Global: 1,185^th place; English: 840^th place)

dl.acm.org

Komo, Andrew; Kominers, Scott Duke; Roughgarden, Tim (2025-07-02). "Shill-Proof Auctions". Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC '25. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. p. 784. doi:10.1145/3736252.3742623. ISBN 979-8-4007-1943-1.

aeaweb.org (Global: 7,762^nd place; English: 5,451^st place)

pubs.aeaweb.org

Li, Shengwu (2017-11-01). "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms". American Economic Review. 107 (11): 3257–3287. doi:10.1257/aer.20160425. ISSN 0002-8282.

arxiv.org (Global: 69^th place; English: 59^th place)

Chakrabarty, Deeparnab; Swamy, Chaitanya (2014-01-12). "Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences". Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science. ITCS '14. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. pp. 105–120. arXiv:1312.1831. doi:10.1145/2554797.2554810. ISBN 978-1-4503-2698-8. S2CID 2428592.

cmu.edu (Global: 1,564^th place; English: 1,028^th place)

cs.cmu.edu

Vazirani, Vijay V.; Nisan, Noam; Roughgarden, Tim; Tardos, Éva (2007). Algorithmic Game Theory (PDF). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-87282-0.

doi.org (Global: 2^nd place; English: 2^nd place)

Chakrabarty, Deeparnab; Swamy, Chaitanya (2014-01-12). "Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences". Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science. ITCS '14. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. pp. 105–120. arXiv:1312.1831. doi:10.1145/2554797.2554810. ISBN 978-1-4503-2698-8. S2CID 2428592.
Yokoo, M.; Sakurai, Y.; Matsubara, S. (2004). "The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in internet auctions". Games and Economic Behavior. 46: 174–188. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.18.6796. doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00045-9.
Li, Shengwu (2017-11-01). "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms". American Economic Review. 107 (11): 3257–3287. doi:10.1257/aer.20160425. ISSN 0002-8282.
Akbarpour, Mohammad; Li, Shengwu (2017). "Credible Mechanism Design". SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3033208. ISSN 1556-5068. SSRN 3033208.
Komo, Andrew; Kominers, Scott Duke; Roughgarden, Tim (2025-07-02). "Shill-Proof Auctions". Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC '25. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. p. 784. doi:10.1145/3736252.3742623. ISBN 979-8-4007-1943-1.
Ashlagi, Itai; Gonczarowski, Yannai A. (2018-09-01). "Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof". Journal of Economic Theory. 177: 405–425. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.001. ISSN 0022-0531.

psu.edu (Global: 207^th place; English: 136^th place)

citeseerx.ist.psu.edu

Yokoo, M.; Sakurai, Y.; Matsubara, S. (2004). "The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in internet auctions". Games and Economic Behavior. 46: 174–188. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.18.6796. doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00045-9.

rochester.edu (Global: 2,691^st place; English: 1,948^th place)

"Group Strategy-proofness And Social Choice Between Two Alternatives" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2020-02-12.

semanticscholar.org (Global: 11^th place; English: 8^th place)

api.semanticscholar.org

Chakrabarty, Deeparnab; Swamy, Chaitanya (2014-01-12). "Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences". Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science. ITCS '14. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. pp. 105–120. arXiv:1312.1831. doi:10.1145/2554797.2554810. ISBN 978-1-4503-2698-8. S2CID 2428592.

ssrn.com (Global: 703^rd place; English: 501^st place)

papers.ssrn.com

Akbarpour, Mohammad; Li, Shengwu (2017). "Credible Mechanism Design". SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3033208. ISSN 1556-5068. SSRN 3033208.

web.archive.org (Global: 1^st place; English: 1^st place)

"Group Strategy-proofness And Social Choice Between Two Alternatives" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2020-02-12.

worldcat.org (Global: 5^th place; English: 5^th place)

search.worldcat.org

Li, Shengwu (2017-11-01). "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms". American Economic Review. 107 (11): 3257–3287. doi:10.1257/aer.20160425. ISSN 0002-8282.
Akbarpour, Mohammad; Li, Shengwu (2017). "Credible Mechanism Design". SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3033208. ISSN 1556-5068. SSRN 3033208.
Ashlagi, Itai; Gonczarowski, Yannai A. (2018-09-01). "Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof". Journal of Economic Theory. 177: 405–425. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.001. ISSN 0022-0531.

Strategyproofness (English Wikipedia)

acm.org (Global: 1,185th place; English: 840th place)

dl.acm.org

aeaweb.org (Global: 7,762nd place; English: 5,451st place)

pubs.aeaweb.org

arxiv.org (Global: 69th place; English: 59th place)

cmu.edu (Global: 1,564th place; English: 1,028th place)

cs.cmu.edu

doi.org (Global: 2nd place; English: 2nd place)

psu.edu (Global: 207th place; English: 136th place)