Tempest (codename) (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Tempest (codename)" in English language version.

refsWebsite

Global rank English rank

9doi.org

2^nd place

8web.archive.org

1^st place

5worldcat.org

5^th place

4cryptome.org

low place

3semanticscholar.org

11^th place

8^th place

3arxiv.org

69^th place

59^th place

2nsa.gov

7,043^rd place

4,687^th place

2governmentattic.org

7,676^th place

4,184^th place

1af.mil

439^th place

283^rd place

1nato.int

940^th place

907^th place

1sans.org

low place

1sst.ws

low place

1cryptome.info

low place

1cse-cst.gc.ca

low place

1bund.de

2,092^nd place

5,505^th place

1cesg.gov.uk

low place

1iad.gov

low place

1cam.ac.uk

670^th place

480^th place

1applied-math.org

low place

1acm.org

1,185^th place

840^th place

1lasecepfl.ch

low place

1usenix.org

5,990^th place

3,752^nd place

1youtube.com

9^th place

13^th place

1harvard.edu

18^th place

17^th place

1eurecom.fr

low place

1books.google.com

3^rd place

1zdnet.com

786^th place

558^th place

acm.org (Global: 1,185^th place; English: 840^th place)

portal.acm.org

J. Loughry and D. A. Umphress. Information Leakage from Optical Emanations (.pdf file), ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 5, No. 3, August 2002, pp. 262-289

af.mil (Global: 439^th place; English: 283^rd place)

netcents.af.mil

Product Delivery Order Requirements Package Checklist (PDF), US Air Force, archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-12-29

applied-math.org (Global: low place; English: low place)

J. Loughry and D. A. Umphress. Information Leakage from Optical Emanations (.pdf file), ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 5, No. 3, August 2002, pp. 262-289

arxiv.org (Global: 69^th place; English: 59^th place)

Guri et al. 2014, pp. 58–67. Guri, Mordechai; Kedma, Gabi; Kachlon, Assaf; Elovici, Yuval (2014). "AirHopper: Bridging the air-gap between isolated networks and mobile phones using radio frequencies". Proceedings of the 9th IEEE International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALCON 2014). pp. 58–67. arXiv:1411.0237. doi:10.1109/MALWARE.2014.6999418.
Guri et al. 2015, pp. 276–289. Guri, Mordechai; Monitz, Matan; Mirski, Yisroel; Elovici, Yuval (2015). "BitWhisper: Covert Signaling Channel between Air-Gapped Computers Using Thermal Manipulations". Proceedings 2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium CSF 2015. pp. 276–289. arXiv:1503.07919. doi:10.1109/CSF.2015.26.
Guri, Zadov & Elovici 2018, pp. 1190–1203. Guri, Mordechai; Zadov, Boris; Elovici, Yuval (2018). "ODINI: Escaping Sensitive Data From Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via Magnetic Fields". IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. 15: 1190–1203. arXiv:1802.02700. Bibcode:2018arXiv180202700G. doi:10.1109/TIFS.2019.2938404. ISSN 1556-6013. S2CID 3622353.

books.google.com (Global: 3^rd place; English: 3^rd place)

Stross 2010, p. 98. Stross, Charles (2010). The Atrocity Archives: Book 1 in The Laundry Files. Little, Brown. ISBN 978-0-7481-2413-8.

bund.de (Global: 2,092^nd place; English: 5,505^th place)

bsi.bund.de

"German Zoned Product List". BSI (German Federal Office for Information Security). Retrieved 2015-12-16.

cam.ac.uk (Global: 670^th place; English: 480^th place)

cl.cam.ac.uk

Kuhn, Markus G. (December 2003). "Compromising emanations: eavesdropping risks of computer displays" (PDF). Technical Report (577). Cambridge, United Kingdom: University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory. ISSN 1476-2986. UCAM-CL-TR-577. Retrieved 2010-10-29.

cesg.gov.uk (Global: low place; English: low place)

"The Directory of Infosec Assured Products" (PDF). CESG. October 2010. Archived from the original (PDF) on May 19, 2011.

cryptome.info (Global: low place; English: low place)

Specification nsa no. 94-106 national security agency specification for shielded enclosures, Cryptome.info, retrieved 2014-01-28

cryptome.org (Global: low place; English: low place)

"How Old IsTEMPEST?". Cryptome.org. Retrieved 2015-05-31.
"Emission Security" (PDF). US Air Force. 14 April 2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on December 23, 2013.
"NACSIM 5000 Tempest Fundamentals". Cryptome.org. Retrieved 2015-05-31.
N.S.A., NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95 RED/BLACK INSTALLATION, Cryptome.org, retrieved 2014-01-28

cse-cst.gc.ca (Global: low place; English: low place)

"Canadian Industrial TEMPEST Program". CSE (Communications Security Establishment ). Retrieved 2017-07-27.

doi.org (Global: 2^nd place; English: 2^nd place)

doi.org

Easter, David (2020-07-26). "The impact of 'Tempest' on Anglo-American communications security and intelligence, 1943–1970". Intelligence and National Security. 36: 1–16. doi:10.1080/02684527.2020.1798604. ISSN 0268-4527. S2CID 225445718.
Marquardt et al. 2011, pp. 551–562. Marquardt, P.; Verma, A.; Carter, H.; Traynor, P. (2011), "(sp)i Phone", Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '11, pp. 551–561, doi:10.1145/2046707.2046771, ISBN 9781450309486, S2CID 5098788
"1. Der Problembereich der Rechtsinformatik", Rechtsinformatik, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 1977, doi:10.1515/9783110833164-003, ISBN 978-3-11-083316-4, retrieved 2020-11-30
Kubiak 2018, pp. 582–592: Very often the devices do not have enough space on the inside to install new elements such as filters, electromagnetic shielding, and others. [...] a new solution [...] does not change the construction of the devices (e.g., printers, screens). [...] based on computer fonts called TEMPEST fonts (safe fonts. In contrast to traditional fonts (e.g., Arial or Times New Roman), the new fonts are devoid of distinctive features. Without these features the characters of the new fonts are similar each other. Kubiak, Ireneusz (2018). "TEMPEST font counteracting a noninvasive acquisition of text data". Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences. 26: 582–592. doi:10.3906/elk-1704-263. ISSN 1300-0632.
Kubiak 2019: Computer fonts can be one of solutions supporting a protection of information against electromagnetic penetration. This solution is called „Soft TEMPEST”. However, not every font has features which counteract the process of electromagnetic infiltration. The distinctive features of characters of font determine it. This article presents two sets of new computer fonts. These fonts are fully usable in everyday work. Simultaneously they make it impossible to obtain information using the non-invasive method. Kubiak, Ireneusz (2019). "Font Design—Shape Processing of Text Information Structures in the Process of Non-Invasive Data Acquisition". Computers. 8 (4): 70. doi:10.3390/computers8040070. ISSN 2073-431X.
Guri et al. 2014, pp. 58–67. Guri, Mordechai; Kedma, Gabi; Kachlon, Assaf; Elovici, Yuval (2014). "AirHopper: Bridging the air-gap between isolated networks and mobile phones using radio frequencies". Proceedings of the 9th IEEE International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALCON 2014). pp. 58–67. arXiv:1411.0237. doi:10.1109/MALWARE.2014.6999418.
Guri et al. 2015, pp. 276–289. Guri, Mordechai; Monitz, Matan; Mirski, Yisroel; Elovici, Yuval (2015). "BitWhisper: Covert Signaling Channel between Air-Gapped Computers Using Thermal Manipulations". Proceedings 2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium CSF 2015. pp. 276–289. arXiv:1503.07919. doi:10.1109/CSF.2015.26.
Guri, Zadov & Elovici 2018, pp. 1190–1203. Guri, Mordechai; Zadov, Boris; Elovici, Yuval (2018). "ODINI: Escaping Sensitive Data From Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via Magnetic Fields". IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. 15: 1190–1203. arXiv:1802.02700. Bibcode:2018arXiv180202700G. doi:10.1109/TIFS.2019.2938404. ISSN 1556-6013. S2CID 3622353.

dx.doi.org

"1. Der Problembereich der Rechtsinformatik", Rechtsinformatik, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 1977, doi:10.1515/9783110833164-003, ISBN 978-3-11-083316-4, retrieved 2020-11-30

eurecom.fr (Global: low place; English: low place)

s3.eurecom.fr

Camurati, Giovanni; Poeplau, Sebastian; Muench, Marius; Hayes, Tom; Francillon, Aurélien (2018). "Screaming Channels: When Electromagnetic Side Channels Meet Radio Transceivers" (PDF). Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). CCS '18: 163–177.

governmentattic.org (Global: 7,676^th place; English: 4,184^th place)

A History of U.S. Communications Security; the David G. Boak Lectures, National Security Agency (NSA), Volumes I, 1973, Volumes II 1981, partially released 2008, additional portions declassified October 14, 2015
"A History of U.S. Communications Security (Volumes I and II)"; David G. Boak Lectures" (PDF). National Security Agency. 1973. p. 90.

harvard.edu (Global: 18^th place; English: 17^th place)

ui.adsabs.harvard.edu

Guri, Zadov & Elovici 2018, pp. 1190–1203. Guri, Mordechai; Zadov, Boris; Elovici, Yuval (2018). "ODINI: Escaping Sensitive Data From Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via Magnetic Fields". IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. 15: 1190–1203. arXiv:1802.02700. Bibcode:2018arXiv180202700G. doi:10.1109/TIFS.2019.2938404. ISSN 1556-6013. S2CID 3622353.

iad.gov (Global: low place; English: low place)

"TEMPEST Certification Program - NSA/CSS". iad.gov. Retrieved 2017-07-27.

lasecepfl.ch (Global: low place; English: low place)

Vuagnoux, Martin; Pasini, Sylvain. "Compromising radiation emanations of wired keyboards". Lasecwww.epfl.ch. Archived from the original on 2019-09-25. Retrieved 2008-10-29.

nato.int (Global: 940^th place; English: 907^th place)

ia.nato.int

TEMPEST Equipment Selection Process, NATO Information Assurance, 1981, archived from the original on 2019-02-02, retrieved 2014-09-16

nsa.gov (Global: 7,043^rd place; English: 4,687^th place)

N.S.A., TEMPEST: A Signal Problem (PDF), archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-09-18, retrieved 2014-01-28
Maneki, Sharon (8 January 2007). "Learning from the Enemy: The GUNMAN project" (PDF). Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency. Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019. All of the implants were quite sophisticated. Each implant had a magnetometer that converted the mechanical energy of key strokes into local magnetic disturbances. The electronics package in the implant responded to these disturbances, categorized the underlying data, and transmitted the results to a nearby listening post. Data were transmitted via radio frequency. The implant was enabled by remote control.[...] the movement of the bails determined which character had been typed because each character had a unique binary movement corresponding to the bails. The magnetic energy picked up by the sensors in the bar was converted into a digital electrical signal. The signals were compressed into a four-bit frequency select word. The bug was able to store up to eight four-bit characters. When the buffer was full, a transmitter in the bar sent the information out to Soviet sensors.

sans.org (Global: low place; English: low place)

Goodman, Cassi (April 18, 2001), An Introduction to TEMPEST, Sans.org

semanticscholar.org (Global: 11^th place; English: 8^th place)

api.semanticscholar.org

Easter, David (2020-07-26). "The impact of 'Tempest' on Anglo-American communications security and intelligence, 1943–1970". Intelligence and National Security. 36: 1–16. doi:10.1080/02684527.2020.1798604. ISSN 0268-4527. S2CID 225445718.
Marquardt et al. 2011, pp. 551–562. Marquardt, P.; Verma, A.; Carter, H.; Traynor, P. (2011), "(sp)i Phone", Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '11, pp. 551–561, doi:10.1145/2046707.2046771, ISBN 9781450309486, S2CID 5098788
Guri, Zadov & Elovici 2018, pp. 1190–1203. Guri, Mordechai; Zadov, Boris; Elovici, Yuval (2018). "ODINI: Escaping Sensitive Data From Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via Magnetic Fields". IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. 15: 1190–1203. arXiv:1802.02700. Bibcode:2018arXiv180202700G. doi:10.1109/TIFS.2019.2938404. ISSN 1556-6013. S2CID 3622353.

sst.ws (Global: low place; English: low place)

"SST: TEMPEST Standards SDIP 27 Level A, Level B & AMSG 784, 720B, 788A". Sst.ws. Archived from the original on 2015-02-26. Retrieved 2015-05-31.

usenix.org (Global: 5,990^th place; English: 3,752^nd place)

blogs.usenix.org

Guri et al. 2015. Guri, Mordechai; Kachlon, Assaf; Hasson, Ofer; Kedma, Gabi; Mirsky, Yisroel; Elovici, Yuval (August 2015). "GSMem: Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Computers over GSM Frequencies". 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15): 849–864. ISBN 9781939133113. Video on YouTube.

web.archive.org (Global: 1^st place; English: 1^st place)

Product Delivery Order Requirements Package Checklist (PDF), US Air Force, archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-12-29
TEMPEST Equipment Selection Process, NATO Information Assurance, 1981, archived from the original on 2019-02-02, retrieved 2014-09-16
"Emission Security" (PDF). US Air Force. 14 April 2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on December 23, 2013.
N.S.A., TEMPEST: A Signal Problem (PDF), archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-09-18, retrieved 2014-01-28
"SST: TEMPEST Standards SDIP 27 Level A, Level B & AMSG 784, 720B, 788A". Sst.ws. Archived from the original on 2015-02-26. Retrieved 2015-05-31.
"The Directory of Infosec Assured Products" (PDF). CESG. October 2010. Archived from the original (PDF) on May 19, 2011.
Vuagnoux, Martin; Pasini, Sylvain. "Compromising radiation emanations of wired keyboards". Lasecwww.epfl.ch. Archived from the original on 2019-09-25. Retrieved 2008-10-29.
Maneki, Sharon (8 January 2007). "Learning from the Enemy: The GUNMAN project" (PDF). Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency. Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019. All of the implants were quite sophisticated. Each implant had a magnetometer that converted the mechanical energy of key strokes into local magnetic disturbances. The electronics package in the implant responded to these disturbances, categorized the underlying data, and transmitted the results to a nearby listening post. Data were transmitted via radio frequency. The implant was enabled by remote control.[...] the movement of the bails determined which character had been typed because each character had a unique binary movement corresponding to the bails. The magnetic energy picked up by the sensors in the bar was converted into a digital electrical signal. The signals were compressed into a four-bit frequency select word. The bug was able to store up to eight four-bit characters. When the buffer was full, a transmitter in the bar sent the information out to Soviet sensors.

worldcat.org (Global: 5^th place; English: 5^th place)

search.worldcat.org

Easter, David (2020-07-26). "The impact of 'Tempest' on Anglo-American communications security and intelligence, 1943–1970". Intelligence and National Security. 36: 1–16. doi:10.1080/02684527.2020.1798604. ISSN 0268-4527. S2CID 225445718.
Kuhn, Markus G. (December 2003). "Compromising emanations: eavesdropping risks of computer displays" (PDF). Technical Report (577). Cambridge, United Kingdom: University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory. ISSN 1476-2986. UCAM-CL-TR-577. Retrieved 2010-10-29.
Kubiak 2018, pp. 582–592: Very often the devices do not have enough space on the inside to install new elements such as filters, electromagnetic shielding, and others. [...] a new solution [...] does not change the construction of the devices (e.g., printers, screens). [...] based on computer fonts called TEMPEST fonts (safe fonts. In contrast to traditional fonts (e.g., Arial or Times New Roman), the new fonts are devoid of distinctive features. Without these features the characters of the new fonts are similar each other. Kubiak, Ireneusz (2018). "TEMPEST font counteracting a noninvasive acquisition of text data". Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences. 26: 582–592. doi:10.3906/elk-1704-263. ISSN 1300-0632.
Kubiak 2019: Computer fonts can be one of solutions supporting a protection of information against electromagnetic penetration. This solution is called „Soft TEMPEST”. However, not every font has features which counteract the process of electromagnetic infiltration. The distinctive features of characters of font determine it. This article presents two sets of new computer fonts. These fonts are fully usable in everyday work. Simultaneously they make it impossible to obtain information using the non-invasive method. Kubiak, Ireneusz (2019). "Font Design—Shape Processing of Text Information Structures in the Process of Non-Invasive Data Acquisition". Computers. 8 (4): 70. doi:10.3390/computers8040070. ISSN 2073-431X.
Guri, Zadov & Elovici 2018, pp. 1190–1203. Guri, Mordechai; Zadov, Boris; Elovici, Yuval (2018). "ODINI: Escaping Sensitive Data From Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via Magnetic Fields". IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. 15: 1190–1203. arXiv:1802.02700. Bibcode:2018arXiv180202700G. doi:10.1109/TIFS.2019.2938404. ISSN 1556-6013. S2CID 3622353.

youtube.com (Global: 9^th place; English: 13^th place)

Guri et al. 2015. Guri, Mordechai; Kachlon, Assaf; Hasson, Ofer; Kedma, Gabi; Mirsky, Yisroel; Elovici, Yuval (August 2015). "GSMem: Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Computers over GSM Frequencies". 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15): 849–864. ISBN 9781939133113. Video on YouTube.

zdnet.com (Global: 786^th place; English: 558^th place)

Cimpanu, Catalin. "Academics turn RAM into Wi-Fi cards to steal data from air-gapped systems". ZDNet.

Tempest (codename) (English Wikipedia)

acm.org (Global: 1,185th place; English: 840th place)

portal.acm.org

af.mil (Global: 439th place; English: 283rd place)

netcents.af.mil

applied-math.org (Global: low place; English: low place)

arxiv.org (Global: 69th place; English: 59th place)

books.google.com (Global: 3rd place; English: 3rd place)

bund.de (Global: 2,092nd place; English: 5,505th place)

bsi.bund.de

cam.ac.uk (Global: 670th place; English: 480th place)

cl.cam.ac.uk

cesg.gov.uk (Global: low place; English: low place)

cryptome.info (Global: low place; English: low place)

cryptome.org (Global: low place; English: low place)

cse-cst.gc.ca (Global: low place; English: low place)

doi.org (Global: 2nd place; English: 2nd place)

doi.org

dx.doi.org

eurecom.fr (Global: low place; English: low place)

s3.eurecom.fr

governmentattic.org (Global: 7,676th place; English: 4,184th place)

harvard.edu (Global: 18th place; English: 17th place)

ui.adsabs.harvard.edu

iad.gov (Global: low place; English: low place)

lasecepfl.ch (Global: low place; English: low place)

nato.int (Global: 940th place; English: 907th place)

ia.nato.int

nsa.gov (Global: 7,043rd place; English: 4,687th place)

sans.org (Global: low place; English: low place)

semanticscholar.org (Global: 11th place; English: 8th place)

api.semanticscholar.org

sst.ws (Global: low place; English: low place)

usenix.org (Global: 5,990th place; English: 3,752nd place)

blogs.usenix.org

web.archive.org (Global: 1st place; English: 1st place)

worldcat.org (Global: 5th place; English: 5th place)

search.worldcat.org

youtube.com (Global: 9th place; English: 13th place)

zdnet.com (Global: 786th place; English: 558th place)

acm.org (Global: 1,185^th place; English: 840^th place)

af.mil (Global: 439^th place; English: 283^rd place)

arxiv.org (Global: 69^th place; English: 59^th place)

books.google.com (Global: 3^rd place; English: 3^rd place)

bund.de (Global: 2,092^nd place; English: 5,505^th place)

cam.ac.uk (Global: 670^th place; English: 480^th place)

doi.org (Global: 2^nd place; English: 2^nd place)

governmentattic.org (Global: 7,676^th place; English: 4,184^th place)

harvard.edu (Global: 18^th place; English: 17^th place)

nato.int (Global: 940^th place; English: 907^th place)

nsa.gov (Global: 7,043^rd place; English: 4,687^th place)

semanticscholar.org (Global: 11^th place; English: 8^th place)

usenix.org (Global: 5,990^th place; English: 3,752^nd place)

web.archive.org (Global: 1^st place; English: 1^st place)

worldcat.org (Global: 5^th place; English: 5^th place)

youtube.com (Global: 9^th place; English: 13^th place)

zdnet.com (Global: 786^th place; English: 558^th place)