Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Yom Kippur War" in English language version.
Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Israel that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war
(p. 6) "For most Egyptians the war is remembered as an unquestionable victory—militarily as well as politically ... The fact that the war ended with Israeli troops stationed in the outskirts of Cairo and in complete encirclement of the Egyptian third army has not dampened the jubilant commemoration of the war in Egypt." (p. 11) "Ultimately, the conflict provided a military victory for Israel, but it is remembered as 'the earthquake' or 'the blunder'"
the Arab has suffered repeated military defeats at the hand of Israel in 1956, 1967, and 1973
(p. 184) "Yom Kippur War ... its final outcome was, without doubt, a military victory ... " (p. 185) " ... in October 1973, that despite Israel's military victory"
It was in France on 20 May 1973. ... We had a formal meeting on the upper floor and, after lunch, I walked with Ismail in the garden in the spring sunshine. In these beautiful ... Ismail remained cool to my scheme of separating sovereignty and security. He called this 'diluted sovereignty,' but said he would check with Sadat and let me know. I never heard from him. The American official who had found the meeting place reported to me that after I left, Ismail, visibly dispirited and glum, had sat alone in the garden for a long time contemplating the waterfall. ... For Ismail knew that Sadat was determined on war. Only an American guarantee that we would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded him.
between 9 October and 12 October ... the American response ... call for cease-fire ... in place ... arms for Israel began to flow in modest quantities
Nixon and Kissinger held back on a full scale ... resupply effort ... short of supplies, the Israeli government reluctantly accepted a cease-fire in place on 12 October ... but ... Sadat refused
Soviet arms must not be allowed to dictate the outcome of the fighting. ... Israeli success on the battlefield had become an important factor in persuading the Arabs and the Soviets to bring the fighting to an end. ... With an airlift in full swing, Washington was prepared to wait until ... realities on the battlefield led to a change of Egyptian and Soviet calculations
it was of prime importance that the fighting should be ended ... when all parties could still emerge from the conflict with their vital interests and self esteem intact ... the airlift ... the Soviets must see that the united states could deliver more than they could; p. 123 the U.S. would not permit the destruction of the 3rd army corps.
By putting a territorial noose around the Third army and sitting about sixty miles from Cairo, Israeli forces had open terrain and no opposition to move on Cairo; had they done so Sadat's rule might have ended.
The U.S. influence with king Hussein had helped keep Jordan out of the war.
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