Acción (filosofía) (Spanish Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Acción (filosofía)" in Spanish language version.

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archive.org

Anscombe, Gertrude (2000). Intention. Harvard University Press. p. 37–45. ISBN 0674003993.

britannica.com

«Action theory». Encyclopedia Britannica (en inglés). Consultado el 8 de julio de 2021.
«Basic action». Encyclopedia Britannica (en inglés). Consultado el 1 de marzo de 2021.

doi.org

dx.doi.org

Stuchlik, Joshua (2013). «From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action». Philosophia 41 (3): 867–886. S2CID 144779235. doi:10.1007/s11406-013-9414-9.
Latham, Noa (2016). «Meditation and Self-Control». Philosophical Studies 173 (7): 1779–1798. S2CID 170959501. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0578-y.
Adams, Frederick; Mele, Alfred R. (1992). «The Intention/Volition Debate». Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3): 323–337. doi:10.1080/00455091.1992.10717283.
Haddock, Adrian (junio de 2005). «At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies». Philosophical Explorations 8 (2): 157–172. ISSN 1386-9795. S2CID 142740785. doi:10.1080/13869790500095939.
Goetz, Stewart C. (1988). «A Noncausal Theory of Agency». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2): 303–316. doi:10.2307/2107978.
Queloz, Matthieu (2018). «Davidsonian Causalism and Wittgensteinian Anti-Causalism: A Rapprochement». Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5: 153–72. doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.006.
Strawson, Galen (2003). «Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaniety». Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3): 227-257. doi:10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00071.x.
Levy, Yair (2019). «What is 'Mental Action'?». Philosophical Psychology 32 (6): 971-993. S2CID 198595347. doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1632427.
Szaniawski, Klemens (1 de agosto de 1980). «Philosophy of decision making». Acta Psychologica (en inglés) 45 (1): 327-341. ISSN 0001-6918. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(80)90041-4.
Alvarez, Maria (1 de agosto de 2018). «Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality». Synthese (en inglés) 195 (8): 3293-3310. ISSN 1573-0964. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-1005-9.
King, Matt (2009). «The Problem with Negligence». Social Theory and Practice 35 (4): 577-595. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract200935433.

issn.org

portal.issn.org

Haddock, Adrian (junio de 2005). «At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies». Philosophical Explorations 8 (2): 157–172. ISSN 1386-9795. S2CID 142740785. doi:10.1080/13869790500095939.
Szaniawski, Klemens (1 de agosto de 1980). «Philosophy of decision making». Acta Psychologica (en inglés) 45 (1): 327-341. ISSN 0001-6918. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(80)90041-4.
Alvarez, Maria (1 de agosto de 2018). «Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality». Synthese (en inglés) 195 (8): 3293-3310. ISSN 1573-0964. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-1005-9.

philpapers.org

Audi, Robert (1999). «action theory». The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Craig, Edward (1996). «Action». Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
Honderich, Ted (2005). «Action». The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Stuchlik, Joshua (2013). «From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action». Philosophia 41 (3): 867–886. S2CID 144779235. doi:10.1007/s11406-013-9414-9.
Railton, Peter (2006). «Humean Theory of Practical Rationality». The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. p. 265–81.
Latham, Noa (2016). «Meditation and Self-Control». Philosophical Studies 173 (7): 1779–1798. S2CID 170959501. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0578-y.
Enç, Berent (2004). «Causal Theories of Intentional Behavior and Wayward Causal Chains». Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1): 149–166.
Honderich, Ted (2005). «Volution». The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Adams, Frederick; Mele, Alfred R. (1992). «The Intention/Volition Debate». Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3): 323–337. doi:10.1080/00455091.1992.10717283.
Honderich, Ted (2005). «Trying». The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Brent, Michael; Upton, Candace. Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action. S2CID 149891767.
Haddock, Adrian (junio de 2005). «At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies». Philosophical Explorations 8 (2): 157–172. ISSN 1386-9795. S2CID 142740785. doi:10.1080/13869790500095939.
Ginet, Carl (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.
Goetz, Stewart C. (1988). «A Noncausal Theory of Agency». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2): 303–316. doi:10.2307/2107978.
Queloz, Matthieu (2018). «Davidsonian Causalism and Wittgensteinian Anti-Causalism: A Rapprochement». Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5: 153–72. doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.006.
Honderich, Ted (2005). «Basic action». The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Strawson, Galen (2003). «Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaniety». Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3): 227-257. doi:10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00071.x.
Levy, Yair (2019). «What is 'Mental Action'?». Philosophical Psychology 32 (6): 971-993. S2CID 198595347. doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1632427.
Skow, Bradford (2016). «2. From Explanations to Why-Questions». Reasons Why. Oxford University Press UK.
Sturdee, P. G. (1995). «Irrationality and the Dynamic Unconscious: The Case for Wishful Thinking». Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (2): 163-174.
King, Matt (2009). «The Problem with Negligence». Social Theory and Practice 35 (4): 577-595. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract200935433.

sciencedirect.com

Szaniawski, Klemens (1 de agosto de 1980). «Philosophy of decision making». Acta Psychologica (en inglés) 45 (1): 327-341. ISSN 0001-6918. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(80)90041-4.

semanticscholar.org

api.semanticscholar.org

Stuchlik, Joshua (2013). «From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action». Philosophia 41 (3): 867–886. S2CID 144779235. doi:10.1007/s11406-013-9414-9.
Latham, Noa (2016). «Meditation and Self-Control». Philosophical Studies 173 (7): 1779–1798. S2CID 170959501. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0578-y.
Brent, Michael; Upton, Candace. Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action. S2CID 149891767.
Haddock, Adrian (junio de 2005). «At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies». Philosophical Explorations 8 (2): 157–172. ISSN 1386-9795. S2CID 142740785. doi:10.1080/13869790500095939.
Levy, Yair (2019). «What is 'Mental Action'?». Philosophical Psychology 32 (6): 971-993. S2CID 198595347. doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1632427.

springer.com

Kühler, Michael; Rüther, Markus (27 de octubre de 2016). «7. Handlungsversuche». Handbuch Handlungstheorie: Grundlagen, Kontexte, Perspektiven (en alemán). J. B. Metzler. ISBN 978-3-476-02492-3.
Kühler, Michael; Rüther, Markus (27 de octubre de 2016). «6. Basishandlungen». Handbuch Handlungstheorie: Grundlagen, Kontexte, Perspektiven (en alemán). J.B. Metzler. ISBN 978-3-476-02492-3.

stanford.edu

plato.stanford.edu

Wilson, George; Shpall, Samuel; Piñeros Glasscock, Juan S. (2016). «Action». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Malpas, Jeff (2019). «Donald Davidson: 2.1 Reasons as Causes». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado el 9 de julio de 2021.
Wilson, George; Shpall, Samuel (2016). «Action: 3. The Explanation of Action». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Schlosser, Markus (2019). «Agency». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado el 9 de julio de 2021.
Talbert, Matthew (2019). «Moral Responsibility». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado el 1 de marzo de 2021.

tennessee.edu

trace.tennessee.edu

Hu, Jiajun (2018). «1. Introduction». Actions Are Not Events: An Ontological Objection to the Causal Theory of Action.
Hu, Jiajun (2018). «6. Conclusion». Actions Are Not Events: An Ontological Objection to the Causal Theory of Action.
Hu, Jiajun (2018). «5. A Davidsonian Challenge». Actions Are Not Events: An Ontological Objection to the Causal Theory of Action.

utm.edu

iep.utm.edu

Mayes, G. Randolph. «Theories of Explanation: 4. Contemporary Developments in the Theory of Explanation». Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado el 1 de marzo de 2021.