«China running 380 detention centres in Xinjiang: Researchers». Al Jazeera. 24 de septiembre de 2020. Archivado desde el original el 22 de octubre de 2020. Consultado el 24 de octubre de 2020. «The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) said it had identified more than 380 “suspected detention facilities” in the region, where the United Nations says more than one million Uighurs and other mostly Muslim Turkic-speaking residents have been held in recent years.»
Peter Neville-Hadley (1997). China the Silk Routes. Cadogan Guides. Globe Pequot Press. p. 304. «Travelling east from Khotan{...}Many Uighurs speak no Chinese at all, and most hotels are even less likely to have English speakers than those elsewhere in China.»
Ryan, Fergus; Cave, Danielle; Ruser, Nathan (1 de noviembre de 2018). "Mapping Xinjiang's 're-education' camps". Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Consultado el 4 de septiembre de 2021
Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, Dr James Leibold, Kelsey Munro & Nathan Ruser (28 de febrero de 2020). «Uyghurs for sale». Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Archivado desde el original el 24 de agosto de 2020. Consultado el 2 de septiembre de 2020.
Ruser, Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, Nathan. «Uyghurs for sale». www.aspi.org.au(en inglés). Archivado desde el original el 24 de agosto de 2020. Consultado el 16 de octubre de 2020.
xjdp.aspi.org.au
«Map». Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Archivado desde el original el 5 de octubre de 2020. Consultado el 24 de octubre de 2020. «Detention Facilities (381)».
Newby, L. J. (2005). The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760-1860. Leiden: Leiden Boston Brill. p. 17. ISBN9004145508. Consultado el 6 de agosto de 2020. «Despite the imperial pronouncement that from Ili in the north to Yarkand in the south, Xinjiang should now be considered part of the interior (neidi), it remained in the eyes of many Chinese officials and literati, a distant land beyond the fringes of Chinese cultural world. … [I]n 1758 the court has already designated Xinjiang as a penal colony and place of exile for disgraced officials. The decision to integrate the new frontier fully into the provincial system was, therefore, not entirely unsurprising.»
Lecturer in Modern Chinese History in the Department of East Asian Studies Michael Dillon; Michael Dillon (23 de octubre de 2003). Xinjiang: China's Muslim Far Northwest. Routledge. ISBN978-1-134-36096-3. Archivado desde el original el 9 de enero de 2017. Consultado el 26 de agosto de 2016.
Linette Lopez (15 de diciembre de 2019). «China's next gambit to save its economy will export dystopia worldwide». Business Insider. Consultado el 7 de abril de 2020. «Pakistani businessman Mirza Imran Baig shows a picture with his Uighur wife, Malika Mamiti, outside the Pakistani embassy in Beijing. Mamiti, was sent to a political-indoctrination camp after returning to China's far west Xinjiang region in May 2017, Baig said. Scores of Pakistani men whose Muslim Uighur wives have disappeared into internment camps in China feel helpless, fighting a wall of silence as they struggle to reunite their families.»
Westcott, Ben; Whiteman, Hilary (19 de diciembre de 2019). «Chinese ambassador says Xinjiang 'trainees' have graduated in rare press conference». CNN. Consultado el 19 de diciembre de 2019. «China's ambassador to Australia has defended Beijing against accusations of human rights violations in a rare press conference Thursday, saying allegations that one million people had been detained in Xinjiang were "fake news"... Cheng said Thursday that... "I understand now the trainees in the centers have all completed their studies and they have, with the assistance of the local government, they have gradually or steadily found their jobs," the Chinese ambassador said.»
Greitens, Sheena Chestnut; Lee, Myunghee; Yazici, Emir (January 2020). «Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China's Changing Strategy in Xinjiang». International Security44 (3): 9-47. S2CID209892080. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00368.
Hayes, Anna (2 de enero de 2020). «Interwoven 'Destinies': The Significance of Xinjiang to the China Dream, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Xi Jinping Legacy». Journal of Contemporary China29 (121): 31-45. S2CID191742114. doi:10.1080/10670564.2019.1621528.
Emily Feng (16 de diciembre de 2018). «Forced labour being used in China's 're-education' camps». Financial Times. Consultado el 13 de diciembre de 2019. «Two of Xinjiang’s largest internment camps — the Kashgar city and Yutian county vocational training centres — have opened forced labour facilities this year. Yutian’s detention centre boasts eight factories specialising in vocations such as shoemaking, mobile phone assembly and tea packaging, offering a base monthly salary of Rmb1,500 ($220), according to Chinese state media reports. Satellite images show that Kashgar’s internment centre has more than doubled in size since 2016 and Yutian’s grew 269 per cent over the same period, according to a report compiled by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a think-tank.»
«Concentration Camps and Genocide». East Turkistan National Awakening Movement. Consultado el 19 de noviembre de 2019. «In July 2019, the Washington Free Beacon broke the news that a vast network of Concentration Camps, prisons, and labor camps were uncovered in East Turkistan. ETNAM uncovered at least 124 concentration camps, 193 prisons, and 66 Bingtuan labor camps with an estimated total 3.6 million detainees. Other researchers estimate there may be some 1,200 concentration camps, prisons, and labor camps across East Turkistan.»
nationalreview.com
«A New Gulag in China». National Review. 22 de mayo de 2018. Consultado el 22 de mayo de 2018.
«Wary Of Unrest Among Uighur Minority, China Locks Down Xinjiang Region». NPR. 26 de septiembre de 2017. Archivado desde el original el 3 de febrero de 2020. Consultado el 28 de enero de 2020. «In the years that followed, Uighur terrorists killed dozens of Han Chinese in brutal, coordinated attacks at train stations and government offices. A few Uighurs have joined ISIS, and Chinese authorities are worried about more attacks on Chinese soil.»
Austin Ramzy (30 de marzo de 2020). «Xinjiang Returns to Work, but Coronavirus Worries Linger in China». New York Times. Consultado el 3 de abril de 2020. «No reports have emerged of conditions in the facilities since the outbreak began. But former detainees have previously described poor food and sanitation and little help for those who fell ill.{...}“According to my personal experience in the concentration camp, they never helped anyone or provided any medical support for any kind of disease or health condition,” said Ms. Sauytbay, who fled to Kazakhstan two years ago, in a phone interview this month. “If the coronavirus spread inside the camps, they would not help, they would not provide any medical support.”{...}Now the region is being jolted back to work. Labor transfer programs, in which large numbers of Uighurs and other predominately Muslim minorities are sent to work in other parts of Xinjiang and the rest of China, have resumed in recent weeks.»
Audrey Young (31 de marzo de 2019). «Pressure on Jacinda Ardern to raise her voice in China against treatment of Uighur Muslims». New Zealand Herald. Consultado el 18 de diciembre de 2019. «"I've raised the issue of the Uighur before and I expect I will do so again," she said. "My expectation is that we will be consistent." She is traveling to China today for one day in Beijing tomorrow, where she will meet Premier Li Keqiang and President Xi Jinping, and returning on Tuesday.»
Jason Walls (3 de noviembre de 2019). «Government expresses concern over 'human rights situation' regarding Chinese Uighur Muslims». New Zealand Herald. Consultado el 18 de diciembre de 2019. «Asked about why New Zealand had signed the letter, Foreign Minister Winston Peters last week said: "Because we believe in human rights, we believe in freedom and we believe in the liberty of personal beliefs and the right to hold them." Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern raised the issue when she met Chinese President Xi Jinping this year, but would not detail exactly what was said.»
Christian Shepherd, Philip Wen (25 de septiembre de 2018). «'China's big mistake': Pakistanis lobby to free wives trapped in Xinjiang». Reuters. Consultado el 7 de abril de 2020. «Mirza Imran Baig, 40, who trades between his home city of Lahore and Urumqui, the Xinjiang regional capital, said his wife was detained in a “re-education” camp in her native Bachu county for two months in May and June 2017 and had been unable to leave her hometown since her release.»
Mamatjan Juma, Alim Seytoff, Joshua Lipes (27 de febrero de 2020). «Xinjiang Authorities Sending Uyghurs to Work in China's Factories, Despite Coronavirus Risks». Radio Free Asia. Consultado el 2 de febrero de 2020. «Recent reports by the official Xinjiang Daily and Chinanews.com said that from Feb. 22-23, “400 youths were transferred to the provinces of Hunan, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi.” Of those, 114 from Awat (in Chinese, Awati) county, in the XUAR’s Aksu (Akesu) prefecture, were sent to Jiangxi’s Jiujiang city on Feb. 23, 100 from Aksu city were sent to Jiujiang on Feb. 22, and 171 from Hotan (Hetian) prefecture were sent to Changsha city in Hunan province, the reports said, without providing a date for the last transfer.»
Shohret Hoshur, Joshua Lipes (31 de agosto de 2018). «One in Six Uyghurs Held in Political 'Re-Education Camps' in Xinjiang's Onsu County». Radio Free Asia. Consultado el 28 de abril de 2020. «Onsu (in Chinese, Wensu) county, in the XUAR’s Aksu (Akesu) prefecture is home to around 230,000 people, according to the county government’s website. Some 180,000 of them are members of minority groups—the largest of which is Uyghurs.»
«France calls on China to close Uighur detention camps». Raidió Teilifís Éireann. 27 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 18 de diciembre de 2019. «France has called on China to end "mass arbitrary detentions" in Xinjiang, where around one million ethnic Uighurs and other Muslim minorities are being held in camps that China calls vocational schools. "We call on China to put an end to mass arbitrary detentions," a foreign ministry spokesperson told reporters. Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has called on China to close the camps and allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit Xinjiang as soon as possible to report on the situation.»
Greitens, Sheena Chestnut; Lee, Myunghee; Yazici, Emir (January 2020). «Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China's Changing Strategy in Xinjiang». International Security44 (3): 9-47. S2CID209892080. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00368.
Hayes, Anna (2 de enero de 2020). «Interwoven 'Destinies': The Significance of Xinjiang to the China Dream, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Xi Jinping Legacy». Journal of Contemporary China29 (121): 31-45. S2CID191742114. doi:10.1080/10670564.2019.1621528.
Clarke, Colin P. (26 de agosto de 2019). «China's Global War on Terrorism». Slate. Archivado desde el original el 3 de febrero de 2020. Consultado el 3 de febrero de 2020. «Over the past decade, groups advocating separatism for Xinjiang's Muslim Uighur minority—including the Turkistan Islamic Party and before it, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement—have been linked to numerous low-level attacks using knives and vehicles as weapons.»
«China running more camps in Xinjiang than thought: group». Taipei Times. 14 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 19 de noviembre de 2019. «Uighur activists on Tuesday said that they have documented nearly 500 camps and prisons run by China to detain members of the ethnic group, alleging that Beijing could be holding far more than the commonly cited figure of 1 million people. The Washington-based East Turkistan National Awakening Movement, a group that seeks independence for the Xinjiang region, gave the geographic coordinates of 182 suspected "concentration camps" where Uighurs are allegedly pressured to renounce their culture.»
«Russia has no reason to act on reports about China's oppression of Muslims — Lavrov». 9 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 19 de diciembre de 2019. «"China has repeatedly provided clarifications concerning the accusations you have mentioned. I don’t know who voiced them, it must have been our Western colleagues," Lavrov said in response to a question. "We don’t have reasons to take any steps apart from procedures that exist within the UN, which I have mentioned, meaning the Human Rights Council," he added.»
Morin, Adrien (23 de febrero de 2017). «Is China's Counterterrorism Policy in Xinjiang Working?». The Diplomat. Archivado desde el original el 3 de febrero de 2020. Consultado el 3 de febrero de 2020. «according to Kyrgyzstan state security, the attack was ordered by Uyghur militants active in Syria and carried out by a member of ETIM.»
«Which Countries Are For or Against China's Xinjiang Policies?». The Diplomat. 15 de julio de 2019. «Days after a group of 22 nations signed a letter addressed to the president of the UN Human Rights Council and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights calling on China to end its massive detention program in Xinjiang, a group of 37 countries submitted a similar letter in defense of China’s policies. The text of the first letter, criticizing China, has been made available (PDF); the second letter has not yet made its way into the general public but both letters reportedly included requests that they be recorded as documents of the Human Rights Council’s just-concluded 41st Session.»
Lily Kuo (11 de enero de 2019). «'If you enter a camp, you never come out': inside China's war on Islam». The Guardian. Consultado el 16 de diciembre de 2019. «Luopu, a sparsely populated rural county of about 280,000 that is almost entirely Uighur, is home to eight internment camps officially labelled “vocational training centres”, according to public budget documents seen by the Guardian.»
Lily Kuo (11 de enero de 2019). «'If you enter a camp, you never come out': inside China's war on Islam». The Guardian. Consultado el 16 de diciembre de 2019. «Some local governments are struggling to maintain this pace of spending. In neighbouring Cele county, where authorities expected to have almost 12,000 detainees in vocational camps and detention centres, a budget for 2018 says: 'There are still many projects not included in the budget due to a lack of funds. The financial situation in 2018 is very severe.'».
Karen, Leigh (9 de octubre de 2019). «The Uighurs». The Washington Post. Archivado desde el original el 4 de febrero de 2020. Consultado el 2 de febrero de 2020. «Tensions erupted in 2009... Attacks by Uighur separatists intensified in the years that followed, with one of the groups that carried them out—the Turkistan Islamic Party—also being credited with having thousands of jihadist fighters in Syria.»
Hannah Knowles, Kim Bellware and Lateshia Beachum (25 de noviembre de 2019). «Secret documents detail inner workings of China's mass detention camps for minorities». Washington Post. Consultado el 11 de agosto de 2020. «A guard tower and barbed wire fences are seen around a section of the Artux City Vocational Skills Education Training Service Center in Artux in western China's Xinjiang region in December. This is one of a growing number of internment camps in the Xinjiang region.»
Fred Hiatt (2 de diciembre de 2019). «These journalists have confounded China's massive propaganda machine». Washington Post. Consultado el 10 de junio de 2020. «It was Hoshur's Oct. 29 story that confirmed the deaths of 150 people over the course of six months at the No. 1 Internment Camp in the Yengisher district of Kuchar county, “marking the first confirmation of mass deaths since the camps were introduced in 2017,” as the story notes.»
Lecturer in Modern Chinese History in the Department of East Asian Studies Michael Dillon; Michael Dillon (23 de octubre de 2003). Xinjiang: China's Muslim Far Northwest. Routledge. ISBN978-1-134-36096-3. Archivado desde el original el 9 de enero de 2017. Consultado el 26 de agosto de 2016.
«Wary Of Unrest Among Uighur Minority, China Locks Down Xinjiang Region». NPR. 26 de septiembre de 2017. Archivado desde el original el 3 de febrero de 2020. Consultado el 28 de enero de 2020. «In the years that followed, Uighur terrorists killed dozens of Han Chinese in brutal, coordinated attacks at train stations and government offices. A few Uighurs have joined ISIS, and Chinese authorities are worried about more attacks on Chinese soil.»
Morin, Adrien (23 de febrero de 2017). «Is China's Counterterrorism Policy in Xinjiang Working?». The Diplomat. Archivado desde el original el 3 de febrero de 2020. Consultado el 3 de febrero de 2020. «according to Kyrgyzstan state security, the attack was ordered by Uyghur militants active in Syria and carried out by a member of ETIM.»
Karen, Leigh (9 de octubre de 2019). «The Uighurs». The Washington Post. Archivado desde el original el 4 de febrero de 2020. Consultado el 2 de febrero de 2020. «Tensions erupted in 2009... Attacks by Uighur separatists intensified in the years that followed, with one of the groups that carried them out—the Turkistan Islamic Party—also being credited with having thousands of jihadist fighters in Syria.»
Clarke, Colin P. (26 de agosto de 2019). «China's Global War on Terrorism». Slate. Archivado desde el original el 3 de febrero de 2020. Consultado el 3 de febrero de 2020. «Over the past decade, groups advocating separatism for Xinjiang's Muslim Uighur minority—including the Turkistan Islamic Party and before it, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement—have been linked to numerous low-level attacks using knives and vehicles as weapons.»
«China running 380 detention centres in Xinjiang: Researchers». Al Jazeera. 24 de septiembre de 2020. Archivado desde el original el 22 de octubre de 2020. Consultado el 24 de octubre de 2020. «The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) said it had identified more than 380 “suspected detention facilities” in the region, where the United Nations says more than one million Uighurs and other mostly Muslim Turkic-speaking residents have been held in recent years.»
«Map». Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Archivado desde el original el 5 de octubre de 2020. Consultado el 24 de octubre de 2020. «Detention Facilities (381)».
Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, Dr James Leibold, Kelsey Munro & Nathan Ruser (28 de febrero de 2020). «Uyghurs for sale». Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Archivado desde el original el 24 de agosto de 2020. Consultado el 2 de septiembre de 2020.
Ruser, Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, Nathan. «Uyghurs for sale». www.aspi.org.au(en inglés). Archivado desde el original el 24 de agosto de 2020. Consultado el 16 de octubre de 2020.
