Klein, Jacob (2012). Reason, Religion, and Natural Law: From Plato to Spinoza. OUP USA. pp. 63-64. ISBN9780199767175. LCCN2012001316. «According to Irwin, the Stoic thesis that loss and tragedy do not affect an agent's welfare does not imply that a rational agent has no reason to regret such a loss, for on Irwin's account of Stoic theory the life of virtue and happiness and the life that accords with nature constitute independently rational aims... A number of considerations tell against this interpretation, however. One such consideration is merely an ex silentio appeal. No Stoic source, to my knowledge, suggests that actions may be justified with respect to anything other than what contributes to the end of happiness, and virtue alone does this in the Stoics view. A few texts, moreover, are explicit on this point. Cicero's summary of Stoics' ethics in De finibus 3 considers and rejects the suggestion that Stoic theory is implicitly committed to two final ends, virtue and a life that accords with nature, where these are conceived as independent objectives at which a rational agent might aim... Independent, that is, in the strong sense according to which one of these rational objectives may be realized while the other is not. See Irwin (2007), p. 316: 'Virtuous action. therefore, is not sufficient for achieving the life according to nature, which includes the natural advantages.' Irwin is certainly correct to point out that virtue is not sufficient for attaining the natural advantages, preferred indifferents such as health and wealth. But it is the Stoics' critics, not the Stoics themselves, who maintain that the actual possession of these items is a necessary condition of the life according to nature.»
Aristotle, also David Ross, Lesley Brown (1980). «The Nicomachean Ethics». Oxford University Press. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «Verbally there is very general agreement, for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement...»
doi.org
dx.doi.org
Ryff, C. D. (1989). «Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being». Journal of Personality and Social Psychology57: 1069-1081. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.6.1069.
huffingtonpost.com
Verena von Pfetten (4 de septiembre de 2008). «5 Things Happy People Do». Huffington Post. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «But researchers now believe that eudaimonic well-being may be more important. Cobbled from the Greek eu («good») and daimon («spirit» or «deity»), eudaimonia means striving toward excellence based on one's unique talents and potential—Aristotle considered it to be the noblest goal in life. In his time, the Greeks believed that each child was blessed at birth with a personal daimon embodying the highest possible expression of his or her nature. One way they envisioned the daimon was as a golden figurine that would be revealed by cracking away an outer layer of cheap pottery (the person's baser exterior). The effort to know and realize one's most golden self—«personal growth,» in today's vernacular—is now the central concept of eudaimonia, which has also come to include continually taking on new challenges and fulfilling one's sense of purpose in life.»
loc.gov
lccn.loc.gov
Klein, Jacob (2012). Reason, Religion, and Natural Law: From Plato to Spinoza. OUP USA. pp. 63-64. ISBN9780199767175. LCCN2012001316. «According to Irwin, the Stoic thesis that loss and tragedy do not affect an agent's welfare does not imply that a rational agent has no reason to regret such a loss, for on Irwin's account of Stoic theory the life of virtue and happiness and the life that accords with nature constitute independently rational aims... A number of considerations tell against this interpretation, however. One such consideration is merely an ex silentio appeal. No Stoic source, to my knowledge, suggests that actions may be justified with respect to anything other than what contributes to the end of happiness, and virtue alone does this in the Stoics view. A few texts, moreover, are explicit on this point. Cicero's summary of Stoics' ethics in De finibus 3 considers and rejects the suggestion that Stoic theory is implicitly committed to two final ends, virtue and a life that accords with nature, where these are conceived as independent objectives at which a rational agent might aim... Independent, that is, in the strong sense according to which one of these rational objectives may be realized while the other is not. See Irwin (2007), p. 316: 'Virtuous action. therefore, is not sufficient for achieving the life according to nature, which includes the natural advantages.' Irwin is certainly correct to point out that virtue is not sufficient for attaining the natural advantages, preferred indifferents such as health and wealth. But it is the Stoics' critics, not the Stoics themselves, who maintain that the actual possession of these items is a necessary condition of the life according to nature.»
Uncertain (19 de septiembre de 2008). «How «God» functioned in Socrates' life». DD:Religion. Archivado desde el original el 26 de febrero de 2010. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «Men of Athens, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any of you whom I happen to meet: «Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?»».
rae.es
dle.rae.es
Real Academia Española. «eudemonía». Diccionario de la lengua española (23.ª edición).
stanford.edu
plato.stanford.edu
Rosalind Hursthouse (18 de julio de 2007). «Virtue Ethics». Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «But although modern virtue ethics does not have to take the form known as «neo-Aristotelian», almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are areté (excellence or virtue) phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing.) As modern virtue ethics has grown and more people have become familiar with its literature, the understanding of these terms has increased, but it is still the case that readers familiar only with modern philosophy tend to misinterpret them.»
Richard Parry (Aug 7, 2009). «Ancient Ethical Theory». Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «Socrates says that a man worth anything at all does not reckon whether his course of action endangers his life or threatens death. He looks only at one thing — whether what he does is just or not, the work of a good or of a bad man (28b–c).»
Dirk Baltzly (7 de febrero de 2008). «Stoicism». Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «But what is happiness? The Epicureans' answer was deceptively straightforward: the happy life is the one which is most pleasant. (But their account of what the highest pleasure consists in was not at all straightforward.) Zeno's answer was «a good flow of life» (Arius Didymus, 63A) or «living in agreement», and Cleanthes clarified that with the formulation that the end was «living in agreement with nature» (Arius Didymus, 63B). Chrysippus amplified this to (among other formulations) «living in accordance with experience of what happens by nature»; later Stoics inadvisably, in response to Academic attacks, substituted such formulations as «the rational selection of the primary things according to nature». The Stoics' specification of what happiness consists in cannot be adequately understood apart from their views about value and human psychology.»
Julia Driver (21 de julio de 2009). «Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe: 5.1 Virtue Ethics». Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «In the past God occupied that role, but systems that dispense with God as part of the theory are lacking the proper foundation for meaningful employment of those concepts.»
uncc.edu
philosophy.uncc.edu
G. E. M. Anscombe (January 1958). «Modern Moral Philosophy». Philosophy 33, No. 124. Archivado desde el original el 31 de enero de 2010. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «Originally published in Philosophy 33, No. 124 (January 1958). ... The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty—moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say—and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of «ought», ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. My third thesis is that the differences between the well‑known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.»
web.archive.org
Uncertain (19 de septiembre de 2008). «How «God» functioned in Socrates' life». DD:Religion. Archivado desde el original el 26 de febrero de 2010. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «Men of Athens, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any of you whom I happen to meet: «Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?»».
G. E. M. Anscombe (January 1958). «Modern Moral Philosophy». Philosophy 33, No. 124. Archivado desde el original el 31 de enero de 2010. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «Originally published in Philosophy 33, No. 124 (January 1958). ... The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty—moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say—and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of «ought», ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. My third thesis is that the differences between the well‑known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.»
wutsamada.com
«The ethics of virtue: The Ethics of Virtue and the Ethics of Right Action». wutsamada.com. 5 de junio de 2010. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «legalistic ethics rest on the incoherent notion of a «law» without a lawgiver: DCT unacceptable; and the alternative sources of moral «legislation» are inadequate substitutes».
