HMAC (Spanish Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "HMAC" in Spanish language version.

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ccc.de (Global: low place; Spanish: low place)

events.ccc.de

iacr.org (Global: 6,361st place; Spanish: low place)

eprint.iacr.org

iacr.org

ietf.org (Global: 731st place; Spanish: 1,533rd place)

datatracker.ietf.org

  • RFC 2104, section 2, "Definition of HMAC", page 3.

ietf.org

  • IETF (February 1997). «RFC 2104». Consultado el 3 de diciembre de 2009. «The strongest attack known against HMAC is based on the frequency of collisions for the hash function H ("birthday attack") [PV,BCK2], and is totally impractical for minimally reasonable hash functions.».

tools.ietf.org

noekeon.org (Global: low place; Spanish: low place)

keccak.noekeon.org

  • Keccak team. «Strengths of Keccak - Design and security». Consultado el 30 de enero de 2013. «Unlike SHA-1 and SHA-2, Keccak does not have the length-extension weakness, hence does not need the HMAC nested construction. Instead, MAC computation can be performed by simply prepending the message with the key.».

php.net (Global: 8,178th place; Spanish: 9,094th place)

psu.edu (Global: 299th place; Spanish: 996th place)

citeseerx.ist.psu.edu

python.org (Global: 4,399th place; Spanish: 4,702nd place)

docs.python.org

schneier.com (Global: low place; Spanish: low place)

  • Bruce Schneier (August 2005). «SHA-1 Broken». Consultado el 9 de enero de 2009. «although it doesn't affect applications such as HMAC where collisions aren't important».

ucsd.edu (Global: 2,146th place; Spanish: 2,294th place)

cseweb.ucsd.edu

  • Bellare, Mihir (June 2006). «New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security without Collision-Resistance». En Dwork, Cynthia, ed. Advances in Cryptology – Crypto 2006 Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4117. Springer-Verlag. Archivado desde el original|urlarchivo= requiere |url= (ayuda) el 16 de julio de 2011. Consultado el 25 de mayo de 2010. «This paper proves that HMAC is a PRF under the sole assumption that the compression function is a PRF. This recovers a proof based guarantee since no known attacks compromise the pseudorandomness of the compression function, and it also helps explain the resistance-to-attack that HMAC has shown even when implemented with hash functions whose (weak) collision resistance is compromised.».

web.archive.org (Global: 1st place; Spanish: 1st place)

  • Bellare, Mihir (June 2006). «New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security without Collision-Resistance». En Dwork, Cynthia, ed. Advances in Cryptology – Crypto 2006 Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4117. Springer-Verlag. Archivado desde el original|urlarchivo= requiere |url= (ayuda) el 16 de julio de 2011. Consultado el 25 de mayo de 2010. «This paper proves that HMAC is a PRF under the sole assumption that the compression function is a PRF. This recovers a proof based guarantee since no known attacks compromise the pseudorandomness of the compression function, and it also helps explain the resistance-to-attack that HMAC has shown even when implemented with hash functions whose (weak) collision resistance is compromised.».