Jack Nicas; Natalie Kitroeff; David Gelles; James Glanz; Julie Creswell; Tiffany Hsu; Agustin Armendariz; Kitty Bennet et al. (1 de junio de 2019). «Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change»(html). The New York Times(en inglés). Archivado desde el original el 1 de junio de 2019. Consultado el 3 de junio de 2019. «Four months later, a second 737 Max crashed in Ethiopia. Within days, the Max was grounded around the world. As part of the fix, Boeing has reworked MCAS to more closely resemble the first version. It will be less aggressive, and it will rely on two sensors.»Se sugiere usar |número-autores= (ayuda)
Aaron C. Davis. «How the FAA allows jetmakers to ‘self certify’ that planes meet U.S. safety requirements». Washington Post(en inglés). Consultado el 17 de marzo de 2019. «Swamped with what some FAA engineers had already come to see as an unmanageable oversight role, the agency did not forcefully resist. In 2009, it delegated authority to Boeing and the first of what would become more than 80 aviation companies allowed to certify the safety of their own products.»
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Jack Nicas; Natalie Kitroeff; David Gelles; James Glanz; Julie Creswell; Tiffany Hsu; Agustin Armendariz; Kitty Bennet et al. (1 de junio de 2019). «Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change»(html). The New York Times(en inglés). Archivado desde el original el 1 de junio de 2019. Consultado el 3 de junio de 2019. «Four months later, a second 737 Max crashed in Ethiopia. Within days, the Max was grounded around the world. As part of the fix, Boeing has reworked MCAS to more closely resemble the first version. It will be less aggressive, and it will rely on two sensors.»Se sugiere usar |número-autores= (ayuda)
