Uri Noy: Russia In World War 2 – The great war plan, preparations, collapse, and recovery – a revised view 2worldwar2.com. Viitattu 8.4.2008. (englanniksi): "Between August 1939 and June 1941, when Germany was at war in the West, Russia devoted all its resources to prepare for war with Germany...In fact, between Aug. 1939 and June 1941, the Russian army expanded and moved towards the western border from remote inland regions at such rate that the German intelligence simply could not keep track of it, and was therefore terribly wrong in its estimates of the size of the Russian force it was about to attack."
Donald P. Steury: What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa 2007-04-15 09:33. Central Intelligence Agency CIA. Arkistoitu 9.4.2008. Viitattu 8.4.2008. (englanniksi). "Insofar as this intelligence was used at all, it was to avoid any action that might be seen as a provocation. German aircraft were allowed to fly reconnaissance missions deep into Soviet territory; German troops were allowed to violate Soviet borders in search of intelligence."
Russell Bodine: Hitler the military commander 2002. Pagewise. Arkistoitu 2.9.2010. Viitattu 8.4.2008. (englanniksi): "However, after the disastrous invasion of Russia in June, 1941, there was a renewal of friction between Hitler and the Army High Command. Hitler’s response was to take over direct control of the army from General Brauchitsch."
Robert Auty, Dimitri Obolensky, Anthony Kingsford: A Companion to Russian Studies: An Introduction to Russian History, s. 357. Cambridge University Press, 1981. ISBN 0521280389Teoksen verkkoversio (viitattu 28.5.2009). (englanniksi)
New Evidence on the 1941 'Barbarossa' Attack: Why Hitler Attacked Soviet Russia When He Did Institute for Historical Review. Viitattu 8.4.2008. (englanniksi): "On May 5, 1941, just seven weeks before the German attack, Stalin delivered another important speech..In this speech, Stalin stressed that the recent peaceful policy of the Soviet state had played out its role. Now, Stalin bluntly announced, it was time to prepare for war against Germany, a conflict that would begin soon"
kansallisbiografia.fi
Markku Salomaa: Törni, Lauri (1919–1965) Biografiakeskus, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura. Viitattu 3.4.2008.: "S-joukkojen kirjoissa Saksassa ja Itävallassa hän [Lauri Törni] palveli kuitenkin vain kesäkuun alusta heinäkuun loppuun 1941 joutumatta rintamalle. Suomalaisessa vapaaehtoispataljoonassa (SS Freiwilligen Bataillon Nordost) hän oli Untersturmführer, joka vastasi vänrikkiä."
Ralph Zuljan: OKW versus OKH 1.7.2003.. Articles On War. Viitattu 8.4.2008. (englanniksi): "In practice, the authority structure rapidly devolved into one in which OKH under the leadership of the Chief of Staff became responsible for conducting the war on the Eastern Front while OKW under its Commander in Chief was responsible for conducting the war on all other fronts (including Norway, Finland, North Africa and eventually the Balkans, Italy and western Europe)"
Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson: Mine and countermine operations in the Batlle of Kursk Final Report. (Prepared for U. S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate, under Prime Contract DAAB07-96-D-H753, Subcontracts 116056-24695 and 116149-30898) Määritä julkaisija!Teoksen verkkoversio. (englanniksi) (Arkistoitu – Internet Archive)
KOVNO 19.2.2008. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Viitattu 7.4.2008. (englanniksi)
Kiev and Babi Yar 19.2.2008. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Viitattu 7.4.2008. (englanniksi)
uwe.ac.uk
ess.uwe.ac.uk
Reviewed by Daniel C. Holtrop, Indiana University: David M. Glantz. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War marraskuu 2000. H-Net. Arkistoitu 21.6.2006. Viitattu 8.4.2008. (englanniksi): "Glantz shows that the Soviets seemed to be caught with their pants down, all along the line...Many Soviet planes were destroyed on the ground, caught in a transition. These planes were parked in rows on temporary airfields while more fields were being built or expanded (p.188)."
Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson: Mine and countermine operations in the Batlle of Kursk Final Report. (Prepared for U. S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate, under Prime Contract DAAB07-96-D-H753, Subcontracts 116056-24695 and 116149-30898) Määritä julkaisija!Teoksen verkkoversio. (englanniksi) (Arkistoitu – Internet Archive)
Russell Bodine: Hitler the military commander 2002. Pagewise. Arkistoitu 2.9.2010. Viitattu 8.4.2008. (englanniksi): "However, after the disastrous invasion of Russia in June, 1941, there was a renewal of friction between Hitler and the Army High Command. Hitler’s response was to take over direct control of the army from General Brauchitsch."
Donald P. Steury: What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa 2007-04-15 09:33. Central Intelligence Agency CIA. Arkistoitu 9.4.2008. Viitattu 8.4.2008. (englanniksi). "Insofar as this intelligence was used at all, it was to avoid any action that might be seen as a provocation. German aircraft were allowed to fly reconnaissance missions deep into Soviet territory; German troops were allowed to violate Soviet borders in search of intelligence."
Reviewed by Daniel C. Holtrop, Indiana University: David M. Glantz. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War marraskuu 2000. H-Net. Arkistoitu 21.6.2006. Viitattu 8.4.2008. (englanniksi): "Glantz shows that the Soviets seemed to be caught with their pants down, all along the line...Many Soviet planes were destroyed on the ground, caught in a transition. These planes were parked in rows on temporary airfields while more fields were being built or expanded (p.188)."
Gerhard Rempel: The Purge Western New England College. Arkistoitu 7.9.2006. Viitattu 8.4.2008. (englanniksi)
